Parker v. State

JOHN C. ELDRIDGE, Judge, Retired, Specially Assigned, This criminal case concerns the applicability of the exclusionary rule to evidence seized following an alleged violation of the “knock and announce” principle in connection with the execution of a search warrant. In addition, the case presents ³⁷⁵ an issue of whether sufficient evidence supported a conviction for possession of a regulated firearm (a handgun) in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Yol, 2001 Supp.), Article 27, § 445(d)(1). 1 The petitioner, Terrance Parker, argues that both the Fourth Amendment and Maryland law require that seized evidence should have been excluded from his trial because police officers did not knock and announce their presence prior to their search of a house at 800 Belnord Avenue in Baltimore City. Furthermore, he contends that the evidence supporting his handgun conviction was insufficient because the State never established that he had an interest in or resided in the house, or that he had ever been in the proximity of the handgun.

In its brief and oral argument, the State’s principal contention is that exclusion of the evidence is inappropriate both under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and as a matter of Maryland law. Regarding the handgun conviction, the State maintains that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that Parker exercised dominion or control over the handgun. I. The basic facts of this case have been undisputed. The case was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on an agreed statement of facts, and in this Court the parties have agreed upon the facts. ³⁷⁶ On December 19, 2002, Baltimore City police officers applied for search warrants, containing so-called “no-knock” provisions, for three residences in Baltimore City.

The three residences were near each other; one of them was a two-story, plus a basement, brick row house at 800 Belnord Avenue. One of the police officers, Detective Thomas Jugan, stated, in the affidavit supporting the application, the following concerning the requested “no-knock” provisions: “[I]t has been the experience of your Affiant and the information supplied from the Confidential Informant that those immersed in the illicit world of illegal narcotics often use firearms. Those weapons are commonly in the form of handguns, rifles, shotguns, Uzi’s(sic), etc. and are extensions of their illicit operations. Based on this information and [your] [Affiant’s] prior experience, this warrant will be attempted by a no knock forced entry to provide a margin of safety.

Furthermore, the area is well known for its high violence, where numerous assaults by shooting and homicides have occurred, and also [is] an area where your Affiant’s (sic) have executed search and seizure warrants in the past and have recovered numerous firearms.” The warrant, authorizing the search at 800 Belnord Avenue and purporting to authorize a “no-knock” entry, was issued by a judge of the District Court of Maryland. Neither the application nor the affidavit nor the warrant mentioned Terrance Parker by name. Detective Jugan, later at the suppression hearing, testified that he did not know whether Parker lived at the 800 Belnord Avenue residence. After the warrant was issued, the police officers, without first knocking and announcing their presence, entered the residence.

According to the prosecuting attorney at the suppression hearing, “there was a forced entry.” Upon entering the house at 800 Belnord Avenue, the police officers found two people, Evania Wilkens, who did reside in the house, and Terrance Parker. The officers detained the two and then searched the house. The search revealed cocaine and marijuana in various places in the basement and on the first floor. The officers also recovered $2100 from above a ceiling tile in ³⁷⁷ the basement and two nine millimeter live rounds of ammunition from the top of a china closet on the first floor.

In addition, they recovered an operable, loaded .357 magnum handgun “[f]rom the second floor hall” and also recovered $1900 from above a ceiling tile in a bedroom. A search of Parker’s person produced nine vials of cocaine, three zip lock bags of marijuana, and $77. Parker was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with possession of a regulated firearm in violation of former Article 27, § 445(d)(1), possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, and various other drug and weapons-related offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search.

In denying Parker’s motion at the conclusion of a suppression hearing, the circuit judge reasoned that there was “sufficient probable cause in the warrant” but was “concerned with ... the ‘no knock’ issue.” The judge found that there was “not a sufficient factual showing. I don’t believe that a ‘no knock’ warrant was necessary for the Belnord Avenue residence.” 2 Nonetheless, ³⁷⁸ relying on the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Davis v. State, 144 Md.App. 144 , 797 A.2d 84 (2002), which was later reversed by this Court, Davis and Adams v. State, 383 Md. 394 , 859 A.2d 1112 (2004), the Circuit Court held that the “good faith exception [to the exclusionary rule] does apply and the officers did act in good faith.” Subsequently, after a not guilty plea and a trial upon an agreed statement of facts, Parker was convicted of one count of possessing a regulated firearm and one count of possession ■with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance. On the firearm conviction, Parker was sentenced to five years imprisonment, without parole, pursuant to former Article 27, § 449(e). He was sentenced to a concurrent twelve-year term of imprisonment for the controlled dangerous substance conviction.

