Parker v. State

ELDRIDGE, Judge. This case concerns the nature and scope of judicial immunity from tort actions, both under Maryland law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . I. The facts are not in dispute. On April 14, 1988, Doris E. Parker was convicted in the District Court of Maryland of driving in excess of the speed limit, was fined $150, and was assessed $5 in court costs.

Parker appealed her conviction to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, and a de novo appeal in that court was scheduled for July 26, 1988. Upon Parker’s failure to appear on that date, the circuit court determined that she had waived her right to a de novo appeal and entered as its judgment the judgment of the District Court. 1 By August 5,1988, Parker had not paid the fine, and on that date, ²⁷⁴ Judge Roger W. Brown of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City issued a warrant for her arrest. The Baltimore County Police Department made various attempts to serve Parker with this warrant but was unable to do so. On May 31, 1989, ten months after the date scheduled for the de novo appeal, Parker filed a motion in the circuit court to strike the dismissal and to reinstate proceedings.

Judge Brown granted the motion and quashed the earlier warrant for Parker’s arrest. An appeal de novo was held before another circuit court judge on September 22, 1989, at which Parker was acquitted of the speeding offense. On December 7, 1989, however, the Sheriff of Baltimore City appeared before Judge Brown and requested a second arrest warrant on the basis of Parker’s “continued” failure to pay the $150 fine levied on July 26,1988. Judge Brown issued the warrant without calling for the case file from the clerk’s office or reviewing the docket entries which reflected Parker’s September 22, 1989, acquittal.

At 9:30 in the morning on January 17, 1990, Parker was arrested at her home in Baltimore County, taken to the Woodlawn police precinct in Baltimore County and detained there throughout the day until she ²⁷⁵ paid the $150 fíne. Judge Brown ultimately quashed the arrest warrant on January 19, 1990. Parker filed the present action for damages in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against the State of Maryland under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Code (1984, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.), §§ 12-101 through 12-110 of the State Government Article, alleging false imprisonment, false arrest and negligence on the part of Judge Brown and the Clerk, Deputy Clerk and Assistant Clerk of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 2 Parker also sued the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , for the erroneous issuance of the warrant.

The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds, inter alia, 1) that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against the clerks because the clerks played no part in the issuance of the warrant, 2) that Judge Brown was entitled to absolute immunity for his judicial acts, and 3) that, if Judge Brown was immune from suit, the State could not be held liable under the Maryland Tort Claims Act for his actions. Parker then filed an amended complaint, adding the sheriff and a deputy sheriff of Baltimore City as defendants based on information contained in an affidavit submitted by Judge Brown regarding the incident. On the same day that the amended complaint was filed, the circuit court signed an order granting the defendants’ motion and dismissing the action with prejudice. Parker then filed a motion to alter the circuit court’s decision pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-534, requesting that the court reconsider its dismissal in light of the allegations in the amended complaint.

After a hearing, the circuit court issued a second order denying Parker’s motion to alter the original order of dismissal, but stating that ²⁷⁶ the dismissal was without prejudice to the plaintiffs bringing a new action against the sheriff and deputy sheriff. Parker appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, complaining about the dismissal of her action against Judge Brown and the State of Maryland. 3 Parker argued that Judge Brown was not entitled to judicial immunity because he had lacked both subject matter jurisdiction over Parker’s case and personal jurisdiction over Parker when he issued the arrest warrant. While the Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument and held Judge Brown absolutely immune from suit, it did so on the basis that, under the constitutional and statutory provisions granting jurisdiction to the circuit court, Judge Brown was authorized in the circumstances to issue, the warrant. Parker v. State, 92 Md.App. 540, 547 , 609 A.2d 347, 351 (1992).

