Norman v. Borison

⁶³⁸ HARRELL, J. Alexander Chaudhry (“Chaudhry”), Ali Farahpour (“Farahpour”), and Petitioner, Stephen Norman (“Norman”), owned equal shares in the Maryland-registered limited liability company, Sussex Title (“Sussex”). 1 Respondents here, all lawyers, filed on behalf of their clients a proposed class action lawsuit against multiple defendants-companies, including Sussex, for their alleged participation in “the single largest mortgage scam in Maryland history____” 2 Respondents did not name Norman as a defendant in any version of their original or amended complaints in any court, although, in their second amended complaint in the federal court, Norman was mentioned by name in certain allegations. Norman claims that Respondents defamed him by republishing the pleadings (which contained allegedly defamatory statements) to the press and on the internet, and by making verbal comments to the press about the lawsuit. 3 For reasons to be explained, we hold that, on the circumstances of this case, an absolute privilege adheres to Respondents’ republication of the pleadings in the mortgage scam case, as well as to their public comments about that case. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which, by its reported opinion, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Norman’s defamation action. See Norman v. Borison, 192 Md.App. 405 , 994 A.2d 1019 (2010). ⁶³⁹ I. A. The “Mortgage Rescue” Scam.

As attributed to Respondent Philip Robinson, the mortgage rescue scam asserted in the underlying litigation was described as involving real-estate professionals (principally the Metropolitan Money Store enterprise) that: [T]arget[ed] homeowners who have thousands of dollars of equity in their homes, but who cannot keep up with their mortgage payments. These “professionals” promise[d] to rescue the homeowners from foreclosure by giving them a new mortgage with payments that they can afford. In reality, though, the scammers s[old] the property to a “straw buyer,” who then t[ook] out a new, larger mortgage — a mortgage with fees that equal[ed] or exceeded] the amount of equity in the property. The lenders, title companies, and others involved in the transactions then split the “fees” (that is, the stripped equity) amongst themselves.

The homeowners, who could not afford their original mortgage payments, ha[d] no hope of repaying the new, higher mortgage. Without settlement companies like Sussex, who closed the transactions between lenders, sellers, and “straw buyers,” the scam could not have succeeded. B. The Complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. On 18 June 2007, Respondents filed a “class action suit on behalf of several hundred homeowners,” 4 in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, “alleging that the Metropolitan Money Store, along with several other companies and real estate professionals, engaged in mortgage fraud.” Norman, 192 Md.App. at 411 , 994 A.2d at 1022-23 .

Without identifying which Sussex owners or employees participated individually and actually in the mortgage rescue scam, Respondents ⁶⁴⁰ averred broadly that Sussex, a “title company,” “aided and abetted the scam by closing ... transactions in exchange for ... repeat business and fees____” Norman posits, for purposes of his later defamation action, that Respondents provided to the press a copy of the complaint on the same day it was filed, but before it was filed. He infers this occurred because, on the filing day, a Baltimore Sun reporter telephoned Chaudhry and read verbatim to Chaudhry passages from the complaint. Norman highlights further that “[the Circuit Court for] Prince George’s County ... does not maintain an [online] case management system that would allow [the reporter] to monitor filings or obtain copies of filed documents [online].” Respondents do not contest this claim. The day following filing of the proposed class action suit, 19 June 2007, The Baltimore Sun published an article about the scam lawsuit.

In particular, the article explained that the complaint named at least six defendants, including Sussex. The article quoted Respondent Peter Holland as saying, without reference to any particular individual or company, “[w]e’re talking about bad people.” In the final paragraphs, the article, quoting from the complaint, reiterated that the defendants’ “sole motive was to enrich their extravagant lifestyles at the expense of hardworking Marylanders.... ” Less than a month later, on 12 July 2007, The Washington Post published an article regarding the lawsuit. It mentioned, in passing, that apparently Sussex was not answering its phones at its offices. It quoted Respondent Philip Robinson as stating that the defendants’ “sole motive seemed to be to enrich their lavish lifestyles as opposed to saving the homes of the vulnerable homeowners from foreclosure.” 5 ⁶⁴¹ C. The Initial Complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (“federal district court”).

