Newsom v. Brock & Scott, PLLC

23Mary T. Newsom v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, et al., No. 532, Sept. Term 2019. Opinion by Meredith, J. CONSUMER PROTECTION – MARYLAND CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION ACT. The Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (the “MCDCA”), Maryland Code (2013 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.), Commercial Law Article (“CL”), provides in § 14-202(8): “In collecting or attempting to collect on an alleged debt a collector may not: … [c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist.” The Court of Appeals has rejected the distinction that some courts have drawn between “methods” of debt collection and “amounts” of debts sought to be collected when assessing a claim under CL § 14-202(8).

A plaintiff is not precluded from invoking CL § 14-202(8) when the amount claimed by the debt collector includes sums as to which the debt collector had knowledge there was not a right to collect. CONSUMER PROTECTION – MCDCA, CL § 14-202(8) – “WITH KNOWLEDGE” ELEMENT. In order to prevail under CL § 14-202(8), a plaintiff must show that a debt collector acted with knowledge that the right to collect does not exist. This element may be proved by evidence that shows either actual knowledge or reckless disregard as to the error in claiming a right to collect the amount.

Although CL § 14- 202(8) does not impose strict liability on a debt collector for a mistake of law, neither does a debt collector escape liability under CL § 14-202(8) whenever, in the absence of controlling authority, the collector makes a mistake of law. And, in a case where the law is settled at the time a collector takes a contrary position in claiming a right, the collector’s recklessness in failing to discover the contrary authority is equivalent to actual knowledge of that legal authority. A debt collector’s state of knowledge in claiming, attempting, or threatening to enforce a claimed debt is a question of fact. REAL PROPERTY – TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES – ATTEMPT OF ONE SPOUSE TO CREATE A LIEN OR ENCUMBRANCE UPON PROPERTY HELD AS TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETIES.

In Maryland, when a married couple holds title to real estate as tenants by the entireties, neither spouse acting alone and without the authorization of the other spouse can convey any interest in the property or create a valid encumbrance upon the property. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CAE17-20035 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 532 September Term, 2019 MARY T. NEWSOM v. BROCK & SCOTT, PLLC, ET AL. Meredith,* Graeff, Eyler, James R. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Meredith, J. Filed: November 24, 2021 *Meredith, Timothy E.,J., now retired, participated in the hearing of this case while an active member of this Court, and after being Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Section 3A, he also participated in the decision 2022-06-15 15:35-04:00 and the preparation of this opinion. Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This case arose from efforts by Capital One to collect a debt by initiating foreclosure proceedings against real estate owned by Mary T. Newsom, appellant. Mrs. Newsom and her husband had held title to the property jointly as tenants by the entireties from 1979 through the time of Mr. Newsom’s death in 2015.

According to Mrs. Newsom, prior to her husband’s death, her husband had, without her knowledge, apparently borrowed money from Capital One. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note signed by the husband alone. But the husband also signed a deed of trust (the “Deed of Trust”) that purported to create a lien upon the residence that had been owned by the married couple as tenants by the entireties. The Deed of Trust also bore the purported signature of Mary Newsom, but she steadfastly denied signing or having any knowledge about the loan or the signing of the Deed of Trust.

After the husband died and payments on the loan ceased, Capital One sent letters—addressed first to the husband, and later to Mrs. Newsom—demanding payment and threatening that the house would be sold at a foreclosure sale if the loan was not brought current. Mrs. Newsom notified Capital One that her husband had died, and that she had no knowledge about her husband’s loan. She explained that she never executed either a promissory note or Deed of Trust in connection with the loan. Capital One nevertheless continued to treat the debt as collectible, and engaged the law firm of Brock & Scott, PLLC (hereafter sometimes referred to as “Brock & Scott” or “B&S”)—one of the appellees—to pursue collection.

B&S assigned several of its attorneys, including Christine Johnson (the second appellee), to serve as substitute trustees under the Deed of Trust and proceed with foreclosure upon the property owned by Mrs. Newsom by virtue of being the surviving tenant by the entireties. Mrs. Newsom’s attorney sent Brock & Scott copies of letters that had been sent to Capital One denying knowledge of the loan and the Deed of Trust. Nevertheless, B&S sent Mrs. Newsom notice of its intent to foreclose upon her home, and Ms. Johnson and other B&S attorneys initiated a foreclosure action by filing an order to docket suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Mrs. Newsom, through counsel, filed a motion pursuant to Maryland Rule 14-211 to dismiss the foreclosure action.

