Pantazes v. State

ADKINS, Judge. On the morning of March 30, 2000, when Clara Pantazes (“Mrs. Pantazes”) entered her garage to leave for work at the bail bond company that she and her husband operated, a stranger shot her three times at close range. The State charged that Dean James Pantazes, appellant, hired Jermel Chambers, a heroin-addicted prostitute, to murder his wife, and then take her jewelry, purse, and Jeep to make the murder look like a random robbery and shooting. The State accused Pantazes of driving Chambers to his house in Upper Marlboro, opening the garage door, and instructing Chambers to shoot his wife with a gun that he left under a towel on top of the garage refrigerator.

According to the State, Pantazes then closed the garage door, leaving Chambers inside to lie in wait for his wife of more than twenty years. The proffered motive was that Clara Pantazes may have been contemplating a divorce that Pantazes believed would cost him too dearly. Pantazes denied that he had anything to do with the murder. At trial, the State’s star witness was Chambers, who admitted murdering and robbing Mrs. Pantazes in exchange for $11,000 from Pantazes.

The primary corroborating witness was “Kim” Young, 1 a prostitute who claimed that Pan- ⁴²⁷ tazes separately solicited her to do the killing. A Charles County jury convicted Pantazes on seven counts, including first degree murder, first degree felony murder, and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. 2 In this appeal, Pantazes demands a new trial because Young blurted out that she had taken a lie detector test, and Chambers, in an emotional outburst from the witness stand, shouted to Pantazes, “You are going to kill the children next. Tell them that. The two of them were next for you.” We conclude that the lie detector remark merited a mistrial, and therefore, do not address whether the emotional outburst did as well.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS The only witness to the events was the admitted shooter, Jermel Chambers. Chambers pleaded guilty to the first degree murder of Mrs. Pantazes in return for the State’s agreement not to seek the death penalty. She said that she was hired by Pantazes to kill his wife. He drove her to the Pantazes’ house on the morning of March 30, where she shot Mrs. Pantazes with a gun left there by Pantazes.

Chambers, a prostitute and drug addict, was first approached by Pantazes on the street in January 2000. Pantazes, who was driving a big green truck and introduced himself as “Steve,” inquired how much oral sex would cost. When Pantazes agreed to pay the forty dollar price quoted, Pantazes took her to a house on K Street, “which is right across the DC line,” and they had oral sex. For an additional sum of fifty dollars, they had vaginal sex, and, according to Chambers, Pantazes “said he wanted to see me as a regular, so he wouldn’t have to go with different girls.” Chambers described the K Street house as having a brown door, with blue carpeting on the first floor. ⁴²⁸ Chambers testified that the topic of murder came up in their first meeting: He told me something about a boss’ wife of his, his boss’ wife.

Anyway, he indicated that she was going to be running off and leaving him and taking almost everything that he had. And his boss, when he was indicated to do him or to do her. The next time they met, Chambers said, “he told me the whole story then.” He said his boss’ wife was going to divorce him and was sleeping around with his best friend, and she was going to get everything that he had. And he would pay someone almost whatever they asked for to do her.

That is how he said it. Chambers told Pantazes that she “would look around and see if [she] knew anybody.” They continued to meet, and engaged in sexual activity between six and eight times, always at the K Street house. During these encounters, they would talk “[a]bout this job being done. Getting his boss’ wife killed.” Chambers described herself as “very high” on these occasions.

Chambers testified that after Pantazes paid her $5,000 in cash, wrapped in a money wrapper, they continued to talk about the murder. When he asked, one evening in February, how much it would cost for her to do the murder, she told him $6,000 more. On March 29, they met in his truck, and agreed to meet again at a convenience store the next morning. Early that morning, Chambers got into Pantazes’ truck, and he drove her to his house on Kenfield Lane, in an affluent neighborhood in Upper Marlboro, arriving at 7:45 a.m.

He opened the garage door. He then told me to come in. I went into the garage. We were standing there kind of going back at each other____He was telling me the gun was on top of the refrigerator.

