Noble v. State

Panel: Graeff, Leahy, James P. Salmon (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. Graeff, J. ¹⁵⁶ This appeal involves the scope of Md. Code (2017 Supp.) § 1-210 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP"), which provides immunity from arrest, charge, prosecution, and sanctions for violations of probation under certain circumstances when medical assistance is requested in response to a suspected drug overdose. Appellant, Christopher Noble, appeals from the ruling of the Circuit Court for Caroline County finding him in violation of probation, revoking his probation, and sentencing him to 18 months of incarceration, with credit for time served. He argues that the circuit court's sanction, based on its finding that he violated his probation by failing to abstain from drugs, was erroneous because the evidence used to support the court's finding of a violation of probation was obtained as a result of his girlfriend's actions in calling 911 when he was unconscious.

Appellant presents the following question for this Court's review: ¹⁵⁷ Does the immunity from sanctions for probation violations created by CP Article § 1-210 extend to overdose victims regardless of whether medical assistance is sought by the victim or a bystander? For the reasons set forth below, we answer that question in the affirmative, and therefore, we shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The violation of probation proceedings at issue relate to appellant's initial guilty plea on July 17, 2013, to conspiracy to possess a narcotic with intent to distribute. The circuit court sentenced appellant to 18 months of incarceration, all suspended, and it placed appellant on probation.

On June 18, 2014, the circuit court found appellant to be in violation of his probation. It revoked appellant's probation and reinstated the original 18-month sentence of incarceration, with credit for 40 days time served. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for modification of sentence. On October 28, 2014, the court suspended the remaining unserved portion of his sentence, and it placed appellant on probation for three years. ⁸¹⁰ On April 29, 2016, paramedics responded to a call for "an unresponsive person, thought to be in cardiac arrest." They discovered appellant in the bathroom, lying on his back.

He was unresponsive and suffering from respiratory depression, i.e., he was breathing approximately four times a minute. Based on appellant's pinpoint pupils and his respiratory depression, the paramedics concluded that appellant was suffering from an opiate overdose, and they administered Naloxone. 1 ¹⁵⁸ Appellant regained consciousness within minutes. He initially stated that "he was just working hard that day, and he took some Benadryl." Appellant later told the police that he had taken several Percocet. 2 He declined to go to the hospital. On July 19, 2016, the Division of Parole and Probation ("DPP") filed in the circuit court a Request for Summons ("Request"), advising the court that appellant was "not in compliance with conditions of probation." In an attached Statement of Charges, DPP indicated that appellant had violated the following probationary conditions: (1) Condition # 1 - Report as directed and follow your supervising agent's lawful instructions; (2) Condition # 8 - Do not illegally possess, use, or sell any narcotic drug, controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or related paraphernalia; (3) Condition # 13 - Submit to, successfully complete, and pay required costs for alcohol and drug evaluation, testing, treatment, as directed by your supervising agent; and (4) Condition # 16 - Totally abstain from alcohol, illegal substances, and abusive use of any prescription drug.

The Statement of Charges provided that conditions # 8 and # 16 were violated as a result of appellant's April 29, 2016, overdose. On July 26, 2016, the circuit court issued an order scheduling a violation of probation hearing. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that he had immunity based on CP § 1-210. In support of his motion, appellant provided, as Exhibit 1, a "Fact Sheet" from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene regarding "Maryland's Good Samaritan Law," which stated, in part: "The law protects a person from a violation of a condition of pretrial release, ¹⁵⁹ probation, or parole, if the evidence of the violation was obtained solely as a result of a person seeking, providing or assisting with medical help to save someone's life." 3 On November 16, 2016, the court held a hearing on the motion.

The State noted that, pursuant to CP § 1-210, a person who seeks or provides medical assistance for a person experiencing a medical emergency after using drugs will not be sanctioned. ⁸¹¹ It argued, however, that appellant did not seek assistance, but rather, appellant's girlfriend called 911, and under these circumstances, appellant was not protected from sanction for a violation of probation. The circuit court stated that it agreed with the State's position that appellant was not immunized from sanction for the violation of probation, and it denied appellant's motion to dismiss. On December 7, 2016, the court held a violation of probation hearing. Ben Wilson, the reporting paramedic, testified as to the events that transpired when he arrived at the scene, including his treatment of appellant.

