Paige v. State

WRIGHT, J. Appellant, Labria Paige, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Howard County, Maryland, of theft under $1,000.00 in connection with a shoplifting case. After she was sentenced to 18 months, with all but six months suspended, appellant timely appealed and presents the following questions for our review: 1. Did the motions court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress a statement obtained in violation of Miranda ? 1 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in permitting Loss Prevention Officer Salley to narrate the events depicted in the Macy’s closed-circuit camera footage?

For the following reasons, we shall affirm. ⁹⁸ BACKGROUND Motions Hearing On April 14, 2013, Thea Salley, a loss prevention agent with the Macy’s Department store located in the Columbia Mall, testified that appellant and two juveniles were stopped by Macy’s loss prevention agents as they exited the store carrying concealed merchandise. Because appellant fought with the loss prevention agents in the Macy’s parking lot, the agents handcuffed her, for her safety as well as their own. Appellant and the two juveniles were then escorted to the Macy’s loss prevention office, located in an area of the store that otherwise was not accessible to the general public. Salley testified that the dimensions of the office was equal to half the size of the well in the courtroom, or approximately 20 feet by 20 feet.

The room was well lit, and there were no police insignia located anywhere within the room. Further, there was one door to the office, and that door was closed during Salley’s interview with appellant. Salley stated that, as a loss prevention officer, she worked for Macy’s, a retail store that is “not affiliated with any government organization.” Salley testified that her office was “not a police department,” and that loss prevention officers are not “endowed with arrest powers,” nor are they “police officers themselves.” According to Salley, during her six years at Macy’s, she was never “affiliated with any law enforcement agency” and never worked for the Howard County Police Department or any other police department. When appellant and her two companions initially arrived in the office, they were met by Salley and three other Macy’s loss prevention officers.

At that time, while Salley was attempting to get everything “sorted out,” appellant admitted that the two juveniles were under her care and that, according to Salley, “she was taking all the blame for anything that they — that the two juveniles did.” Salley also testified: Ms. Paige was frightened that the two juvenile teenagers that was with her, she was frightened that she would be in ⁹⁹ trouble by the parents of the children because they was under her custody. She was — they were hanging out with her is what she said and she wanted all the blame to go on herself because she didn’t want the parents of the children to try to, you know, harm her or — and/or threaten her. So, she repeatedly said, “I did it. I did everything.

I did everything. Don’t involve them. Don’t get them in trouble.” At a later point, Salley called the Howard County Police, informed them of the theft, and asked them to respond to the store. Salley testified that the police ordinarily were called anytime there was a shoplifting case where the value of the goods exceeded $50.00.

Salley agreed that she called the police so that appellant would ultimately be charged in connection with the theft. She also stated that she had called Howard County Police about sixteen times in the past month and that equaled the average number of calls Macy’s would make on a monthly basis. Officer Kristian Bush, of the Howard County Police Department, arrived at approximately 2:10 p.m. 2 Thereafter, at around 2:48 p.m., and after appellant’s handcuffs had been removed, appellant signed a Macy’s statement of admission form, a Macy’s trespass notification form, and a Macy’s civil demand notice. Salley agreed that Officer Bush was present when these forms were signed.

At the time, Officer Bush was standing near the door, up against a wall. Salley confirmed that Officer Bush did not handle the Macy’s forms, and that she handed the forms over to appellant. In addition, Officer Bush never handcuffed appellant, nor did he ever threaten her. And, according to Salley, Officer Bush never spoke to appellant about the Macy’s forms and never told her that she needed to talk in order to avoid arrest.

Salley further testi ¹⁰⁰ fied that she did not tell Officer Bush about appellant’s earlier oral admission of guilt. After appellant signed the Macy’s forms, she was temporarily transferred to the custody of Officer Bush, who released her shortly thereafter. 3 In addition to Salley, Officer Bush also testified at the motions hearing, but he provided very limited details about the interview with appellant. He confirmed that he met with Salley on the day in question and went to the loss prevention office. However, when asked if he saw Salley direct anyone to sign any papers in his presence, the officer replied that he was “not sure,” and “I didn’t notice that.” Officer Bush then concluded his brief testimony by stating: “I believe the — the three suspects that were in custody signed papers, and I’m not sure of the papers.” After testimony concluded, defense counsel moved to suppress any statements appellant made after Officer Bush arrived in the Macy’s loss prevention office.

