Patras v. Syphax

⁷⁰ SALMON, J. In answer to special interrogatories, a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County found that appellee Paul Christopher Syphax negligently operated a car that rear-ended a vehicle driven by appellant Dan Patras, and that Syphax’s “negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by [Patras].” But the jury nevertheless awarded Patras no damages. Patras appeals from the judgment entered on that verdict, raising several issues that we reorder and rephrase as follows: I. Is the jury’s finding that Syphax’s negligence caused Patras’s injuries inconsistent with its zero dollar damage award?

II

Is the jury’s zero damage award inconsistent with uncontroverted proof that Patras sustained injuries in the accident?

III

Did the trial court err in permitting the jury to consider allegedly prejudicial evidence and argument?

IV

Did the trial court err in denying Patras’s motion for a new trial on damages? I. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On March 20, 2000, motorists Patras and Syphax were involved in a rush-hour, rear-end accident near the intersection of Seminary Road on Georgia Avenue in Silver Spring. According to the defendant, Paul Syphax, the impact was a mere “tap” that caused no damage to either vehicle. Mr. Patras, on the other hand, described the impact as “forceful” and said that the impact caused him to be rendered momentarily unconscious and also caused “a bend” in the back of the trunk of the rental vehicle he was driving.

Patras was examined, treated, and released from a hospital emergency room within hours of the accident. He later completed a course of physical therapy for a strained neck and back. ⁷¹ Patras sued Syphax on a single count of negligence. At trial, Syphax admitted that he was following Patras too closely in rainy conditions. The defense focused primarily 1 on Pa-tras’s injury claims, offering evidence to show that he exaggerated his pain and injuries from the accident, possibly to obtain compensation for non-existent injuries or pre-existing conditions.

Bernard Stopak, M.D., Patras’s treating physician, recounted the course of evaluation and treatment he prescribed. A list of medical expenses totaling $11,832.60, itemized by provider and showing “dates of service,” was introduced into evidence after Stopak testified that each of these was a reasonable and necessary medical expense. In a de bene esse video deposition, Clifford Hinkes, M.D., testified as an expert on behalf of Syphax. After examining Patras, Dr. Hinkes agreed that he had some physical injuries from the collision: [Defense Counsel:] Do you have an opinion, within [a] ... degree of medical probability, as to whether Mr. Patras did, in fact, sustain some injuries in this case? [Dr. Hinkes:] Well, I do have an opinion.

He did sustain an injury. There had been a car accident, and a good description. And Mr. Patras has a muscular strain of his neck, and probably his lower back also. He had some aches and pains from the accident.

I don’t dispute that. I think he had a temporary injury. I think he had ... pain. Dr. Hinkes also testified that Patras incurred reasonable medical expenses in the course of treatment for these injuries: [Dr. Hinkes:] Some of the treatment was necessary, and some was not.

To be exact, one visit to the emergency room at Holy Cross was necessary, due to the accident.... Treatment with Dr. Shaw was necessary April, May, June, ⁷² and July of 2000____The two MRI scans were necessary. The one opinion from Dr. Stopak was necessary. Physical therapy .... should have been limited to visits twice a week for four weeks.

In support of the “exaggeration” defense, counsel presented medical records showing that Patras, age 69 at time of the accident, suffered from degenerative arthritis before the accident. Notwithstanding Dr. Hinkes’s expert opinion regarding causation and injury, the defense also challenged whether the conditions for which Patras was evaluated and treated were caused by the collision with Syphax. Defense counsel cross-examined Patras about (a) hospital records showing that, after he was evaluated following the accident, Patras refused to leave, which caused security personnel to escort him out of the emergency room; and (b) other personal injury claims that Patras made as a result of unrelated incidents. In addition to evidence that Patras had previously been treated for arthritis, the defense offered medical records showing that Patras was seen in a hospital emergency room in 1995 with reports of the same symptoms that he told Drs.

Stopak and Hinkes that he experienced for the first time after the subject accident. Defense counsel argued that this evidence shows that Patras “lied” to Drs. Stopak and Hinkes, and that both physicians premised their causation opinions on Patras’s false reports that he had no prior injuries or complaints. The trial judge’s jury instructions included the following passages: You need not believe any witness even though the testimony is uncontradicted.

You may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. An expert is a witness who has special training or experience in a given field. You should give expert testimony the weight and value you believe it should have. You are not required to accept any expert’s opinion.

You should consider an expert’s opinion together with all the other evidence. ⁷³ The party who asserts a claim has the burden of proving it by what we call the preponderance of the evidence. To prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, means to prove that something is more likely so, than not so. In other words, a preponderance of the evidence means such evidence which, when considered and compared with the evidence opposed to it, has more convincing force and produces, in your minds, a belief, that it is more likely true than not true. In determining whether a party has met the burden of proof you should consider the quality of all of the evidence, regardless of who called the witness, or introduced the exhibit, and regardless of the number of witnesses which one party or the other may have produced.

