Norwood v. State

⁶²⁴ BERGER, J. On the morning of March 12, 2011, Brittany Norwood (“Norwood”), appellant, and her co-worker, Jayna Murray (“Murray”), were discovered in the Lululemon Athletica retail store in Bethesda, Maryland, the apparent victims of a violent attack. Murray was found deceased, having suffered approximately 331 individual injuries. Norwood was found bound with zip-ties, with a laceration on her forehead and scratches on her abdomen. Norwood’s pants were torn at the crotch.

A check of Norwood’s neck, back, and extremities revealed no injuries. Norwood was placed on a stretcher and transported to a hospital for medical treatment. Over the course of the next several days, authorities investigated the incident and subsequently came to view Norwood as a suspect rather than a victim. Norwood was ultimately arrested on March 18, 2011 and was subsequently charged with murder.

Following an eight-day trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the sole charges submitted to the jury were first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree specific intent to kill murder. On November 2, 2011, the jury found Norwood guilty of first-degree murder. On January 27, 2012, the court sentenced Norwood to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Norwood presents two issues for our review on appeal, which we have rephrased and reordered as follows: 1.

Whether the trial court erred by denying Norwood’s motion to suppress statements she made to the police on March 16 and 18, 2011. 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by permitting a witness to testify about a laceration he saw on Norwood’s hand and about knife wounds he had seen in the past. For the reasons stated herein, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. ⁶²⁵ FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Many of the underlying facts of this case are not relevant to the rather limited issues raised on appeal. We set forth the facts significant to the issues presented and further facts that are relevant to the overall context in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Norwood and Murray were co-workers at the Bethesda Lululemon Athletica retail store. They had worked together at the store on the night of March 11, 2011. After closing the store, both Norwood and Murray left the building. At 9:51 p.m., Norwood telephoned Eila Rab, another sales associate at Lululemon, and told her that she had left her wallet at the store.

Norwood asked Ms. Rab for Murray’s telephone number so that she could call Murray and ask her to meet her at the store to let her in. Ms. Rab sent Murray’s phone number to Norwood via a text message. Norwood telephoned Murray, and Murray agreed to meet Norwood at the store. Once Norwood and Murray met at the Lululemon store, a violent encounter occurred which resulted in Murray’s death.

Employees at the Bethesda Apple Store, which adjoined the Lululemon store, heard noises coming from the Lululemon store shortly after 10:00 p.m., including sounds of dragging, grunting, thudding, and high-pitched squealing. One Apple Store employee asked a security guard to check the nature of the disturbance and spoke to another manager about the noises. The employee continued to hear noises, including screaming and yelling. The employee heard one female voice which sounded hysterical and another female voice saying, “Talk to me.

Don’t do this. Talk to me. What’s going on?” The employee heard additional screaming, yelps, and yells, and heard a voice say, “God help me. Please help me.” She did not believe the voice pleading to God was the same voice that had said, “Talk to me.

Don’t do this.” The employee left the Apple Store shortly after 11:00 p.m. Norwood attacked Murray with multiple weapons, causing approximately 331 individual injuries and ultimately Murray’s death. Murray had injuries to her head, face, neck, back, and ⁶²⁶ extremities. According to the medical examiner, Murray was alive when she incurred the majority of her injuries.

A stab wound to the back of Murray’s head hastened her death. Norwood doctored the scene in order to make it appear that a robbery had occurred and that both Murray and Norwood had been victims of an attack. Norwood used a pair of men’s size fourteen Reebok tennis shoes to create bloody footprints at the crime scene. 1 Norwood moved Murray’s car to a parking lot further from the Lululemon store and moved various items in the Lululemon store in an attempt to make it appear that a robbery had occurred. Norwood opened the safe in the store and removed three bags of money from it.

Norwood inflicted various superficial injuries upon herself, cut a slit in the crotch of her pants, bound her hands and feet with zip ties, and laid on the floor. Norwood then waited to be discovered the following morning. On the morning of March 12, 2011, manager Rachel Oertli arrived at the Lululemon store shortly before 8:00 a.m. She noticed that the door was unlocked and initially believed that someone had arrived just before her and had forgotten to lock the door.

When she entered the store, the lights were on and things were out of place, leading her to believe an altercation had occurred. Ms. Oertli called out and heard someone moaning. She left the store and immediately called 911. Ms. Oertli saw a man, Ryan Haugh, waiting outside the Apple Store 2 and asked him if he would accompany her into the Lululemon store.