She also filed a separate suit (which is the subject of this appeal) against Capital One and Brock & Scott, alleging violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (“MCDCA”), Maryland Code, Commercial Law Article (“CL”), §§ 14-201 et seq.; and the Maryland Mortgage Fraud Protection Act, Maryland Code, Real Property Article (“RP”), §§ 7-401 et seq. Capital One eventually entered into a settlement with Mrs. Newsom that terminated the foreclosure proceeding and resulted in Capital One being dismissed as a defendant in this case. In an amended complaint that omitted Capital One and added Christine Johnson as a defendant, Mrs. Newsom alleged that Brock & Scott and Christine Johnson had violated the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (Count I) and the Maryland Mortgage Fraud Protection Act (Count II), and had committed the tort of malicious use of process (Count IV). The amended complaint also alleged that Brock & Scott had committed the tort of injurious falsehood (Count III).

A jury trial proceeded on those claims, and, at the close of Mrs. Newsom’s case-in-chief, the appellees moved for 2 judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-519. The trial court granted the appellees’ motion for judgment as to all counts. This timely appeal followed. QUESTIONS PRESENTED The questions presented by Mrs. Newsom, which we have reordered and rephrased, are the following:1 1.

Did the circuit court err in denying Mrs. Newsom’s pretrial motion for partial summary judgment? 2. Did the trial court err in granting the appellees’ motion for judgment on the counts alleging violations of (1) the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act, and (2) the Maryland Mortgage Fraud Protection Act?2 3. Did the trial court err in excluding certain evidence from being introduced in Mrs. Newsom’s case-in-chief? 4. Did the trial court err in denying Mrs. Newsom’s motion for recusal of the trial judge?

For the reasons explained herein, we will vacate the judgment of the circuit court granting the appellees’ motion for judgment on Count I (alleging violation of the 1 The questions as presented by Mrs. Newsom in her brief are as follows: 1. Did the Circuit Court err in denying Newsom’s summary judgment motion? 2. Did the Circuit Court err by excluding certain evidence which was relevant and material to the Parties’ claims and defenses? 3. Did the Circuit Court err by granting Substitute Trustees’ Motion for Judgment? 4.

Do the irregular and improper proceedings below give the objective appearance to a reasonable member of the public that Newsom was denied her right to a fair and impartial day in court? 2 In this appeal, Mrs. Newsom raises no issue with respect to the trial court’s grant of appellees’ motion for judgment relative to the counts asserting the common law torts of injurious falsehood and malicious use of process. 3 Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act) and Count II (alleging violation of the Maryland Mortgage Fraud Protection Act), but we will affirm the unchallenged judgment in favor of the appellees with respect to Counts III and IV. We will remand the case for a new trial on Counts I and II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The evidence, considered in the light most favorable to Mrs. Newsom, included the following facts. In 1979, Mrs. Newsom and her husband, Leslie “Boh” Newsom, received, as a wedding gift from Mr. Newsom’s aunt, a parcel of unimproved real property located at 13010 Old Fletchertown Road in Bowie, Maryland (“the Property”).

Several years later, they developed plans for a residence they constructed upon the Property. They moved into that home in 1987, and lived together in that home until Mr. Newsom died in 2015. The Newsoms held title to the Property as tenants by the entireties. Mrs. Newsom still resided in the home at the time of the trial in this case.

After Mr. Newsom died intestate on May 24, 2015, Mrs. Newsom opened an estate and was appointed personal representative. Based upon information she received from a staff person at the office of the register of wills, Mrs. Newsom notified all known creditors of Mr. Newsom’s passing as well as the opening and administration of his estate. She also published a notice to creditors. After her husband’s death, Mrs. Newsom began to receive correspondence from Capital One about a line of credit her husband had obtained from Capital One in 2011.

Because the Newsoms had customarily kept their business affairs separate, Mrs. Newsom 4 was surprised to learn that her husband was indebted to Capital One. By letter dated October 22, 2015, Mrs. Newsom notified Capital One of her husband’s death and further advised the creditor: I have reported Mr. Newsom’s demise to local bank representatives (along with documentation that I am providing with this letter). Still, several pieces of correspondence from your bank were sent to his attention following his death. I am responding [to] the most recent of those items; Home Equity Line of Credit Statement.

