Pantazes v. Pantazes

⁷¹⁴ BISHOP, Judge. The appellant, Dean James Pantazes, appeals from a $41,750 judgment entered upon a jury’s verdict in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Mason, J.), in favor of his brother, Michael Pantazes, and his sister-in-law, Melanie Pantazes. Appellant asks the Court to consider: I. Whether the appellee’s claims for defamation and malicious prosecution were barred by a release which appellee executed pursuant to Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27 § 737 (1987), “Expungement of Police and Court Records.” II. Whether the damages awarded by the jury are duplicitous.

FACTS In January 1985 Michael Pantazes (Michael) was contacted by an employee of the Budget Rent-A-Car Company (Budget) who demanded payment for damage which Michael had allegedly inflicted on one of Budget’s cars. The employee told Michael that Dean Pantazes (Dean) had informed Budget that Michael was the one who damaged the car. Later, in February 1985, Michael was summonsed by the Sheriff’s Department for Prince George’s County and served with a statement of charges which alleged that he “did willfully and maliciously destroy, injure and molest the right side of 1985 Lincoln the property of Budget Rent-A-Car.” Attached thereto was an “Application for Statement of Charges”, signed by one of Budget’s employees, alleging that Dean saw Michael scratch the car. When Michael appeared in the District Court on March 8, 1985, the criminal charges against him were dismissed by the State.

Shortly thereafter, Michael filed a “Petition for Expungement of Records” pursuant to Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27 § 737 1 which included, in accordance with the statute, ⁷¹⁵ the following: 2 GENERAL WAIVER AND RELEASE I, Michael Pantazes, hereby release and forever discharge the Montgomery County Police Department, all of its officers, agents and employees and any and all other persons from any and all claims which I may have for wrongful conduct by reason of my arrest, detention or confinement on or about January 23, 1985. This General Waiver and Release is conditioned on the expungement of the record of my arrest, detention, or confinement and compliance with Section 736(c) of Article 27 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and shall be void if these conditions are not met. [Dated] 14 March 1985 [Signed] Michael Pantazes As a result, and in compliance with Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27 § 737(c) and Md.Rule 4-508, on July 2, 1985, the District Court for Montgomery County ordered the expungement of all police and court records with reference to Michael “pertaining to the arrest, detention or confinement on or about 1/20/85.” On November 14, 1985, following the expungement of records, Michael filed the complaint in the case sub judice in which he alleged, inter alia, that Dean’s statements to Budget were defamatory and that Dean had maliciously caused Michael to be prosecuted for malicious destruction of property. On the third day of the trial, Dean’s counsel moved for summary judgment on the ground that the ⁷¹⁶ Waiver and Release which Michael had signed in the ex-pungement proceeding precluded the tort claims against Dean. The circuit court judge denied the motion because, the court reasoned, Michael had not been subjected to any “arrest, detention, or confinement,” and, therefore, the release was of no effect.

The court stated that “[i]f the general release had included the word ‘charges’, we would have been out of here yesterday morning before twelve o’clock, and I would have been twenty five cents poorer.” At the conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict against Dean Pantazes and Michael DeLorenzo (the Budget employee who signed the application for statement of charges) on both the defamation and malicious prosecution counts. By way of a special verdict sheet the jury awarded the following damages: $12,000 Malicious prosecution by both Defendants 14.000 Punitive damages for malicious prosecution by Dean 50 Defamation by Dean 700 Punitive damages for defamation by Dean 15.000 Consortium by both defendants $41,750 I. The Release We discuss separately the effect of the release on the counts for malicious prosecution and for defamation. A. Malicious Prosecution In Pemrock, Inc. v. Essco Co., 252 Md. 374 , 249 A.2d 711 (1969), the Court held that: [A] general release to all mankind barred further suits against other entities involved in the occurrence which produced the settlement with one participant that led to the release. Relied on were various cases holding a ⁷¹⁷ release of “all other persons” did release a joint tort-feasor, including Thomas v. Erie Ins.

Exchange, 229 Md. 332 ; .... [ 182 A.2d 823 (1962)] Peters v. Butler, 253 Md. 7, 10 , 251 A.2d 600 (1969). “Thus, language releasing ‘all other persons, firms and corporations’ discharges remaining tort-feasors even though they are not named in the release.” Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 Md.App. 515, 525 , 492 A.2d 1358 (1985). It would appear that this general rule would apply to the case sub judice so as to release appellant in the action for malicious prosecution. Budget, Dean Pantazes, and the law enforcement officials can all be considered as joint tort feasors 3 in the malicious prosecution.

Secondly, the release of “any and all other persons” is the sort of “general release” to which the rule in Pemrock has been found applicable. See Peters v. Butler, 253 Md. at 10 , 251 A.2d 600 ; Pemrock, Inc. v. Essco Company, Inc.; Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 Md.App. at 524 , 492 A.2d 1358 . Appellees, however, claim that the rule is not applicable to the release sub judice.