Parker appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying both convictions, arguing that his motion to suppress should have been granted, and contending that the five-year sentence without the possibility of parole for the firearm conviction was illegal.

II

At this point, it would be useful to review the legal background and history regarding the “knock and announce” principle, so-called “no-knock” warrants, the exclusionary rule when there is some illegality with respect to a search and a seizure of evidence, and the relationship of such matters to the appellate proceedings in the present case. During the period of time since the search of the residence at 800 Belnord Avenue, there have been significant fluctuations in the United States Supreme Court and Maryland case law concerning these matters. The appellate proceedings in the case at bar have been directly affected by these fluctuations. ³⁷⁹ A. The “Knock and Announce” Principle and “No-knock” Search Warrants Chief Judge Bell for this Court extensively reviewed the “knock and announce” principle in State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275 , 821 A.2d 922 (2003), tracing its common law origins, pointing out that it is a settled rule of Maryland common law, and discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 979 (1995), “that this common-law ‘knock and announce’ principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.” The State v. Lee opinion, 374 Md. at 284 n. 7, 821 A.2d at 927 n. 7, quoted from Semayne’s Case, 5 Coke’s Reports 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-196 (K.B.1603), the leading English common law decision delineating the “knock and announce” principle when an officer seeks to arrest a person in a residence or to search a residence: “In all cases where the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party’s house, either to arrest him or to do other execution of the K[ing]’s process, if otherwise he cannot enter.

But before he breaks it he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors ..., for the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, or which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey it.” See also, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, supra, 514 U.S. at 931-933 , 115 S.Ct. at 1916-1917 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 980-981 (reviewing other early English cases and treatises, and tracing the origins of the principle to a statute enacted in 1275); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-308 , 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1194-1195 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 1337-1338 (1958) (also reviewing the early authorities, including a reported decision during the reign of Edward IV, 1461-1483); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 522 , ³⁸⁰ 204 A.2d 516, 519 (1964) (where Judge Hammond for the Court, quoting some of the early decisions, stated that “ ‘the law abhors unnecessary breaking or destruction of any house,’ ” and that “ ‘the dweller in the house would not know the purpose of the person breaking in, unless he were notified, and would have a right to resist seeming aggression on his private property’ ”); Irma S. Raker, The New “No-Knock” Provision and Its Effect on The Authority of the Police to Break and Enter, 20 Am. U.L.Rev. 467 (1970-1971) (discussing the common law development of the principle and the earlier cases in this country). 3 The “knock and announce” principle was recognized as part of federal case and statutory law before the Supreme Court held that it was also a requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In Miller v. United States, supra, 357 U.S. at 308-315 , 78 S.Ct. at 1195-1198 , 2 L.Ed.2d at 1337-1340 , the Supreme Court held that, under a federal statute and District of Columbia case law, the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his District of Columbia apartment, and the search incident to the arrest, were “unlawful because the officers broke the door of petitioner’s home without first giving notice of their authority and purpose in demanding admission.” Miller, 357 U.S. at 305 , 78 S.Ct. at 1193 , 2 L.Ed.2d at 1336 . The Court concluded that “the evidence seized should have been suppressed.” 357 U.S. at 314 , 78 S.Ct. at 1198 , 2 L.Ed.2d at 1341 .