He handed me the gloves. He told me to sit on a milk crate that is behind the cooler that is in his basement, or is in his garage. Then, Chambers learned for the first time that there was no “boss” and Pantazes’ wife was to be the victim. ⁴²⁹ He told me she would be coming out before ten o’clock, because she had an appointment. He said she was in the shower.

When he said that to me, I knew that he was lying. That he was really Dino ... the boss. Whoever he said his boss was. I figured it out when he said she is in the shower right now.

She’ll come out. She’ll put the dog in. Pantazes left Chambers inside the garage and closed the door. According to Chambers, she could not leave because she did not know how to reopen the garage door.

When Mrs. Pantazes came out of the house, she saw Chambers, and they exchanged words. Mrs. Pantazes asked Chambers what she was doing in her house, and Chambers replied that a man named Steve had let her in. Chambers begged Mrs. Pantazes to let her leave the garage, without telling the police she had been there. After Mrs. Pantazes said she was going to call the police, Chambers shot her three times.

She then prepared the scene to look like a robbery had occurred. I grabbed everything and did like he told me to do, make it look like a robbery. And he said he would put cigarette butts and hair and all around her to mess up the scene for the cops before they got there.... I finally figured out how to get out.

There was a remote control on the visor [of Mrs. Pantazes’ car]. Chambers recounted that she drove away in Mrs. Pantazes’ Jeep, and headed back to the District of Columbia. She took with her the gun, and Mrs. Pantazes’ ring and Rolex watch. She said that she called Pantazes with the cell phone she found in Mrs. Pantazes’ car, and “told him it was done.” She left the car in the District of Columbia.

Chambers recounted that after the murder, she called Pan-tazes twice and asked for the balance of the sum promised her to do the murder. In the second call, she “made it very clear to him that if he didn’t give me my money, you know, he was going to have repercussions behind it.” Pantazes replied, “[You] didn’t ... do it right.” On cross-examination of Chambers, the defense brought out her long term history of prostitution. Chambers also admit ⁴³⁰ ted that she had lied on numerous occasions to police and court agencies about her name and address. She admitted that the details of her testimony about what happened inside the Pantazes’ garage were inconsistent with her previous statements to the police.

The defense also established that she had worked occasionally as a bounty hunter. Chambers explained that a bounty hunter is “a person-that retrieves fugitives or persons that have run away and are on bond.” She denied having worked as a bounty hunter for Pantazes. Although she had been to the bail bond office where “Steve” worked, she denied knowing that he was a bail bondsman until three months after she was incarcerated. The State’s chief corroborating witness was Kim Young, also a prostitute.

Although she worked in the same general area of Eastern Avenue as Chambers, and had seen Chambers on the streets, Young denied having any relationship with Chambers. Young said she met Pantazes, who called himself “Steve,” in December 1999 when she was working by Paul’s Liquor Store. She flagged him down in his “big old truck” to offer him sex. She got in his car, where the two had oral sex, for which he paid her twenty dollars plus a twenty dollar tip.

According to Young, when Pantazes was driving Young back to the area of the liquor store to drop her off, he mentioned that he was looking for someone to commit a contract murder. [H]e said this old mail wants this woman killed, and I said why.... [H]e said because she’s like a bitch.... I said how do you want her killed. He said well, she go to work at 9, best do it in the morning. That way no one will be home.

He said when she comes out, she comes out between 9:00 and 9:30 like that. I said oh. And you shoot her, take the Jeep, her Cherokee, her Jeep and get rid of it[.] Young testified that Pantazes offered her $10,000 to “do it,” but she declined, because she was afraid of guns. When he asked her to look for “one of those young hustlers,” Young gave him her telephone number.

Pantazes called Young frequently after their first meeting. ⁴³¹ Young testified that the next time they met, in January 2000, Pantazes had murder on his mind. “[W]e talked about the murder, the plot again.... [H]e said I want it done quickly. Did you find somebody. I said yes, I found somebody.” Young explained that she had not, in fact, found anyone, but rather, “was playing with him.” “Stringing him along,” she told him, “I met this guy K.” When Pantazes heard this, “he said give K the address,” and gave Young a small card with an address on it. When they met a third time, Young recounted, Pantazes paid her for oral sex, and Young continued the fiction about “K.” Q: While you were with him that night did you have any further discussions about this murder? ...

