Newcomer v. Beeler

Urner, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. It is provided by section 114 of Article 93 of the Code of Public General Laws that “In paying the debts of a decedent an administrator shall observe the following rules: All taxes due and in arrear from the decedent shall be preferred to the exclusion of all other debts, and claims for rent in arrear against deceased persons, for which a distress might be levied by law, shall next have preference. Judgments and decrees shall next be wholly discharged. After such claim for taxes and rent, and judgments and decrees shall be satisfied, all other just claims shall be on equal footing'without priority or preference.

If there be not sufficient to discharge all such judgments and decrees, a proportionate dividend shall be made between the judgment and decree creditors.” ' The single question to be decided on this appeal is whether a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace of this State is entitled to the priority over general claims which is provided by the clause we have italicized in the section, just quoted. This question was raised by exceptions filed to the ratification of an administration account in the Orphans’ Court of Washington County upon the ground that it treated as a common debt the magistrate’s judgment probated by the exceptant and passed for payment. The appeal is from an order of the Oourt below overruling the exceptions and ratifying the account. The appellees refer to the provision of section 83 of Article 93 of the Code to the effect, in part, that “The voucher or proof of a judgment or decree shall be a short copy thereof-under seal, attested by the clerk of the Court where it was obtained, who shall certify that there is no entry or proceeding in the Court to show that the said judgment or decree hath been satisfied.” It is urged that this indicates an ⁶⁴⁹ intention on the part of the Legislature that only such judgments as are rendered by a Court of record shall enjoy a preference over ordinary debts in settlement of the estate of decedents.

The Code provisions we have quoted had their origin in Chapter 101 of the Acts of 1798. By that statute judgments and decrees against the decedent were the only liabilities of his estate which were given priority. Rents in arrear were preferred by the Acts of 1836, Chapter 192, and' taxes by the Acts of 1843, Chapter 208. At the time of the passage of the Act of 1798 the pre-existing laws of the State had defined the jurisdiction of justices of the peace with respect to the rendition of judgments for the recovery of small debts.

It was provided by the Acts of 1791, Chapter 68, that “in all cases where the general debt and damage doth not exceed ten pounds current money, or one thousand pounds of tobacco, it shall and may be lawful for any one justice of the peace of each respective county where the debtor doth reside, to try and determine the matter in controversy between the creditor and debtor, and upon full bearing of the allegations and evidences of both parties to give judgment according to the laws of the land and the equity and right of the matter.” The act further provided that the justices of the several comity Courts should “not hold plea in said Court of any debt or damages in cases within the jurisdiction given the justices of the peace out of Court by this act, which shall not exceed ten pounds current money, or one thousand pounds of tobacco, any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.” It is' thus apparent that from the inception of the legislation giving a preference to “judgments and decrees” in the administration of decedents’ estates the law has made provision for the recovery of judgments before justices of the