See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 , 88 S.Ct. 1755 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968), which also involved the federal “knock and announce” statute. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), involved a “no-knock” entry into the petitioners’ apartment by local California police officers, who believed that the petitioners were selling marijuana from the apartment. Except for a short opening part of Justice Clark’s opinion in Ker , in which eight of the nine justices reaffirmed their adherence ³⁸¹ to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), there was no opinion of the Court. 4 Despite the absence of an opinion of the Court, however, both the plurality opinion of four justices and the dissenting opinion of four justices seemed to agree that police officers’ method of entry and the “knock and announce” principle were pertinent in determining whether a search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. See Ker, 374 U.S. at 38, 46-47 , 83 S.Ct. at 1632, 1636 , 10 L.Ed.2d at 741, 746 .

The Ker plurality opinion, 374 U.S. at 40 , 83 S.Ct. at 1633 , 10 L.Ed.2d at 742 , held that the police officers’ failure to knock or announce their presence before entering the apartment did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of “the officers’ belief that Ker was in possession of narcotics which could be quickly and easily destroyed,” coupled with “Ker’s furtive conduct in eluding them” at an earlier time. Henson v. State, supra, 236 Md. 518 , 204 A.2d 516 , decided about \lh years after Ker v. California, upheld, under both Maryland common law and federal constitutional law, a “no-knock” entry pursuant to a valid search warrant. In Henson , police officers, with probable cause to believe that the appellant was selling narcotics from his residence, obtained a search warrant for the residence, forcibly entered the house unannounced, found quantities of heroin, and arrested the appellant Henson. After his conviction of two narcotics felonies, Henson appealed, and this Court affirmed.

The Court, after reviewing English common law authorities, as well as earlier Maryland cases, 5 held, as a matter of Maryland law, that a common law exception to the “knock and announce” principle was applicable under the circumstances. Judge Hammond for ³⁸² the Court initially stated ( 236 Md. at 521-523 , 204 A.2d at 518-519 ): “The claim that the evidence seized was inadmissible because the police officers executing the search warrant did not advise those within that they had such a warrant and demand admittance, but broke in forcibly without notice, is an extension of the old rule that a peace officer seeking to arrest an individual who is in a house, either by authority of an arrest warrant or under circumstances making a warrant unnecessary, must give proper notice of his purpose and authority and be denied admittance before he can use force to break and enter. * * * However, the rule often has been made subject to qualifications and exceptions ....” The Henson opinion next pointed out that a “similar rule as to the execution of a search warrant has often been stated [by] this Court____” (Ibid.). Judge Hammond continued (Henson, 236 Md. at 522-523 , 204 A.2d at 519 ): “Yet, as in the similar arrest cases, similar exceptions and qualifications have regularly been engrafted on the general rule whether it be imposed by common law or a statute (which often is declaratory of the common law). If the exigencies and practicalities of the situation demand entry without prior notice and demand, force may be used to break and enter under authority of a valid search warrant.

Practicalities and exigencies in searches for narcotics require the element of surprise entry, for if opportunity is given all evidence easily may be destroyed during the time required to give notice, demand admittance and accept communication of denial of entry.” The Court concluded its Maryland common law discussion as follows ( 236 Md. at 524 , 204 A.2d at 520 ): “We hold that in the case before us the actions of the police in breaking into the premises without warning were reasonable, permissible and legál and the evidence seized was admissible against the appellant.” The Henson opinion then turned to “binding federal constitutional safeguards,” and, relying upon Ker v. California, held ³⁸³ that the “no-knock” entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Ibid. As previously indicated, Wilson v. Arkansas, supra, 514 U.S. 927 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 , decided in 1995, is particularly important because it is the first time that an opinion of the Supreme Court (contrasted with plurality and dissenting opinions) held that the “knock and announce” principle formed a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. In upholding a “no-knock” entry, the search of the petitioner’s home, and his narcotics conviction, the Arkansas Supreme Court had held that the “knock and announce” principle was not embodied in the Fourth Amendment.

