New York, Philadelphia & Norfolk Railroad v. Peninsula Produce Exchange

Urner, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellee delivered to the appellant railroad company a carload of strawberries for transportation from Marion, Maryland, to New York City over the lines of the defendant and connecting carriers. It is alleged in the declaration that the defendant, or companies operating the connecting lines, failed to forward the shipment with reasonable dispatch; that because of this delay the berries did not-reach their destination until after the close of the market for which they were intended and for which they would have arrived in time if due diligence had been observed in their transportation; and that they consequently sustained a large shrinkage and loss in value. The evidence shows that the strawberries were shipped from Marion on the afternoon of Thursday, May 26, 1910, and according to the usual operation of trains engaged in this class of service they should have been delivered in New York City the following night in advance of the early Saturday morning wholesale market, which opened about one o’clock A. M. The shipment reached its destination in good condition, but about six hours later than the customary time of arrival.

The wholesale market, for which the berries were shipped and in which they could have been sold to advantage, was then practically at an end and the price had fallen two or three cents per quart below that which might have been received if they had been forwarded with the usual dispatch. ²²¹ The berries had to be sold at these lower prices because of the delay in their delivery. The defendant was sued as the initial carrier under the Carmack Amendment of 1906 to the 'Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which provides in part: “That any common carrier, railroad or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass; and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed.” (34 Stat. at L. 584, Ch. 3591; U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288.) The first question raised by the exceptions in the record is whether the loss of value resulting from delay in transit for which the plaintiff seeks to recover is within the purview of the provisions quoted making the initial carrier liable “for any loss, damage or injury to such property.” It is argued on behalf of the defendant that according to the true interpretation of the statute the only cases for which it provides are those in which the commodities themselves become damaged or depleted in the course of the transportation, and that an impairment of value due to delay in delivery, while it occasions a loss to the owner, does not produce such loss, damage or injury to the property ai the act contemplates. The theory thus advanced does not appear to give due regard to the purpose of this important legislation and the considerations which prompted its passage.

In Adams Express Company v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 , it was said, in the opinion by Mr. Justice Ltjbtok, that prior to the Carmack Amendment “the rule of carriers’ liability for an interstate shipment of property, as enforced.in both Federal and State Courts, was either that of the general ²²² common law, as declared by this Court and enforced in tbe Federal Courts throughout the United States (Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331 ), or that determined by the supposed public policy of a particular State (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477 ), or that prescribed by statute law of a particular State (Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133 ). Neither uniformity of obligation nor of liability was possible until Congress should deal with the subject * * *. That the legislation supersedes all the regulations and policies of a particular State upon the same subject results from its general character. It embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier under a bill of lading which he must issue, and limits his power to exempt himself by rule, regulation or contract * * *.

The duty to issue a bill of lading, and the liability thereby assumed, are covered in full; and though there is no reference to the effect upon State regulation, it is evident that Congress intended to adopt a itniform rule and relieve such contracts from the diverse regulation to which they had been theretofore subject.” It was said in Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 203 , in reference to the effect of this statute: “The rule is adapted to secure the rights of the shipper by securing unity of transportation with unity of responsibility. The regulation is one which also facilitates the remedy of one who sustains a loss, by localizing the responsible carrier.” In B. C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Sperber, 117 Md. 602 , Chief Judge Boyd, in referring to some of the reasons for the enactment of this statute, said: “When goods were shipped at a great distance over connecting lines, the rule which requires a shipper sustaining loss to‘ prove on which line it occurred oftentimes resulted in great hardship; and sometimes in a failure to recover, simply becáuse the shipper could not produce evidence to show where the loss occurred. It may in' some instances be burdensome to the initial carrier to be held responsible for loss, damage or injury to the property caused by some other carrier, to whom it is delivered or over whose line it passes, but it cannot be denied that the initial carrier ²²³ can generally protect itself far better than a shipper can, and it might easily have happened under the former rule that a shipper would be prevented from collecting a just claim by reason of the great expense incurred, and inconvenience sustained in an effort to establish it in a distant Court.” T'he reason and policy of the act as thus indicated in the decisions cited are sufficiently broad to include the liability here sought to be charged. The remedies of shippers in respect to losses of value from delay in transportation were subject to the same diverities and inconveniences as were those relating to recovery for physical injury to the property accepted for carriage.

