Owens v. State

HOLLANDER, J. In this case, we must consider, among other things, whether the Circuit Court for Howard County erred in denying a new trial to Marcus Dannon Owens, appellant, after it was discovered that a foreign national sat on the jury that convicted Owens of second-degree depraved heart murder of his two-year old stepson, Kevonte Davis, as well as first degree assault and child abuse. 1 Appellant presents three issues, which we quote: 1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion for a new trial. 2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Appellant’s statements to police. 3. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions.

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm. ⁴⁴ I. Factual Summary A. Trial The following evidence was adduced at the trial in June 2004. Kenesha Davis married appellant on July 25, 2008, five days before Kevonte’s death on July 30, 2003. The couple lived with Ms. Davis’s two children, Dacquan Davis, then four, and Kevonte, as well as the couple’s seven-month-old son, Kemari Owens. In July 2003, Ms. Davis worked weekdays at a warehouse from 7 a.m. until 5:30 p.m.; appellant was unemployed.

Appellant and Ms. Davis shared a Honda Civic, so each morning they would bring the children to Yvette Edmunds, a day-care provider, and then appellant would take Ms. Davis to work. At the end of the work day, appellant would pick up the children as well as Ms. Davis. However, the children did not go to Ms. Edmunds on July 30, 2003. Ms. Davis testified that, on the morning of July 30, 2003, appellant dropped her off at work with the children.

At the time, Kevonte “was active and normal____” At around 5 p.m., when appellant arrived to pick up Ms. Davis, she noticed that Kevonte’s eyes were closed, he was “foaming at the mouth,” his hands were cold, and he was “moaning like he was in pain.” She and appellant took Kevonte to Howard County General Hospital (the “Hospital”), where he died. Lisa Zovko, a patient care technician in the Pediatric Emergency Room of the Hospital, was on duty when Kevonte arrived. Ms. Zovko saw “blood and foam” were coming from Kevonte’s mouth, and he was “posturing,” a “movement that can be described as arching and your limbs kind of go stiff and bend backwards,” reflective of “central nervous system damage.” Zovko “started suctioning the blood out of [Kevonte’s] mouth, because [she] didn’t want [Kevonte’s] airway to be compromised any more.” Zovko summoned Doctor Jackson Tsai, who then rushed Kevonte to the “code room.” While chest compressions were ⁴⁵ performed, Zovko noticed “an abrasion, like a rug burn,” on Kevonte’s chest. Resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful, however.

According to Ms. Zovko, both parents were upset by Kevonte’s death. Dr. Tsai treated Kevonte as “a priority one patient.” While Dr. Tsai was attempting to resuscitate Kevonte, he observed the victim’s chest and noticed “some ecchymosis or bruising ... right below the ribs.” In addition, he saw “some bruising over the right side of [Kevonte’s] face ... around the eyeball,” as well as “[t]he liver spleen area.” He also reported that the child’s “belly was sort of distended.” According to Dr. Tsai, appellant did not provide a history as to the source of trauma that would explain the child’s injuries. Dr. Tsai noted that the “history” provided by appellant was that Kevonte was eating “peanut butter that afternoon” and that “[t]here was no history of trauma. No history of fall.

Or a thud that, that was heard by [appellant]. No history of ingestions.” Dr. David Monroe, the Director of the Hospital’s pediatric emergency room, recalled that Kevonte was “bleeding from his mouth,” had “a very large bruise on his upper abdomen, lower chest,” and bruising on his face and the upper back. Dr. Monroe spoke with appellant to obtain a medical history for Kevonte. Owens told Dr. Monroe that he thought “everything was fine until somewhere between four and four thirty.” In Dr. Monroe’s view, appellant’s “story didn’t match at all what we saw in the room.

I mean, something, some serious trauma had happened to this child. The story I was given right then was nothing happened.” According to Dr. Monroe, the “massive injuries” suffered by Kevonte were similar to those of “someone that fell off a building, several stories.... Or a very serious car accident. Or child abuse.” Dr. Monroe also testified that the low oxygen level in the child’s blood tended to establish that Kevonte had bled to death.

Dr. Monroe acknowledged that chest compressions performed on a person with an existing ⁴⁶ break to the ribs could “aggravate the problem to some extent.” Lavanda Pope, Kevonte’s great aunt, responded to the Hospital and thought that appellant seemed “agitated.” When appellant saw Ms. Pope, he said: “ ‘They’re trying to accuse me of killing Kevonte.’ ” At the time of that remark, the “detectives were standing behind” him. Ms. Pope told appellant “that the officers were doing their job and at this point he needed to let them do his (inaudible) job, because Kenesha is dealing with the fact that her son is dead.” Ms. Pope also saw Kevonte’s body, and noticed “a bruise on his face” as well as a “big bruise in the middle of his chest.” Detective Joseph King secured appellant’s residence “until a search warrant could be completed.” During the execution of the search warrant, he found that the home’s telephone was in working order. Sergeant William Porter was also involved in the search of appellant’s home. During the search, he found soiled toddler pants, a soiled diaper in the bathroom, and a soiled wet washcloth in the sink.

Michael DeVilbis, a maintenance employee at Genco at the time of Kevonte’s death, testified that he saw appellant pick up Ms. Davis on the evening in question. Mr. DeVilbis heard appellant tell Ms. Davis that “ ‘he been [sic] shaking the kids all day and couldn’t get ‘em up’ ” Yvette Edmunds, the children’s day-care provider, recalled that appellant called her late on the morning in question, and advised that the children were coming. However, the children never arrived, nor did she hear from appellant again. Detective Eric Kruhm responded to the Hospital and viewed Kevonte’s body, which was bruised on the face and chest.

Kruhm first encountered Owens with Dacquan in the playroom of the pediatric ward. At that time, Kruhm and Detective Shaffer had a “conversation” with appellant, who responded “freely” to their questions. Detective Kruhm recounted: ⁴⁷ [E]arly that morning, [appellant] had a job prospect that he went to. And that they sent him home....

He said he called the babysitter and told her that he would be bringing the children that day. He said he got home. They had breakfast. That his child ... had diarrhea that day and that he didn’t have what he needed for the kids for day-care.