On 24 July 2007, Respondents dismissed voluntarily their action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and refiled their claim in federal district court. According to the federal complaint, by July 2007, “it became apparent that the fraud ... extended across three different jurisdictions [i.e., interstate]____” The initial federal complaint asserted the same allegations as the previous State action, and added Chaudhry — a part owner of Sussex — as a named defendant. Norman was not sued or named in the initial federal complaint in any capacity. The next day, The Baltimore Sun published an article about the federal litigation relating to the mortgage rescue scam.

It included Respondent Scott Borison’s statement that, “[a]s we kept investigating the case, it became clear that there were also federal charges to be asserted.... Metropolitan Money Store was out stealing the equity in people’s homes and on top of that, getting it tax free.” June Arney, Federal Court Gets Home-Equity Suit; Md. Case Grows into Class Action Seeking Recovery of Homes Swindled from Owners, Balt. Sun, 25 July 2007, at 3D. The article mentioned that Sussex was named as a defendant, and included a comment attributed to Chaudhry claiming that Sussex was a victim equally of Metropolitan Money Store’s scam.

D. The First Amended Complaint in the Federal District Court. Respondents, on 21 January 2008, amended their initial filing, removing Sussex as a defendant, which had filed for bankruptcy protection. The first amended complaint also added Farahpour as a defendant, as well as Wilbur Ballesteros (“Ballesteros”), 6 a former employee of Sussex. (“This matter ⁶⁴² involves the single largest mortgage scam in ...

Mid-Atlantic history ... and involved the willful participation of so-called real estate professionals — including ... licensed settlement agents Sussex Title, LLC ... and its part owners and employees, Alexander Chaudhry, ... Ah Farahpour ... [and] Wilbur Ballesteros.... ”). The first amended complaint, however, did not name Norman as an involved third party or defendant. In the vast majority of instances where the complaint refers to the “owners and employees of Sussex,” it included a qualifying descriptor.

For example, the complaint states that “[t]o finance the foreclosure reversal transactions, the owners and/or employees of Sussex ... Chaudhry, Farahpour and Ballesteros arranged and settled federally related mortgage loans----” 7 In most other occasions, the first amended complaint refers to the Sussex-related participants as “Sussex, Chaudhry, Farahpour and Ballesteros....” 8 E. The Second Amended Complaint in the Federal District Court. On 29 September 2008, a federal trial judge dismissed the first amended complaint, but gave Respondents leave to refile. See Proctor v. Metro.

Money Store Corp., 579 F.Supp.2d 724, 727 (D.Md.2008). In seeking dismissal, Chaudhry and Farahpour argued that “[Respondents] have failed to state a claim ... because they have failed to make specific factual ⁶⁴³ allegations as to how either of these individuals participated in the alleged scheme.” Proctor, 579 F.Supp.2d at 742 . In other words, by grouping together Chaudhry, Farahpour, and Ballesteros in their first amended complaint, Respondents suggested that “all [of the defendants] delivered one check, recorded one deed, instructed one buyer to sign a document, and received one fax.” Proctor, 579 F.Supp.2d at 743 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The federal district court held that this repeated grouping “must be read as an allegation that one of the three [defendants] did each act” and, therefore, is deficient speculation under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

Proctor, 579 F.Supp.2d at 744 . Thus, in any subsequent complaint, Respondents were obliged to allege “what specifically each Defendant did (not what the group did) to fulfill his role in the scheme.” Id. Respondents filed a more specific, second amended complaint on 14 November 2008, alleging that “Mr. Ballesteros defrauded [homeowner clients], and that Mr. Chaudhry and Mr. Farahpour failed to supervise Mr. Ballesteros, thereby facilitating the fraud.” Respondents removed Ballesteros as a defendant, however, because, like Sussex, Ballesteros had sought the protective harbor of bankruptcy. Although this version of the complaint, again, did not name Norman as a defendant, it identified him by name in certain averments.