The United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the “knock and announce” principle was part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment, although the Court further held that “no-knock” entries were sometimes permissible. The United States Supreme Court did not rule upon the State’s arguments that the “no-knock” entry into the petitioner’s home was constitutional because there had been evidence that the petitioner had earlier threatened someone with a firearm or because of a risk that the narcotics would be destroyed. Instead, the case was remanded to the Arkansas Supreme Court for that court to decide these issues. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Wilson noted, but did not rule upon, the argument by the State and amici “that exclusion is not a constitutionally compelled remedy where the unreasonableness of a search stems from the failure of announcement.” Wilson, 514 U.S. at 937 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. at 1919 n. 4, 131 L.Ed.2d at 984 n. 4.

While purporting not to decide the issue, the reversal and remand to the Supreme Court of Arkansas was obviously premised upon the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule being applicable. Like several other Supreme Court “knock and announce” cases, Wilson was a criminal case, and the only issue was whether the Fourth Amendment required the exclusion of the evidence seized during the search. About two years after Wilson , the United State Supreme Court rejected the holding by the Wisconsin Supreme Court ³⁸⁴ “that police officers are never required [by the Fourth Amendment] to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387-388 , 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1418 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615, 620 (1997) (emphasis in original). The Court in Richards, 520 U.S. at 390 n. 1, 117 S.Ct. at 1420 n. 1, 137 L.Ed.2d at 622 n. 1, specifically citing Henson v. State, supra, 236 Md. at 523-524 , 204 A.2d at 519-520 , also disagreed with the apparently similar Fourth Amendment holding in Henson . 6 Instead, the Richards opinion enunciated the following Fourth Amendment principle ( 520 U.S. at 394 , 117 S.Ct. at 1421-1422 , 137 L.Ed.2d at 624 ): “Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case.

Instead, in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement. “In order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” The United States Supreme Court in Richards , however, affirmed the petitioner’s convictions and the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, holding that, under the facts of the case, the “no-knock” forcible entry was reasonable and, for this reason, the evidence should not have been suppressed. ³⁸⁵ See also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 , 124 S.Ct. 521 , 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003) (The Court applied the principles of Richards to hold that exigent circumstances justified the “no-knock” entry and that, therefore, the evidence was admissible. The Court also held that the standards under the Fourth Amendment and the federal “knock and announce” statute were the same); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 , 118 S.Ct. 992 , 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (to the same effect as the Banks case). A more detailed analysis of the Richards and Wilson opinions, as well as other cases applying the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule to evidence seized in violation of the “knock and announce” principle, can be found in State v. Lee, supra, Md. 275, 374 Md. 275 , 821 A.2d 922 . The Lee opinion also discussed the Maryland “knock and announce” cases.

This Court held in Lee that neither the inevitable discovery nor the related independent source exceptions to the exclusionary rule were applicable to allow the admission of evidence seized during a search conducted in violation of “knock and announce” requirements. B. Recent “Knock and Announce” Decisions and the Appellate Proceedings in the Instant Case In 2002, about one year prior to this Court’s opinion in State v. Lee, supra, the Court of Special Appeals rendered its opinion in Davis v. State, supra, 144 Md.App. 144 , 797 A.2d 84 . The Court of Special Appeals in Davis took the position that the specific holding in Richards v. Wisconsin, supra, was limited to the situation where the police officers “did not have no-knock authorization in the search warrant” ( 144 Md.App. at 154 , 797 A.2d at 90 ). The intermediate appellate court’s Davis opinion went on to hold that, when the police officer’s affidavit, submitted with the application for a warrant, contains sufficient facts to establish a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances, and the warrant authorizes a “no-knock” entry, a “no-knock” entry into the premises is permissible under the Fourth Amendment and Richards v. Wisconsin.