So he ended up not taking them that day.... That ... the boys, who would be Dacquan and the victim, played that day. They rode bikes. They watched television.

He said that around noontime, they had lunch, all of them. And that the boys went back to the living room to watch TV. He went upstairs to give his son a bottle. And he said that Dacquan and the victim had fallen asleep in front of the television.

He said that close to five o’clock ... he had to wake the boys up. They were still asleep. He said that the victim was very fussy.... So he let him lay there.

And then he came back and he said he wasn’t acting right. And that he was falling back asleep.... So he got the kids in the car. He went to his wife’s job in Columbia and picked her up.

And ... he said that the victim was dozing off in the car. Detective Kruhm asked appellant how Kevonte sustained his bruising. According to Detective Kruhm, appellant advised that it was probably from fighting with his brother Dacquan or that it might have happened at day care. But first he said he wasn’t sure....

He said that he was the only one with the children that day. He had watched them from the time he got back from dropping his wife until the time he went to pick her up. He said that no one visited the home. He said that they didn’t leave the home.

Detective Kruhm also testified: “At one point, [appellant] backed his head against the wall and he said, quote, ‘Fucking up.’ And then at another point in the conversation, between questions he said, ‘How does this shit happen?’ ” At approximately 9:45 p.m., Detective Kruhm had a second “conversation” with appellant at the Hospital, which was re ⁴⁸ corded by audiotape. The interview was played for the jury and a transcription was admitted in evidence. In the statement, appellant denied responsibility for Kevonte’s death. Doctor Zabiullah Ali, an Assistant Medical Examiner, performed the autopsy on Kevonte.

He was admitted, without objection, as an expert “in the field of forensic pathology.” During the autopsy, Dr. Ali observed bruising to the victim’s right temple, left lip, head, and lower chest/upper abdomen. In addition, Kevonte had four fractured ribs and two injuries to his liver. The doctor opined that the cause of the injury to the ribs and liver was blunt force to the abdomen/chest, which then caused internal bleeding. Kevonte also had “bruising of ... both lungs [and the] thymus.... ” According to Dr. Ali, a small child could not have inflicted the injuries sustained by Kevonte.

He claimed that “we usually observe these kinds of injuries in motor vehicle accidents.” Dr. Ali also stated that, because of Kevonte’s rib fractures, he would not have been able to put his shirt on by himself. Dr. Ali opined “that the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma,” inflicted less than four to six hours before death. Dr. Ali also concluded that “[t]he manner of death was homicide.” Appellant was the sole witness for the defense. He recalled that he was with the children from approximately 7:30 a.m. on July 30, 2003, until he drove with the children to pick up his wife at approximately 5:00 p.m.

Appellant explained that he fed the children lunch, but Kevonte “just play[ed] with his.” After lunch, Owens left the children downstairs watching TV, while he took care of the baby upstairs. The following exchange is relevant: [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: And so you’re upstairs with the baby lying on your chest? [APPELLANT]: On top of me. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: And what occurred at that point? ⁴⁹ [APPELLANT]: I heard them, I guess they, they may have got into something or whatever. I just yelled downstairs and told them to cut it out or I was going to cut the TV off. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And what do you mean they got into something? [APPELLANT]: I believe it was like a little, a little fight or argument or something, it was a truck or something. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay.

And is this unusual? [APPELLANT]: No. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And so after that, what did you hear from downstairs? [APPELLANT]: Nothing. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: All right. And so what did you do upstairs? [APPELLANT]: I just laid on the floor ... and ... I just fell asleep. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: And at some point you woke up.

Do you remember what woke you up? [APPELLANT]: I heard a truck like backfire like the next parking lot over or something. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And you went downstairs because? [APPELLANT]: Because I’d fallen asleep. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: And? Anything else? [APPELLANT]: Just, uh, it just dawned on me to go check on them because I feel [sic] asleep — [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And so what happened after that? [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Daquan was by the TV.

Kevonte, he was back a little ways from Daquan, like over by the sliding door, glass door, balcony door. ⁵⁰ [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: And is that where he was the last time you had been downstairs? [APPELLANT]: No, it wasn’t. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: At that point, what were they both doing? [APPELLANT]: Daquan was up. Kevonte was asleep. According to appellant, after checking on the boys, he went back upstairs, gave the baby a bottle, and prepared to pick up his wife. The following testimony is relevant: [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: And when you talk about gathering things, what are you gathering?

What are you putting together? [APPELLANT]: Like extra bottle and looking for clothes and stuff like that. Tee shirts or whatever. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: All right. And what was, what were the kids doing? [APPELLANT]: Kevonte was still laying down and Daquan was like, he was like on his knees, I believe, looking at TV. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And what did you do then? [APPELLANT]: And I believe I gave Daquan some shoes.

Or something. And I had a shirt for Kevonte with me. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. What did you do with that shirt? [APPELLANT]: I woke him up and told him to put his shirt on, because it was almost time to go pick Mommy up. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And what happened next? [APPELLANT]: He got up and was like proceeding to put his shirt on.

I went in the kitchen for something and went back upstairs. ⁵¹ [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And did you come back downstairs? [APPELLANT]: Yeah. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Did Kevonte have his shirt on? [APPELLANT]: Partially. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. What do you mean by that? [APPELLANT]: He like had his, had his arm in it and like hanging on his shoulder like by his neck. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: So like one arm through the sleeve? [APPELLANT]: Yeah. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And what happened with Kevonte after that? [APPELLANT]: He sat up, put his shirt on, laid back down.

Like groggy. Like still sleepy like. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Did you notice any kind of bruising on Kevonte? [APPELLANT]: I noticed like maybe a little scratch or something on his face. Something like, like they might have been fighting or something like that or — something. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Did you see anything on his chest area? [APPELLANT]: I didn’t notice anything. (Emphasis added.) B. Post-Trial The jury returned its verdict on June 10, 2004.