Appellees, as did the trial court, take the position that although the release that Michael Pantazes signed is a “general release”, malicious prosecution is not related to “the occurrence which produced” the release with the State, Peters, 253 Md. at 10 , 251 A.2d 600 ; consequently, the parties to the malicious prosecution charge are not affected by the release of March 14, 1985. They contend that the “occurrence which produced the settlement” was a nonexistent “arrest, detention or confinement”, as specifically stated in the release, and since none of these events occurred, it could not possibly be related to the occurrence (the malicious prosecution) which is the basis of the present litigation. In other words, appellees contend that the “General Waiver and Release” to the State and “all other per ⁷¹⁸ sons” releases the public from liability for a non-occurrence, for which no one could possibly be liable, in exchange for which Michael Pantazes was granted an early expungement of his records. We do not agree with appellees’ understanding that Michael Pantazes made such an “illusory promise,” Stamatiades v. Merit Music, 210 Md. 597, 614 , 124 A.2d 829 (1956) (“[W]here the option reserved to the promisor is unlimited ... his promise becomes illusory and incapable of forming part of a legal obligation.” (quoting Williston, Contracts, (Rev.Ed.) Vol.

I § 43)). The flaw in appellees’ reasoning is that they treat the signing of the “General Waiver and Release” as if it were part of a criminal proceeding in which they, knowing of a potential ambiguity in the State’s position, can remain silent and later capitalize on that ambiguity. For example, consider the trial testimony of the attorney who represented and advised Michael Pantazes at the time of the expungement process: I knew from the evidence, and from my investigation, from the paperwork that, to my knowledge, there was no arrest, no detention, or no confinement on the date in question. And thus, there could be no release to anybody including Mr. Dean Pantazes, for having caused the arrest, detention, or confinement, because there was no such cause of action civilly could be based upon that since it never happened.

THE COURT: If you don’t comply with the statute, you’re not entitled to the expungement. THE WITNESS: If—that is not the way I read it—if there was a proper objection by the State’s Attorney to the form of the release, number one; number two, if the Court sustains the objection by the State’s Attorney in the petition for expungement, then in that event, one is not entitled to the release, if the Court rules that way. In this State, however, releases are normally construed and applied according to the rules of contract law, Bernstein v. ⁷¹⁹ Kapneck, 290 Md. 452, 458 , 430 A.2d 602 (1981); Parish v. Milk Producers Ass’n, 250 Md. 24, 101 , 242 A.2d 512 (1968); Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 Md.App. at 530 , 492 A.2d 1358 , not criminal law.

There is no reason why this rule should not be applied to the present situation. The State and Michael Pantazes, in good faith, entered a mutually beneficial, bilateral agreement, Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating Co., 147 Md. 588, 593 , 128 A. 280 (1925), which was fully supported by adequate consideration on both sides, Beall v. Beall, 291 Md. 224, 229 , 434 A.2d 1015 (1981); Broaddus v. First National Bank, 161 Md. 116, 121-2 , 155 A. 309 (1931). Had Michael Pantazes waited the three years required by § 737, which is the period of limitations for civil actions, Md.Cts. & Jud. Proc.Code Ann. 5-101 (1984 & Supp.1988), then, after that time, the State would have been required, § 737, to expunge his records without the release requirement.

Where, as here, the petitioner elects to obtain expungement of his records prior to the running of the limitations period, then the predicament is created wherein certain evidence is rendered unavailable 4 by which persons sued might defend themselves in a civil action. For this reason, the State, on its own behalf and for the benefit of all other potential defendants in a civil action, bargained to give up its records in exchange for the general release. Michael Pantazes, on the other hand, bargained for an early expungement in exchange for which he gave up his right to sue. In light of the understanding that the General Waiver and Release of March 14, 1985, is to be interpreted as a contract, key among the general principles applicable to the interpretation of the agreement is that: ⁷²⁰ [A] release is to be construed according to the intent of the parties and the object and purpose of the instrument, and that intent will control and limit its operation.

Shriver v. Carlin & Fulton Co., 155 Md. 51, 64 , b141 A. 434 (1928), quoted in Wheaton Lanes v. Rinaldi, 236 Md. 525, 531 , 204 A.2d 537 (1964). Furthermore: The written language embodying the terms of an agreement will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties, irrespective of the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract, unless the written language is not susceptible of a clear and definite understanding____” Slice v. Carozza Prop., Inc., 215 Md. 357, 368 , 137 A.2d 687, 693 (1958). “[Wjhere a contract is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and it must be presumed that the parties meant what they expressed.” Kasten Constr. v. Rod Enterprises, 268 Md. 318, 328 , 301 A.2d 12, 18 (1973); Little v. First Federated Life, 267 Md. 1, 6 , 296 A.2d 372, 375 (1972); Devereux v. Berger, 253 Md. 264, 269 , 252 A.2d 469, 471 (1969). Thus, when interpreting [an] ... agreement, this Court is “bound to give effect to the plain meaning of the language used.” Woodham v. Woodham, supra [ 235 Md. 356 ], 360, 201 A.2d [674], 676 [1964]; Sands v. Sands, 252 Md. 137, 249 A.2d 187 (1969). Goldberg v. Goldberg, 290 Md. 204, 212 , 428 A.2d 469 (1981).

Finally: Where contract language is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. Sternbergh v. Brock, 225 Pa. 279, 74 Atl. 166 (1909); Kennedy v. Erkman, 389 Pa. 651 , 133 A.2d 550 (1957). Words are to be given their ordinary meaning, Pines Plaza Bowling, Inc. v. Rossview, Inc., 394 Pa. 124 , 145 A.2d 672 (1958). However, if the language under consideration is ambiguous or uncertain a court must then determine the intention of the parties.

In such a case a court may consider evidence of extrinsic factors: i.e., negotiations of the parties, the circumstances surrounding execution of the contract, the parties’ own ⁷²¹ construction of the contract and the conduct of the parties.