Patton v. United States Rugby Football

HARRELL, J. On 17 June 2000, Robert Carson Patton, II, and his father, Donald Lee Patton, while at an amateur rugby tournament in Annapolis, were struck by lightning. Robert, a player in the tournament, was seriously injured, but survived. Donald, a spectator watching his son play, died. Robert and various other members of the Patton family filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County alleging negligence against the rugby tournament organizers, referee, and related organizations with regard to the episode.

Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss arguing they owed no legal duty to Robert and Donald Patton. A hearing was held and, on 10 July 2003, the Circuit Court dismissed the action. The Patton family appealed. This Court, on its own initiative and before the appeal could be decided in the Court of Special Appeals, issued a writ of certiorari to determine whether any of the defendants, under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, owed a legal duty to Robert and Donald Patton.

Patton v. USA Rugby, 379 Md. 224 , 841 A.2d 339 (2004). I. A. The Lightning Strike Based on Appellants’ amended complaint, we assume the ⁶³¹ truth of the following factual allegations: 1 Sometime during the early morning of 17 June 2000, Robert and Donald Patton arrived at playing fields adjacent to the Annapolis Middle School in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Robert was to play rugby for the Norfolk Blues Rugby Club. Donald intended to support his son as a spectator.

Robert and Donald, along with other participants and spectators, placed their equipment and belongings under a row of trees adjacent to the playing fields. The rugby tournament was coordinated by Steven Quigg and was sanctioned by the United States of America Rugby Football Union, Ltd., d/b/a USA Rugby, and Mid-Atlantic Rugby Football Union, Inc. Rugby matches involving over two dozen teams began at approximately 9:00 a.m. and were planned to continue throughout the day. It was a warm, muggy day. The weather forecast for Annapolis was for possible thunderstorms.

At some point prior to the start of the twenty minute match between the Norfolk Blues and the Washington Rugby Football Club (“the match”), a thunderstorm passed through the area surrounding the Annapolis Middle School. At the start of the match, rain commenced; lightning could be seen and thunder could be heard proximate to the lightning flashes. By this time, the National Weather Service had issued a thunderstorm “warning” for the Annapolis area. Kevin Eager, a member of the Potomac Society of Rugby Football Referees, Inc., was the volunteer referee for the afternoon match in which Robert Patton was a participant.

Under the direction of Eager, the match continued as the rain increased in intensity, the weather conditions deteriorated, and the lighting flashed directly overhead. Other matches at ⁶³² the tournament ended. Robert Patton continued to play the match through the rain and lightning and his father continued to observe as a spectator until the match was stopped just prior to its normal conclusion. Upon the termination of the match, Robert and Donald fled the playing fields to the area under the trees where they left their possessions.

As they began to make their exit from under the trees to seek the safety of their car, each was struck by lightning. Donald died. Robert Patton sustained personal injuries and was hospitalized, but recovered. B. Circuit Court Proceedings Appellants here and Plaintiffs below are Judith Edwards Patton (wife of Donald Patton), acting in both an individual capacity and as personal representative of the estate of Donald Patton; Sophia P. Patton and Robert C. Patton (the parents of Donald Patton); Robert Carson Patton, II; and Meredith Patton (Donald’s daughter).

They sued the United States of America Rugby Football Union, Ltd., d/b/a USA Rugby (“USA Rugby”), the Mid-Atlantic Rugby Football Union, Inc. (“MARFU”), the Potomac Rugby Union, Inc. (“PRU”), the Potomac Society of Rugby Football Referees, Inc. (“Referees’ Society”), Kevin Eager, 2 and Steven Quigg, alleging that Defendants were liable in tort for the death of Donald Patton and the injuries suffered by Robert Patton. This liability, Appellants contended, was due to Defendants’/Appellees’ failure to employ proper policies and procedures to protect players and spectators at the tournament from lightning strikes. Appellants alleged that Appellees each had a duty to, but failed to, do one or more of the following acts: “(a) Have and implement proper policies and procedures regarding the protection of players and spectators from adverse weather conditions and lightning; ⁶³³ “(b) Have and implement a policy regarding the safe evacuation of players and spectators from the fields of play at its matches when lightning is present; “(c) Safeguard the health, safety, and welfare of the players and spectators at its matches; “(d) Terminate the rugby match and tournament when lightning is present; “(e) Monitor and detect dangerous conditions associated with its matches; and “(f) Train, supervise, monitor and control actions of officials prior to ensure the safety of the participants and spectators from dangerous lightning strikes.” On 26 August 2002, the Referees’ Society filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims pending against it on the ground that the Referees’ Society owed no tort duty to Robert or Donald Patton as a matter of law. Thereafter, on 16 September 2002, USA Rugby, MARFU, and Steven Quigg filed a joint Motion to Dismiss in which they adopted the arguments of the Referees’ Society and advanced the additional argument that Maryland’s Recreational Land Use Statute, found in Maryland Code (1974, 2000 Repl.Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 5-1101, et seq. of the Natural Resources Article, conferred tort immunity on them for injuries arising from recreational use of premises, i.e., playing rugby on the Annapolis Middle School fields. 3 Appellants, on 30 December 2002, filed an amended complaint.