Robert McDonald, a probation officer with the Division of Parole and Probation ("DPP"), testified from DPP records regarding the supervision of appellant while on probation. As part of appellant's terms of probation, he was directed to attend and complete alcohol and drug treatment. Mr. McDonald testified that, although DPP had records indicating that appellant entered the program, there was "no verification that [appellant] successfully completed the program." He stated that appellant had been cited for violating the condition of probation, which required that he regularly report to DPP, based on his "failing to report on June 2 nd , July 7 th , and July 14 th , [2016,] and anytime thereafter." 4 Mr. McDonald testified that appellant violated two other conditions: condition eight, that appellant not illegally possess, use, or sell any controlled ¹⁶⁰ dangerous substance; and condition 16, that he abstain from illegal substances or abusive use of any prescription drugs. Appellant testified that he was 31 years old, and he had reported to DPP "[m]ultiple times" since June 2016.

He agreed that he failed to report to his probation officer on the dates listed by Mr. McDonald. He stated that, on April 29, 2016, he had taken some medicine given to him by a friend, which he thought was Tylenol or ibuprofen, but he told the police that it possibly was Percocet because he was afraid for his life. When asked if it was true that the paramedics told him he should go to the hospital and he refused, appellant stated that, at the time, he was "in shock." The circuit court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that appellant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. It found that appellant failed to satisfy the conditions of his probation by failing to report, complete alcohol and drug treatment, and abstain from illegal substances, "specifically the use of any prescription drug." With respect to the latter finding, the court relied on Mr. Wilson's testimony that, after finding appellant unresponsive on the bathroom floor, he administered Narcan (naloxone ), which is designed to revive someone who has overdosed on an opiate, and when appellant was revived, he stated that he had taken Percocet.

The circuit court revoked appellant's probation and sentenced him to 18 months of incarceration, with credit for five months already served. Appellant filed an application for leave to appeal. This Court granted the application and set the case in for briefing and argument. DISCUSSION Appellant's sole challenge to the circuit court's ruling revoking his probation is based on the court's finding that he violated his probation by failing to abstain from illegal substances.

He asserts that, because the evidence used to support that violation ⁸¹² was obtained when his girlfriend called 911 seeking medical assistance, pursuant to CP § 1-210, it could ¹⁶¹ not be used as a basis for a sanction for a violation of probation finding. The State contends that the circuit court correctly determined that CP § 1-210 did not provide appellant immunity from sanction for a violation of probation. It asserts that the plain language of the statute makes clear that a person is immune from a violation of probation sanction only if that person seeks, provides, or assists with the provision of emergency medical care, and because appellant's girlfriend, not appellant, was the one who took such action, appellant is not entitled to immunity. The issue before this Court is one of statutory interpretation, which involves a question of law that we review de novo .

Harrison-Solomon v. State , 442 Md. 254 , 265, 112 A.3d 408 (2015). As such, we review the scope of CP § 1-210 de novo . See Bellard v. State , 452 Md. 467 , 480, 157 A.3d 272 (2017) ("An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court's interpretation of a statute."); Davis v. Slater , 383 Md. 599 , 604, 861 A.2d 78 (2004) (appellate review of Maryland Code or Rules is de novo ). The Court of Appeals has set forth the well-settled rules of statutory construction, as follows: We have long held that "[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Williams v. Peninsula Reg'l Med.

Ctr. , 440 Md. 573 , 580, 103 A.3d 658 , 663 (2014). Our primary goal "is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision[.]" Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Marcas , L.L.C. , 415 Md. 676 , 685, 4 A.3d 946 , 951 (2010). As we have so often explained, in undertaking this endeavor: [W]e begin with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute.

If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction. We neither add nor ¹⁶² delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute[.] ... We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute's plain language to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute....

Where words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. In every case, the statute must be given reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense. ⁸¹³ Espina v. Jackson , 442 Md. 311 , 321-22, 112 A.3d 442 (2015) (quoting Marcas , 415 Md. at 685 -86 , 4 A.3d 946 ). Maryland is one of 40 states, as well as the District of Columbia, to enact statutes that provide some form of immunity from sanctions for substance abusers who report or experience a medical emergency.

See Drug Overdose Immunity and Good Samaritan Laws, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/DP8R-49U6. Maryland's statute, CP § 1-210, provides, as follows: (a) In general. - The act of seeking, providing, or assisting with the provision of medical assistance for another person who is experiencing a medical emergency after ingesting ¹⁶³ or using alcohol or drugs may be used as a mitigating factor in a criminal prosecution of: (1) the person who experienced the medical emergency; or (2) any person who sought, provided, or assisted in the provision of medical assistance. (b) Immunity from prosecution - Person assisting . - A person who, in good faith, seeks, provides, or assists with the provision of medical assistance for a person reasonably believed to be experiencing a medical emergency after ingesting or using alcohol or drugs shall be immune from criminal arrest, charge, or prosecution for a violation of § 5-601, § 5-619, § 5-620, § 10-114, § 10-116, or § 10-117 of the Criminal Law Article if the evidence for the criminal arrest, charge, or prosecution was obtained solely as a result of the person's seeking, providing, or assisting with the provision of medical assistance. (c) Immunity from prosecution - Person ingesting or using . - A person who reasonably believes that the person is experiencing a medical emergency after ingesting or using alcohol or drugs shall be immune from criminal arrest, charge, or prosecution for a violation of § 5-601, § 5-619, § 5-620, § 10-114, § 10-116, or § 10-117 of the Criminal Law Article if the evidence for the criminal arrest, charge, or prosecution was obtained solely as a result of the person seeking or receiving medical assistance.