The Court of Special Appeals’ Davis opinion alternatively held that, even ³⁸⁶ if the affidavit does not show exigent circumstances, if the “no-knock” authorization is contained in the warrant, “the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule” is applicable ( 144 Md.App. at 158 , 797 A.2d at 93 ). As earlier indicated, the Circuit Court in the case at bar applied the Court of Special Appeals’ alternative Davis holding in denying Parker’s motion to suppress. While the appeal in the present case was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, but before briefing and argument in the intermediate appellate court, this Court in Davis and Adams v. State, supra, 383 Md. 394 , 859 A.2d 1112 , reversed the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Davis v. State, supra, 144 Md.App. 144 , 797 A.2d 84 . Our Davis and Adams opinion, 383 Md. at 409 , 859 A.2d at 1121 , initially stated “that Maryland does not statutorily authorize its judicial officers to issue ‘no-knock’ warrants” and that “it does not have a ‘knock and announce’ statute.” The opinion in Davis and Adams, 383 Md. at 408 , 859 A.2d at 1120 , also pointed out that Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is “[interpreted as generally in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment” and “has a like, though not identical, purpose....” 7 This Court’s Davis and Adams opinion, 383 Md. at 410-412 , 859 A.2d at 1122 , went on to rely on both earlier Maryland common law “knock and announce” cases as well as Fourth Amendment decisions.

After noting that cases in other jurisdictions are divided as to whether magistrates may issue “no-knock” warrants in the absence of statutory authority, the Court in Davis and Adams held as follows ( 383 Md. at 427-428 , 859 A.2d at 1132 ): ³⁸⁷ “We hold that a judicial officer in Maryland, under current Maryland law, may not issue a ‘no-knock’ warrant. Rather, the propriety of a ‘no-knock’ entry will be reviewed and determined on the basis of the facts known to the officers at the time of entry, rather than at the time of the application for the warrant.” In light of the holdings that “no-knock” warrants “are not authorized under Maryland law and [that] exigency must be determined at the time of the entry,” this Court had no need to “decide the applicability of the good faith exception to ‘no-knock’ warrants.” Davis and Adams, 383 Md. at 437-438 , 859 A.2d at 1137-1138 . The Court in Davis and Adams, 383 Md. at 433 , 859 A.2d at 1125 , decided “that the entry in this case was not justified by existing and articulated exigency,” and the judgments below were reversed. See also State v. Carroll, 383 Md. 438 , 859 A.2d 1138 (2004), reaffirming the holdings in Davis and Adams , although deciding that the police officers’ “no-knock” entry was reasonable under the facts of the Carroll case.

Turning to the case at bar, the petitioner Parker argued in the Court of Special Appeals, inter alia, that the Circuit Court’s reliance upon the “good faith exception” for “no-knock” warrants, delineated in the Court of Special Appeals’ Davis opinion, was erroneous in light of this Court’s opinion in Davis and Adams . Parker contended that, at the time the police officers entered the residence at 800 Belnord Avenue, there existed no exigent circumstances justifying the “no-knock” forcible entry and that, therefore, the entry and search were unreasonable. Consequently, Parker’s argument continued, the Circuit Court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Parker relied upon the Fourth Amendment, Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Maryland case law.

Parker also argued that the warrant authorizing the search at 800 Belnord Avenue was not supported by probable cause, that the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction, and that the sentence imposed for the firearm conviction was illegal. The State’s only argument with respect to the “knock and announce” matter was that exigent circum ³⁸⁸ stances, at the time of entry, justified the forcible “no-knock” entry, and, consequently, both the entry and the search were reasonable. For this reason, according to the State, the motion to suppress was properly denied. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, did not accept either Parker’s argument or the State’s argument.

Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals reiterated the view expressed in its earlier Davis v. State opinion, 144 Md.App. at 155 , 797 A.2d at 91 , that the “good faith exception” is pertinent and “must be addressed under these circumstances.” The Court of Special Appeals, purportedly based on this Court’s Davis and Adams and Carroll opinions, vacated the Circuit Court’s judgments and remanded the case “for the Circuit Court to decide in the first instance (1) whether the specific facts known to the officers at the moment they entered 800 Belnord Avenue—including whatever facts came to their attention between the time when they obtained the warrant and the time of their entry— justified a ‘no-knock’ entry into that residence; and, if the answer to this question is ‘no,’ (2) whether, in light of the Davis and Carroll opinions filed by the Court of Appeals on October 21, 2004, the evidence seized is nonetheless admissible under the ‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule.” As to the other issues, the Court of Special Appeals held that there was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, that the evidence supporting the convictions was sufficient, and that Parker should not have been sentenced under former Article 27, § 449(e), for the firearm conviction. See Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175 , 887 A.2d 1078 (2005). On May 12, 2006, Parker filed in this Court a timely petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting three issues. First, Parker challenged the Court of Special Appeals’ directives that, after a remand, the Circuit Court should conduct a new suppression hearing to determine whether the facts justified the “no-knock” entry and, even if a “no-knock” entry was unjustified, determine whether the “good faith” exception was applicable. ³⁸⁹ Parker, relying on this Court’s opinion in Davis and Adams v. State, contended that the validity of the “no-knock” entry should be determined by the present record, that the record showed no justification for a “no-knock” forcible entry, and that the “good faith” exception does not apply where, at the time, “no-knock” warrants were not authorized by Maryland law.