Counsel’s argument was that the presence of the police officer, as well as the other circumstances surrounding the interview, established that appellant was in custody when she signed the written admissions of guilt and that those statements should be suppressed. The State responded that any statements appellant made were not made to State agents because the Macy’s employees were not working as agents of the police. Further, the State contended that Officer Bush was merely present and did nothing to either further the interview or to suggest that appellant was in custody. In denying the motion to suppress, the circuit court found that, after Macy’s employees observed an apparent shoplifting, they took appellant “into their custody based on a — what they observed.” Appellant was handcuffed by Macy’s personnel and then taken to the loss prevention office at the store.

The court further found that there was no dispute that appellant ¹⁰¹ gave an oral admission of guilt, and that statement was made before the police officer, Officer Bush, arrived. The circuit court then found that, after Officer Bush arrived, he did not take appellant into police custody, he did not handcuff her, he was not aware of the prior oral admission, and he did not make “any inquiries of the defendant concerning any statement or — or the signing of any documents by the defendant.” The court also found that, although Officer Bush was present in the loss prevention office when appellant signed the written admissions, he did not “seem to be taking any sort of an active role” in the investigation. In fact, the court found that Officer Bush “wasn’t entirely aware of exactly what the paperwork was” and that “their decision to present the paperwork to the defendant was not at Officer Bush’s suggestion or direction.” The circuit court then concluded as follows: So, clearly, you have custody, but it’s not police custody. It’s Macy’s custody.

And I don’t find that — that the Macy’s personnel were acting on behalf of Officer Bush or the Howard County Police Department. The Macy’s personnel clearly are not state agents or actors. The arrest was by Macy’s. No participation in the arrest by Officer Bush.

The handcuffs were Macy’s. The Macy’s loss prevention room is not a Howard County Police facility. There is no indication Officer Bush made any gestures or statements to the defendant or about the defendant within earshot of the defendant to manipulate her into signing the subject documents. So, the — I find that the defense has not met its burden of demonstrating that there was a Howard County Police custody or interrogation by Howard County Police or some actors acting on the — for the benefit of the Howard County Police Department or for — or based on any sort of encourage [sic] or direction of the Howard County Police Department. ¹⁰² So, I find that the defense has not been able to meet its initial burden of demonstrating that this was a police custody or police interrogation, and I’ll deny your motion.

Trial On April 14, 2013, at around 1:30 p.m., Salley was working as a loss prevention officer at the Macy’s inside the Columbia Mall. While observing the broadcasts from the approximately 97 closed circuit televisions located throughout the store, Salley saw a man roaming around in the women’s department. Testifying that this was “kind of unusual,” she watched the man approach three female individuals, which included appellant, a 14-year-old, and a 16-year-old. One of these three was carrying a large Downtown Locker Room bag, and another was carrying a black handbag. 4 All three were making “random selections” of merchandise from the racks without looking at either the price tag or the sizes of the respective items.

They would drape this merchandise over their arms, concealing the contents of the bags. Salley identified appellant, in court, as one of these three individuals. Salley watched as appellant selected a leather jacket, a yellow shirt, and some leggings, and then threw them over her arm. Then, appellant and the other two juveniles went to the fitting rooms.

There, all three of them went inside a single stall. Testifying that the stall was a “small room,” Salley indicated that the three individuals remained in the stall for ten minutes. Salley provided more detail in court as she testified along with a recording of surveillance video that was played for the jury. After watching the man approach appellant and the other two juveniles, Salley watched them on multiple cameras, from multiple angles, walking around the women’s department.

Salley saw six items of merchandise in appellant’s possession at this time, and she also testified that one of the ¹⁰³ other juveniles was carrying the large Downtown Locker Room bag. The three individuals continued walking around the department, working their way towards the fitting rooms, gathering merchandise along the way. After the man again appeared in the video nearby, appellant and the two juveniles then took “a lot of merchandise” into the handicapped stall located in the fitting room, where they remained for approximately ten minutes. Because there were no cameras in the fitting room stall, Salley left her post in the loss prevention observation room and went to the fitting room area.

She then entered a stall that was located opposite the one occupied by appellant and the juveniles. Salley was able to see into this other stall because there were broken slats on the bottom of the door. As she crouched down to get a better view, Salley observed “the merchandise going into the black bag and the Downtown Locker Room bag.” And, Salley specifically saw appellant placing items into the Downtown Locker Room bag. Salley then testified that, while she was inside the adjacent stall, she heard the man she had seen before call out, and appellant and the two juveniles then emerged from their stall, exiting together and carrying a few items.