As the Estate Administrator (document enclosed), I inform you that Mr. Newsom’s estate is insolvent. Only the estate of the deceased is liable for the debt owed and family members are not personally responsible for payment of this debt. If there is any other information that you feel is relevant to this account, please provide written documentation for legal consideration. According to Mrs. Newsom, on February 23, 2016, Alice G. Pinderhughes (Mrs. Newsom’s attorney at the time) notified Capital One in writing that “Mrs. Newsom never executed a Promissory Note and/or deed of trust for the [Property],” and “Mrs. Newsom has no knowledge of this debt.” Ms. Pinderhughes requested that all correspondence to Mrs. Newsom concerning this matter cease immediately, but if there were any questions, “please do not hesitate to contact me.” Neither Ms. Pinderhughes nor Mrs. Newsom received a response to the letter of February 23, 2016.

On March 31, 2016, Mrs. Newsom received correspondence from Capital One’s Loss Mitigation Department, addressed to the Estate of Leslie B. Newsom, stating that the loan had been “referred to an attorney with instructions to begin foreclosure proceedings,” and any questions could be directed to Brock & Scott, appellee. 5 On April 27, 2016, Ms. Pinderhughes sent another letter to Capital One via fax, with a copy to Brock & Scott, again reiterating that “Mrs. Newsom never executed a Promissory Note and/or deed of trust for the [Property],” and “has no knowledge of this debt.” The letter restated that Mr. Newsom had died, and the property had been titled to both of them. Ms. Pinderhughes faxed a copy of her April 27 letter to Brock & Scott. Mrs. Newsom did not receive a response from Brock & Scott—either directly or through Ms. Pinderhughes—to Ms. Pinderhughes’s April 27 letter. On May 17, 2016, Brock & Scott sent a letter addressed to The Estate of Leslie B. Newsom at the Property address, stating: “The above referenced loan has been placed with Brock & Scott, PLLC (‘B&S’) for foreclosure.” The letter asserted that Capital One, N.A. was owed $52,501.06.

Among other statements, the letter included an advisement stating: “THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT, AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.” (Capitalization and boldface in original.) When Mrs. Newsom read the letter, she understood it to mean “that Capital One was escalating their efforts to take my house.” Capital One sent a “Notice of Intent to Foreclose,” dated August 18, 2016, to Mrs. Newsom. Among other statements, the notice stated: “You are at risk of losing your home to foreclosure. You have missed one or more payments on your mortgage loan or you are otherwise in default.” (Boldface in original.) The notice further stated that the names of the “Borrower(s)” were “LESLIE NEWSOM [and] MARY NEWSOM,” and the name of the Mortgage Lender was: “Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B.” The Notice of Intent to Foreclose stated that the date of default was November 11, 2015. 6 Mrs. Newsom felt sick after receiving the notice of intent to foreclose. She explained: “I’m 70 and I was losing everything.

And there would be no way of making it up again.” She hired another attorney to represent her in the foreclosure action. At some point, she learned more about the source of Capital One’s claim that there was a mortgage on her home. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to her, it appears that, on October 25, 2011, Mr. Newsom had agreed, without her knowledge, to accept a home equity line of credit in the amount of $50,000.00 from Capital One, National Association (“Capital One”). As part of the loan documentation for that transaction, Mr. Newsom alone had signed a promissory note.

Mr. Newsom had also signed a Deed of Trust that purported to grant Capital One a security interest in the Property as collateral for the $50,000 line of credit. Although the Deed of Trust also bears a signature above the signature line for Mary T. Newsom, Mrs. Newsom was adamant that she did not know about the loan, did not attend any loan closing, and did not sign the Deed of Trust. As of the time Mr. Newsom died in 2015, the Deed of Trust had not been recorded among the Land of Records of Prince George’s County. Nor was the Deed of Trust recorded within six months after Mr. Newsom’s death.