That evening, Steven Merson, the Howard County Jury Commissioner, received a voice-mail message from Juror 10, Adeyemi Alade, a twenty-eight year old Nigerian national. Alade expressed concern about his jury service because he was not a United States citizen. 2 ⁵² The court decided to hold a hearing on June 18, 2004, to discuss the matter. At the outset of the hearing, the court said: “And we’re here today, really at my request, I guess, since there is no pending motion, to just inquire as to the nature and content of a phone call received by our jury commissioner after the trial was concluded.” Mr. Merson testified about the telephone message he received from Mr. Alade on June 10, 2004. According to Merson, Alade related that he was “worried about his status, or the status of the case, since he was a non-citizen.” According to Mr. Merson, potential jurors are mailed a juror qualification form several weeks before they are scheduled to report, which they are to fill out and return to the court.

He identified Mr. Alade’s juror qualification form. Part B of the form provides: QUALIFIED: — I am qualified to serve as a juror and will report as instructed. — I am qualified to serve as a juror and will need an accommodation (i.e., sign language interpreter, etc.) DISQUALIFIED: I AM NOT QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS A JUROR BECAUSE — I am no longer a resident of Howard County. My new address is: — I am not a citizen of the United States. I am a citizen of — I do not have sufficient knowledge of the English language to act as a juror. — I have been convicted of a criminal offense and received a fine of more than $500 or a sentence of more than (6) six months, and have not been pardoned. — I have pending charges against me punishable by a fine of more than $500 or a sentence of more than (6) six months. ⁵³ — I have a civil case pending in Howard County, (except for civil actions in which a party is not entitled to a jury trial.) — I have a physical or mental infirmity that would impair my capacity to serve as a juror.

(Please attach letter explanation). Merson explained that Mr. Alade checked the box indicating that he was qualified to serve as a juror. Further, he testified that it is not the practice of his office to review the information supplied on the form at the time jurors appear for service, unless it appears that some information is missing. Merson acknowledged that the film shown to jurors upon arrival for service does not include information regarding qualifications for service as a juror.

Mr. Alade testified that Nigeria is his “country of origin,” and he is not a United States citizen. As a graduate student in the United States, he is “a permanent resident,” and may remain in this country as long as he is “working, serving [in] the military, [or] go[ing] to school.” At the time of the hearing, Alade had been in the United States for two years. He holds a valid Maryland driver’s license, which lists his Howard County address. Alade related that he contacted Mr. Merson after a colleague at school informed him that only United States citizens are allowed to serve on juries.

Mr. Alade confirmed that he received in the mail the juror qualification form, and checked the space indicating that he was “qualified” to serve. He explained that he “just missed” the portion of the form regarding categories for disqualification, but “[i]t wasn’t deliberate.” He added: “Maybe I just [flipped] through [the form] and didn’t see that.” To the best of Alade’s recollection, when he reported for jury duty nobody sought to verify his citizenship. Nor was he asked about his citizenship at any time during the course of the trial. At the end of the hearing the court stated: “Okay.

I guess that’s all that is before me today, is just to make the inquiry, ⁵⁴ and there’s nothing pending, so with that, I guess we’ll conclude for today.” On the same day as the hearing, appellant filed a “Motion for a New Trial,” pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-331. 3 He argued that his “trial was not conducted before a lawful jury,” because the “jury contained a juror who was not qualified for jury service in that he was not a citizen of the United States and [he] was not qualified to vote in the county where the trial took place.” In its opposition to the motion, the State asserted: 1. The Defendant was afforded a trial before a fair and impartial jury as is required by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 2. A non-citizen was inadvertently seated on the Defendant’s petit jury. The participation of a non-citizen on the jury does not render the verdict null and void. 3.

Citizenship is a Maryland statutory requirement for juror eligibility. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 8-207; Hunt v. Maryland, 345 Md. 122 , 691 A.2d 1255 (1997). Neither the United States Constitution nor the Maryland Declaration of Rights requires that a jury be comprised only of citizens. Instead, the Defendant is constitutionally guaranteed a right to a fair and impartial trial jury which he was in fact afforded. 4.

The Defendant waived any challenge to the statutory eligibility of the jurors by not challenging the array pursuant to Courts and Judicial Proceedings, Section 8-211. Hunt v. Maryland, 345 Md. 122, 143-144 , 691 A.2d 1255 (1997). The Defendant further waived any challenge to the statutory disqualification of the non-citizen juror by failing to request a voir dire question regarding the statutory requirement of juror eligibility. Hunt, 345 Md. at 144 , 691 A.2d 1255 .

The non-citizen juror did not indicate bias or prejudice by answering any of the voir dire questions posit ⁵⁵ ed by the Court as requested by the Defendant and the State. He was, therefore, a fair and impartial juror. 5. The jury in this case unanimously reached a fair verdict after deliberating for four (4) hours. 6. The evidence fully supported the verdict rendered by the jury. 7.

The interests of justice require that this Court deny the Defendant’s Motion. The Defendant has not cited any authority in his motion justifying the extraordinary relief he seeks. On July 16, 2004, the court held a hearing as to appellant’s motion for new trial. Appellant’s counsel maintained that United States citizenship is a requirement for service on a Maryland jury.

Further, he argued: The [Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article] contains a list of various types of disqualifications, which run from ... not being physically strong, or not being able to hear well, to having a pending misdemeanor charge or a pending civil case that would entitle one to a jury. I would suggest to the Court that ... not all these disqualifications are created equal. And I would suggest to the Court that non-citizenship is a disqualification that takes on different significance than perhaps the other disqualifications that are listed in the statute. Defense counsel continued: At this time in history, when our nation is at war with foreign nationals who would seek the destruction of our institutions and way of life in this country, I think that we have to look particularly at the question of non-citizenship and view it in a way different than perhaps some of these other disqualifications may be viewed....