Parker’s second question presented was similar to the first, namely whether the “no-knock” entry in the present case violated either the Fourth Amendment or Maryland law, and thus whether the evidence should have been suppressed. Parker’s third question was whether sufficient evidence supported the firearm conviction. The State did not file a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. Instead, on May 26, 2006, the State filed an answer arguing that the Court of Special Appeals’ judgment was correct and that further review by this Court was unwarranted.

This Court, on June 14, 2006, granted Parker’s certiorari petition, Terrance Parker v. State, 393 Md. 245 , 900 A.2d 751 (2006). Our order granting certiorari neither added issues to Parker’s certiorari petition nor deleted any issue set forth in Parker’s petition. The day after Parker’s certiorari petition was granted, on June 15, 2006, the United States Supreme Court decided Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006), holding that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule was inapplicable to “knock and announce” violations. In his brief and argument before this Court, Parker contends that, in deciding whether the evidence should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, it would be “unfair” to apply Hudson v. Michigan.

(Petitioner’s brief at 29). Parker’s principal argument, however, is that the “knock and announce” rule is embodied in Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and is also part of Maryland common law, that the “officers’ ‘no-knock’ entry violated ... Article 26 and Maryland common law,” and that “exclusion is the appropriate remedy for evidence obtained as the result of an entry made in violation of the knock and announce requirements of Article 26 and Maryland common law.” (Id. at 19, ³⁹⁰ 31). Parker primarily relies upon this Court’s opinion in Davis and Adams v. State which, he argues, is legally and factually directly on point.

As previously mentioned, Parker also contends that the evidence underlying his firearm conviction was insufficient. The State, in its brief and oral argument, contends that Hudson v. Michigan is dispositive of the Fourth Amendment issue, and that, “[r]egardless of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation in the manner of entry in this case, the drug and weapons evidence ... subsequently recovered in the search is not subject to suppression under Hudson.” (State’s brief at 17-18). With respect to Maryland law, the State relies on our holdings that Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as well as the “knock and announce” principle of Maryland common law, are in pan materia with the Fourth Amendment and should be construed and applied consistently with Hudson v. Michigan. According to the State, “if a violation of the Fourth Amendment does not automatically require the suppression of evidence, a violation of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights similarly does not necessitate suppression.” (Id. at 21).

The State alternatively suggests that “there is no applicable exclusionary rule in Maryland that would be available as a remedy for Parker,” citing Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484 , 864 A.2d 1006 (2004). (Id. at 22). Finally, the State argues that, if Davis and Adams v. State and State v. Carroll are controlling with regard to Maryland law, the Court of Special Appeals’ remand to the Circuit Court “is appropriate for the suppression court to reexamine [the] evidence in light of Davis and Carroll in order to determine if the ‘no-knock’ entry at issue in this case was both reasonable and necessary under the existing and articulated exigent circumstances and facts known to the executing officers at the time of entry.” (Id. at 32). As earlier indicated, the State also contends that Parker’s firearm conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. ³⁹¹ There is one further development concerning the “knock and announce” principle which should be mentioned.

