Nina & Nareg, Inc. v. Movahed

CATHELL, J. On November 1, 2000, the District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery County entered a judgment in favor of Abdollah Movahed and the Estate of Nourollah Toulabi, respondents, and against Nina & Nareg, Inc. doing business as D & D Auto Body, petitioner. On November 8, 2000, petitioner filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. On November 29, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Amend in the District Court and on November 30, 2000, respondents filed a cross-appeal to the Circuit Court. Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike the Motion to Amend filed by respondents in the District Court.

On January 17, 2001, the District Court denied petitioner’s Motion to Strike and increased the judgment for respondents based on the Motion to Amend. On January 26, 2001, petitioner filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County from the January 17, 2001 judgment and the denial of its Motion to Strike by the District Court. On February 9, 2001, respondents also filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County from the January 17, 2001 judgment of the District Court. At this point, there were two appeals before the Circuit Court filed by petitioner and two appeals filed by respondents, one each relating to the November 1, 2000 judgment and one each as to the subsequent January 17, 2001 order amending the November 1, 2000 judgment.

Thereafter, the Circuit Court did not address petitioner’s appeal or respondents’ cross-appeal from the November 1, 2000 judgment of the District Court, but affirmed in part and modified in part the later January 17, 2001 judgment of the District Court. Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court, which we granted. Nina & Nareg v. Movahed, 367 ¹⁹⁰ Md. 86, 785 A.2d 1290 (2001). Petitioner has presented one question for our review: “I. Whether the lower courts erred in considering [respondents’] Motion to Amend from the District Court when appellate jurisdiction had attached?” We hold that the District Court erred in considering respondents’ Motion to Amend once appellate jurisdiction had attached in the Circuit Court.

Therefore, we reverse and remand the case to the Circuit Court for consideration of the appeals from the November 1, 2000 judgment entered by the District Court. I. Facts In July of 1997, petitioner repaired a 1992 Mercedes Benz for Champion Motors, Inc., a used car dealership. Respondents were two of the three owners of Champion. 1 After the Mercedes was left with petitioner for repairs, Champion’s owners became involved in the dissolution of Champion. Petitioner alleges that it completed the repairs on the Mercedes and that it tried to contact respondents to inform them that the repairs had been completed and that the Mercedes needed to be picked up.

After not receiving payment and the Mercedes not being pickéd up, petitioner alleges that it eventually attempted to notify Champion of its intention to seek a mechanic’s lien. In May of 1998, petitioner contracted with Nationwide Lien and Recovery to have the Mercedes sold pursuant to the possessory lien. The Mercedes was eventually sold at auction for $9,100.00. On February 7, 2000, suit was filed by respondents against petitioner in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery County. 2 Respondents sought damages of $20,142.47 ¹⁹¹ ($16,000.00 plus $4,142.47 of interest) for the alleged wrongful sale of the Mercedes.

At trial before the District Court on November 1, 2000, respondents claimed that they had not received the proper statutory notice for the sale to be conducted pursuant to a mechanic’s lien; therefore, the sale of the Mercedes was an improper conversion. Petitioner claimed that notice had been sent to respondents and that even if respondents had not received the proper statutory notice, respondents had actual notice that petitioner possessed the vehicle and had a lien on the vehicle. The District Court found that although respondents had notice that petitioner had possession of the Mercedes, the proper statutory notice was not given to respondents prior to the sale pursuant to the mechanic’s lien. The District Court also determined that a conversion had not occurred.

On November 1, 2000, the District Court entered a judgment against petitioner for $5,130.00. 3 On November 8, 2000, petitioner filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. On November 29, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Amend in the District Court. The following day, respondents filed a cross-appeal of the November 1, 2000 District Court judgment. On December 13, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike the Motion to Amend.

On January 17, 2001, the District Court denied petitioner’s Motion to Strike and held a hearing on the Motion to Amend. At the end of the hearing, the District Court amended its November 1, 2000 judgment and found that a conversion had occurred, that respondents did not have notice ¹⁹² of the pending sale of the vehicle, and that respondents were obligated to pay $20.00 per day for storage. The District Court also increased the amount of the judgment for respondents. On January 26, 2001, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court’s January 17, 2001 judgment to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

On February 9, 2001, respondents also filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court’s January 17, 2001 judgment to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court affirmed in part and modified in part the January 17, 2001 judgment of the District Court. Petitioner raised one procedural and two substantive issues before the Circuit Court. The procedural issue raised by petitioner was that the District Court should not have ruled on respondents’ Motion to Amend because once petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal to the Circuit Court, prior to respondents filing their Motion to Amend, the District Court was divested of jurisdiction over the case.

The Circuit Court held “that [petitioner’s] appeal did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to dispose of the post-judgment motions.” Therefore, it concluded that the District Court properly ruled on respondents’ Motion to Amend. The two substantive issues raised by petitioner in its appeal resulting from the January 17, 2001 judgment of the District Court were that the court erred in finding a conversion and that the District Court also erred in finding that petitioner had failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements. The Circuit Court did not find any merit to either of these issues. On their cross-appeal from the January 17, 2001 order, respondents presented two issues.