And I think, Your Honor, that in that situation, the factors that were mentioned in Perkins v. Smith [ 370 F.Supp. 134 (D.Md.1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 , 96 S.Ct. 2616 , 49 L.Ed.2d 368 (1976),] ... affirmed by the Supreme Court ... talks about ... citizenship as a requirement for jury service and the importance of citizenship as a requirement for jury service, when ⁵⁶ they mention that the State can presume its citizens are conversant with the social and political institutions of our society, the customs of the locality, the nuances of local tradition and language, and naturalized citizens have at least demonstrated a basic understanding of our form of government, history and traditions, there is no corresponding basis for assuming that resident aliens have that same shared, national mores that is essential in reaching the determinations which, in the jury system, as Perkins v. Smith says, is the very palladium of a free government. So my limited request, and the limited rule for which I advocate, is that when the disqualification is non-citizenship and when it comes to light prior to the entry of judgment, during that ten day period when the Court had broad discretion to grant a motion for a new trial, I would say in that limited circumstance, it would be an abuse of the Court’s discretion not to grant the motion for a new trial____ The State countered that neither the United States Constitution nor the Maryland Declaration of Rights requires citizenship of Maryland jurors. Further, it maintained that appellant waived his claim, because he failed to request a voir dire question regarding juror eligibility. Moreover, the State asserted that no prejudice to the accused was shown.

It argued: Your Honor, this was a case that was heard before a jury of twelve. It was a jury selected after several hours.... At no time, Your Honor, was there a challenge to the array, suggesting at all that the jury was not eligible or qualified or had been chosen in a manner contrary to the provisions of the Courts Article which governs jury selection and service. Your Honor, the legislature of Maryland has spoken in terms of what it is that is to be acceptable as a juror.

If the Court looks to the ... statute that governs qualifications of a juror, you will see, Your Honor, language that is inclusive rather than exclusive. The legislature has very ⁵⁷ limited situations in which they deem a person to be disqualified to serve, one of which the State accedes is in fact citizenship, because you have to ... be able to be registered to vote in the county.... What we find ourselves in, at least in this county and particularly in this case, is that we have now extended from the voter registration rolls to include the motor vehicle rolls for selection of jurors, as is acceptable under the jury plan that was selected for Howard County and acceptable under the Courts Article. The hope being that you would garner more diversity, more jurors that may be eligible for service.

Again, more inclusive rather than exclusive____The legislature has spoken in this particular state and has made it a statutory disqualification to have citizenship be a requirement for service on a jury. There is nothing in the United States Constitution itself or the Maryland Declaration of Rights which creates a constitutional right of a jury comprised solely of United States citizens. Here in this case, Your Honor, we had multiple questions being asked of the prospective jurors regarding bias.... Here, the defense chose not to ask any other questions regarding statutory disqualifications.

The Court in fact went beyond what was asked ... by the attorneys in this case.... The Court asked regarding pending of a civil suit. That was contained neither in the defense voir dire or the State’s voir dire. To determine whether or not there was a disqualifying factor in tíiat particular case.

(Emphasis added.) The State continued: Your Honor, we’re in, we are at war. There is no question. But we’re not at war with Nigeria, which is the citizenship of Mr. Alade. And I suggest to the Court that ... flag-waving here is somewhat inappropriate in this particular case, because there is no suggestion that Mr. Alade is anything but honest, anything but honorable.

When he found out that in fact there may be a problem -with his ⁵⁸ having served on this jury, he immediately contacted the jury commissioner, Mr. Merson. Left a message that Thursday night following the verdict. He came in to the court, gave testimony that was very clear this was simply a situation in which the line regarding citizenship was overlooked. This was not an intentional misapplication of, or an intentional lie or something untoward for him to be able to sit on this jury.

We have before us, Your Honor, a situation where if the Court were to grant this motion for new trial, we’ve had already three days of testimony. We have had twelve jurors sitting in a box. All the courtroom personnel, all the attorneys involved here----The reason that there are strict guidelines set forth in the statute for challenging the qualifications of a juror, is because there is a greater interest in having some finality, Your Honor, in this system. And absent any showing of bias or prejudice, which has not even been close to being shown in this case.... [T]o grant a new trial sets a precedent.

And a precedent that I suggest the Court would open Pandora’s box, because it would be used by others to look at juror’s personal lives.... And in the interest of justice, the State suggests this verdict should stand. In a well reasoned opinion issued on July 21, 2003, the court denied appellant’s motion. The trial court recognized that, under Md. Rule 4-331, it had the discretionary authority to order a new trial in the interest of justice.

The court also recognized that Maryland Code (1973, 2002 RepLVol.), § 8-207(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”) “enumerates nine (9) grounds for disqualification of jurors,” and “one such ground” is “[n]ot being constitutionally qualified to vote in the county where the court convenes.... ” But, the court concluded that neither the United States Constitution nor the Maryland Declaration of Rights “mandates that a jury be comprised solely of United States’ [sic] citizens.” It stated: ⁵⁹ The Defendant asserts that the disqualifying factor of Mr. Alade’s non-citizenship could not reasonably have been discovered during the voir dire examination of potential jurors. The basis for the Defendant’s proposition is his contention that the court is not required to ask proposed voir dire questions disclosing potential statutory disqualification since it is presumed that the court has already screened and removed disqualified persons prior to the commencement of voir dire. The Defendant additionally contends that the court need not have asked any questions about citizenship in voir dire had the Defendant proposed them. The fallacy of the Defendant’s argument is that neither the State nor the defense requested a voir dire question directed to the issue of citizenship.

Had such a question been requested, the court would in all likelihood have made the inquiry (as it did sua sponte regarding the issue of pending jury trials) and Mr. Alade would have been excused as a disqualified juror. Contrary to the Defendant’s assertions, a reasonable opportunity existed to challenge Mr. Alade’s qualifications to serve as a juror during the voir dire questioning of potential jurors. The Defendant did not avail himself of this opportunity. The Court notes that Mr. Alade responded appropriately to all questions posed to him by the Court and/or counsel during the evidentiary hearing.

Based upon this fact, it would appear that Mr. Alade has no difficulty understanding or conversing in the English language. The jurors deliberated for approximately four (4) hours. The jurors did not send out any questions during the course of their deliberations which suggests that the jurors (including Mr. Alade) had no difficulty understanding the evidence or the instructions of law in reaching their unanimous verdicts. In addition, there has been no showing that Mr. Alade’s non-citizen status in any way or manner prejudiced the Defendant’s case, his consideration of the evidence, or the jury’s deliberations. ⁶⁰ Testimony adduced from Mr. Alade at the evidentiary hearing established that his failure to note that he was not a citizen of the United States was simply an oversight.