After appellant and the juveniles placed a few of these items down, Salley saw that one of the other, unidentified juveniles was carrying the Downtown Locker Room bag. Over objection, Salley testified that the bag had been filled because it was larger than it was before the three of them first took the bag into the stall. After the appellant and the two juveniles walked away, Salley entered the stall in question and noticed that, although appellant originally entered with six items of merchandise, only two items remained behind. Salley then emerged from the fitting room and watched as appellant proceeded past approximately twelve cash registers, without paying, towards a store exit.

After appellant and her companions walked out the door, Salley called out a code on her radio that instructed other loss prevention officers to stop ¹⁰⁴ and detain appellant and her companions “[b]ecause they left the store with merchandise that was unpaid for.” Appellant was apprehended near the curb outside Macy’s carrying the Downtown Locker Room bag. There ensued a “lot of tussling and fighting and profanity.” Salley explained that she identified herself and told appellant that she needed to come back inside the store to discuss the merchandise, but appellant attempted “to run and fight.” Thereafter, after she was escorted to the loss prevention office, appellant verbally admitted that she stole the Macy’s merchandise in question. Appellant also signed a Macy’s trespass notice, a Macy’s civil demand notice, and a Macy’s statement of admission. The trespass notice forbade appellant from entering any Macy’s for three years.

And, the civil demand notice let appellant know the amount of restitution owed to Macy’s for the stolen items. As for the Macy’s statement of admission, that form not only listed the specific items of merchandise that had been taken, but also included appellant’s admission that “I did take merchandise and/or cash belong to Macy’s valued at $673.98 without consent or permission and with the intent to permanently deprive Macy’s of their property.” Salley testified that she had personally witnessed appellant take many of the listed items while inside the store. She also saw appellant attempt to leave without paying for them. The items, with their anti-theft sensors still attached, were ultimately found inside the Downtown Locker Room bag.

Salley further testified that the bag was lined with aluminum foil which was significant because lining a bag in this way could defeat the sensor alarms located near the exits of the store. Appellant testified in her defense that her boyfriend, Brandon Wilder, drove her and the two other juveniles to the Columbia Mall on the date in question in order to buy clothes. Appellant agreed that she went into the fitting room with the two juveniles and watched as they tried on some of the clothes. Appellant had brought some of the items into the fitting room and then left some behind when the three of them left. ¹⁰⁵ After leaving the fitting room, appellant and the two juveniles met up with Wilder and then walked out of Macy’s.

Appellant testified that one of the two juveniles was carrying a bag at the time. Appellant denied leaving the store with anything in her hands. At that point, appellant was apprehended by three men. The three men were not in uniform, did not have identification badges, and did not identify themselves to her. 5 After the men told her she needed to go back inside Macy’s, because someone had stolen merchandise, appellant complied, but the woman who had the bag resisted.

Appellant maintained that she did not know about, and was not involved with, the shoplifting. Appellant was taken to a small room, where she and the two juveniles were interviewed by three or four men, as well as Salley and a police officer. During the course of the interview, Salley gave appellant the forms and told her to sign them. Appellant testified that she had a prior theft case and had vowed never to steal again, so she initially refused to sign. 6 At that point, Salley told her that if she did not sign, she would be turned over to the police officer.

Appellant, who was pregnant at the time, needed to go pick up her four-year-old daughter from school that afternoon, so she testified she agreed to sign the papers because “I had no choice.” She maintained that she did not steal anything from Macy’s on the day in question. We shall include additional detail in the following discussion. DISCUSSION I. Appellant first contends the circuit court erred in denying the motion to suppress her written statements because she ¹⁰⁶ was in custody for Miranda purposes when she gave those statements. The State responds that appellant was not in custody because the Macy’s loss prevention agents were not acting as State agents at the time of the encounter.

We agree. In reviewing the motions court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we are limited to the facts developed at the hearing, Hill v. State, 418 Md. 62 , 67 n. 1, 12 A.3d 1193 (2011), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion. Robinson v. State, 419 Md. 602 , 611—12, 19 A.3d 952 (2011); accord Gonzalez v. State, 429 Md. 632, 647 , 57 A.3d 484 (2012). We review the motions court’s factual findings for clear error, but we make our own independent constitutional appraisal, “reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the facts and circumstances of this case.” State v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360 , 375 n. 3, 993 A.2d 25 (2010) (citation omitted); accord Moore v. State, 422 Md. 516, 528 , 30 A.3d 945 (2011).

