New York, Philadelphia & Norfolk Railroad v. Coulbourn

Alvey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the appellee against the appellant to recover for an injury sustained by the former, caused, as it is alleged, by the negligence of the latter. The accident occurred on the 11th of March, 1887, at Marion Station, on a branch road of the defendant. The plaintiff had been in the employ of the defendant, hut had left the service before the accident occurred.

The defendant was indebted to the plaintiff on account of service rendered, and when the defendant’s pay car came to the station to pay off employés, the plaintiff, in company with the station agent, entered the car to receive the amount due him; and immediately after the amount was paid him the car started, and while moving the plaintiff jumped off and ³⁶⁷ broke his leg. The testimony varies as to the length •of time the car stopped at the station; some of the witnesses say about two minutes, and others from two to four minutes. The plaintiff jumped from the car step, which is said by some of the witnesses to be about two and a half or three feet from the ground. When the plaintiff jumped off, the car had passed the end of a high platform, and was moving, according to the testimony of some of the witnesses, at the rate of about four and a half to five miles to the hour.

There was no question raised as to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to be submitted to the jury. The two questions submitted to the jury upon the evidence, by the instructions given, were, 1st, whether there was sufficient time allowed, or warning given of the starting of the car, to enable the plaintiff, by the use of reasonable care,' to get from the car in safety; and, 2d, whether he did exercise reasonable care in his attempt to get off the car, under the circumstances of the case ? The plaintiff entered the car for a lawful purpose, and was therefore rightfully in the car for such time as was reasonably sufficient to enable him to transact the business for which he entered it. The defendant, by its agents, and servants, was bound to afford reasonable time for the transaction of the business, before moving thp train, and was also bound to give proper warning of the purpose to'put the train in motion, to enable the plaintiff, by the xrse of reasonable care and diligence, to leave the car without risk of injury to himself in the act of getting off.

If the defendant was negligent in the observance of these reasonable and necessary precautions, and such negligence caused the injury to the plaintiff, then, unless it be shown that the plaintiff, by his own want of care, directly contributed to the production of the injury, the defendant became liable. ³⁶⁸ Doss vs. Mo., Kans. & Texas R. Co., 59 Mo., 27 . The question of the negligence of the defendant, and also that of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, appear to have been very distinctly and fairly put. to the jury in the first and third of the prayers of the plaintiff, and the third prayer of the defendant, granted by the Court, and by the substituted instruction of the Court, in