In addition, the Court of Special Appeals held that judicial immunity attached if “the judge had general subject matter jurisdiction, whether or not he or she also possessed personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff.” 92 Md.App. at 551 , 609 A.2d at 352 . Parker petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing, as she had in the Court of Special Appeals, that Judge Brown could not be held judicially immune from suit because he had lacked jurisdiction to issue a warrant for Parker’s arrest. Concerned by the approach of both the petitioner and the Court of Special Appeals to the issue of judicial immunity in this case, we granted Parker’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

II

Parker sued the State of Maryland for damages, under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Code (1984, 1993 Repl.Vol., ²⁷⁷ 1994 Cum.Supp.), §§ 12-101 through 12-110 of the State Government Article, based on Judge Brown’s allegedly tortious conduct. The parties to the present case have agreed that if Judge Brown is immune from suit, then the State of Maryland will not be liable under the Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, Parker’s state law claims were properly dismissed if Judge Brown is entitled to the common law defense of absolute judicial immunity. The principle that judicial officers should be immune from all civil liability for their judicial acts has been part of the common law since very early days.

In 1607, an English court refused to entertain a civil action for damages against a judge of the Assizes, Richard Barker, for his role as judge in the trial and conviction of a criminal defendant. Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 E.R. 1305 (1607). The court concluded that “the Judge, be he Judge of Assise, or a justice of peace, or any other Judge, being Judge by commission and of record, and sworn to do justice, cannot be [sued] ... for that which he did openly in Court as Judge or justice of peace----” 12 Coke at 24, 77 E.R. at 1306. The court based its holding on the established principle of law that “one shall never assign for error, against that which the Court doth as Judges.... ” 12 Coke at 24, 77 E.R. at 1307.

To the same effect, the court cited one of its own earlier cases, in which “it was resolved, that that thing, that a Judge doth as Judge of Record, ought not to be drawn in question in this Court.” 12 Coke at 25, 77 E.R. at 1307. In light of the clear legal principles involved, “it was ordered and decreed by all the Court, that the ... bill [against the judge] ... shall be taken off the file and can-celled, and utterly defaced____” Ibid. Later, in 1674, Chief Justice Hale held that a tort action for false imprisonment would not lie against a magistrate for a “matter ... done in a course of justice----” Bushell’s Case, 1 Mod. 119, 86 E.R. 777, 778 (1674). In Hamond v. Howell, 2 Mod. 218, 86 E.R. 1035 (1677), a jury had acquitted two Quaker preachers, Penn and Mead, ²⁷⁸ who had been indicted for attending a conventicle. 4 The acquittal went “against the direction of the Court in matter of law and against plain evidence----” 2 Mod. at 218, 86 E.R. at 1035.

Outraged by the acquittal, the judges “fined the jury forty marks a-piece” and sent them to Newgate gaol for their failure to pay the fine. Later, a juror sued one of the judges, Judge Howell, for false imprisonment. The defendant’s attorney conceded that he “would not offer to speak to that point, whether a Judge can fine a jury for giving a verdict contrary to evidence, since the case was so lately and solemnly resolved by all the Judges of England ... that he could not fine a jury for so doing.” 2 Mod. at 218, 86 E.R. at 1036. Instead, the defendant argued that “no action will lie against him ... because it is done as a Judge.” Ibid.

In response, the plaintiff contended that the judge was not entitled to judicial immunity because he had no jurisdiction to perform the wrongful acts, stating (2 Mod. at 219, 86 E.R. at 1036): “The trial of Penn and Mead, and all incidents thereunto, as swearing the jury, examining of the witnesses, taking of the verdict, and acquitting the prisoner, were all within the [judicial] commission; but the fining of the jury, and the imprisoning of them for non-payment thereof, was not justi ²⁷⁹ fiable by their commission; and therefore what was done therein was not as commissioners or Judges.” The court in Hamond v. Howell rejected the plaintiffs argument, relying on a broad concept of jurisdiction to support the availability of immunity (2 Mod. at 220, 86 E.R. at 1037): “The [trial court] had jurisdiction of the cause, and might try it, and had power to punish a misdemeanor in the jury: they thought it to be a misdemeanor in the jury to acquit the prisoners, which in truth was not so, and therefore it was an error in their judgments, for which no action will lie: how often are judgments given in this Court reversed in the King’s Bench!” The court held the defendant judge immune from civil liability for the misuse of his general power to punish the jury: “though [the judges] were mistaken, yet they acted judicially, and for that reason no action will lie against the defendant.” Ibid. The plaintiff in Hamond v. Howell also contended that the judge was not protected by judicial immunity because he had violated the jurors’ rights under the Magna Charta and the Petition of Right of 1629. The court refused to except constitutional claims from the doctrine of judicial immunity, reasoning that constitutional rights, like other rights, were protected by existing mechanisms for appellate review. Hamond v. Howell, supra, 2 Mod. at 220-221, 86 E.R. at 1037.

