Pappas v. Modern Manufacturing Co.

Anderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal on behalf of Harriet Pappas, appellant-claimant, from a judgment in the Baltimore City Court in favor of The Modern Manufacturing Company, appellee-employer (hereinafter called Modern), and the State Accident Fund, appellee-insurer. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission found that the claimant had sustained an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. On appeal to the Baltimore City Court, the court, sitting non-jury, found that the injuries sustained by the claimant did not arise out of and in the course of her employment, and reversed the ruling of the Commission.

The case was submitted on the record before the Commission and there was no dispute as to the facts. The pertinent facts are as follows: Appellant, Harriet Pappas, had been employed as a seamstress by Modern for more than six years prior to the happening of the accident which occurred on January 7, 1970. Modern is a concern engaged in the garment business. Its plant is located at 501 E. Preston Street, Baltimore, in a building owned by Industrial Building Associates, from which it leases space for the operation of its business.

For some time prior to July 1969 appellant’s employer, Modern, was experiencing difficulty in keeping experienced employees such as women seamstresses since it had no parking facilities. As a result, its employees were often forced to park their cars several blocks away from their work and there were numerous instances where they were subjected to assaults, purse snatchings, and vandalism to their automobiles. ⁵³¹ As a solution to the problem the employer, Modern, made arrangements with its landlord to have parking facilities made available to its employees. In June 1969 its landlord cleared a lot owned by it adjacent to its building in which Modern’s plant was located and made it into a parking lot for the convenience of Modern’s employees. In July 1969 a parking space on the lot was provided for the appellant by her employer and she agreed that $6.00 each month would be deducted from her pay check for the use of the parking space.

At that time the appellant was given a card to keep in her car as evidence to the lot attendant that she had a parking space on the lot. Thereafter, each morning, when she came to work she would drive her car into the parking lot, park in the space designated by the lot attendant, leave the parking lot by the gate and enter a ten foot alley between the building where she worked and the parking lot. She would then walk north in the alley one-half block to Preston Street, and turn west on Preston Street twenty feet to the entrance to the building. This was the direct route from the parking lot to her place of employment.

On the morning of January 7, 1970, appellant arrived for work at approximately 7:45 a.m., and parked her car in the parking space designated by the lot attendant. After leaving her car, she proceeded towards the gate to enter the alley and continue in a direct route to her place of employment. It had snowed the night before and underneath the snow was ice in some places which she was unable to see. While still on the parking lot she slipped on some ice and fell, fracturing her right arm.

It is from this accidental personal injury that she now seeks to recover under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Art. 101, § 15, Maryland Code (1964 Repl. Vol.). The sole question on appeal is whether the appellant, Harriet Pappas, sustained an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with Modern. ⁵³² For the appellant to recover she must prove that the accidental personal injury arose “out of” and “in the course of” her employment, as both must be satisfied by the claimant to bring her case within the operation of the Act. The words “out of” refer to the cause or origin of the accident, while the phrase “in the course of” refers to the time, place and circumstances under which it occurs.

An injury arises out of employment when it results from some obligation, condition or incident of the employment, under the circumstances of the particular case. An injury arises in the course of employment when it occurs during the period of employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his or her duties and while he or she is carrying out those duties or something incident thereto. See Proctor-Silex v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477, 480 , 252 A. 2d 800 . Pariser Bakery v. Koontz, 239 Md. 586, 590 , 212 A. 2d 324 ; Dept. of Correction v. Harris, 232 Md. 180 , 192 A. 2d 479 .

In the instant case the appellant had arrived on the parking lot and parked in her designated parking space prior to beginning her actual duties. At the time of the accident, which occurred on the parking lot, she was proceeding to work by the shortest and most direct route. It is unquestioned that an employee is in the course of his or her employment where he or she is injured before the hour of work while on the premises for the purpose of engaging in the day’s work. Giant Food, Inc. v. Gooch, 245 Md. 160 , 225 A. 2d 431 ; Proctor-Silex v. DeBrick, supra.

The appellees contend that the accidental injury suffered by the appellant did not arise out of and in the course of her employment since the injury occurred either on a parking lot or in a public alley, neither of which were owned or controlled by the appellant’s employer; and that appellant’s injury was not one which followed as a natural incident of her work as a seamstress nor resulted from a causative danger peculiar to her work, or have its origin in a risk in any way con ⁵³³ nected with her employment. They argue that appellant’s claim comes under the “going and coming rule.” It has been generally held that employees who suffer injuries in going to or returning from work are excluded from the benefits of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Pariser Bakery v. Koontz, supra; Saylor v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 258 Md. 605 , 267 A. 2d 81 ; Stoskin v. Board of Education, 11 Md. App. 355 , 274 A. 2d 397 .

The rule applies, in particular, to injuries occurring on a public street or highway. However, there are certain exceptions to the rule, such as, the premises rule and the proximity rule as enunciated in Proctor-Silex v. DeBrick, supra, and Saylor v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., supra. Appellant contends that she is entitled to recover under the proximity rule as enunciated in Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation (1951) Vol. 8, § 1724 which says: “The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while coming to or going from his work, when, though off the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, and is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress or egress, either on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the express or implied consent of the employer.” See Maryland Paper Products Company v. Judson, 215 Md. 577, 585 , 139 A. 2d 219 ; Stoskin v. Board of Education, supra.

As analyzed in Pariser Bakery v. Koontz, 239 Md. 586, 591 , the rule “allows compensation for an injury to an employee when, under the special facts of the case, the employment itself involves peculiar and abnormal exposure to a common peril which is annexed as a risk ⁵³⁴ incident to the employment.” The gravamen of the proximity rule “is not that the employee is in close proximity to his place of employment, but rather that by reason of such proximity, the employee is subjected to danger peculiarly or to an abnormal degree beyond that to which the general public was subjected.” Pariser Bakery, at page 591. The facts, which are undisputed, show that the employer, Modern, was in dire need of a parking lot for its employees who, for lack of parking facilities, had been subjected to various