Even when Brock & Scott sent the notice of intent to foreclose in August 2016, the Deed of Trust remained unrecorded. The Deed of Trust dated October 25, 2011, was recorded by Brock & Scott in 2017. When Brock & Scott first attempted to record the instrument, it was returned to them “from the land records in Prince George’s County advising that a lender’s 7 certification was missing.” “There was a missing affidavit from the lender.” The Deed of Trust was finally recorded by Brock & Scott on February 25, 2017. At the trial of this case, when Mrs. Newsom was shown the Deed of Trust that purported to bear her signature, she steadfastly denied she had signed that document.

The following colloquy during her direct examination appears in the record: Q. [BY COUNSEL FOR MRS. NEWSOM] . . . So there’s a signature above the printed name, Mary T. Newsom. A. [BY MRS.

NEWSOM] Yes. *** Q. And did you sign this document? A. No. Q. Did you appear before [the notarial witness] Linda Wagstaff on . . . October 25, 2011? A. No, I have never used Linda Wagstaff for a notary.

Q. Did you ever authorize anyone to sign your name on this deed of trust? A. No. *** Q. Ms. Newsom, since we broke your testimony overnight, I just wanted to go back one final time to make sure. On Exhibit 7, the deed of trust . . . *** Is that your signature? A. No. *** 8 Q. When I asked you if that was your signature earlier, do you have any doubts in that answer?

A. No. On cross-examination, Mrs. Newsom reiterated that she did not sign the Deed of Trust dated October 25, 2011: Q. [BY COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES] Now, ma’am, I’m going to show you a series of documents that bear a date of October 25, 2011. . . . And would you look at the signatures there and tell me, ma’am, whether or not these signatures in October of 2011 are your signatures and the signatures of your husband. A. [BY MRS. NEWSOM] It appears to be, but I was not present for any loan in 2011.

I was not present at any time in 2011. Q. So the signature that appears for Mary Newsom, you say that’s not your signature? A. I’m saying it looks like my signature, but I was not there to sign. *** Q. But your testimony is that . . . despite the fact it looks like your signature, is not your signature, right? A. Right. *** Q. . . .

We are not going to belabor this any further, but . . . the deed of trust, that’s not your signature, right? A. Right. On April 13, 2017, Capital One executed a “Deed of Appointment of Substitute Trustee,” appointing appellee Christine Johnson, and six other B&S attorneys (Thomas W. Hodge, Gene Jung, Laura D. Harris, Robert M. Oliveri, Scott Robinson and Louis 9 Gingher) to serve as substitute trustees. The deed of appointment was recorded in the Prince George’s County Land Records.

On May 5, 2017, the appellees initiated an action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to conduct a foreclosure sale of the Property by filing an order to docket, which was assigned case number CAEF17-11086. The required affidavit of default and mailing of a notice of intent to foreclose that was filed in support of the order to docket stated that a default under the Deed of Trust “occurred on November 11, 2015, when borrower(s), Leslie B. Newsom and Mary T. Newsom, failed to make the installment payment due on November 10, 2015.” The affidavit also stated that the required Notice of Intent to Foreclose was the one sent on August 18, 2016, and that “the contents of the Notice were accurate at the time it was sent.” The required affidavit of indebtedness asserted that Capital One “has the right to foreclose against the property subject to the Deed of Trust.” On June 5, 2017, Mrs. Newsom, through counsel, filed a motion pursuant to Rule 14-211 to dismiss the foreclosure action, and requested a hearing. In her Rule 14-211 motion, she argued, among other things, that Capital One had no legal interest in the Property because what appears to be Mrs. Newsom’s signature on the Deed of Trust was forged, and one spouse, acting alone, cannot legally encumber property that is held as tenants by the entireties. The motion asserted that the appellees “may not knowingly continue this action based upon a void deed of trust which never legally attached to the subject property because it (i) was not signed by all parties of the marriage, (ii) contains a forged signature, and (iii) is otherwise unenforceable under Maryland law.” Although the 10 circuit court initially denied the Rule 14-211 motion without a hearing, Mrs. Newsom, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration, citing Mitchell v. Yacko, 232 Md. App. 624 (2017) (“Yacko I”), for the proposition that forgery was a defense.