Thus, by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a broad concept of absolute civil immunity for judicial acts had been firmly established at common law. See, e.g., Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 172, 98 E.R. 1021, 1027 (1774) (“by the law of England, if an action be brought against a Judge of Record for an act done by him in his judicial capacity, he may plead that he did it as Judge of Record, and that will be a complete justification”); Ashby v. White, 2 Ld.Raym. 938, 941, 92 E.R. 126, 129 (“no action lies against a man for what he does as a judge”), rev’d on other grounds, 1 Brown 62, 1 E.R. 417 (H.L. 1703); Groenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Ld.Raym. 454, 468, 91 E.R. ²⁸⁰ 1202, 1211 (1699) (“as a Judge shall not be questioned at the suit of the parties, no more shall he be questioned at the King’s suit before another Judge”); Raine’s Case, 1 Ld.Raym. 262, 263, 91 E.R. 1071 (1697) (“no action lies against a man for what he does judicially”). The American courts likewise recognized the same broad principle of absolute judicial immunity from civil suits. See, e.g., Busteed v. Parsons, 54 Ala. 393, 25 Am.Rep. 688 (1875); Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day 315 (Conn.1804); Briggs v. Wardwell, 10 Mass. 356 (1813); Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228 (1867); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (Ct. of Errors 1810), aff'd 9 Johns. 395 (N.Y.1811); Hoggatt v. Bigley, 25 Tenn. 236 , 6 Hum. 236 (1845).

In 1872, in an opinion by Justice Field, the Supreme Court decided Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872), which remains today the leading American case on judicial immunity. 5 The Court refused to allow a civil suit to proceed against a judge who had prohibited an attorney from appearing in the court for allegedly using offensive language and threatening the judge “with personal chastisement.” 6 The Supreme Court recognized that “in all countries where there is any well-ordered system of jurisprudence” judges had been granted immunity from liability “for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions____” 13 Wall, at 347, 20 L.Ed. at 649 . The Court explained the reasons for the grant of judicial immunity as follows (Ibid.): ²⁸¹ “[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequence to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.” As the Court in Bradley v. Fisher indicated, individual citizens are more likely to feel aggrieved and injured by judges than by other public officials, because judges are ultimately responsible for decisions closely affecting individuals’ lives. 13 Wall, at 348, 20 L.Ed. at 650 . Under these circumstances, the Court held, citing Floyd v. Barker, supra, 12 Coke 25, 77 E.R. 1305, that it is not enough to limit civil actions against judges to those involving judicial corruption or malice (13 Wall, at 348, 20 L.Ed. at 650 ): “Controversies involving not merely great pecuniary interests, but the liberty and character of the parties and, consequently, exciting the deepest feelings, are being constantly determined in [the] courts____ If civil actions could be maintained in such cases against the judge, because the losing party should see fit to allege in his complaint that the acts of the judge were done with partiality, or maliciously or corruptly, the protection essential to judicial independence would be entirely swept away.

Few persons sufficiently irritated to institute an action against a judge for his judicial acts would hesitate to ascribe any character to the acts which would be essential to the maintenance of the action.” Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the judicial system provides other avenues of relief for disappointed litigants. While erroneous rulings may be corrected through the appellate process, judges who act “with partiality, or maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily, or oppressively, ... may be called to an account by impeachment and suspended or removed from office.” 13 Wall, at 350, 20 L.Ed. at 650 . Accordingly, the Court concluded, no judge “can[ ] be subjected to responsibili ²⁸² ty for [a judicial act] in a civil action, however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” 13 Wall, at 347, 20 L.Ed. at 649 . Seeking to avoid the application of the principle of judicial immunity, the plaintiff in Bradley v. Fisher contended that the order prohibiting his appearance was not a judicial act, since “the judge attempted to create for himself a jurisdiction and discretion not given by law.” 13 Wall, at 346, 20 L.Ed. at 648 .