The issue of whether a confession is voluntary presents a mixed question of law and fact, subject to de novo review, with deference given to the suppression court’s factual findings. Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 310-11 , 765 A.2d 97 (2001). In Maryland, a confession may be admitted against an accused only when it has been “determined that the confession was ‘(1) voluntary under Maryland non-constitutional law, (2) voluntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and (3) elicited in conformance with the mandates of Miranda.’ ” Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 173-74 , 699 A.2d 1170 (1997) (quoting Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 597-98 , 655 A.2d 370 (1995)); accord Knight v. State, 381 Md. 517, 531-32 , 850 A.2d 1179 (2004); Smith v. State, 220 Md.App. 256, 273 , 103 A.3d 1045 (2014), cert. denied, 442 Md. 196 , 112 A.3d 374 (2015). Appellant’s claim is grounded in an alleged Miranda violation.

Pursuant to Miranda and its progeny, the police are required, when they detain a person for questioning in a ¹⁰⁷ custodial setting, to inform the person of several rights including the right to remain silent, that anything the person says may be used in evidence, that the person has a right to consult with an attorney before responding to questioning, and that an attorney will be appointed if the person is indigent----[A]n inculpatory statement elicited in violation of that requirement is inadmissible in the State’s case-in-chief. See Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). Phillips v. State, 425 Md. 210, 212 , 40 A.3d 25 (2012) (footnote omitted). The Miranda requirements, however, apply only to custodial interrogation.

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 , 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2401-02 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011). This is due to the Supreme Court’s recognition that “[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam). Therefore, “before a defendant can claim the benefit of Miranda warnings, the defendant must establish two things: (1) custody; and (2) interrogation.” State v. Thomas, 202 Md.App. 545, 565 , 33 A.3d 494 (2011) (citation omitted), aff'd, 429 Md. 246 , 55 A.3d 680 (2012). Accord Smith v. State, 186 Md.App. 498, 518 , 974 A.2d 991 (2009), aff'd, 414 Md. 357 , 995 A.2d 685 (2010).

And, the burden of “showing the applicability of the Miranda requirements,” i.e., that there was custody and interrogation, is on the defendant. Smith, 186 Md.App. at 520 , 974 A.2d 991 . In suggesting that appellant has not met her burden, the State contends that she was not in custody when she was interrogated by the Macy’s loss prevention agents. Some commentators have addressed this issue: The Supreme Court has emphasized that constitutional rights protect against governmental infraction.

In 1986 in ¹⁰⁸ Colorado v. Connelly, [ 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ], the Supreme Court ruled that, in order for a confession to be suppressed under the constitutional due process test of voluntariness, “coercive police activity is a predicate.” The Connelly Court concluded: “Even the most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process clause.” Some form of police interrogation is similarly required to trigger the Miranda protections of the Fifth Amendment. Jezic, et al., Maryland Law of Confessions § 10:1 at 437-38 (2014-2015 ed.) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter “Law of Confessions ”). And: In the Miranda case the Court defined interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers.” Because of this and also because of the general doctrine that state action is a prerequisite to application of constitutional protections, it is clear that Miranda does not govern interrogation by private citizens acting on their own. 2 LaFave, Israel, et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.10(b) at 871-72 (3d ed.2007) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter “Criminal Procedure ”). There is little case law in Maryland addressing when or whether the Miranda advisements are necessary when it is alleged an encounter involves a non-State actor.

In Pratt v. State, 9 Md.App. 220 , 263 A.2d 247 (1970), William C. McKinley worked as a security officer for Montgomery Ward, Incorporated, in Prince George’s County. In fulfilling this role, McKinley swore an oath to perform his duties and was appointed by the Governor in order to protect the property of the establishment. Id. at 220 , 263 A.2d 247 . On October 8, 1970, McKinley saw Bernard Pratt climb onto a Montgomery Ward’s department store’s loading dock and start to move a box towards the edge.

Id. at 221-22 , 263 A.2d 247 . After he hollered for Pratt to stop, a chase ensued inside the store, and Pratt, apparently carrying a box of stolen merchandise, was ¹⁰⁹ ultimately stopped by McKinley and taken to the store security office. Id. at 222 , 263 A.2d 247 . The box contained a sewing machine worth approximately $170.00.