He testified that he overlooked the line asking this question on the juror qualification questionnaire. The Court finds Mr. Alade’s testimony in this regard to be credible. The Court further finds that Mr. Alade did not provide a dishonest response to the citizenship question. The Court notes that the questionnaire itself is confusing.

As reflected on Court’s Exhibit A, a person can “check off’ that he or she is qualified to serve as a juror before even seeing the disqualifying factors listed below. There was no evidence presented in the case sub judice to suggest that the presence of Mr. Alade on the jury in any way denied the Defendant a fair and impartial trial or violated his due process rights. The mere presence and participation of a juror who would have been disqualified by statutory provisions is not a basis for a new trial absent a showing of bias or prejudice. The Defendant has failed to make such a showing.

The Court will accordingly deny the Defendant’s Motion for New Trial. We shall include additional facts in our discussion.

II

Discussion A. Juror Disqualification Owens insists that, in order to be qualified for jury service in Maryland, “one must be a United States citizen and a citizen of the State.... ” Because “Mr. Alade was not registered to vote in Howard County-and, indeed, was a non-citizen,” appellant contends that Alade was “neither constitutionally nor statutorily qualified to sit as a juror in the instant case.” According to appellant, he was “effectively left [with] a jury of eleven, violating Maryland Rule 4-311 ... and the constitutional requirement of unanimity of twelve jurors in order to convict in a criminal case....” Therefore, he claims that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. ⁶¹ In support of his claim that he was entitled to a jury composed of twelve citizens of the United States, Owens relies on the Sixth Amendment of United States Constitution, Articles 5, 21, 23, and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as well as the common law. He asserts: [Ujnder the English common law, while not entirely sufficient, it was at least necessary that jurors be drawn from the county in which the “fact (crime) was committed.” ... It goes without saying, then that citizenship was a prerequisite for jury service under the common law of England[ and so it goes without saying that such is the case under the explicit terms of Article 5 of the Constitution of Maryland and its incorporation of then existing English common law. (Citations omitted; emphasis in original).

Urging us to reverse his convictions, Owens adds: Appellant respectfully suggests that owing to the unprecedented historical and political circumstances in which we find our country and the several United States — that we are, indeed, at war with [an] enemy which is comprised, at the very least, of an unspecified number and variety of foreign nationals who likely move about freely among us as yet undetected-that this Court should interpret the “impartial jury” requirement under the federal constitution, Sixth Amendment, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, to mean that in any trial by jury in a criminal case, all of the jurors be United State’s [sic] citizens. (Emphasis in original). Although the State agrees that “[t]he right to trial by jury is a fundamental right, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and by the Maryland Declaration of Rights,” it contends that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for a new trial. It maintains: “Contrary to Owens’s contention, and as the trial court correctly held, ‘[n]either the United States Constitution nor the Maryland Declaration of Rights mandates that a jury be ⁶² comprised solely of United States’ citizens.’ ” (Citation omitted).

According to the State, the trial court correctly concluded that “there has been no showing that Mr. Alade’s non-citizen status in any way or manner prejudiced [Owens’s] case, his consideration of the evidence, or the jury’s deliberation.” Thus, it maintains that Mr. Alade’s inclusion on the jury “did not infringe on Owens’s due process right to a fair and impartial jury” of twelve persons. Furthermore, the State agrees with the trial court that “Owens had a reasonable opportunity to challenge Mr. Alade’s qualifications to serve as a juror during the voir dire process,” but did not avail himself of the opportunity. Disputing appellant’s contention that “voir dire was not adequate,” the State reminds us that “the trial court found that no questions were requested directed to the issue of citizenship and that ‘[h]ad such a question been requested, the court would in all likelihood have made the inquiry----’ ” Thus, it contends that the trial court properly concluded that “Owens waived his complaint to the presence of the non-citizen juror and, because, Owens failed to make a showing of bias or prejudice, Owens stated no grounds warranting a new trial.” We begin our analysis with a review of the right to a trial by jury in a criminal case. The right of a criminally accused person to trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 4 made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ⁶³ as well as Articles 5, 5 21, 6 and 24 7 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

Maryland Rule 4-311 is also pertinent. It provides, in part: Rule 4-311. Trial by jury. (a) Right preserved.

The right of trial by jury as guaranteed by the Maryland Constitution and the Maryland ⁶⁴ Declaration of Rights or as provided by law shall be preserved to the parties in circuit court inviolate. (b) Number of jurors. A jury shall consist of 12 persons unless the parties stipulate at any time in writing or on the record that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12. In Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618 , 843 A.2d 64 (2004), the Court of Appeals reiterated that “[t]he right to a trial by jury, of twelve persons, has been part of the common law for centuries, along with the requirement of unanimity.

The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Maryland Rules, as well as the United States Constitution.” Id. at 625-26 , 843 A.2d 64 (citing Kawamura v. State, 299 Md. 276 , 473 A.2d 438 (1984)). In reviewing the right to a jury trial, the Court said, id. at 626, 843 A.2d 64 (emphasis added): Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in pertinent part, “That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to ... trial by Jury____” Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights provides, in pertinent part, “That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.” ... Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights provides, “That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges ... or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” The reference to “jury” in our organic laws, refers to a jury as constituted under the common law, unless the contrary plainly appears. See State v. Kenney, 327 Md. 354, 361 , 609 A.2d 337, 340 (1992); State v. Ledger, 175 Wis.2d 116 , 499 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Ct.App.1993) (citing State v. Gollmar, 32 Wis.2d 406 , 145 N.W.2d 670, 671-72 (1966)).

Cf. Bryan v. State Roads Comm’n, 356 Md. 4, 14 , 736 A.2d 1057, 1061 (1999) (holding that the 1992 amendment to Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights permits a six person jury in all cases except criminal cases); Thompson v. State, 278 Md. 41, 53 , ⁶⁵ 359 A.2d 203, 210 (1976) (noting that common law right to a jury trial exists absent a rule or statute taking the right away where it would be constitutionally permissible to do so). The right to a jury trial is codified in Maryland in Title 8 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”) of the Maryland Code (1974, 2005 Supp.), which governs “Juries.” 8 Notably, C.J. § 8-102 provides that jurors shall be randomly chosen from “citizens” of the State. In particular, it provides: 9 § 8-102.