(d) Other sanctions prohibited . - A person who seeks, provides, or assists with the provision of medical assistance in accordance with subsection (b) or (c) of this section may not be sanctioned for a violation of a condition of pretrial release, probation, or parole if the evidence of the violation was obtained solely as a result of the person seeking, providing, or assisting with the provision of medical assistance. The State focuses solely on the language of CP § 1-210(d), the provision addressing sanctions for a violation of probation. The State asserts that the plain language of ¹⁶⁴ § 1-210(d) makes clear that appellant is not entitled to immunity because he "did not seek, provide, or assist with the provision of his emergency medical care." It concedes that, if appellant had reasonably believed that he was suffering from a drug overdose and called 911 seconds before he lost consciousness, he could not have been sanctioned for a violation of probation based on the evidence obtained from the act of seeking assistance. The State asserts, however, that because it was appellant's girlfriend who called 911 after appellant became unconscious, pursuant to the plain language of CP § 1-210, appellant is not entitled to immunity.

Appellant disagrees. He indicates that the language, in context, is ambiguous, stating that, although "the prosecution's strict interpretation of the immunity provision in this case finds some superficial support in the muddled language of the ⁸¹⁴ statute," CP § 1-210"is not a model of clarity." Appellant argues that the State's interpretation of the statute "is fundamentally at odds with the legislative intent as revealed through the statute's history and the bill file, and therefore must be rejected under well-established principles of statutory construction." We agree with the parties that, at first glance, viewing just the first part of CP § 1-210(d), the language does appear to limit protection to those persons who take active steps to provide medical assistance, i.e., "[a] person who seeks, provides, or assists with the provision of medical assistance," which appellant did not do. Subsection (d), however, refers back to subsection (c) of CP § 1-210, which, as discussed infra , provides that the person receiving medical assistance is entitled to protection. As indicated, there may be situations where the words of a statute appear to be clear when viewed in isolation, but they become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme.

Espina, 442 Md. at 322 , 112 A.3d 442 . In that situation, "a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to ¹⁶⁵ the legislative process." Id. (quoting Marcas , 415 Md. at 686 , 4 A.3d 946 ) In Broadous v. Commonwealth , 67 Va.App. 265 , 795 S.E.2d 904 , 906 (2017), the Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed the meaning of Virginia's statute providing an affirmative defense to prosecution for an individual who "seeks or obtains emergency medical attention for himself, if he is experiencing an overdose, or for another individual." In that case, Broadous' boyfriend called 911 because Broadous was unconscious after taking Fentanyl, a narcotic. Id. at 905.

Once Broadous was revived, she admitted to the medical personnel that she used what she believed to be heroin. Id. Broadous argued that, although she did not "seek" medical assistance, she "obtained" assistance for an overdose, and therefore, she had an affirmative defense to a charge of possession of a controlled substance. Id. at 907.

The court disagreed, concluding that the words "seek" and "obtain" were "active verbs that require more than passive receipt of emergency medical attention." Id. The court stated: The clear purpose of the statute is to provide what amounts to a "safe harbor" from prosecution to encourage the provision of prompt emergency medical treatment to those who have suffered an overdose as a result of ingesting a controlled substance. The General Assembly has obviously made a policy determination that encouraging others, who may themselves be guilty of violating the laws involving controlled substances, to call 911 in an effort to save a life is more important than their prosecution. We therefore hold that pursuant to the plain meaning of the phrase "obtains emergency medical attention for himself," Broadous was required to have actively planned and taken steps to actually gain medical treatment.

Simply benefiting from such treatment while unconscious is not sufficient to bring her within the ambit of the affirmative defense provided by Code § 18.2-251.03. Therefore, we hold that the intent of Code § 18.2-251.03 does not provide an affirmative defense ¹⁶⁶ to prosecution to an individual who passively receives emergency medical attention. Id. In so concluding, the court noted that some states had chosen to extend protection to overdose victims