Id. At trial before a jury, and over objection, McKinley testified that he asked Pratt “if he was going to sell the sewing machine and he said no, he was going to keep it.” Id. The issue on appeal was whether McKinley was acting as a law enforcement agent such that admission of Pratt’s statement was in violation of Miranda. The Court agreed with Pratt that the statement was improperly admitted.

Pratt, 9 Md.App. at 226-27 , 263 A.2d 247 . McKinley had testified that he was a sworn, and appointed, law enforcement officer, pursuant to then Sections 342-348 of former Article 23. See Md.Code (1957), Art. 23, §§ 342-48 (superseded). Pertinent to its discussion, former Section 344 authorized policemen appointed under these provisions to exercise “all the authority and powers held and exercised by constables at common law and under the statutes of this State, and also all the authority and powers conferred by law on policemen in the City of Baltimore.” Article 23 § 344 (superseded).

This Court agreed that this designation of powers meant that McKinley was performing his duties as a State actor. The Court observed: “If an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is state action. It is irrelevant that he might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely private capacity or that the particular action which he took was not authorized by state law.” Pratt, 9 Md.App. at 226 , 263 A.2d 247 (quoting Griffin v. State of Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 , 84 S.Ct. 1770 , 12 L.Ed.2d 754 (1964)). This Court concluded: With regard to the issue of the admissibility of the statement, the court could not have properly concluded, on the evidence before it, other than that McKinley was appointed and qualified as a policeman as provided by law, and purported to act under that authority when he took appellant in ¹¹⁰ custody.

We find it crystal clear that McKinley was a ‘law enforcement officer’ within the meaning of Miranda. As the statement of appellant was obtained by a law enforcement officer initiating questioning of him while he was in custody without the employment of the procedural safeguards required by Miranda, its introduction in evidence was reversible error. Pratt, 9 Md.App. at 226 , 268 A.2d 247 . The role of private security guards in Maryland has also been addressed in cases decided under the Fourth Amendment.

For instance, in Waters v. State, 320 Md. 52 , 575 A.2d 1244 (1990), on the evening of May 16, 1988, while Paul Madden was working as a licensed security guard at a private establishment in Anne Arundel County, he accosted Waters, apparently at gunpoint, as Waters was leaning against a vehicle in the parking lot. During the encounter, Madden removed a beer can and a plastic bag containing a whitish substance from Waters’s pocket. Waters, 320 Md. at 54 , 575 A.2d 1244 . Madden called Anne Arundel County police, and Waters was arrested and charged with possessing cocaine.

Id. at 54-55 , 575 A.2d 1244 . Waters moved to suppress the cocaine, contending that Madden was acting as an agent of the police and that the arrest and search were unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. Waters, 320 Md. at 55 , 575 A.2d 1244 . Waters maintained that because privately licensed security guards, just like special police officers commissioned by the Governor, perform duties similar to those of regular police officers, he was subject to illegal state action.

Id. at 56 , 575 A.2d 1244 . The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed Waters’s conviction. The Court began its analysis as follows: The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right of individuals to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. It applies to actions by the State, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), but generally does not apply to actions by private individuals.

United States v. Jacobsen, ¹¹¹ 466 U.S. 109, 113 , 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656 , 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 , 41 S.Ct. 574, 574 , 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921). Thus when a private individual obtains incriminatory matter from an accused, no matter how improperly, and such matter comes into the possession of the government without a violation of the accused’s rights by governmental authority, the exclusionary rule does not prohibit its use at trial. Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 139-40 , 468 A.2d 101 (1983); Herbert v. State, 10 Md.App. 279, 284-85 , 269 A.2d 430 (1970). A private search or seizure may, however, trigger Fourth Amendment protections if the private individual whose actions are in question, “in light of all the circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an ‘instrument’ or agent of the state.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2048 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

Waters, 320 Md. at 56-57 , 575 A.2d 1244 . The Court distinguished between private individuals employed as “special police officers” appointed by the Governor pursuant to statute, and individuals licensed as security guards by the Maryland State Police. Waters, 320 Md. at 57-59 , 575 A.2d 1244 . Special police officers have “ ‘and may exercise, the powers of a police officer upon the property,’ including the power to preserve the ‘peace and good order’ of the property and to make arrests.” Id. at 57 , 575 A.2d 1244 (quoting Md.Code (1986 Repl.Vol.), Article 41, § 4-905 (repealed)).