If you believe that the evidence is evenly balanced on an issue, then your finding on that issue must be against the party who has the burden of proving it. For the plaintiff to recover, the defendant’s negligence must be a cause of the plaintiffs injury. In the event you find for the plaintiff on the issue of liability, then you must go on to consider the question of damages. It will be your duty to determine what, if any, award will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the losses.

The burden is on the plaintiff to prove, by the preponderance of the evidence, each item of damage claimed to be caused by the defendant. In considering the items of damage you must keep in mind that your award must adequately and fairly compensate the plaintiff, but an award should not be based on guess work. (Emphasis added.) Counsel for Patras made no objection to any of the above instructions. The questions on the verdict sheet that was submitted to the jury and the answers by the jury to the questions were: 1.

Do you find that Plaintiff Dan Patras has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant, Paul ⁷⁴ Syphax, was negligent in operating his motor vehicle and that this negligence was a proximate cause of the automobile accident on March 20, 2000? Yes / No_ 2. Was the Defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff? Yes y No_ If you answered “Yes” to Question No. 2, then go on to answer Question No. 3.

If you answered “No” to Question No. 2, then your job is done and you may not award any damages in this case. You should proceed no further except to sign this form and return it to the Court. 3. What amount, if any, do you award as damages to the Plaintiff: a) Medical expenses $0.00 b) Non-economic damages $0.00 Other than asking that the jury be polled, Patras’s counsel did not ask the court to take any action at trial after the answers to the questions on the verdict sheet were announced. Within ten days of the date a judgment in favor of Syphax was entered, Patras moved for a new trial as to damages, only.

He argued: (1) the jury’s answer to Question 3 on the verdict sheet constituted “a miscarriage of justice ... [and amounted to]' jury nullification and an illegal verdict” in light of the fact that “the jury found that the [defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and further found that the [defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of injury to [p]laintiff’; (2) “the jury’s verdict of zero damages was legally inadequate given the jury’s findings that the [defendant was negligent in causing the accident and that the [defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of injury to [pjlaintiff”; and (3) “the verdict of zero damages was against the weight of the evidence.” Following the trial court’s denial of his new trial motion, Patras noted this timely appeal. ⁷⁵ II. DISCUSSION A. Inconsistent Verdicts Whereas inconsistent verdicts in criminal trials “may be permitted to stand,” the Court of Appeals has held that “irreconcilably inconsistent jury verdicts ” in a civil case “cannot stand.” Southern Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 487-88 , 836 A.2d 627 (2003). “ ‘Where the answer to one of the questions in a special verdict form would require a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and an answer to another would require a verdict in favor of the defendant, the verdict is irreconcilably defective.’ ” Id. at 488 , 836 A.2d 627 (citation omitted). The question we must resolve is this: Based on the jury instructions, did the answer to Question 2 on the special verdict form require that some damages be awarded when Question No. 3 was answered?

Patras argues that the jury’s zero-damage awards for both medical expenses and non-economic damages (answer to special Interrogatory No. 3) are irreconcilably inconsistent with its findings that Syphax’s negligence caused both the accident (answer to special Interrogatory No. 1) and Patras’s injuries (answer to special Interrogatory No. 2). Patras contends that, because the jury found by special interrogatory that Syphax’s negligence caused Patras’s injuries, some award of damages was required. Syphax responds that “case law supports the jury’s ability to award zero damages to the [pjlaintiff even if negligence is found.” He cites, inter alia, Mason v. Lynch, 151 Md.App. 17 , 822 A.2d 1281 (2003), aff'd on other grounds, 388 Md. 37 , 878 A.2d 588 (2005), in which we recently affirmed a zero-damage award, even though the jury found that the defendant was negligent. We disagree with Patras’s assertion that the jury’s zero-damage award cannot be reconciled with its causation findings.

Based on the unobjected-to instruction that the burden was on Patras to prove by a preponderance of evidence “each item of damage claimed to be caused by a defendant,” the jury could ⁷⁶ have found that as a result of the accident Patras had suffered some injury, but he nevertheless had failed to meet his burden of proof in showing the amount that would compensate him for his injury as to any particular item of damage. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Syphax, the jury could have concluded that (1) the negligence of Syphax caused an almost negligible impact with Patras’s vehicle; (2) that Patras gave false information to Drs. Stopak and Hinkes in an effort to increase the value of his claim against Syphax; (3) that Patras’s testimony concerning his post-accident physical complaints was intentionally false; and (4) that the expert’s opinions as to the necessity and reasonableness of medical treatment was based on a false history provided by Patras and was therefore unreliable. If the jury reached those conclusions, it could have, in conformity with the court’s instructions, believed that Patras had no legitimate medical expenses resulting from the accident but nevertheless experienced some minor pain as a result of the “slight tap” of his vehicle.

A reasonable juror could conclude that no monetary award was justified because Patras was so untrustworthy as a medical historian that he had failed to meet his burden of proving the amount of money that would compensate him for his pain. Accordingly, having been told by the judge that a damage award should not be