In this regard, the second amended complaint alleged that: • The payments to Ballesteros were items paid out of the share of monthly proceeds to Farahpour, Chaudhry, and Norman. • Sussex is an entity owned and controlled by Farahpour, Chaudhry, and a third person, Steven Norman____Sussex changed its name from CapTitle and filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of Maryland in late 2007. Based on the testimony of Norman in connection with the bankruptcy case, Sussex was operated for the financial benefit of the three owners since Ali Farahpour would review the company’s records and make an equal monthly distribution to each of the three based on the money ⁶⁴⁴ received by the company during the given month after payment of expenses and leave some amount of reserve for future expenses. • Wilbur Ballesteros was paid a salary out of Chaudhry, Farahpour and Norman’s share of the revenues generated by the operation of Sussex as well as a bonus per settlement in which he was involved. • Upon information and belief, the fees and other charges collected by Sussex in connection with this transaction were disbursed at the direction of Farahpour to Farahpour, Chaudhry and Norman. • Farahpour participated through the use of his entity Money Tree Funding and by dividing up the funds received from these transactions to himself, Chaudhry, and Norman.[ 9 ] F. Respondents’ Website. Sometime in the Fall of 2007, after filing their initial complaint in the federal district court, Respondents created a website, http://www.metromoneystore.com, on which they eventually posted links to the three iterations of the federal complaint. Respondent Robinson claims that the website was intended to “give notice to the class about the lawsuit.” Indeed, the federal district judge “expressly permitted the use of the internet to communicate with class action litigants.” Norman, 192 Md.App. at 427 , 994 A.2d at 1032 .

Nonetheless, Norman asserts that these publications were “incomplete,” at least in part, because they were redacted heavily and “did not provide the reader with the facts ... or the various exhibits which strongly contradicted the allegations----” G. Norman, et al., Strike Back. On June 18, 2008, Norman, Sussex, Chaudhry, and ⁶⁴⁵ Farahpour filed á complaint for defamation[ 10 ] in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In November 2008, the defamation complaint came to the attention of the federal court during a hearing on Chaudhry and Farahpour’s Rule 11 motion against [Respondents] concerning the class action litigation. The court stated: “I find that the litigation brought by Messrs.

Chaudhry and Farahpour in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County is patently intended to interfere with the jurisdiction of this court and to chill attorneys before this court and I simply will not tolerate it.” Thereafter, Chaudhry and Farahpour dismissed their defamation claims in the circuit court. On January 5, 2009, Norman filed a second amended complaint in the circuit court. The complaint consisted of fourteen counts for defamation, negligence, civil conspiracy, and injurious falsehood. The complaint alleged that [Respondents] defamed Norman by circulating copies of the state and federal complaints to a newspaper reporter, the internet, and by speaking to a reporter.

The complaint also singled out certain statements by individual [Respondents]. [Respondents] moved to dismiss the complaint. On February 19, 2009, the court held a hearing on [Respondents’] motion to dismiss and took the matter under advisement. On February 20, 2009, the court issued an order dismissing Norman’s complaint with prejudice. The order first noted that “[o]verall, there is no allegation in any of the counts of any ‘falsity,’ a required element of defáma ⁶⁴⁶ tion.” The order then dismissed the following counts based on absolute privilege: 1) Count I (Publishing the state complaint to the Baltimore Sun); 2) Count III (Publishing the state complaint to the Washington Post); 3) Count V (Publishing the federal complaint to the Baltimore Sun); 4) Count VII (Publishing the federal complaint on the internet); 5) Count VIII (Publishing the first amended complaint on the internet); 6) Count IX (Publishing the second amended complaint on the internet); 7) Count X ([Respondent] Borison’s reply to Chaudhry’s Rule 11 Motion); and 8) Count XI ([Respondent] Borison’s opposition to notice of sale claims by the estate).