Security guards, in contrast, do not have arrest or other police powers. Id. at 58, 575 A.2d 1244 . The Court explained that “[w]ithout governmental powers, security guards are acting as private citizens when protecting property, and their private status is not altered because their interest in protecting property coincides with the public’s interest in preventing crime generally.” Id. at 59 , 575 A.2d 1244 . The Court concluded that Waters had not met his burden of establishing a Fourth Amendment violation.

Waters, 320 Md. at 59 , 575 A.2d 1244 . He also did not prevail because, “[i]n the same vein, the burden of establishing government involvement in a private search rests on the party objecting to the ¹¹² admissibility of the evidence.” Id. at 60 , 575 A.2d 1244 (citations omitted). As Madden was a licensed security guard and there was no evidence that he “was working in collusion with the police at the time of the search, or otherwise acted as an instrument of the State in the performance of his duties,” the Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence was admissible and that the motion to suppress was properly denied. Id.

The commentators have further explained the distinction in Maryland law as follows: Special police officers are deemed state agents in the performance of their responsibilities. Unlike special police officers, security guards are not vested with arrest or other police powers.... Courts in Maryland have therefore determined that such private security guards are not state agents unless they are working under the direction of, or in concert with, law enforcement officers. Law of Confessions, § 10:7 at 466.

And: [T]he courts have rather consistently held that such persons as security officers, store detectives, railroad detectives, insurance investigators, bank investigators, and private investigators are not required to comply with the Miranda procedures. A contrary result has sometimes been reached if the interrogator, though then serving private security functions, has been given police powers by a governmental unit. Criminal Procedure § 6.10(b) at 873. The record in this case persuades us that Salley and the other loss prevention officers at Macy’s were private security guards, and were not special police officers, as that category of individual is understood under Maryland law.

Salley did not have any arrest powers or other duties associated with typical law enforcement. Ordinarily in these circumstances, and as many courts recognize, private security guards are not required to give the Miranda warnings when interrogating an individual. See Woods v. City Court of City of Tucson, 128 Ariz. 477 , 626 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Ct.App.1981); ¹¹³ People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206, 1214 (Colo.1987); State v. Boyd, 5 Conn.Cir.Ct. 648 , 260 A.2d 618, 623 (1969); Singleton v. State, 231 Ga.App. 694 , 500 S.E.2d 411, 412-13 (1998); People v. Raitano, 81 Ill.App.3d 373 , 36 Ill.Dec. 597 , 401 N.E.2d 278, 281 (1980); Owen v. State, 490 N.E.2d 1130, 1135 (Ind.Ct.App.1986); City of Grand Rapids v. Impens, 414 Mich. 667 , 327 N.W.2d 278, 281 (1982); Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91 , 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976); State v. Kelly, 61 N.J. 283 , 294 A.2d 41, 43 (1972); State v. Giallombardo, 29 Ohio App.3d 279 , 504 N.E.2d 1202, 1204 (1986); State v. Petersen, 469 S.W.3d 737 (Tex.Ct.App.2015); State v. Valpredo, 75 Wash.2d 368 , 450 P.2d 979, 981 (1969); see also In re Deborah C., 30 Cal.3d 125 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 852 , 635 P.2d 446, 449 (1981) (“That private security guards sometimes act under color of law when they conduct illegal searches neither makes them ‘law enforcement officials’ nor establishes the complicity of those officials for purposes of Miranda. It does not render their detention of shoplifting suspects ‘police custody’ nor their questioning ‘official’ ”); People in Interest of R.R., 447 N.W.2d 922, 926 (S.D.1989) (“[A]bsent coordinate action or complicity between private security guards and the police, Miranda warnings need not be given to a suspect”).

In arguing that the Macy’s employees were actually acting as agents of the State, appellant directs us to Peoples v. State, 615 So.2d 1265 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). In that case, Peoples entered a K-Mart with her two children and another unrelated juvenile child from her neighborhood. While she was in the shoe department, the unrelated juvenile was stopped on suspicion of shoplifting. Peoples was called to the front of the store and informed of these developments.

Peoples, 615 So.2d at 1265-66 . After disavowing any responsibility for this other child, Peoples began to walk away but was stopped after store personnel noticed that she not only was wearing new shoes from the shoe department, but that their tags had been removed. Id. at 1266 . Peoples and her children were then taken to the store security office, where they were interviewed by three store employees and a police officer in a very small room that could ¹¹⁴ barely accommodate that number.

Id. The police officer had responded to the store earlier due to the reported shoplifting by the juvenile and was asked by the loss prevention manager to attend