Although he did not know Ms. Oertli, Mr. Haugh agreed to enter Lululemon with her. After they entered, Mr. Haugh went toward the back of the store by himself at Ms. Oertli’s request. Mr. Haugh saw a body lying face down and called out to Ms. Oertli to call the police because it appeared as if someone was dead. As Mr. Haugh ⁶²⁷ walked back toward Ms. Oertli, he saw a second person who was tied up but breathing.

Mr. Haugh told Ms. Oertli that there was one person who was dead and another person who was alive and appeared to have been sexually assaulted. Ms. Oertli called police for a second time. Several officers arrived shortly thereafter. When the police approached Norwood, she appeared to be unresponsive.

The police found Murray face down in a pool of blood with no pulse. An ambulance arrived at approximately 8:00 a.m. Norwood was placed on a stretcher and transported to Suburban Hospital. Officer Colin O’Brien was working part-time for Suburban Hospital performing security work as a uniformed police officer on March 12.

He met the ambulance carrying Norwood when it arrived and followed her stretcher into the trauma bay. Officer O’Brien observed a number of cuts on Norwood’s chest, legs, arms, and forehead. In particular, Officer O’Brien noticed a one to two-inch laceration on Norwood’s right hand that ran parallel to Norwood’s thumb. While at the hospital, Norwood was examined by a sexual assault nurse examiner.

The examination revealed no evidence of sexual assault. Over the next several days, multiple police officers engaged in various conversations with Norwood. Norwood’s statements to police officers during conversations were later the subject of a motion to suppress. Specifically, Norwood sought to suppress statements made on March 12, 14, 16, and 18. 3 The March 12 Interview Detective Deana Mackie of the Montgomery County Police Department met with Norwood at Suburban Hospital at 10:25 a.m. on March 12, 2011 for approximately forty-five to fifty minutes.

After her conversation with Norwood, Detective Mackie went to the Lululemon store before returning to Suburban Hospital at approximately 2:35 p.m. to speak with Norwood further. Detective Mackie viewed Norwood as a ⁶²⁸ victim and spoke with her to obtain information in order to develop a suspect. Norwood spoke freely and responded appropriately to Detective Mackie’s questions during both sessions. Norwood told Detective Mackie that she and Murray had been attacked by two men wearing masks.

She described an attack by two men in significant detail. Nor-wood told Detective Mackie that she had been raped and sexually assaulted with a clothing hanger. In addition to speaking with Norwood, while at Suburban Hospital, Detective Mackie spoke with various medical professionals. The March 14 Interview On March 14, 2011, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Detective Dimitry Ruvin and Detective James Drewry met with Nor-wood at her residence.

The detectives were wearing plainclothes attire. The meeting had been arranged through telephone conversations with Norwood’s family members. The detectives’ purpose in visiting Norwood was to introduce themselves and inquire as to whether Norwood remembered any additional details of the incident. Detective Ruvin testified that he still considered Norwood a victim during the March 14 interview.

When the detectives arrived, they met several of Norwood’s family members. Norwood emerged and the detectives introduced themselves and told her that they wanted to see if she had remembered anything else. At Norwood’s suggestion, the detectives and Norwood went downstairs to her living area and sat around a table in the living room area. Norwood recounted her story regarding the events of March 11-12, 2011 while the detectives took notes and recorded a portion of the interview. 4 The atmosphere of the conversation was very ⁶²⁹ casual, and Norwood was coherent and cooperative.

Norwood told the detectives that she was sexually assaulted. Norwood explained that the attacker told her that the only reason she was not killed was because she was “fun to fuck.” Norwood said that one attacker pushed her onto Murray’s body. Nor-wood told detectives that the attackers knew her name and address, which she presumed the attackers found on Comcast and Washington Gas bills which had been in her purse. Norwood told detectives that the attacker swore at her and called her a “dirty slut” and a racial epithet while sexually assaulting her.

Detective Ruvin testified that Norwood became emotional during the conversation about the sexual assault. She had tears in her eyes and looked down a lot, but continued to talk to the detectives. At the end of the interview, Norwood spoke with the detectives about what she was going to do in the future. Norwood told the detectives that her family wanted her to move back to Seattle, but that she had been recently offered a new job in Bethesda, which she planned to begin after she recovered.

The detectives recommended that Norwood inform her family members that the attackers knew her address. She told her family members in front of the detectives. Detective Ruvin testified that Norwood’s family members were “very, very concerned.” The detectives advised Norwood’s family members to contact the police if they saw anything suspicious. Detective Ruvin testified that at the end of the March 14 interview, he still viewed Norwood as a victim.