With regard to the above eight counts, the order stated that “Maryland law makes no distinction between internet press and written press____Additionally [Norman] has no standing because he is not a named party to the aforementioned suit.” The court dismissed the following counts because Norman “has no standing to allege the [ ] causes of action:” 1) Count II ([Respondent] Holland’s 6/19/07 defamation to the Sun); 2) Count TV ([Respondent] Robinson’s 7/12/07 defamation to the Post); and 3) Count VI ([Respondent] Borison’s 7/25/07 defamation to the Sun). The court dismissed Count XII (negligence) for failure to state a cause of action under Maryland law. Count XIII (injurious falsehood) and Count XIV (civil conspiracy) were dismissed as duplicitous. ⁶⁴⁷ Norman appeals from the [judgment], but does not challenge dismissal of Counts IV, XII, XIII or XIV. Norman, 192 Md.App. at 416-419 , 994 A.2d at 1026-27 .

In other words, the Circuit Court decided that Norman waived his defamation claim against Respondent Robinson, while preserving his claim against Respondents Holland and Borison. 11 Norman appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. H. The Court of Special Appeals’s “Take.” In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals addressed initially the issue of standing. See Norman, 192 Md.App. at 420 , 994 A.2d at 1027 . Norman argued that he had standing because Respondents made defamatory, extrajudicial comments to the press, which were understood by persons who had dealt with Sussex to be aimed at him.

See Norman, 192 Md.App. at 420 , 994 A.2d at 1028 . Moreover, as they filed and re-filéd their complaint, Respondents not only alluded to him generally, but eventually named him outright in averments in the second amended complaint. See id. The intermediate appellate court organized the allegedly defamatory statements into two categories — those that named Norman directly and those that may have “referred to him by virtue of his position with Sussex.” Norman, 192 Md.App. at 420 , 994 A.2d at 1028 .

Regarding the former, they were held not to be defamatory, but merely a “description of Norman’s business relations with the company he owned [in part].” Norman, 192 Md.App. at 421-22 , 994 A.2d at 1028-29 . Regarding the latter, they targeted the company, Sussex, not Norman. “Where [a] company holds a right of action in tort,” our appellate brethren continued, “th[e] right does not extend to the company’s owners, just as a cause of action that belongs to an owner individually [does] not extend to the company.” ⁶⁴⁸ Norman , 192 McLApp. at 422, 994 A.2d at 1029 . Moreover, the appellate panel observed that the tort allegations specified that “Sussex owners and employees” referred to Chaudhry, Farahpour, and Ballesteros — not Norman; therefore, Norman lacked standing to assert the claims he advanced. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Norman had standing, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the “allegedly defamatory statements are [nonetheless] protected by absolute privilege.” Norman, 192 Md.App. at 423 , 994 A.2d at 1030 .

Regarding the allegations in the complaints (as opposed to the press “sound bites”), the intermediate appellate court reiterated that the “ ‘Mbsolute judicial privilege applies to statements contained in pleadings, affidavits, or other documents directly related to the case.’ ” Id. (quoting Offen v. Brenner, 402 Md. 191, 200 , 935 A.2d 719, 724 (2007)) (quoting Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 403-04 , 494 A.2d 200, 203 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To date, Maryland courts have not held that redistribution or dissemination of [such] pleadings will void privileged status.... ” Norman, 192 Md.App. at 427 , 994 A.2d at 1032 . To do otherwise would suggest that courtroom proceedings and pleadings, once filed, are no longer “open to the public,” Baltimore Sun Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 662 , 755 A.2d 1130, 1135 (2000), or “public property.” Rosenberg v. Helinski, 328 Md. 664, 669 , 616 A.2d 866, 873 (1992). The panel of the intermediate appellate court distinguished the principal cases on which Norman relied 12 on the basis that the present case stemmed from a proposed class action suit.