At its 2005 legislative session, the Maryland General Assembly enacted Ch. 560 of the Acts of 2005, effective October 1, 2005, codified in Maryland Code (2001, 2006 Supp.), § l-203(a)(2)(ii) and § 1—203(a)(3)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure Article. Ch. 560 provided as follows: “(II) AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT MAY CONTAIN A REQUEST THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT AUTHORIZE THE EXECUTING LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TO ENTER THE BUILDING, APARTMENT, PREMISES, PLACE OR THING TO BE SEARCHED WITHOUT GIVING NOTICE OF THE OFFICER’S AUTHORITY OR PURPOSE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE IS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE THAT, WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION: 1. THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO SEIZURE MAY BE DESTROYED, DISPOSED OF, OR SECRETED; OR 2. THE LIFE OR SAFETY OF THE EXECUTING OFFICER OR ANOTHER PERSON MAY BE ENDANGERED. “(Ill) IF WARRANTED BY APPLICATION AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH (2) OF THIS SUBSECTION, AUTHORIZE THE EXECUTING LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TO ENTER THE BUILDING, APARTMENT, PREMISES, PLACE OR THING TO BE SEARCHED WITHOUT GIVING NOTICE OF THE OFFICER’S AUTHORITY OR PURPOSE.” Section 2 of Ch. 560 expressly stated: “Section 2.

And be it further enacted, That this Act shall be construed to apply only prospectively and may not be applied or interpreted to have any effect on or application to any application for a search warrant made before the effective date of this Act.” ³⁹² The Department of Legislative Services’ Fiscal and Policy Note on House Bill 577 of the 2005 legislative session, which became Ch. 560, discussed in detail our decisions in Davis and Adams v. State and State v. Carroll as forming the background for the bill. C. The Exclusionary Rule—Maryland Law This Court has in recent years discussed the rule excluding evidence resulting from an illegal search and its history under Maryland law. See Judge Raker’s opinion for the Court in Fitzgerald v. State, supra, 384 Md. at 506-512 , 864 A.2d at 1019-1023 , and Judge Rodowsky’s opinion for the Court in Chu v. Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673 , 537 A.2d 250 (1988). See also, e.g., Kostelec v. State, 348 Md. 230, 235-243 , 703 A.2d 160, 162-166 (1997); Sheetz v. City of Baltimore, 315 Md. 208, 212-217 , 553 A.2d 1281, 1283-1285 (1989); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 243-256 , 522 A.2d 1348, 1357-1364 (1987); Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 492-499 , 124 A.2d 764, 768-772 (1956).

Nonetheless, before responding to the parties’ arguments, another review of the exclusionary rule under Maryland law would be useful. The United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), held that the Fourth Amendment incorporated an exclusionary rule. At the time, however, the Court had not held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable in state proceedings. Nonetheless, many state supreme courts after Weeks held that state constitutional provisions similar to the Fourth Amendment also incorporated exclusionary rules.

See Fitzgerald v. State, supra, 384 Md. at 508 , 864 A.2d at 1020 (“Now, forty-six states have an exclusionary rule for their state constitutions”). The question of whether this Court would follow Weeks v. United States, supra, under the Maryland Constitution, arose in Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195 , 141 A. 536 , 142 A. 190 (1928), where the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of the liquor laws, and the prosecution’s evidence introduced at his trial was the product of an illegal search and seizure. This Court, in a 4-3 decision, declined to follow ³⁹³ Weeks , holding that, despite the illegality of the search and seizure, “the liquor so seized was admissible in evidence,” Meisinger, 155 Md. at 199 , 141 A. at 538 . Chief Judge Bond, Judge W. Mitchell Digges, and Judge Parke dissented, setting forth various reasons for their position that the Weeks principle should be followed under the Maryland Constitution.

At the next session of the Maryland General Assembly, the legislators expressed some disagreement with the policy underlying Meisinger. The General Assembly enacted Ch. 194 of the Acts of 1929, known as the Bouse Act, which adopted an exclusionary rule for misdemeanors but not for felonies. The next significant developments were the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), and Mapp v. Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 . Wolf v. Colorado held that, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states; Wolf further held, however, that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule was inapplicable in state proceedings.