A: I said K he can’t do it in the morning. He wanted to do it at night. He said, well, she worked late in Upper Marlboro, but you can’t do it. It’s too many cops be around.

She only works late on Wednesday. Young testified that in their fourth meeting, around February, Pantazes again paid Young for oral sex. He then gave Young a yellow piece of paper containing his home address, on Kenfield Lane, Upper Marlboro, and the access code to his garage. The typed paper also provided directions to Pan-tazes’ house.

He told Young to give the paper to K. After the murder, the police searched Young’s apartment for the paper, but did not find it. After the search, Young found the paper, and turned it over to police, saying that her brother had used it as scrap paper. Young related in her testimony that the paper was found in her brother’s room, which was not searched by the police because her brother was asleep at the time of their search. The yellow piece of paper was introduced as an exhibit.

According to Young, during one of their meetings, Pantazes shared with Young his plan for how the murder would happen. He said when she comes out of her garage about 9, between 9 o’clock, that he will have — he told me he’ll have the garage cracked opened, ... because he the only one with access to ⁴³² the house. He said he’ll be out of town. He said he’ll be out of town when it happens, but he want her shot and want truck taken to southeast or anywhere, blown up, set on fire.

On another occasion, Pantazes brought a large amount of money to their meeting. [Young]: I got in the truck with him and he had a box, a multi color box with two knots of money in it----And he said you think I’m joking, look. I told you I got to get this done very fast. I said sweetheart, I can’t find him, like that. Q: You can’t find K?

A: K. Young testified that a box that the police found at Pantazes’ home, and which was introduced into evidence, looked like the one that held the money. She also explained that at the time Pantazes showed her the box, he said: “I have to get rid of this money before my son finds it and spends it, my son and my wife find it and spend it.” Young recounted that the last time she met with Pantazes was sometime in March 2000. On March 30, 2000, Young heard about Mrs. Pantazes’ murder on television, and contacted the police. [T]he news was about to come on and the lady said, one of the anchors said a woman was murdered in an Upper Marlboro home, in the garage, and I said, oh, my God, he done found somebody to kill that woman, and I said — I woke my little brother up. I said little Bobby, get up.

This is the same plan this man told me about, a woman being killed in a garage. I said watch if she say a truck is missing. Indeed they said a truck is missing. ... I waited until 10 o’clock that night, about 10, about 10:15, 10:30 that night, because the [police officer] was coming in to work.

I think he was coming in, and I said I know about that murder plot that happened in Upper Marlboro. She identified Pantazes as a “big, heavy set, looked like a Puerto Rican man, Spanish man. He got a big belly, always wear jeans and striped shirt, checkered shirt and got a ⁴³³ mustache, always smoke cigars.” Young was taken to the police station, where she gave a statement and identified Pantazes from a group of photographs. She testified that although she did not ask for money from the police, later she was given $1,000 from Crime Solvers.

On cross-examination, Young acknowledged a prior conviction for theft and for prostitution. She also acknowledged that she “love[d] money,” and had been paid by the police several times during the period she was giving statements and cooperating with them. 3 Police assisted in getting her the $1,000 from Crime Solvers. The State offered additional corroborative evidence. Police testified that the garage at the Pantazes home showed no signs of forced entry, corroborating Chambers’ testimony that Pantazes let her into the garage.

Two weeks after the murder, Young, under police supervision, made a tape-recorded telephone call to Pantazes at his office. During the call, Young accused Pantazes of the murder and referred to the yellow sheet of paper that Pantazes had given her with directions to his house and the code to open his garage. In this taped conversation, Pantazes insisted that he did not know Young. Nonetheless, Pantazes told Young he would “pay for some information.” When Young asked Pantazes to meet her at Paul’s Liquor Store, Pantazes repeatedly claimed that he did not know where Paul’s was located.