The March 16 Interview The detectives met with Norwood a third time on March 16, 2011. Norwood came to the police headquarters at the re ⁶³⁰ quest of Detective Drewry. By this time, Detective Drewry had begun to view Norwood as a suspect. Detective Drewry asked Norwood to come to headquarters in order to provide elimination fingerprints and hair samples.

Detective Drewry testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that Nor-wood was asked to come in both to provide elimination prints and because “it was also a ruse to get her to come in” to talk to the detectives. Norwood arrived at approximately 5:00 p.m. with two of her siblings. Norwood’s siblings left to get something to eat and Norwood was asked to sit in an interview room. The interview, which was video recorded, took place in an interview room at police headquarters. 5 The interview room had two doors, one of which was often left open and the other of which was occasionally open.

During the first approximately one hour of the interview, Norwood spoke informally with Detective Drewry while waiting for evidence technicians to take hair samples, photographs, and fingerprints. Norwood again described being attacked by two assailants. When asked whether she knew the type of car Murray drove, Norwood replied that she did not know. At the end of the interview, Norwood left the station with her family.

The following day, Norwood’s brother, Chris Norwood, and sister, Marissa Norwood, contacted the detectives via telephone. Norwood’s siblings explained that Norwood had been withholding information from the detectives because she was afraid that the suspects would harm her. Specifically, one of Norwood’s siblings told Detective Drewry that the attackers had forced her to move Murray’s car. An additional interview was scheduled, at Marissa Norwood’s request, for March 18, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. 6 ⁶³¹ The March 18 Interview On March 18, Norwood arrived at police headquarters accompanied by her siblings, Marissa and Chris Norwood.

Nor-wood went into an interview room with Detectives Drewry and Ruvin. At the beginning of the interview, Norwood discussed her plans for the future, including the possibility of moving back to her hometown of Seattle to move in with her brother, Chris. Norwood told Detective Drewry that her “only concern” with respect to moving to Seattle was that she wanted to be reachable by police during the investigation. Unprompted, Norwood initiated a conversation regarding Murray’s car, saying, “All right, I’m here because....” Nor-wood told detectives that prior to the sexual assault, the attackers made her move Murray’s car to a different parking lot.

According to Norwood, the attackers told her they would be watching her the entire time and threatened to kill her if she talked to anyone. She explained that she went, alone, to move Murray’s car. While moving Murray’s car, Norwood saw a police officer in a patrol vehicle but did not flag down the officer or attempt to contact him because she was too afraid. When asked why she returned to the Lululemon store after moving Murray’s car instead of driving away and attempting to contact police, Norwood explained that she was “afraid for [her] life” and that the attackers knew where she lived.

At one point during the interview, Norwood expressed, “we’ve been over this.” Detective Drewry responded, “Yeah, but every time we go over it something else comes out or changes a little so I’m just trying to get it as straight as possible.” 7 The trial court suppressed the statements made after this exchange. ⁶³² Eventually, Detective Drewry told Norwood that he did not believe her story and explained to her why the evidence demonstrated that her story was a lie. 8 Norwood’s siblings were brought into the interview room, and Detective Drewry explained to them why he believed Norwood had murdered Murray. Ultimately, Norwood was placed under arrest later that day. Following an eight-day trial in late October and early November of 2011, the charges submitted to the jury were first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree specific intent to kill murder. The jury found Norwood guilty of first-degree murder.

On January 27, 2012, the court sentenced Norwood to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This timely appeal followed. Additional facts shall be included as necessitated by our discussion of the issues. DISCUSSION I. Norwood maintains that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress statements made during the March 16, 2011 interview and during a portion of the March 18, 2011 interview.

Norwood asserts that the circumstances of the March 16 and March 18 interviews would have led a reasonable person to believe that he or she was in custody, and therefore, Miranda warnings were required. Having reviewed the video recordings of each interview and the transcript of the motion to suppress, we are persuaded that the trial court correctly determined that Norwood was not in custody and, therefore, Norwood was not entitled to Miranda warnings during the relevant time periods. ⁶³³ When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence “we confine ourselves to what occurred at the suppression hearing.” Gonzalez v. State, 429 Md. 632, 647 , 57 A.3d 484 (2012) (quoting Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 148 , 12 A.3d 1238 (2011)). Moreover, “[w]e view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion, here, the State.” Id. “The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence come within the province of the suppression court.” Id. at 647-48, 57 A.3d 484 (citing Long-shore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 499 , 924 A.2d 1129 (2007)); see also Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569 , 774 A.2d 420 (2001) (“We extend great deference to the fact finding of the suppression court and accept the facts as found by that court unless clearly erroneous.”). We review de novo the question of whether, based on the facts presented, a constitutional right has been violated.

Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 401 , 813 A.2d 231 (2002) (citing Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569 , 774 A.2d 420 (2001)). See also Upshur v. State, 208 Md.App. 383, 392 , 56 A.3d 620 (2012), cert. denied, 430 Md. 646 , 62 A.3d 732 (2013). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from being compelled to make self-incriminating statements. 9 U.S. Const. Amend.

V. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court recognized that a “police-dominated atmosphere” can be coercive and potentially “undermine the individual’s will to resist and ... compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” The Miranda Court held that, “[i]n order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and ⁶³⁴ effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” Id. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . The Court of Appeals described the warnings required by Miranda as follows: The prophylactic measures developed in Miranda are the now-familiar warnings that law enforcement personnel are required to convey to a suspect before embarking on any custodial interrogation: [A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Gonzalez v. State, 429 Md. 632, 650 , 57 A.3d 484 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). The requirements of Miranda only apply when a defendant is both (1) in custody; and (2) subject to interrogation.

We have explained: The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that, although “[a]ny police interview of an individual suspected of a crime has ‘coercive aspects to it,’ ” the Miranda requirements apply only to custodial interrogation. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2401-02 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011). Thus, before a defendant can claim the benefit of Miranda warnings, the defendant must establish two things: (1) custody; and (2) interrogation. Smith v. State, 186 Md.App. 498, 518 , 974 A.2d 991 (2009), aff'd, 414 Md. 357 , 995 A.2d 685 (2010).

The burden of “showing the applicability of the Miranda requirements,” i.e., that there was custody and interrogation, is on the defendant. Id. at 520 , 974 A.2d 991 . State v. Thomas, 202 Md.App. 545, 565 , 33 A.3d 494 (2011), aff'd, 429 Md. 246 , 55 A.3d 680 (2012) (alteration in original). It is undisputed that Norwood was subjected to interrogation during the March 16 and March 18 interviews.

Ac ⁶³⁵ cordingly, we consider only whether Norwood was in custody. “ ‘[Wjhether a suspect is ‘in custody’ is an objective inquiry.’ ” Id. at 565, 33 A.3d 494 (quoting J.D.B., supra, 131 S.Ct. at 2402 ). In Thomas, supra, we quoted from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in J.D.B., supra, which explained as follows: “Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Thomas, supra, 202 Md.App. at 566 , 33 A.3d 494 (quoting J.D.B., supra, 131 S.Ct. at 2402 (quoting Thompson v. Keo-hane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995))). Courts consider multiple factors when determining whether a defendant is in custody, considering the totality of the circumstances.

Id. at 567, 33 A.3d 494 . The factors considered include: [W]hen and where it occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present, what the officers and the defendant said and did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door, and whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or as a witness. Facts pertaining to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially how the defendant got to the place of questioning!],] whether he came completely on his own, in response to a police request or escorted by police officers. Finally, what happened after the interrogation!],] whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning. ⁶³⁶ Id. at 567-68 , 33 A.3d 494 (alterations in original) (quoting Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 429 , 924 A.2d 1072 (2007) (quoting Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141 , 411 A.2d 415 (1980))).

In the present case, the trial court determined that Miranda rulings were required at approximately fifty-two minutes into the March 18 interview. The trial court concluded that Norwood was not in custody when she spoke to detectives on March 16 and during the initial portion of the March 18 interview. With respect the March 16 interview, the trial court ruled as follows: 10 The fourth statement that is the subject of challenge is contained in the video recorded on March 16 which was taken at police headquarters. And during this period of time, at least in the initial part, the defendant, who was brought to the police station by family members and left with them at the end is fingerprinted and hair samples were obtained from her at that time.

In fact, she chatted quite amiably with the evidence technicians. It was amiable. She was animated. She was polite.

She didn’t appear to be intimidated by anything that happened. And then the interview that takes place afterwards — you know, I’ll remark to you, another thing that was just — it was uncanny to me — besides the facility with which she answered questions, having been a prosecutor and defense attorney for many years before coming on the bench and now being on the bench and watching videos for many years, I’ve seen instances where the police were interrogating a suspect and then they get up and leave and the camera is still running. ⁶³⁷ And you see defendants picking at themselves, moving around, jumping around, standing up, pounding their fists. I had to fast forward through several of the intervals when the police left the room on the 16th to see any movement in the defendant at all. She didn’t appear to be nervous.

She was composed. Just, you know, to suggest from that that there was some overbearing of her will, that these officers were subjecting [her] to a pressure-filled situation where her will was overborne, to me is just almost — it’s almost absurd. Again, the offering of detail that wasn’t asked for. The appropriate affect at times when emotions ought to be