Norris v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance

Parke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company of Boston, Massachusetts issued three industrial insurance policies, of the aggregate amount of $638, upon the life of Helen Norris. The assured was the mother of an infant, Richard E. Norris, who was named as the beneficiary, subject to a stipulation which was common to every one of these policies and which has become known as the “facility of payment” clause. After providing for proof of the death of the assured and for a compliance with certain formal requirements, the clause proceeded with the promise to pay the amount of the insurance carried “either to the beneficiary above named, if living, or to such other living beneficiary as may be duly and finally designated and recognized by endorsement hereon or to the Executor or Administrator of said Insured or to any relative by blood or connection by marriage, or to any person appearing to the Company to be equitably entitled thereto by reason of having incurred expense in any way on behalf of the Insured for burial or for any other purpose; and the receipt of such payee shall be conclusive evidence that payment has been made to the person or persons entitled thereto and that all claims under this policy have been fully satisfied.” While these policies were in force, the assured died and was survived by her infant son, and all things had happened and had been done for the performance by the assurer of its promises under the contract.

The assured was a widow at the time of her death, and ⁵⁸⁰ her sister, Susie Seymour, was, with the assured’s son, the next of kin of the assured. The sister requested the assurrer to pay $426.50 of the insurance carried to Frederick A. Cole, an undertaker, to reimburse him for the funeral expenses and for the cost of a burial lot that he had paid or incurred. After making this payment, the residue of the insurance, or $211.50, was paid by the assurer to Susie Seymour as the guardian of the infant beneficiary. About two months later, the same Susie Seymour as his next friend brought an action at law in the name of the infant against the assurer for $426.50, on the theory that the payment of this sum to the undertaker was not a part performance of the contract óf insurance.

There is nothing on the record at bar to raise an issue of fraud or good faith in respect to the action of the assurer in making the payment to the undertaker at the instance of the sister of the assured, who was at the same time the guardian of the infant beneficiary. The payment was not only for the expenses of the funeral, but also for those at the cemetery. The measure of the obligation in this respect were the terms of the contract of insurance. So, the provisions , of section 5 of article 93 of the Code, which have been invoked to impose its terms as a restriction upon the amount of funeral expenses, but which have reference to the allowances, and their priority, in the statement of the account of an