The court granted Mrs. Newsom’s motion for reconsideration on September 26, 2017, and, although the court denied Mrs. Newsom’s request to consolidate the foreclosure action with her suit for damages, the court stayed the foreclosure action. On August 11, 2017, Mrs. Newsom, through counsel, had filed a separate suit against Capital One and Brock & Scott. The lawsuit for damages was docketed as case number CAE17-20035 (the action that is the subject of this appeal). In her amended complaint, Mrs. Newsom claimed that the appellees B&S and Johnson “knowingly maintained . . . a right to foreclose on the Property with knowledge that no such right existed.” In Count I of her amended complaint, Mrs. Newsom alleged that the appellees violated the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (“MCDCA”), codified at Maryland Code (1975, 2013 Repl.

Vol.), Commercial Law Article (“CL”), §§ 14-201, et seq. In particular, she asserted that appellees violated CL §§ 14-202(8)-(9) of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act, which provide: In collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt a collector may not: *** (8) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist; [or] (9) Use a communication which simulates legal or judicial process or gives the appearance of being authorized, issued, or approved by a government, governmental agency, or lawyer when it is not; . . . . 11 The suit claimed money damages, which are authorized in CL § 14-203 as follows: A collector who violates any provision of this subtitle is liable for any damages proximately caused by the violation, including damages for emotional distress or mental anguish suffered with or without accompanying physical injury.3 In Count II, Mrs. Newsom asserted that appellees violated the Maryland Mortgage Fraud Protection Act (“MMFPA”), codified at Maryland Code (1974, 2015 Repl. Vol.), Real Property Article (“RP”), §§ 7-401, et seq. She alleged that appellees violated RP §§ 7-401(d)(1)-(4), which provide: (d) “Mortgage fraud” means any action by a person made with the intent to defraud that involves: (1) Knowingly making any deliberate misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission during the mortgage lending process with the intent that the misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission be relied on by a mortgage lender, borrower, or any other party to the mortgage lending process; (2) Knowingly creating or producing a document for use during the mortgage lending process that contains a deliberate misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission with the intent that the document containing the misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission be relied on by a mortgage lender, borrower, or any other party to the mortgage lending process; (3) Knowingly using or facilitating the use of any deliberate misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission during the mortgage lending process with the intent that the misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission be relied on by a mortgage lender, borrower, or any other party to the mortgage lending process; 3 In LVNV Funding LLC v. Finch, 463 Md. 586, 612 (2019), the Court of Appeals, after quoting CL § 14-203, observed: “It is hard to imagine . . . a clearer expression of an intent to provide a private remedy for the violation of [MCDCA based upon a violation] of MCALA – a remedy that permits recovery of ‘any damages,’ including for emotional distress.” 12 (4) Receiving any proceeds or any other funds in connection with a mortgage closing that the person knows resulted from a violation of item (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection; . . . .

(Emphasis added.) In Counts III and IV, Mrs. Newsom also asserted claims of injurious falsehood and malicious use of process. But, as noted above, in this appeal, Mrs. Newsom raises no issue with respect to the trial court’s grant of appellees’ motion for judgment with respect to Counts III and IV. (In her Reply Brief, she stated: “Newsom did not challenge the lower court’s rulings on those claims in her opening brief and they are therefore not before the Court.”) During August 2017, Brock & Scott sent several more letters to Mrs. Newsom regarding its effort to collect the monies it claimed were due Capital One relative to the Deed of Trust that Mrs. Newsom had told them she did not sign. The letters were dated August 7, 2017; August 9, 2017; and August 30, 2017.

Each of the letters indicated at the top that the “Mortgagor(s)” were “Leslie B. Newsom and Mary T. Newsom.” Each of the letters began with this statement: “The above-referenced account has been placed with Brock & Scott, PLLC (‘B&S’) for foreclosure.” And, although the opening paragraph of the letters claimed that “[t]his letter is not a demand for payment or money from you, and should not be interpreted or construed as demand for payment or money from you by B&S,” the letters also stated in bold-face all caps: “THIS COMMUNICATION IS FROM A DEBT COLLECTOR. THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT, AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.” 13 On September 10, 2018, Capital One and Mrs. Newsom entered into a “Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims.” As provided for in the agreement, the trial court ordered that the agreement be reviewed at the trial of this case, and was aware that Capital One had agreed to dismiss the foreclosure case with prejudice, to release the note and Deed of Trust, and to pay Mrs. Newsom a sum of money in exchange for her releasing Capital One from liability in this case. The settlement agreement between Mrs. Newsom and Capital One also stated that Mrs. Newsom’s claims against the appellees were not released, settled, or compromised. On September 20, 2018, at the request of Capital One, the appellees filed in the foreclosure action a “Motion to Dismiss Case with Prejudice pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-506(c).” On September 21, 2018, the circuit court entered the foreclosure action as “Dismissed[.]” At the trial in this case, Mrs. Newsom observed that, by the time the voluntary dismissal was filed, the action that Brock & Scott had filed seeking to foreclose upon her home had been pending for “[a]lmost 500 days.” Additional facts will be supplied in the following discussion of issues.