Yet an employee at Paul’s identified a photograph of Pantazes as that of a man who regularly came to Paul’s in a green Suburban. According to the employee, during the early part of the year, Pantazes would sit in his Suburban outside Paul’s “every night to every other night.” Sometimes Pantazes would come into Paul’s and purchase soda and chips. Shortly after the monitored telephone call, Pantazes met Young at Paul’s Liquor. During their conversation, which was ⁴³⁴ also recorded, he remarked that he felt as if he were under surveillance.

He still maintained that he did not know Young, but paid her $1,300 for information. Young denied giving any information to Pantazes, and Pantazes did not pass on any information from Young to the police. Telephone records showed that between December and March, Pantazes made thirty-one calls to Young’s telephone number. When police searched Pantazes’ bail bond office on May 23, they located a piece of paper with Young’s phone number on it under the blotter on Pantazes’ desk.

In addition, telephone records showed that between January and March, Pantazes made fourteen calls to Chambers. Chambers’ cousin, who lived with Chambers, recalled that a man identifying himself as “Steve,” a “white guy” with a high-pitched voice, made about a “half dozen” calls asking for Chambers. When Chambers’ cousin produced “Steve’s” phone number, which she had written on a sheet of paper, it turned out to be Pantazes’ cell phone number. Another relative confirmed that the same person called for Chambers several times, including twice on the relative’s birthday.

On the date of the murder, Pantazes talked to the police, and provided them with a detailed recitation of his whereabouts throughout the day. Although Pantazes claimed to have done work on a federally-owned property in Mt. Laurel early that morning, he had not signed a visitor’s list for the property, as was required by the federal government. The State also introduced evidence regarding the distances and driving time from the stops Pantazes claimed that he made that morning, and argued that Pantazes had sufficient time (40 minutes) to pick up Chambers and drive her to his home, even if he did go to the Mt.

Laurel property. The State also introduced Pantazes’ recorded statement that a few people knew the code to the garage, and established that there was no evidence of a forced entry into the Pantazes’ garage. Regarding motive, the State introduced a letter written by the Pantazes’ son indicating that there had been some marital discord. He testified that he left the letter in his father’s ⁴³⁵ truck sometime in September 1999.

His mother had called him at college, and during their conversation, revealed that she had argued with Pantazes. The letter indicated that the disagreement had been serious. My entire life I have looked up to you.... I honestly don’t know what to say right now.

I have never been so hurt as I am. When I talked to Mom this morning and heard her cry I didn’t care who was at fault, I just wanted to get this settled.... Driving home I didn’t think at all .... but when I got home I realized my world had crashed down.... I always thought our family was unbreakable....

I am proud to call you dad but upset because it seems as though you forgot where your home is. Telephone records also established that a ten-second phone call was made from the victim’s cell phone to Pantazes’ cell phone at 9:40 on the morning of the murder. Although defense counsel argued that this phone call might have been placed by Mrs. Pantazes in a cry for help, the State introduced telephone company records to show that it was more likely placed from a location near Washington, not from the Pan-tazes house. A college student who lived near the K Street townhouse corroborated Chambers’ testimony that she and Pantazes went to the townhouse to have sex.

The student remembered that, on two or three occasions in “about March,” he saw two people entering a vacant townhouse on K Street. The man was heavy set, white, and drove a “big green Suburban,” and the woman was 5’7”, “disoriented, her clothes was tom. She looked like a crack head.” The State showed that Pantazes had access to a house in that block, and that the interior of that house matched Chambers’ description of the K Street house where Pantazes took her. The defense presented numerous witnesses, including Mrs. Pantazes’ mother and sister, who stated that Pantazes’ relationship with his wife was very happy.

In response to the State’s evidence of phone calls to Chambers, the defense ⁴³⁶ offered the testimony of James Verapapa, a bondsman who shared offices with Mr. and Mrs. Pantazes, and joint ventured with them on large bonds. Verapapa explained that a “jumper” was a person for whom they posted a bond, but who failed to appear in court at the appointed time. If this occurred, the bondsman would forfeit the bond amount, unless he could locate and bring the person to court within a set time period. Verapapa reported that when making calls to locate a jumper, he and Pantazes would usually use a false name.

