Packham v. Glendmeyer

Jones, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involved the trial of issues from the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City upon a caveat to the will of Mary Polk, late of said city, deceased, and is in this Court upon appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City where said trial was had. The issues are four in number and to the following effecr: ist.Whether the contents of a paper wrtting purporting to be the will of the said Mary Polk and to have been executed by her on the 30th day of April, 1902, were “known by her at or before the time of the alleged execution thereof;” 2nd. Was the execution of said paper writing “procured by undue influence exercised and practiced upon her;” 3rd.

Was the execution of the same “procured by fraud exercised and practiced upon her;” 4th. Was the same “executed by her when she was of sound and disposing mind, memory and understanding, and capable of executing a valid deed or contract.” The questions to be determined here are presented by eight exceptions taken to rulings of the trial Court; the last ot which is to the action of that Court upon the prayers submitted on behalf of the caveatees, and all the others to rulings upon questions of evidence. The record sets out the testimony adduced by the respective parties at the trial with much detail; and the briefs of counsel deal largely with the facts. There appears in this testimony a conflict that presented questions that fell within the exclusive province of the jury for decision.

We are concerned with it here only s'o far as it may be necessary to have reference to it to deal intelligently with the legal questions raised by the exceptions. ⁴²⁰ It was in evidence that the testatrix died in the spring of the year 1903. In her lifetime she had executed three wills— one dated in October, 1896, one the 30th of April, 1902, and the last the 14th of April, 1903. At the death of the testatrix this last will was offered for probate. A caveat was filed to the same by the caveators in the case at bar together with five of those who appear in this case as caveatees.

The caveatees to the caveat of the will of April, 1903, were six of the eighteen caveatees in the case at bar. Upon the filing of the caveat to the will of 1903 issues were sent to the Court of Common Pleas in Baltimore City for trial. The result was a 'finding upon certain of the issues in favor of the caveators in that case and a judgment, upon the findings of the jury, by the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City refusing to admit the said will to probate and adjudging that the same was “not the last will and testament of said Mary Polk.” Thereupon the will, here in controversy, of 1902, was produced and offered for probate, the proceedings with reference to which are here before us for review as already indicated. At the trial of the issues upon the caveat in this case after the caveatees had propounded the will, the caveators offered in evidence the will of 1903, which had been set aside and in connection with it made the following offer of evidence: “We offer in evidence the record from the Court of Common Pleas, certified to the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City containing the issues and the findings on the issues upon the will of Mary Polk of 1903, accompanied by the judgment of the Orphans’ Court refusingon those findings to admit the will to probate;” and stated the title of the case shoeing who were the caveators and who the caveatees.

To this offer the appellees made objection which the Court sustained and this is the subject of appellants’ first exception. It may be said in this connection that it was admitted by the appellees that the will of 1903, referred, to in the foregoing offer of the appellants, ‘‘was set aside by a jury in the -Court of Common Pleas in October, 1904;” and J:he record discloses that, later in the trial, the judgment of the Orphans’ Court upon the findings of the jury in the Court of ⁴²¹ Common Pleas, the purport of which has been given,, was in evidence without objection. This judgment of the Orphans’ Court established conclusively the status of the will of 1903 for whatever' effect that could have in the case. This is conceded, and if not conceded, it is a proposition that could not well admit of dispute.

The offer of the appellants of the evidence in question was the bald- offer of it without indicating any particular purpose therefor or offering to follow up or connect the proffered evidence with other evidence that might go to affect its admissibility if, in itself, it was not admissible. The evidence having been offered generally therefore, the inquiry is was it admissible for any purpose, other than that of which the appellants got the benefit, if benefit it was to them, by the admission of the appellees and the having in evidence the judgment of the Orphans’ Court in which the proceedings referred to in their offer' culminated. The evidence embraced in the offer, in question, if admissible at all, was admissible with conclusive effect only as to the status of the will of 1903. It cannot be pretended, and we do not understand that it is claimed, it was admissible with any conclusive effect upon any issue involved in the case at bar so as to close further inquiry in regard to it It must therefore have been offered, as only reflecting upon and tending to prove some one or more of the issues here involved.

It appears that, in the proceedings referred to in the offer of evidence in question there were issues involving the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, and fraud and undue influence in the procurement of the will there in controversy; and that these'issues were decided by the findings of the jury adversely to the validity of such will. It further appears that the parties, against whom the charges of fraud and undue influence were made, were named as beneficiaries in both the will of 1903 and that of 1902, and were among .the caveatees in each of the caveats to those wills, though not the'sole caveatees in the proceedings in respect to either. It is urged in support of the exception under consideration that, .because, under the circumstances detailed, there was, ⁴²² according to the findings-of the jury upon the issues under the caveat to the will of 1903, fraud in respect to the execution of that will, these findings are proper evidence going to the similar issues under the caveat to the will of 1902. Here is invoked the principle that as evidence going to establish fraud in a particular transaction similar fraud or frauds in a similar transaction committed by ■ the party charged may be shown.

The rule in respect to this is stated in 14 Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 196, to be this : “A charge of fraud in a particular transaction cannot be proved by evidence of other and independent frauds of the party charged, though in a similar transaction, unless it appears that there is such a connection between the transactions as to authorize the inference that the frauds are both parts of a general scheme or purpose to defraud.” The proposition here laid down is fortified with numerous references. It will not be necessary to examine any of these to determine how far they support the text; nor to inquire how far the caveators here have offered evidence that the frauds here charged were “parts of a general scheme or purpose to defraud.” Merely remarking that it was not a part of their offer to show this, we may allow the rule in regard to admitting evidence of other frauds to be more liberal than stated above without bringing the offer of evidence here in question within it. What can be put in proof against a party, charged with fraud in a particular transaction, in respect to fraud in similar -transactions, is the fraud — the acts of fraud — committed by him in the similar transactions.

That is not the character of evidence indicated in the offer of evidence in question. That offer is of the opinion of a jury as to fraud in. a particular transaction upon the evidence they had before them, and is designed to affect, not alone the parties charged with the fraud, but the interests of others who have had no opportunity to be heard in respect-to the considerations that influenced the jury’s findings. In regard to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix which was passed upon by the jury, in the proceedings re ⁴²³ ferred to in the offer of evidence in question, what was determined as to that was her capacity vel non at the very time of the execution of the will which was there in controversy. The finding had no relation to any time anterior ; and was but thé opinion of the jury upon evidence relating to the case in which it was adduced.

Judgments and decrees as against those not parties to them are only “admissible to prove rem ipsam, and the legal incidents and consequences” thereof; but “not to prove the facts” upon which they are founded. Parr v. State, 71 Md. 220 ; 2 Harr. & Johns. 402—409 (marg.) The contention of the appellants here would give to the findings of a jury a greater or larger effect in respect to their admissibility as evidence than the law gives to judgments and decrees. The ruling oh the first exception must be affirmed. The second exception was taken to the rulings of the Court below upon objection to the evidence of a witness offered in connection with the following facts stated in brief.

In March, 1903, a nephew of the testatrix, one of the defendants in this' case, as a legatee under the will of 1902, filed a petition for a writ of de lunático to inquire into the sanity of the testatrix under which a jury was summoned and sworn which found