Respondents contended that in the damages awarded by the District Court, the court failed to properly calculate the fair market value of the Mercedes and that the damage amount was improperly offset by the storage and auction fees. The Circuit Court, deciding only the issues arising out of the appeals of the January 17, 2001 order, held that the fair market value determined by the ¹⁹³ District Court for the Mercedes was not clearly erroneous and that the District Court had properly determined the storage fees and offset the damage award with the storage fees. The Circuit Court, however, held that the District Court erred in offsetting the damage award with the auction fees ($795.00). The Circuit Court stated that: “This Court finds it contradictory to determine that a wrongful conversion occurred, yet to offset the damages by an allowance of $795 for auction fees.

If [petitioner] had no right to sell the car, certainly [respondents] should not have to bear the cost of a wrongful sale.” Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court, which we granted.

II

Discussion Petitioner contends that once it filed its first timely notice of appeal on November 8, 2000, jurisdiction over the case vested in the Circuit Court and the District Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on respondents’ Motion to Amend that was filed pursuant to the court’s revisory power under Maryland Rule 3-535. Respondent contends that the filing of a notice of appeal does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a timely filed revisory motion under Rule 3-535. We hold that under the circumstances here present, once petitioner filed a notice of appeal, jurisdiction was vested in the Circuit Court, acting as an appellate court. Therefore, the District Court did not have the authority to consider respondents’ Motion to Amend.

A. Standard of Review In Cooper v. Sacco, 357 Md. 622, 629-30 , 745 A.2d 1074, 1077 (2000), we examined the construction of the Maryland Rules when we stated: “We begin this analysis by noting the general tenets of statutory construction, which apply to the drafting of the Maryland Rules as well. See State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717 , 720 A.2d 311, 315 (1998); State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 79 , 702 A.2d 723, 728 (1997); In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 , 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994). ¹⁹⁴ We have repeatedly stated that ‘[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the true intention of the legislature.’ Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491 , 632 A.2d 753 [, 757] (1993). To discern the legislative intent, we must consider the ‘general purpose, aim, or policy behind the statute.’ Id. While great weight is given to the plain meaning of the statute’s language, Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

Co., 308 Md. 69, 73 , 517 A.2d 730 [, 731-32] (1986), we examine this language in the context in which it was adopted. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Mohler, 318 Md. 219, 225 , 567 A.2d 929 [, 932] (1990). In this light, ‘[i]t is often necessary to look at the development of a statute to discern legislative intent that may not be as clear upon initial examination of the current language of the statute.’ Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 492 , 632 A.2d [at 758] (citing Mohler, supra, 318 Md. at 225-27 , 567 A.2d 929 ). C.S. v. Prince George’s County Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 343 Md. 14, 24 , 680 A.2d 470, 475 (1996) (some alterations in original). We have also said that statutes and rules ‘relating to the same subject matter or sharing a common purpose should be read together.’ Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 29 , 716 A.2d 237, 240 (1998) (citing Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436 , 639 A.2d 675, 679 (1994)); see also Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 649 , 689 A.2d 610, 613 (1997).” [Alterations in original] B. Maryland Rules A motion to amend in the District Court is filed pursuant to either Maryland Rule 3-534 or Maryland Rule 3-535. 4 These rules state, as applicable to this case: ¹⁹⁵ “Rule 3-534. Motion to alter or amend a judgment. On motion of any party filed within ten days after entry of judgment, the court may open the judgment to receive additional evidence, may amend its findings or its statement of reasons for the decision, may set forth additional findings or reasons, may enter new findings or new reasons, may amend the judgment, or may enter a new judgment.

A motion to alter or amend a judgment may be joined with a motion for new trial. “Rule 3-535. Revisory power. (a) Generally. On motion of any party filed within 80 days after entry of judgment, the court may exercise reviso-ry power and control over the judgment and may take any action that it could have taken under Rule 3-534.

(d) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed by the appellate court, and thereafter with leave of the appellate court.” In the case at bar, a judgment was entered by the District Court on November 1, 2000. The Motion to Amend was filed by respondents on November 29, 2000; therefore, because the motion was not filed within ten days of the entry of judgment, the motion was filed pursuant to Rule 3-535.

Rule 3 — 535(d) contains the only provision in the rule which permits the lower ¹⁹⁶ court to take action during the pendency of an appeal. Even then, however, the appellate court, if the appeal has been docketed in that court, must approve the correction. The record does not reflect that any such approval was sought in the case sub judice. In any event, as we shall explain, the amendment here did not concern a “clerical” mistake.

What the District Court did here was not the correction of a clerical mistake; the District Court changed its interpretation of the law and its judgment. The time for filing an appeal from a judgment of a District Court to a Circuit Court is controlled by Maryland Rule 7-104, which in relevant part states: “Rule 7-104. Notice of appeal — Times for filing. (a) Generally.

Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by law, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. (c) Civil action — Post judgment motions. In a civil action, when a timely motion is filed pursuant to Rule 3-533 or Rule 3-534, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of (1) a notice withdrawing the motion or (2) an order denying a motion pursuant to Rule 3-533 or disposing of a motion pursuant to Rule 3-534. A notice of appeal filed before the withdrawal or disposition of either of these motions does not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction to dispose of the motion.” The motion filed by respondents was a Rule 3-535 motion because