Declaration of policy. (a) Right to jury selected, at random. — When a litigant in a court of the State is entitled to trial by a petit jury and when a person accused of a criminal offense is presented to a grand jury, the jury shall be selected at random from a fair cross section of the citizens of the State who reside in the county where the court convenes. (b) Opportunity and duty to serve. — Every citizen of this State has: (1) The opportunity to serve on grand and petit juries; and (2) The obligation to serve when summoned as a juror. (Emphasis added.) Subtitle 2 of Title 8 concerns juror selection.

Until December 31, 2000, prospective jurors in Maryland were selected solely “from among those persons at least 18 years old or older whose names appear on the voter registration lists, and from such additional sources permitted by a plan adopted under [C.J.] § 8-201.” See C.J. § 8-104 (1998 Repl.Vol.). ⁶⁶ With respect to the “sources of prospective jurors,” C.J. § 8-104 was revised, effective January 1, 2001, to provide, in part: (a) Sources — The jury commissioner or the clerk of the court shall select the names of prospective jurors from among: (1) Those persons at least 18 years old whose names appear on the voter registration lists; (2) The list of individuals at least 18 years old who have been issued a driver’s license by the Motor Vehicle Administration; [10] (3) The list of individuals at least 18 years old who have been issued an identification card by the Motor Vehicle Administration; and (4) Additional sources permitted by a plan adopted under § 8-201 of this title. (Emphasis added.) C.J. § 8-201 provides that each circuit court shall maintain a “written plan for random selection of ... petit jurors....” 11 C.J. § 8-202(2) requires that each jury selection plan shall “[sjpecify detailed procedures to be followed by the jury commissioner or clerk in selecting names from the voter registration lists, the Motor Vehicle Administration lists ... or from other sources....” 12 Of particular import here, C.J. § 8 — 202(5)(i)(l) provides for a “juror qualification form” that asks all potential jurors the following: ⁶⁷ 1. The potential juror’s A. Name, address, age, sex and education; B. Race, religion, national origin, C. Occupation and occupation of spouse; D. Length of residence within the county; and E. Prior jury service; In addition, the “juror qualification form” must ask the following, pursuant to C.J. § 8 — 202(5)(i)(2)—(5): § 8-202. Same — Mandatory provisions. 2.

Whether the potential juror should be excused from jury service because the individual has any physical or mental infirmity impairing the individual’s capacity to serve as a juror; 3. If the potential juror is able to read, write, speak, and understand the English language; 4. If the potential juror has pending against the individual any charge for the commission of, or has been convicted in any state or federal court of record, of a criminal offense other than a minor traffic offense (i.e., one punishable by a fine of $500 or less or imprisonment for six months or less) and has not been legally pardoned; and 5. Any other questions not inconsistent with the provisions of this title, required by the juror selection plan in the interests of the sound administration of justice.

(ii) The juror shall certify under penalty of perjury that his responses are true to the best of his knowledge. Notarization is not required. (iñ) The form shall make clear to the person that furnishing any information with respect to his race, religion, or national origin is not a prerequisite to his qualifications for jury service, and that his information need not be furnished if the person finds it objectionable to do so. C.J. § 8-206 provides for the mailing of juror qualification forms to those persons selected at random under C.J. § 8-205, ⁶⁸ with instructions to complete the form and return it within ten days.

C.J. § 8-206(c) provides: 13 § 8-206. Completion of the juror qualification form; failure to return form; questioning jurors’ qualifications. (c) Judge may question juror about qualifications. — When a person appears for jury service, or is interviewed by the jury judge, clerk or jury commissioner, the person may be required to fill out another juror qualification form in the presence of the jury commissioner or the clerk of the court, and at that time, if it appears warranted, the person may be questioned, but only about his responses to questions contained on the form and grounds for his excuse or disqualification. The clerk or jury commissioner shall note any additional information thus acquired on the juror qualification form and transmit it to the jury judge.

C.J. § 8-207 is also of import here, as it sets forth the grounds for juror disqualification. 14 It provides, in part: § 8-207. Qualifications for jury service. (a) Determination. — A person may not be disqualified or excused from jury service except on the basis of information provided by the juror qualification form as it may be supplemented by an interview or other competent evidence. The determination of a prospective juror’s qualifications shall be made by the jury judge on his own initiative, or on the recommendation of the clerk or jury commissioner....

(b) Grounds for disqualification. — A person is qualified to serve as a juror unless he: (1) Is not constitutionally qualified to vote in the county where the court convenes; ⁶⁹ (2) Is unable to read, write, or understand the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form; (3) Is unable to speak the English language or comprehend spoken English; (4) Is incapable, by reason of physical or mental infirmity, of rendering satisfactory jury service; any person claiming such a disqualification may be required to submit a doctor’s certificate as to the nature of the infirmity; (5) Has a charge pending against him for a crime punishable by a fine of more than $500, or by imprisonment for more than six months, or both, or has been convicted of such a crime and has received a sentence of a fine of more than $500, or of imprisonment for more than six months, or both, and has not been pardoned; (6) Has a charge pending against him for, or has been convicted of, an offense punishable under the provision of § 8 401(c) of this title; (7) Is a party in a civil suit, except for those civil actions in which a party is not entitled to a jury trial, pending in the court in which he is called to serve; (8) Is under 18 years of age; or (9) Fails to meet any other objective test prescribed by the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis added). As noted, C.J. § 8-207(b)(l) does not expressly disqualify those who are not citizens of the United States. Rather, it renders unqualified any person ineligible to vote in the jurisdiction “where the court convenes.” Therefore, we must next look to the laws governing voter eligibility.

Those laws make clear that only United States citizens are entitled to vote. Article 1, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution, provides: Every citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding the election, shall ⁷⁰ be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he resides at all elections to be held in this State. (Emphasis supplied). Article 1, § 2 of the Maryland Constitution states, in part: “[N]o person shall vote, at any election, Federal or State, hereafter to be held in this State, or at any municipal election in the City of Baltimore, unless his name appears in the list of registered voters.” Section § 3-102 of the Election Law Article of the Md. Code (2002, 2005 Supp.) also provides that, in order to qualify to vote in Maryland, a person must be a United States citizen. 15 It states: § 3-102.