See Norman, 192 Md.App. at 427 , 994 A.2d at 1032 . Regarding Respondents’ verbal comments to the press, the Court of Special Appeals analyzed Kennedy v. Cannon, ⁶⁴⁹ 229 Md. 92 , 182 A.2d 54 (1962). Fearing a lynching of an African-American suspect for the alleged rape of a Caucasian woman, the suspect’s attorney in Kennedy called the press, in an effort to defuse the tension, claiming the intercourse was consensual. See Kennedy, 229 Md. at 94 , 182 A.2d at 55 .

In declining to extend the absolute privilege to the attorney’s public “defense” of his client, the Court cautioned that not all “statements] made by an attorney after the inception of a judicial proceeding will be privileged.” Kennedy, 229 Md. at 97 , 182 A.2d at 57 . Rather, to be protected, statements must be made “during the course of,” i.e., “as part of,” a judicial proceeding. Kennedy, 229 Md. at 97-98 , 182 A.2d at 57-58 . The intermediate appellate court observed that Respondents “did not make any comments to the newspaper that were both slanderous per se and directly identified Norman.” Norman, 192 Md.App. at 425 , 994 A.2d at 1080 .

Moreover, in contrast to Kennedy , Respondents filed pleadings with the court. See id. Considered together, Respondents “were not attempting to set up a slanderous defense to the allegation of rape or some other crime in the press [like in Kennedy].” Norman, 192 Md.App. at 425 , 994 A.2d at 1031 . The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.

We granted Norman’s petition for writ of certiorari, Norman v. Borison, 415 Md. 337 , 1 A.3d 467 (2010), to consider whether: (1) [T]he lower court improperly rule[d] that [Norman], as owner of a small, unique business, lacked standing to sue for defamation when the defamatory statements personally referred to [Norman]?[ 13 ] ⁶⁵⁰ (2) [T]he lower court err[ed] in concluding that the absolute litigation privilege extends to the republication of incomplete judicial pleadings to the press and on the internet?

II

Absolute Privilege The crux of this case is the doctrine of absolute privilege. Accordingly, we shall describe our understanding of its contours before applying the law to the present, assumed factual circumstances. There are at least three situations implicating an absolute privilege in the context of this case. A. Statements Made in a Judicial Proceeding.

Although an understated principle in our caselaw, the application of an absolute privilege differs depending on whether the putative tortfeasor is a -witness/ party/ judge, or an attorney of record in the case. For witnesses, parties, and judges, we employ the “English” rule, which provides that the putative tortfeasor enjoys absolute immunity from civil liability, even if the statement is wholly unrelated to the underlying proceeding. See Keys, 303 Md. at 404 , 494 A.2d at 203 (“We [follow] the minority or ‘English’ rule which affordfs] the absolute privilege to witnesses and parties without the necessity of demonstrating the relevance of the statement to the pending litigation.” (citing Korb v. Kowaleviocz, 285 Md. 699 , 402 A.2d 897 (1979) (emphasis added))); Adams v. Peck, 43 Md.App. 168, 173 , 403 A.2d 840, 843 (1979) (“[N]ote that the English decisions relied upon all dealt with words spoken from the witness stand.”). For attorneys whose appearances are entered in a case, however, we follow the majority American rule and require that the defamatory statement have some rational relation to the matter at bar before unfurling the umbrella of absolute privilege.

See Korb, 285 Md. at 702 , 402 A.2d at 898 (“It was perfectly competent for this court ... to follow and adopt the ... American decisions in regard to the privilege of the advocate, and to follow and adopt the rule of the English courts as regards the privilege of the witness.” (quoting ⁶⁵¹ Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 198-99 , 14 A. 500, 505 (1888))); 14 see also Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1 , 3 n. 1, 415 A.2d 292 , 293 n. 1 (1980) (“Defamatory statements made by judges, parties and witnesses are absolutely privileged even though they have no relation to the judicial proceeding. However, an attorney’s defamatory statement is absolutely privileged only if it has some relation to the judicial proceeding.”). The privilege “extends not only to defamatory statements made in the courtroom during the course of the trial, but also to such statements published in documents which have been filed in a judicial proceeding.” Adams, 288 Md. at 3 , 415 A.2d at 293 (citations omitted).