In each class of cases there was an apparent and equal need of uniformity and simplicity in the regulation and enforcement of the carrier’s liability. The duty to deliver without undue delay was just as obligatory at common law as the duty to deliver safely. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Whitehill, 104 Md. 310 . In P., B. & W. R. Co. v. Diffendal, 109 Md. 509 , this Court, speaking through Judge Wobthi:n'gtoe\ said that it became the implied duty of a defendant in accepting a carload of fruit for transportation “to use due diligence to deliver, the same at its destination within a reasonable time (Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 652). and for a breach of this duty resulting in a loss to the plaintiff, the defendant was responsible in damages whether the loss was occasioned by a fall in the market price, or by damage to the goods themselves, or by a combination of the two causes.” If the appellant’s construction of the statute were accepted, it would only partially accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted.

While undertaking to deal in a comprehensive way with the general subject of carrier liability under any bill of lading issued by it for an interstate shipment, the law would be confined in its practical operation to a portion only of the cases in which the property may be injuriously affected by the carrier’s failure to perform its common law duty. It is not to be supposed that Congress intended the terms of the statute to have such a restricted application. The initial carrier is made liable “for any loss, ²²⁴ damage or injury to such property caused by vt” or by any connecting carrier. Tbe primary object of tbe act was to provide a convenient remedy for any loss toi the commodity occasioned by any carrier in tbe course of tbe transportation, and not to define particular classes of damages to wbicb recovery should be limited.

It is with tbe right of tbe person sustaining tbe loss and not with any specific causes of injury to tbe property that tbe statute is concerned. If tbe goods received for shipment in fact suffer loss, damage or injury in course of transit, through any failure of carrier duty, the statutory liability attaches without regard to tbe precise nature of tbe effect thus produced. Tbe act does not suggest any discrimination in favor of losses due to mere physical deterioration of tbe commodity transported. It permits recovery for any loss to tbe property caused by tbe carrier, and it affords no support for a construction wbicb would confine its remedy to losses of quantity or quality as distinguished from losses of value.

In the opinion, to wbicb we have already referred, in tbe case of Adams Express Co. v. Croninger it was said that “the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce among tbe States and with foreign nations comprehends power to regulate contracts between the shipper and tbe carrier of an interstate shipment by defining tbe liability of tbe carrier for loss, delay, injury or damage to such property.” Ttwas suggested in tbe argument of tbe case at bar that tbe use of tbe word “delay” in tbe sentence just quoted indicates that tbe Supreme Court regarded that cause of loss as a separate and distinct ground of liability, and that as it isi not specifically mentioned in tbe Carmack Amendment it should be held to be excluded from the remedy therein provided. Tbe quotations previously made from tbe opinion in tbe case cited show that tbe Supreme Court was proceeding upon tbe theory that tbe act under consideration was intended to apply generally to the subject of carrier liability, and tbe use of tbe term “delay” in that connection is a clear indication that tbe Court understood this legislation to cover cases in wbicb loss to ²²⁵ property received for carriage resulted from that cause. There are many instances in which physical deterioration of goods, as well as loss of value, results from delay in transportation, and it was evidently not the intention of Congress to place such cases beyond the scope and effect of the statute. The case of the Gulf, C. and S. By.

Co. v. Nelson (Tex.), 139 S. W. 81 , was cited in support of the contrary view. In that case a shipment of machinery and equipment intended for construction work was delayed in transit and was delivered too late to be used profitably for that purpose. The carriers engaged in the transportation were sued jointly upon their common law liability for the loss sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of the delay. They made the contention that the only remedy available to the plaintiff was the one provided by the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act.

In disposing of this objection the Court said that the act did not in its opinion “apply where the damage claimed is not in reference to the property itself which is the subject of the transportation.” As the property shipped in that case was not affected in its condition or value, it was held that the suit was properly based on the common law