The defense suggested to the jury that Pantazes made the calls to Chambers and Young, and falsely identified himself as “Steve” because he was trying to obtain information about a jumper. During the time period of Pantazes’ calls to Chambers and Young, Pantazes and Verapapa were looking for a jumper, an exotic dancer who was reported to be working in New Jersey or Philadelphia. Verapapa testified that although there was no evidence that the jumper was living or working locally, both of the Pantazes and he did make some local calls to look for her. He acknowledged, however, that when he testified before the grand jury, he said that Mrs. Pantazes was doing the “office work” on that jumper, that Pantazes was not working the case, and that in fact the F.B.I. told them “not to work the case” because that person was the subject of a federal investigation.

In an effort to create reasonable doubt, the defense also challenged the State’s time line of Pantazes’ movements on the morning of the murder. In addition, it presented a witness who saw Young and Chambers together the summer before the murder, in an effort to suggest that Young and Chambers may have framed Pantazes. DISCUSSION “The results of a lie detector test, as well as the fact of taking such a test, are not admissible.” Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 658 , 480 A.2d 800 (1984). There is good reason for the exclusion of lie detector or polygraph evidence. ⁴³⁷ The reliability of such tests has not been established to our satisfaction, and we have consistently refused to permit evidence with regard to them.

In our system of criminal justice, the trier of fact is the lie detector, and we have been steadfast in disallowing that function to be usurped by a process we have not found to be trustworthy. Mention at a criminal trial of the results of a polygraph test, or the taking of the test, or the willingness or unwillingness to take the test, raises the specter of reversal. In criminal prosecutions, the polygraph test is a pariah; “polygraph” is a dirty word. State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 275 , 604 A.2d 489 (1992) (citations omitted).

See generally Michelle M. Gee, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Informing Jury that Witness in Criminal Prosecution Has Taken Polygraph Test, 15 A.L.R.4th 824 (2000). Midway through her cross-examination, Young was asked: “You had talked to a number of police officers during that night and early morning hours and into the afternoon.” Young responded, “Yes. I kept falling asleep, because I had to take a lie detector test and all that.” After Young’s testimony on cross-examination, redirect, and re-cross, defense counsel asked to approach the bench. Noting that Young had “said she was given a lie detector,” defense counsel asserted that he had “received nothing in discovery” about the lie detector test.

The prosecutor replied that he was not “aware of that” but would find out during the noon recess. After the State located and for the first time gave defense counsel the results of a voice stress analysis, 4 defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the testimony was prejudicial because “the most important facts of this case are the ⁴³⁸ credibility of Jermel Chambers and Kim Young.” The defense emphasized that had the State provided the information about the lie detector test in discovery, the lie detector testimony could have been prevented through a motion in limine and appropriate instructions to counsel and to the •witness. Defense counsel also pointed out that if he had received the lie detector information in discovery, he could have “cross-examined around it.” The prosecutor admitted that the State had failed to furnish the discovery. Nonetheless, he argued, the nondisclosure did not justify a new trial.

Although defense counsel insisted that a new trial was the only just remedy, the trial court denied the mistrial. Instead, at the close of the evidence, the court gave a curative instruction. 5 Defense counsel objected to the instruction, and moved again for a mistrial. On appeal, Pantazes argues that if “the lie detector test had been disclosed, both the defense strategy and the results of the trial would have been different, i.e. the jury would never have been exposed to Young’s prejudicial, inadmissible lie detector testimony.” He contends that his conviction must be reversed because the discovery violation tainted both his trial strategy and the case that was put before the jury. Pantazes offers three rationales for reversal.