In any case, the putative tortfeasor is protected “even if his [or her] purpose or motive was malicious, he [or she] knew that the statement was false, or his [or her] conduct was otherwise unreasonable.” Id. We give the privilege a “broad and comprehensive” interpretation, so as to “foster the ⁶⁵² ‘free and unfettered administration of justice.’ ” Keys, 303 Md. at 404 , 494 A.2d at 203 . “The ultimate purpose of the judicial process is to determine the truth.” Adams, 288 Md. at 5 , 415 A.2d at 294 . B. Statements Made in a Quasi-Judicial Proceeding. Likewise, a decision-maker/adjudicator, witness, or party in a qmisi-judicial proceeding who makes a defamatory statement in the proceeding is shielded by the privilege, if the proceeding satisfies the two part test of Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188 , 434 A.2d 547 (1981).

To don also the protective armor of the privilege, an attorney of record must demonstrate additionally that his or her statement was relevant to the matter at hand. In Gersh , a witness before the Baltimore City Community Relations Commission alleged that a commission staff member committed “obstruction of justice and subornation of perjury.” Gersh, 291 Md. at 189 , 434 A.2d at 547 . The witness, Gersh, argued that he was protected by the absolute privilege because he was “speaking as a witness at a public hearing and ... his statements were made in response to questions asked him at this hearing.” Gersh, 291 Md. at 189 , 434 A.2d at 548 . We held that the absolute privilege applies only to certain types of administrative proceedings.

In sorting out which types of proceedings merit this protection, we probe: “(1) the nature of the public function of the proceeding and (2) the adequacy of procedural safeguards which will minimize the occurrence of defamatory statements.” Gersh, 291 Md. at 197 , 434 A.2d at 552 . In other words, we examine the significance of “the public interest sought to be advanced” and the protective trial-like attributes of the proceeding. Gersh, 291 Md. at 196 , 434 A.2d at 551 ; see id. (stating that the two factors balance the public’s interest in full disclosure with the “harm of subjecting the individual to possible legal injury without remedy”).

Because the administrative hearing in Gersh— before the Baltimore City Community Relations Commission — neither advanced a sufficiently compelling public interest nor possessed suitable procedural safeguards, we rejected ⁶⁵³ extending the absolute privilege. See id.; see also McDermott v. Hughley, 317 Md. 12, 26 , 561 A.2d 1038, 1045 (1989) (holding that the absolute privilege did not apply to a psychiatrist who, after meeting with a park police officer, issued a defamatory report because there were “insufficient procedural safeguards” during the meeting). C. Statements Made Extrinsic to a Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceeding. Some forty-nine years ago, we considered an out-of-court statement in Kennedy , where an attorney — fearing a possible lynch mob targeting his client — reached out to the press to defend his client from the perceived wrath of the mob.

See Kennedy, 229 Md. at 94 , 182 A.2d at 55 . We noted the distinction that “absolute immunity extends ... [to] defamatory statements uttered in the course of a trial or contained in pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other documents directly related to the case.” Kennedy, 229 Md. at 97 , 182 A.2d at 57 (emphasis added). Owing in part to the breadth of this language, we extended the privilege in Adams to defamatory statements made prior to (and, therefore, outside of) a proceeding, reasoning that a qualifying statement could be “directly related to the pending litigation and [published] during the course of the judicial proceeding.” Adams, 288 Md. at 8 , 415 A.2d at 295 (emphasis added). Adams (published a year before Gersh) has spawned sophisticated progeny on the subject of out-of-court defamation, which deserve further comment.