DISCUSSION I. Mrs. Newsom’s motion for partial summary judgment Prior to trial, Mrs. Newsom moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that, based upon undisputed facts, she was entitled to the entry of a judgment as to liability on her claim in Count I pursuant to the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act. Mrs. Newsom supported her motion for partial summary judgment with numerous exhibits. She asserted that it was beyond dispute that the appellees were “debt collectors” subject 14 to MCDCA, and that they had initiated the foreclosure action at a time when they “knew that the debt . . . which they sought to collect was barred from collection by Est. & Trusts § 8-103(a) since the purported debt was (i) unsecured at the time of Mr. Newsom’s death . . . and (ii) Capital One never filed any timely claim with the Estate of Leslie Newsom . . . .” 4 The appellees filed an opposing response, arguing that Mrs. Newsom failed to establish that the appellees “acted with knowledge as to the invalidity of the debt.” They also argued that Mrs. Newsom failed to prove either that her apparent signature on the Deed of Trust was forged or that the appellees knew or should have known of the forgery. Regarding the failure of Capital One to formally assert a claim against the estate of Mr. Newsom, the appellees argued that, as a secured creditor, Capital One was not required to file a claim against the estate.

The appellees also attached numerous exhibits to their reply. 4 Section 8-103(a) of Maryland Code (1974, 2017 Repl. Vol.), Estates and Trusts Article (“ET”), provides: (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute with respect to claims of the United States or the State, a claim against an estate of a decedent, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, is forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and legatees, unless presented within the earlier of the following dates: (1) 6 months after the date of the decedent’s death; or (2) 2 months after the personal representative mails or otherwise delivers to the creditor a copy of a notice in the form required by § 7- 103 of this article or other written notice, notifying the creditor that the claim will be barred unless the creditor presents the claim within 2 months after the mailing or other delivery of the notice. 15 On December 21, 2018, the circuit court heard oral argument on open motions, including Mrs. Newsom’s motion for partial summary judgment. At oral argument, Mrs. Newsom conceded that the question of whether the signature appearing on the Deed of Trust was “forged” was “a fact issue for the jury.” The circuit court took the motion under advisement. On December 27, 2018, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion; it did not provide any oral or written opinion setting forth the rationale for denying the motion.

Mrs. Newsom contends that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for partial summary judgment because the evidence is clear that neither Capital One nor the appellees filed a claim in Mr. Newsom’s estate pursuant to ET § 8-103(a), and the appellees nevertheless commenced an action to foreclose on the Property by filing an order to docket suit. The appellees argue that the circuit court was legally correct in denying Mrs. Newsom’s motion because “Capital One had the right to enforce its security interest” under the Deed of Trust, and did not need to file a claim with the estate because ET § 8- 103(d) exempts mortgages from the requirement of filing all creditors’ claims against an estate within six months after the death of the decedent.5 They also argue that, “it has 5 ET § 8-103(d) provides: Enforcement of mortgages, pledges, judgments, or other liens (d) Nothing in this section shall affect or prevent an action or proceeding to enforce a mortgage, pledge, judgment or other lien, or security interest on property of the estate. 16 never been proven that Mary T. Newsom’s signatures and initials on the October 25, 2011 Deed of Trust and accompanying Finance Affidavit were forged.” Maryland Rule 2-501(f) provides: “The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In general, the appellate courts review a circuit court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment—in contrast to the grant of a motion for summary judgment—for abuse of discretion. In Housing Authority of Baltimore City v. Woodland, 438 Md. 415 (2014), the Court of Appeals explained that, when “presented with a pretrial motion for summary judgment, a court has discretion to ‘affirmatively . . . deny . . . a summary judgment request in favor of a full hearing on the merits; and this discretion exists even though the technical requirements for the entry of such a judgment have been met.’” Id. at 426 (quoting Metropolitan Mortg. Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 28 (1980)).