First, he complains that the State’s failure to produce information about the voice stress analysis in discovery, in violation of Md. Rule 4 — 263(b) (4), prejudiced Pantazes because it prevented the defense from taking steps to ensure that the jury did not learn that Young had taken a lie detector test. Second, he contends ⁴³⁹ that the lie detector testimony so prejudiced the jury that no curative instruction could correct it. Third, he claims that even if the remark could have been remedied by a curative instruction, the trial court’s instruction in this case only “compounded the problem.” We do not follow Pantazes’ approach of resolving this case by conducting three separate, compartmentalized examinations of the discovery violation, the lie detector remark, and the curative instruction, using three different standards of review. The record here establishes that the State’s failure to provide the defense with Young’s lie detector test information prevented the defense from filing a motion in limine in order to avert any mention of a lie detector test in front of the jury.

In these circumstances — when the discovery violation directly leads to inadmissible testimony about a lie detector test — the taint from the discovery violation cannot be “detached” from the lie detector remark, because the harm caused by the discovery violation was the remark itself. Nor do we accept the State’s contention that we should resolve this case by applying the usual standard of review that governs the determination of whether a lie detector remark “so prejudiced the defendant that it deprived him of a fair trial.” Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 659 , 480 A.2d 800 . For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the appropriate standard for our review of a discovery violation resulting in inadmissible lie detector testimony is the “harmless error” standard. 6 ⁴⁴⁰ Although this case presents a closer question than the Maryland precedent that guides our review, ultimately we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the “double-barreled prejudice” resulting from the discovery violation and the lie detector remark did not affect the guilty verdict in this case. As we explain below, that conclusion requires us to vacate the conviction, and remand for a new trial.

I. The Standard Of Review For A Discovery Violation Resulting In A Lie Detector Remark Is “Harmless Error” Maryland Rule 4-263(b)(4) defines the State’s discovery obligations in criminal prosecutions. It requires that upon the request of the defendant, the State shall produce “the results of any ... scientific test[.]” A lie detector test is a scientific test that must be produced under this rule. See Patrick v. State, 329 Md. 24, 35-36 , 617 A.2d 215 (1992). There is no distinction, for purposes of discovery, between scientific tests administered to witnesses or to the accused.

See id. Nor does the rule condition the discovery of scientific tests upon their admissibility as evidence, or upon a showing that the results of the tests are material to the preparation of the defense and intended for use by the State. See id. at 35 , 617 A.2d 215 . Even an unintentional failure to provide discoverable lie detector information may constitute a discovery violation.

See Williams v. State, 364 Md. 160, 177 , 771 A.2d 1082 (2001). ⁴⁴¹ When a discovery violation occurs, “[u]pon an independent review of the record, we must be able to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the [violation] in no way influenced the verdict____” Id. at 179 , 771 A2d 1082 . The State bears that heavy burden of proof. See id. In Williams , the Court of Appeals recently applied this “harmless error” standard of appellate review in holding that a discovery violation resulting in the admission of harmful identification testimony required a mistrial.

See id. at 180-81 , 771 A.2d 1082 . In doing so, the Court emphasized the policy reasons for mandatory disclosure in criminal cases. The discovery rules “are not mere guides but are ‘precise rubrics’ to be strictly followed.” Id. at 171 , 771 A.2d 1082 . The “major objectives” of mandatory disclosure are “to assist defendants in preparing their defense and to protect them from unfair surprise” at trial.

Id. at 172 , 771 A.2d 1082 . Specifically, the mandatory disclosure rule “facilitate[s] ... effective cross-examination” and allows the defense to determine “whether certain motions can be filed prior to trial” in order to “protect [the defendant] from surprise” at trial. Id. at 172, 174 , 771 A.2d 1082 . Using the most stringent standard of appellate review to examine the prejudicial effect of a discovery violation promotes these objectives and prevents the State from being “the recipient of the unquestionable windfall that resulted from its own clear violation of the discovery rules.” Id. at 176 , 771 A.2d 1082 .

Accordingly, we review the prejudice resulting from a discovery violation on a harmless error standard. See Williams, 364 Md. at 179 , 771 A.2d 1082 . [W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed “harmless” and a reversal is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence com ⁴⁴² plained of — whether erroneously admitted or excluded— may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976).