Qualifications for voter registration. (a) In general. — Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, an individual may become registered to vote if the individual: (1) is a citizen of the United States; (2) is at least 18 years old or will be 18 years old on or before the day of the next succeeding general or special election; (3) is a resident of the county as of the day the individual seeks to register; and (4) registers pursuant to this title. (Italics and boldface added.) Finally, we look to C.J. § 8-211. 16 It states, in part: § 8-211. Challenging compliance with selection procedures.

(a) Motion in criminal cases. — In a criminal case, before the voir dire examination begins, the defendant or State’s Attorney, as the case may be, may move to dismiss the indictment or stay the proceedings on the ground of sub ⁷¹ stantial failure to comply with the provisions of this title in selecting the grand or petit jury. (d) Remedies for failure to comply with selection procedures. — If the court determines that there has been a substantial failure to comply with: (1) The provisions of § 8-103 [17] of this title in selecting a petit jury, the court shall stay the proceedings pending the selection of a petit jury in conformity with this title. (2) The provisions of this title, other than those contained in § 8-103, in selecting a petit jury, and this failure is likely to be prejudicial to the moving party, the court shall stay the proceedings pending the selection of a petit jury in conformity with this title.... Under the statutory scheme outlined above, we agree with appellant that one must be a United States citizen, as well as a citizen of the jurisdiction where the court convenes, in order to qualify for jury service in Maryland.

Clearly, Alade was not qualified to serve as a juror, because he was not a United States citizen at the time of the trial. That conclusion does not end our inquiry, however. Contrary to appellant’s contention, his right to a jury composed solely of American citizens derives from statutory law, rather than the federal Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Indeed, the right to a jury consisting solely of United States citizens is not so fundamental that it affects “the substantial rights of the accused.... ” Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 302 , 16 S.Ct. 304 , 40 L.Ed. 432 (1895).

It follows that the right to a jury comprised only of United States citizens is a right that may be waived. In our view, that is precisely what occurred here. We explain. Along with the jury questionnaire, the voir dire process is designed to ferret out grounds for juror disqualifi ⁷² cation, and “give substance to the constitutional guarantee to criminal defendants of a fair and impartial jury trial.” Williams v. State, 394 Md. 98 , 904 A.2d 534 (2006).

See also Curtin v. State, 393 Md. 593 , 903 A.2d 922 (2006) (“Voir dire is the primary mechanism through which the constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, is protected.”); Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9 , 759 A.2d 819 (2000); Md. Rule 4-312. In particular, voir dire “is the process in which prospective jurors are examined through the use of questions ... to determine the existence of any bias or prejudice” or grounds for disqualification. Curtin , slip op. at 7. As the Dingle Court said, 361 Md. at 10 , 759 A.2d 819 : Undergirding the voir dire procedure and, hence, informing the trial court’s exercise of discretion regarding the conduct of the voir dire, is a single, primary, and overriding principle or purpose: “to ascertain ‘the existence of cause for disqualification.’ ” (Emphasis added.) See generally Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1, 10 , 806 A.2d 265 (2002); State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 206 , 798 A.2d 566 (2002); Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 435 , 671 A.2d 33 (1996); Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 279 , 661 A.2d 1164 (1995); Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 36-39 , 633 A.2d 867 (1993); Baker v. State, 157 Md.App. 600, 613 , 853 A.2d 796 (2004).

However, the voir dire process depends upon complete and truthful responses by the prospective jurors to the voir dire questions. Williams , slip op. at 13. Voir dire may reveal bias through two areas of inquiry: (1) “whether jurors meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service ”; (2) whether a juror has a bias with “ ‘respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him.’ ” Dingle, 361 Md. at 9-10 , 759 A.2d 819 (quoting Davis, 333 Md. at 35-36 , 633 A.2d 867 ) (emphasis added). See Thomas, 369 Md. at 207 , 798 A.2d 566 ; Boyd, 341 Md. at 436-37 , 671 A.2d 33 . ⁷³ In this case, appellant never asked the court to pose a single voir dire question aimed at verifying that all members of the venire panel were qualified based on the statutory criteria of citizenship.

Consequently, Alade slipped through the jury selection process. While appellant may have assumed that the venire panel had been pre-screened based on the jury questionnaire, it is easy to anticipate that mistakes do occur, which is why a questionnaire alone is not the sole tool used to select a jury. Therefore, the use of the form does not eliminate the need to verify qualification of the venire by way of voir dire. Waiver principles apply to the failure to pose voir dire questions aimed at verifying that venire satisfies the statutory qualifications.

In Kohl, supra, 160 U.S. at 293 , 16 S.Ct. 304 (1895), the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He argued that he was deprived of his constitutional rights because one of the jurors in his case was not a United States citizen. As the Supreme Court recognized, “alienage of a juror is cause of challenge, but is not per se sufficient to set aside a verdict, and this whether the complaining party knew of the fact or not.” Id. at 300 , 16 S.Ct. 304 . The Supreme Court also said: The disqualification of alienage is cause of challenge propter defectum/ [18] on account of personal objection and, if voluntarily, or through negligence, or want of knowledge, such objection fails to be insisted on, the conclusion that the judgment is thereby invalidated is wholly inadmissible.

The defect is not fundamental as affecting the substantial rights of the accused, and the verdict is not void for want of power to render it. Id. at 302 , 16 S.Ct. 304 (emphasis added.) By way of analogy, Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122 , 691 A.2d 1255 , cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1131 , 117 S.Ct. 2536 , 138 L.Ed.2d ⁷⁴ 1036 (1997), is also instructive. Although convicted felons are statutorily barred from jury service in Maryland, the Hunt Court established that a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to a new trial if a convicted felon mistakenly serves on the jury. Hunt was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.