Mapp v. Ohio overruled Wolf v. Colorado’s exclusionary rule holding and held that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule was applicable to state criminal prosecutions. In 1973, as an initial part of the project to revise the Maryland Code, the Revisor of the statutory provisions submitted to the General Assembly a proposed “Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” The proposed statute repealed the Bouse Act because, in the view of the Revisor at that time, the Bouse Act was “unconstitutional” under Mapp v. Ohio. The Revisor’s then view was erroneous, as the Bouse Act, to the extent that it required the exclusion of evidence, was entirely consistent with Mapp v. Ohio. Simply because a state law provision conferring rights upon individuals, or restrictions upon government, does not in some respects go as far as a similar federal constitutional provision, does not mean that the state law provision is invalid.

On the contrary, the individual is entitled to the rights, and the state government has the obligations, conferred by each provision. Neverthe ³⁹⁴ less, the General Assembly presumably accepted the Revisor’s position, and the Bouse Act was repealed, effective January 1, 1974, by the statute enacting the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. See Ch. 2 of the Acts of the First Special Session of 1973, General Revisor’s Note, Laws of Maryland, First Special Session of 1973, at 332. This Court has not, since Meisinger, and the enactment and later repeal of the Bouse Act, decided generally whether Maryland constitutional and/or common law recognizes an exclusionary rule for evidence resulting from an illegal search and seizure.

Nonetheless, this Court has adopted, as a matter of Maryland common law, an exclusionary rule in certain specific situations. We have also declined to adopt an exclusionary rule in certain other specific situations. Thus, in Chase v. State, supra, 309 Md. at 253 , 522 A.2d at 1362 , this Court held that, with regard to the admission of illegally seized evidence in probation revocation proceedings, even though the exclusionary rule was ordinarily inapplicable, “when the officer has acted in bad faith and not as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances, the evidence should, in any event, be suppressed.” This Maryland evidence law holding was based on fairness and the need to deter improper conduct by government officials. Similarly, in Sheetz v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, supra, 315 Md. at 215 , 553 A.2d at 1284 , while stating that the exclusionary rule was usually not applicable in civil administrative employee discharge proceedings, this Court, as a matter of Maryland common law, “[was] unwilling to hold that such [illegally seized] evidence is always admissible.” The Court continued (Sheetz, 315 Md. at 215-216 , 553 A.2d at 1284-1285 ): “Although discharge proceedings are not usually designed to be punitive and therefore do not fall within the scope of primary police interest, they may be manipulated to serve punishment purposes.

In this context, the police deterrence gained from barring the admission of illegally obtained evidence is needed. We therefore hold that such evidence is inadmissible in civil administrative discharge proceedings where the defendant establishes that the police were im ³⁹⁵ properly motivated to illegally seize evidence to benefit civil proceedings. See generally Chase, 309 Md. at 256 , 522 A.2d at 1364 ....” The Court in Sheetz directed that the proceedings be remanded for a new administrative hearing at which it would be determined whether the police acted in good faith and, therefore, whether the evidence was admissible. See also MVA v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 377-378 , 739 A.2d 58, 70-71 (1999) (pointing out that a “bad faith” exclusionary rule was incorporated in regulations governing administrative driver’s license suspension proceedings).

In Chu v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 311 Md. 673 , 537 A.2d 250 , this Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in a civil action, authorized by former Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1987 Supp.), Art. 27, § 551(a), for the return of property taken under a search warrant. The Court noted, however, that it did “not intimate ... as to whether an exclusionary rule might operate under Maryland law in [other] contexts,” Chu, 311 Md. at 679 n. 2, 537 A.2d at 253 n. 2. On the other hand, Kostelec v. State, supra, 348 Md. 230 , 703 A.2d 160 , was a criminal prosecution where evidence seized in violation of former Art. 27, § 551, was admitted at trial, and the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals. This Court reversed, holding that, under Maryland law, “the motion to suppress should be granted,” Kostelec, 348 Md. at 243 , 703 A.2d at 166 .

We refused to consider the State’s argument, made for the first time in its brief in this Court, that, under Maryland law, there is no exclusionary rule for violations of former Art. 27, § 551. The Kostelec opinion reasoned that the premise of the defendant’s argument and the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion was that an exclusionary rule was operable for violations