The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a judge who has a general judicial authority to perform the kinds of acts for which he is sued is absolutely immune from civil liability for those acts. The Court explicitly rejected any conception of judicial immunity that would make a judge’s immunity depend on whether or not he had jurisdiction in a narrow, technical sense, over the matter complained of. As the Court explained, 13 Wall, at 352, 20 L.Ed. at 651 , “some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction, or that of the court held by him, or the manner in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised. And the same principle of exemption from liability which obtains for errors committed in the ordinary prosecution of a suit where there is jurisdiction of both subject and person, applies in cases of this kind, and for the same reasons.” Accordingly, since the criminal court, “as a court of general criminal jurisdiction, possessed the power to strike the name of the plaintiff from its rolls as a practising attorney,” the judge was immune from suit for his wrongful exercise of that power. 13 Wall, at 354, 20 L.Ed. at 651 .

The Supreme Court described as acts “in excess of jurisdiction” those judicial acts that might be wrongful, or outside the technical jurisdiction of the judge, but which lay within his general jurisdiction. Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 13 Wall, at 351, 20 L.Ed. at 651 . The Court distinguished acts taken in excess of jurisdiction from acts taken in the “clear absence of ²⁸³ all jurisdiction,” holding that only in the latter situation could judges be sued. Ibid.

The Supreme Court explained that, “[w]here there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, ... for the exercise of [judicial] authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.” 13 Wall, at 351-352, 20 L.Ed. at 651 . The Court gave the following example of such a case (13 Wall, at 352, 20 L.Ed. at 651 ): “[I]f a probate court, invested only with authority over wills and the settlement of estates of deceased persons, should proceed to try parties for public offenses, jurisdiction over the subject of offenses being entirely wanting in this court, and this being necessarily known to its judge, his commission would afford no protection to him in the exercise of the usurped authority.” The Court emphasized that only in such egregious circumstances, where a judge’s lack of jurisdiction was both obvious and known to the judge, would judicial immunity be withdrawn. In the more typical case, the Supreme Court concluded, “judges ... are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” 13 Wall, at 351, 20 L.Ed. at 651 . The common law principle of absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts has neither been abrogated nor been modified in Maryland. 7 On the contrary, this Court’s cases have recognized that judges are absolutely immune from civil ²⁸⁴ liability for their judicial acts. 8 In Roth v. Shupp, 94 Md. 55 , 50 A. 430 (1901), an action for false imprisonment against a Justice of the Peace, this Court stated that “a Judge or judicial officer, acting within his jurisdiction is exempt from liability for false imprisonment, even though his judgment may be the result of mistake, error of judgment, or even of malice.” 94 Md. at 59 , 50 A. at 431 . 9 More recently, this Court has reaffirmed the principle of absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts.

See, e.g., Mandel v. O’Hara, 320 Md. 103, 107 , 576 A.2d 766, 768 (1990) (“Absolute ‘immunity protects ... judges ... so long as their acts are “judicial” ... in nature and within the very general scope of their jurisdiction’”). In particular, the Court has distinguished between the qualified and narrower immunity for discretionary acts generally accorded to public officials, and absolute judicial immunity, which, unlike qualified immunity, applies regardless of the nature of the tort and even where the suit against the judge alleges that he acted in bad ²⁸⁵ faith, maliciously or corruptly. See Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 444 , 298 A.2d 156, 161 (1972) (contrasting the absolute immunity of judges with the qualified immunity of law enforcement officers); Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 356 , 196 A.2d 887, 889-890 (1964) (comparing the principle that “judges have an absolute privilege from suits arising out