Id. at 127 , 691 A.2d 1255 . He complained that the circuit court erred when it found that he was not deprived of his right to an impartial jury at his capital sentencing trial even though, inter alia, a juror failed to disclose, both at jury orientation and during voir dire, a pending misdemeanor theft charge that would have statutorily disqualified her from jury service under C.J. § 8-207(b)(5), and would have been a basis for a challenge for cause. Id. at 140-41, 691 A.2d 1255 . In denying Hunt’s appeal, the Court recognized that voir dire is aimed at uncovering jurors who are statutorily disqualified.

It said, id. at 141 , 691 A.2d 1255 (emphasis added): The “ ‘right’ to examine potential jurors, inherent in the constitutional right to a fair trial and impartial jury, translates into a defendant’s right to have certain questions propounded to the jurors ... ‘concern[ing] a specific cause for disqualification.’ ” Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 436 , 671 A.2d 33, 36 (1996) (quoting Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 280 , 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995)); see also Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 670 , 566 A.2d 111, 116 (1989) (“Maryland Declaration of Rights Article XXI guarantees a defendant the right to examine prospective jurors to determine whether any cause exists for a juror’s disqualification.”). These “causes” may take two forms: disqualification for bias or disqualification for failure to meet minimum statutory requirements for jury service. With regard to challenges based on statutory criteria, the Hunt Court addressed the method for “uncovering information concerning the prospective juror’s age, literacy, or criminal background, for which minimum requirements exist as prerequisites to service.” Id. at 142 , 691 A.2d 1255 . Noting that Title 8, Subtitle 2 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings ⁷⁵ Article “necessarily embodies the Sixth Amendment’s light to an impartial jury,” it pointed out that the “rights are statutory in nature” and, “[o]rdinarily, their violation may only be vindicated by invocation of the statutorily-prescribed remedy.” Id. at 143 , 691 A.2d 1255 .

Quoting from Boyd v. State, supra, 341 Md. at 441 , 671 A.2d 33 , the Hunt Court said: “ ‘Maryland courts screen juror qualifications on at least three levels: a statutorily-required qualification form, appearance before the jury judge or commissioner at the courthouse, and the trial judge’s observance of each juror during the voir dire.’ ” Id. at 143 , 691 A.2d 1255 . Further, the Court stated: “The guidelines set forth in C.J. § 8-207, which delineate the minimum qualifications for service, are the means by which the selection of a representative venire is effected.” Id. at 143, 691 A.2d 1255 . It also admonished that the language of C.J. § 8-211 “is clear and very specific,” and that the failure to file a motion under C.J. § 8-211(a) “results in waiver of the statutory remedies provided in C.J. § 8-211(d).” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 146, 691 A.2d 1255 citing United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624 (D.C.Cir. 1992) (failure to “challenge properly the jury for improper selection waives the issue”). Of import here, the Hunt Court determined that, after completion of voir dire, the defendant “lost the statutory remedy and must labor under constitutional or common law principles.” Id. at 144-46 , 691 A.2d 1255 .

It reasoned, id. at 146 , 691 A.2d 1255 (citations omitted): The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a fair trial and impartial jury is the touchstone of our justice system.1 J What is required of jurors is that they be without bias or prejudice for or against the defendant and that their minds be free to hear and impartially consider the evidence and render a fair verdict thereon. Furthermore, “ ‘[bjias on the part of prospective jurors will never be presumed, and the challenging party bears the burden of presenting facts ... which would give rise to a showing of actual prejudice.’ ” If a criminal defendant undertakes to challenge a juror on grounds of bias, the attack must be affirmatively advanced ⁷⁶ at the time of trial. It may not be raised for the first time in a collateral attack upon the conviction and/or sentence. In an effort to distinguish the case sub judice from Hunt , appellant argues: The fact that Mr. Alade disclosed his non-citizenship status within hours of the rendition of the verdict, and the fact the issue was raised in this case pursuant to a ten-day motion, place it in a markedly different procedural posture than were the circumstances of the Hunt case.

In short, the concerns implicated in Hunt as it regards efficiency and finality of judgment are simply not present here. We see appellant’s position as a distinction without a difference. That Alade’s status was disclosed within hours after the verdict was rendered does not alter the fact that the trial was already over. Hansel v. Collins, 180 Md. 100 , 23 A.2d 1 (1941), supports our view that appellant waived his right to complain about Mr. Alade’s jury service.

There, the appellant filed a bill of complaint to set aside the judgment on the ground that the jury foreman had been a resident of West Virginia and had registered to vote in that state in 1940. Id. at 101, 103 , 23 A.2d 1 . The juror worked in Allegany County, however, and his name remained on the voter rolls of that county. Id. at 103 , 23 A.2d 1 .

The Court of Appeals declared, id.: Appellant could have made proper inquiry and objected before the juror was sworn which he did not do, but waited until over four months after he had lost the case to present this matter to the court, nor has he shown that his rights were prejudiced by the service of this juror. See also Young v. Lynch, 194 Md. 68, 72 , 69 A.2d 787 (1949) (judgment affirmed where, after trial, it was shown that brother of juror whose name was selected had been seated; mistake occurred without fraud or dishonesty and could have been discovered by defendant before jury was sworn); Vaccaro v. Caple, 33 Md.App. 413, 417 , 365 A.2d 47 (1976)(“The rule is ... when a juror who might otherwise be disqualified for cause is permitted to serve on a jury because of the failure of ⁷⁷ the aggrieved party to use due diligence in discovering the irregularity, a judgment of that jury will not be disturbed.”); Leach v. State, 47 Md.App. 611 , 425 A.2d 234 (1981) (during voir dire, juror failed to disclose her acquaintanceship with a State witness, who was a homicide detective; the omission was discovered on cross-examination; in its discretion, trial court was entitled to accept juror’s assurance that she could serve without bias); Burkett v. State, 21 Md.App. 438, 445 , 319 A.2d 845 (juror inadvertently failed to respond to a voir dire inquiry that would have revealed that he was the father of a secretary in the prosecutor’s office; Court ruled that grant of a new trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court unless “actual prejudice” to the accused is shown or the information that was withheld creates “a reasonable belief that prejudice or bias by the juror against the accused is likely”), cert. denied, 272 Md. 738 (1974). Here, the trial court expressly found that Owens had a reasonable opportunity to