These extrinsic statements occur commonly in three categories: (1) statements made with the direct purpose or effect of producing a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, e.g., a police brutality complaint, (2) statements “prepared for possible use in connection with a pending judicial proceeding,” Adams, 288 Md. at 4 , 415 A.2d at 294 (emphasis added), but which remain unfiled at the time of the alleged injury, and (3) statements that are not designed necessarily to produce a proceeding or cause one to be “filed,” but which are connected contextually to a pending or ongoing proceeding. ⁶⁵⁴ We extend the absolute privilege to these three categories of statements for the traditional reason — to encourage the free divulgence of information in pursuit of justice. More specifically, we apply the privilege because “[t]he evaluation and investigation of facts and opinions for the purpose of determining what, if anything, is to be raised or used in pending litigation is as integral a part of the search for truth ... as is the presentation of such facts and opinions during the course of the trial....” Adams, 288 Md. at 8 , 415 A.2d at 295 ; see also Offen, 402 Md. at 202 , 935 A.2d at 726 (“[T]he basis for extending absolute immunity [is] to prevent unduly hindering important speech, and to ensure that otherwise actionable conduct thus is protected where the accused acts in furtherance of a recognized socially important interest.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 1. Statements Producing a Proceeding. As to the first category, we consider whether the proceeding, which results from the statement, serves an important public interest and possess adequate procedural safeguards.

As examples, in Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 174-77 , 498 A.2d 269, 273-75 (1985), and Imperial v. Drapeau, 351 Md. 38, 50-51 , 716 A.2d 244, 250-51 (1998), we held that absolute privilege protected citizens who filed complaints with governmental entities against a deputy sheriff and an emergency medical technician, respectively. 15 The possible harm stemming from these defamatory complaints was “outweighed by the public’s interest in encouraging the filing and investigation of valid complaints.” Miner, 304 Md. at 176 , 498 A.2d at 275 (emphasis added); see also Imperial, 351 Md. at 50, 716 ⁶⁵⁵ A.2d at 250-51 (“[P]ublic policy encourages the communication of information to public authorities responsible for maintaining the quality of emergency medical services.”). 2. Prefatory Statements. The second category involves statements prepared for possible use in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, “regardless of whether the [statement] has been filed.” Adams, 288 Md. at 8 , 415 A.2d at 295 . For instance, in Adams, a husband and wife entered into a separation agreement, whereby the wife would receive physical and legal custody of the children and the father visitation rights.

See Adams, 288 Md. at 2 , 415 A.2d at 292 . Later, the wife began to doubt the propriety of the father’s visitation. See id. She sent her children to see a psychiatrist, who concluded ultimately that “the father had abused one of the children, and that he was ‘an ill man and in definite need of psychiatric treatment.’ ” Adams, 288 Md. at 2 , 415 A.2d at 292-98 .

The wife sought modification of the visitation rights on that basis. See Adams, 288 Md. at 2 , 415 A.2d at 293 . The father alleged that the psychiatrist defamed him. See Adams, 288 Md. at 2-3 , 415 A.2d at 293 .

Concluding that an absolute privilege protected the statements by the psychiatrist, the Adams Court reasoned that his statements were “published in a document which [wa]s prepared for possible use in connection with a pending judicial proceeding....” Adams, 288 Md. at 4 , 415 A.2d at 294 . Any other holding would permit a potential plaintiff to say, “ T do not bring the action against you for what you said in the witness-box, but I bring the action against you for what you told the solicitor you were about to say in the witness-box.’ ” Adams, 288 Md. at 7 , 415 A.2d at 295 (quoting Watson v. M’Ewan, (1905) A.C. 480(HL)). The “ ‘public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary ... must as a necessary consequence involve that which is a step towards and is part of the administration of justice — namely, the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove.’ ” Id. (quoting Watson). ⁶⁵⁶ 3.

Statements Made During the Course of a Pending or Ongoing Proceeding. Many