Parker v. State

Fowler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The traverser, George Parker, was indicted on the 21st of May, 1903, in the Circuit Court for Talbot County for selling and giving away spirituous and fermented and intoxicating liquors to one William Ewing, and on the same day in the same Court he was indicted for a similar offense committed in selling and giving away such liquors to another person. In each of these cases there was a demurrer to the indictment. These demurrers were overruled and in each case there was a plea of not guilty, tried before a jury and a verdict of guilty and judgment thereon of fine and imprisonment.

In each case there was an appeal and a writ of error, but- the latter were dismissed at the hearing in this Court. The two appeals, therefore, remain, but they present the same questions, viz., ¹⁹⁹ the constitutionality of the Acts under which the traverser was indicted and secondly as to the form of the indictment. This case was most elaborately argued, but we think the general principles involved are well settled. It appears that the two Acts were passed at the session of 1902, one of them being ch. 84 and the other ch. 265 containing the same provisions, both prohibiting the selling and giving away of spirituous or intoxicating liquors in Chapel District of Talbot County.

There is a difference, however, in the titles of the two Acts. The title of the former may, perhaps, be properly criticised, but be this as it may, no objection has been made to the validity of the latter, ch. 265, on the ground that its title does not sufficiently disclose its subject-matter, nor is it objected to for any other reason relating to the imperfection of the title. We may; therefore, for the purposes of this case concede that the Act of 1902, ch. 84, is not valid because of the objection to its title based on Art. 3, sec. 29 of the Constitution. But, as we have said the title of ch. 265 of the same session of the Legislature containing the same provisions as those contained in ch. 84 is, or must be conceded to be free from any objection whatever, and hence, unless there is some constitutional objection to the Act itself, the judgment appealed from must stand — unless the indictment is bad in form.

First then as to the constitutional validity of ch. 265, 1902. The objection as stated by the traverser is that it is “unreasonable, arbitrary aad oppressive; invades the rights of personal liberty and security guaranteed by the Constitution to the people and denies them the privileges and immunities secured to them by the fundamental doctrines of the common law. ’ ’ This is certainly very strong language as applicable to the facts of the case now before us. The traverser was indicted for, and by the jury convicted of, the violation of the Act under which he was indicted, that is to say, he was convicted of selling and giving away intoxicating drinks. The question, therefore is. does the Constitution of this State or do “the im ²⁰⁰ memorial principles of the common law” guarantee to the traverser the right to sell and give away spirituous and intoxicating liquors.

Even the counsel of the traverser concedes the plenary-power of the State to abolish and destroy the liquor traffic or to suppress the evils of 'intoxication at certain places, or at certain times or to certain classes of persons. But his- contention is that the Act is void because it does not contain explicit provisos excepting the giving of liquor by private citizens to the members of their household or their guests within their own homes. In our opinion no such exception is necessary- to make the- Act valid. In the first place we