Accord Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 165 (2006) (Stating that, ordinarily, “ʻIt is not reversible error for [the motion judge] to deny the motion and require a trial.’” (quoting Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 316 Md. 418, 424 (1989)). This case is not one of the exceptions to the normal rule that permits a judge hearing a motion for summary judgment to deny the motion even though the technical requirements for the entry of such a judgment have been met. At the hearing on the motion for partial summary judgment, the motion judge expressed concern that there were genuine disputes of material facts.

With respect to the validity of the Deed of Trust 17 that was allegedly not signed by Mrs. Newsom, counsel for Mrs. Newsom told the court that whether the Deed of Trust was forged was a “fact issue for the jury.” Counsel for Mrs. Newsom stated: [COUNSEL FOR MRS. NEWSOM]: Now, in our summary judgment motion we filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Not on all claims. We did not file a cross motion for forgery. . . .

We didn’t ask for the Court to rule that something is forged . . . . There’s a basic, simple reason for that, Your Honor. That’s a fact issue for the jury. You can’t make that ruling.

We can’t prove that at a summary judgment stage or they can’t prove it at a motion to dismiss. All we can do is put them on notice of the issue. Similarly, the circuit court and counsel for appellees had the following exchange: [COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: The entire claim is - - the alleged forgery of [Mrs. Newsom’s] name is the critical fact that underlies this whole case. If there is no forgery, then everything is proper.

THE COURT: Isn’t that a factual question that a jury would have to decide? [COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: If it got to that point. But my point is for purposes of - - THE COURT: But I think that’s what [counsel for Mrs. Newsom] was saying. If I’m not mistaken, I believe that plaintiff’s counsel was indicating that that’s a factual issue that the Court can’t rule upon in these motions. He wasn’t saying that it doesn’t matter whether or not there was a forgery. [COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: Okay.

Well, viewing it through that analysis, then, it still doesn’t give rise to any allegations of wrongdoing by my clients . . . . Although counsel for Mrs. Newsom contends her statute of limitations argument relative to claims against an estate provided the motion court an independent basis to find the Deed of Trust unenforceable as a matter of law, the appellees contend that ET § 8- 103(d) provided an arguable exception to the time limit for claims against an estate 18 imposed in ET § 8-103(a). And the resolution of that dispute turns upon the validity of the Deed of Trust, which turns upon the question of whether that document was signed by Mrs. Newsom, which is a question of fact. Consequently, at the time of the hearing on Mrs. Newsom’s pretrial motion for summary judgment, there was sufficient uncertainty regarding the facts in this case that it was not an abuse of discretion for the motion judge to deny the motion.

II

Appellees’ motion for judgment on Counts I and II Mrs. Newsom contends that the trial court erred in granting the appellees’ motion for judgment with respect to Counts I and II at the close of the plaintiff’s case. The following excerpts from the court’s oral ruling summarize the trial court’s explanation for granting the appellees’ motion on those counts: [THE COURT]: So the first allegations the Court really looked at was the allegation that the deed of trust is a forgery. And in examining that – and the Court will just say initially that it believes plaintiff has been very blunt on this, and appropriately so, that they have been unable to really prove how the forgery came about, who forged it for what purposes . . . . So the Court does understand that plaintiff’s counsel has largely conceded the inability to prove . . . who . . . forged it and for what purpose. *** [T]here is no factual dispute that Brock & Scott was in any way involved in the creation of the deed of trust . . . .

So from that end, there’s simply no factual matter that can be put before this jury that Brock & Scott . . . [and] defendant Christine Johnson can in any way be held liable or otherwise responsible for the forgery of the document [i.e., the Deed of Trust]. *** The Court, however, goes back to the fact that all of those documents . . . were prepared by Capital One. So the question becomes, how is Brock & Scott, as the substitute trustee, vicariously liable as the 19 agent to Capital One? . . . [V]icarious liability flows up. It flows up from the agent to the principal. It does not flow down from the principal to the agent.