In contrast, when a witness makes a lie detector remark to the jury, “the question is whether the reference to taking a lie detector test by the ... witness so clearly prejudiced the appellant that a motion for mistrial should have been granted.” Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 658 , 480 A.2d 800 . We give deference to the trial court’s assessment of the prejudicial effect that a lie detector remark had on the jury, because that court is in a better position to evaluate its impact on the jury in the context of the witness’ entire testimony and the trial as a whole. See, e.g., Hawkins, 326 Md. at 278 , 604 A.2d 489 (“The fundamental rationale in leaving the matter of prejudice vel non to the sound discretion of the trial judge is that the judge is in the best position to evaluate it”). In Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653 , 480 A.2d 800 (1984), the seminal case addressing prejudice resulting from lie detector testimony to a jury, the Court of Appeals directed courts to consider a number of factors in assessing such prejudice.

In determining whether evidence of a lie detector test was so prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial, courts have looked at many factors. The factors that had been considered include: whether the reference to a lie detector was repeated or whether it was a single, isolated statement; whether the reference was solicited by counsel, or was an inadvertent and unresponsive statement; whether the witness making the reference is the principal witness upon whom the entire prosecution depends; whether credibility is a crucial issue; whether a great deal of other evidence exists; and, whether an inference as to the result of the test can be drawn. Id. at 659 , 480 A.2d 800 . We think it is correct to say that in both discovery violation and lie detector cases, courts must examine the' prejudicial effect of the impermissible conduct in question.

In assessing the prejudicial effect of a discovery violation, however, the ⁴⁴³ term “prejudice” is tied to the stricter harmless error standard, and requires a showing that beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant suffered no harm from the violation. See Williams, 364 Md. at 179 , 771 A.2d 1082 . In contrast, when we assess the prejudicial effect of a “straight” lie detector remark, the term “prejudice” is measured by the more deferential standard. This case, however, involves both a discovery violation and a related lie detector remark.

We are reviewing the trial court’s decision to remedy a discovery violation that resulted in a lie detector blurt with a curative instruction to the jury, rather than a mistrial. The link between the discovery violation and the lie detector testimony in this case raises a question about the appropriate standard of review. Although a lie detector blurt in front of the jury may be an anticipated consequence of the State’s failure to disclose the fact and results of a witness’s lie detector test, we found no Maryland case addressing these circumstances. Cf.

Patrick, 329 Md. at 36-37 , 617 A.2d 215 (discovery violation regarding lie detector information that was not presented to the jury). Applying Williams in this new context, we conclude that the appropriate standard of review is the more stringent “harmless error” standard. A lesser standard would reward the State with an inappropriate “windfall”- from its violation of the discovery rules — i.e., having the inadmissible lie detector testimony evaluated under a less stringent standard of appellate review. See Williams, 364 Md. at 176 , 771 A.2d 1082 .

Williams teaches that we must assess the effect of the lie detector testimony under a harmless error standard, because doing so promotes the policy and purpose of the mandatory disclosure — “to assist the defendant in preparing his defense and prevent unfair surprise at trial.” Id. at 178, 771 A.2d 1082 (emphasis in original). In adopting this standard of review, we recognize that in cases involving discovery violations and lie detector testimony, the Court of Appeals has used language suggesting that appellate review of the denial of a mistrial should focus on the ⁴⁴⁴ trial court’s exercise of its discretion to fashion a remedy. In the context of discovery violations, the Williams Court recently stated that the remedy ... for a violation of the discovery rule is, in the first instance, within the sound discretion of the trial judge. The exercise of that discretion includes evaluating whether a discovery violation has caused prejudice.

Generally, unless we find that the lower court abused its discretion, we will not reverse. Williams, 364 Md. at 178 , 771 A.2d 1082 (citations omitted) (but reviewing a police officer’s surprise identification testimony at trial, which was not disclosed in discovery, under a harmless error standard). We acknowledge that this language raises some uncertainty about the appropriate standard