Patterson v. Gelston

Bartol, J., delivered tbe opinion of tbis Court: Tbe application in this case was made to tbe Land office, for a special warrant to cover about twenty acres of vacant land suggested to lie in Baltimore city, on Harris’ creek. A warrant was issued, and in its execution twenty-one acres, two roods, and twenty-four perches were located and embraced in a certificate of survey dated tbe 24th day of October 1851, by tbe name of “Oversight.” Tbis certificate was returned, and tbe composition money paid. A caveat was filed by tbe Canton Company as to part of tbe land embraced in tbe survey; and that caveat being sustained, tbe plats and certificates were returned and corrected. On tbe 30th of October 1860, tbe appellants filed their caveat,, and under an order from the Commissioner, evidence was taken, and locations made by them.

On tbe 2nd of August 1861, tbe Commissioner passed an order sustaining tbe caveat in part, and in part overruling tbe same, and deciding that a patent should issue to tbe appellee for two parcels, one containing two acres, one rood and six perches, tbe other one rood and seven perches. On the application of tbe caveators, this order was opened, and further proof was offered, and other locations were made on their behalf. Upon tbe re-bearing, tbe Commissioner, on the 11th of October 1861, adhered to bis decision of the 2nd of August. Whereupon tbe caveators ajjpealed, and filed their reasons therefor, as required by the 46th section of the 5th Article of tbe Code.

In tbe progress of tbe case in tbe Land office, a great many locations were made, and numerous plats returned, accompanied with voluminous testimony, requiring for their examination much labor on tbe part of tbe Commissioner, and that officer appears to have devoted to the consideration and decision of tbe subject very great care and ability. ⁴⁴⁵ In disposing of tbe present appeal, however, it will not be necessary for ns to enter into any elaborate examination of the plats, or to discuss tbe many interesting questions presented in tbe argument of counsel. The whole contest before us, is upon the caveat to one parcel delineated on tbe plats and described in the surveyor’s return of the 30th of September 1861, as containing two acres, one rood and six perches, and is, for the most part, covered by navigable water. Since the decision of the case by the Commissioner, the Legislature, by the Act of 1862, ch. 129, has enacted “that no patent shall hereafter issue for land covered by navigable waters.” This Act came before us for consideration in the recent case of Day vs. Day, reported in 22 Md. Rep., 530 , when it was determined, upon full argument, that under its provisions no patent could be issued for land covered by navigable waters, notwithstanding the warrant had been returned, and the composition money paid into the Treasury, before the passage of the Act. That case, it is conceded by the appellee, would be conclusive of the present; provided the appellants have such an interest in the subject of dispute as to entitle them to prosecute an appeal.

In the case of Gittings vs. Moale, reported in 21 Md. Rep., 135 , this Court intimated the opinion that in order to maintain an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of the Land office, overruling a caveat, the caveator must prove title, or an interest in the land in dispute, without which the appeal would be dismissed. That opinion was not material to the decision of the case, inasmuch as the interest was there shown to exist. Nor is it actually necessary now to decide that point, as it appears from the record before us, that these appellants have rights as riparian owners, which would be injuriously affected by granting the patent; and, therefore, even if such interest were necessary to be shown, would be entitled to prosecute the appeal. Tet, as the question is an important one, and has ⁴⁴⁶ been fully argued and more carefully considered, and as we are all of opinion tbat wbat was said in Gittings vs. Moale, on-this subject, was erroneous, and ought to be corrected, we deem it proper now to dispose of the question.

Ordinarily, every suitor is bound to show to the Court some interest in the matter in dispute, in order to maintain his suit; and in the same manner every appellant must appear to be aggrieved by the judgment complained of, in order to he heard on his appeal; and, ordinarily, no one can be properly said to be aggrieved by a judgment, unless it be rendered upon a matter in which he has some interest or right of property. But this rule is not applicable to cases arising in the Land office, on applications for patents. It seems to he settled, by the long established usage and practice of that office, that “a caveat will not be dismissed merely because the caveator shows no