There is no standard of care presented for the substitute trustee in this case. There is no standard of care presented for attorneys when filing foreclosure actions. . . . But quite frankly, the Court is not convinced that the substitute trustee bears a specific standard of care to investigate behind the beneficiary of the deed of trust. It takes its directions from the beneficiary and acts accordingly. *** [A]t no point is there any evidence that [Mrs. Newsom], in fact, was deceived by [communications from Brock & Scott] or that she, in fact, thought that she owed any of these sums, because consistently throughout [Mrs. Newsom] took the stand that she personally was not liable on either the deed of trust or certainly not on any revolving line of credit. *** But again, . . . even if there were misstatements on the foreclosure documents, those are laid at the feet of Capital One. . . .

Capital One is a released party . . . and we are trying to now extend liability beyond Capital One to Brock & Scott. *** [T]here is no evidence that Brock & Scott played any role in the deed of trust, that it did not create the deed of trust, it was not present when the deed of trust was signed, it did not - - none of the affiants on the deed of trust are any of Brock & Scott’s employees. There’s simply no evidence of that in the record at all. *** [T]he Pagenhardt versus Walsh case[, 250 Md. 333, 335-38 (1968),] does talk about equitable mortgages and how if an affidavit for consideration is in some way defective, that it makes the mortgage voidable as opposed to void. But it also creates an equitable mortgage between the grantor and the grantees or the mortgagees. 20 *** [I]n light of the Blackstone ruling [Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87 (2018)], the Court does not find that CJP 5-1201, et cetera, is applicable to foreclosure cases. So having run through all that, the Court believes that it has covered every basis of liability that [Mrs. Newsom] could conceivably assert either under the Maryland [Consumer] Debt Collection Act or the Maryland Mortgage Fraud Protection Act, and as such, there are insufficient facts, even in a light viewed most favorably to [Mrs. Newsom], to allow this case to proceed to the jury.

Mrs. Newsom argues that the trial court’s rulings with respect to Counts I and II were legally incorrect for a number of reasons. First, Mrs. Newsom argues the “trial court improperly added the element of a ‘breach of standard of care’ . . . under the MCDCA[.]” Second, Mrs. Newsom asserts that the trial court “erroneously held that [she] had the burden to prove the Appellees were involved in the forgery of her purported signature in order to advance that theory of her MCDCA and MMFPA claims.” Third, Mrs. Newsom argues that the trial court erred in concluding that “the evidence showed that an equitable mortgage existed and was secured by the unrecorded DOT.” Fourth, Mrs. Newsom asserts: “There was no legal basis for the Circuit Court to enter judgment on the legal conclusion that other legal theories supporting her actual well pled claims under the MCDCA and MMFPA, were not identified in Newsom’s Amended Complaint.” Fifth, Mrs. Newsom argues that the trial court erred in faulting other judges for not addressing more disputes in the foreclosure action. The appellees contend that the trial court did not err in entering judgment in their favor. 21 A. Standard of Review “We review, without deference, the trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment in a civil case. We conduct the same analysis that a trial court should make when considering the motion for judgment.” District of Columbia v. Singleton, 425 Md. 398, 406-07 (2012) (internal citations and footnote omitted). “In deciding a motion for judgment in a jury trial, the trial court must ‘consider all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.’” Elste v. ISG Sparrows Point, LLC, 188 Md. App. 634, 647 (2009) (quoting Maryland Rule 2-519(b)).

As we stated in Marrick Homes LLC v. Rutkowski, 232 Md. App. 689 (2017), the appellate court “ʻassumes the truth of all credible evidence on the issue and any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to appellants, the nonmoving parties.’” Id. at 697-98 (quoting Lowery v. Smithsburg Emergency Med. Serv., 173 Md. App. 662, 683 (2007)). “ʻConsequently, if there is any evidence, no matter how slight, that is legally sufficient to generate a jury question, the case must be submitted to the jury for its consideration.’” Id. at 698 (quoting Tate v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s County, 155 Md. App. 536, 545 (2004)). We agree with Mrs. Newsom that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment as to Count I, which asserted a claim pursuant to the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act, as well as Count II, which asserted a claim pursuant to the Maryland Mortgage Fraud Protection Act. 22 B(1). The Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act As previously noted, CL §§ 14-202(8) and (9) of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act provide: In collecting or attempting to collect an