On 9 January 2003, USA Rugby, MARFU, PRU, and Mr. Quigg filed a second Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment. The Motion to Dismiss argued that: (1) Appellees owed the Pattons no legally cognizable tort duty as a matter of law; (2) Appellees are immune from tort liability under Maryland’s Recreational Land Use Statute; ⁶³⁴ and (3) the claims of Robert were barred by waiver. On 13 January 2002, the Referees’ Society also filed a Motion to Dismiss the amended complaint. The pending motions were heard on 5 February 2003.

The Circuit Court, subsequently, issued an order granting the pending motions to dismiss and, on 17 November 2003, issued a Memorandum Opinion explaining the reasons for the dismissal. Based on Maryland precedents and caselaw from other jurisdictions, the Circuit Court concluded that Appellees did not owe a duty of care to Robert or Donald Patton. The Circuit Court noted generally that courts in other jurisdictions have found that “landowners” or their equivalent do not have a duty to warn invitees of the risk of lightning. As regards Donald Patton, the Circuit Court stated: “[Djecedent Donald Patton was a nonpaying spectator at a rugby match organized and overseen by [Appellees].

There is no indication from the record that Decedent had entrusted himself to the control and protection of [Appellees], indeed he was free to leave the tournament at any time. Additionally, there is no indication that he had lost the ability to monitor changing weather conditions and act accordingly. While [Appellants] allege the storm began near the beginning of the match, it was not until the conclusion of the game, that Decedent and plaintiff Robert Patton, attempted to escape the storm by running towards the tree line adjacent to the open field to retrieve their belongings. It was here that both were struck by lightning. “The inherently unpredictable nature of weather and the patent dangerousness of lightning make it unreasonable to impose a duty upon [Appellees] to protect spectators from the type [of] injury that occurred here.” As regards Robert Patton, the Circuit Court stated that “[w]hile it is arguable that [Appellees] had a greater duty to protect plaintiff Robert Patton, a player/participant from injury, they were under no duty to protect and warn him of lightening strikes and other acts of nature.” The hearing ⁶³⁵ judge relied on cases from other jurisdictions involving lightning strikes on golf courses to conclude that “lightning is a universally known danger created by the elements” and, in the absence of evidence that Appellants created a greater hazard than brought about by natural causes, there is no duty to warn and protect.

The Circuit Court expressly rejected as grounds for its grant of Appellees’ motions to dismiss both Maryland’s Recreational Land Use Statute, and waiver argument based on language contained in Robert Patton’s alleged execution of a USA Rugby Participant Enrollment Form. This appeal follows, therefore, from a dismissal of the amended complaint based solely on the ground that there was no legal duty owed to Robert or Donald Patton. Appellants present the following question for our consideration: Did the trial court err, when it found that Appellees had no duty to protect Appellants from lightning injuries and granted Appellees’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted?

II

Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2) provides for the filing of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We have stated that: The granting of a motion to dismiss is proper when, even if the facts and allegations as set forth in the complaint were proven to be true, the complaint would nevertheless fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted____[I]t will be affirmed if the record reveals any legally sound reason for the decision. Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 548-49 , 727 A.2d 947, 949 (1999) (citations omitted).

III

A. For a plaintiff to state a prima facie claim in negligence, he or she must prove the existence of four elements by ⁶³⁶ alleging facts demonstrating “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty.” Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 582 , 831 A.2d 18, 26 (2003) (quoting Muthukumarana v. Montgomery Co., 370 Md. 447, 486 , 805 A.2d 372, 395 (2002), and cases cited therein). Generally, whether there is adequate proof of the required elements to succeed in a negligence action is a question of fact to be determined by the fact-finder. The existence of a legal duty, however, is a question of law to be decided by the court. Valentine, 353 Md. at 549 , 727 A.2d at 949 .

As established in Maryland jurisprudence over a century ago: there can be no negligence where there is no duty that is due; for negligence is the breach of some duty that one person owes to another. It is consequently relative and can have no existence apart from some duty expressly or impliedly imposed. In every instance before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which duty would have averted or avoided the injury.... As the duty,owed varies with circumstances and with the relation to each other of the individuals concerned, so the alleged negligence varies, and the act complained of never amounts to negligence in law or in fact; if there has been no breach of duty.

Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 714 , 697 A.2d 1371, 1375 (1997) (quoting West Virginia Cent. & P.Ry. v. State ex rel. Fuller, 96 Md. 652, 666 , 54 A. 669, 671-72 (1903)). “[O]ur analysis of a negligence cause of action usually begins with the question of whether a legally cognizable duty existed.” Remsburg, 376 Md. at 582 , 831 A.2d at 26 . When assessing whether a tort duty may exist, we often have recourse to the definition in W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 53 (5th ed.1984), which characterizes “duty” as “an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular ⁶³⁷ standard of conduct toward another.” Id. In determining the existence of a duty, we consider, among other things: the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 627 , 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986) (citation omitted). Where the failure to exercise due care creates risks of personal injury, “the principal determinant of duty becomes foreseeability.” Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank of Maryland, 307 Md. 527, 535 , 515 A.2d 756, 760 (1986) (citations omitted). The foreseeability test “is simply intended to reflect current societal standards with respect to an acceptable nexus between the negligent act and the ensuing harm.” Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 338 Md. 341, 348 , 658 A.2d 675, 678 (1995) (quoting Henley v. Prince George’s County, 305 Md. 320, 333 , 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986)). In determining whether a duty exists, “it is important to consider the policy reasons supporting a cause of action in negligence.

The purpose is to discourage or encourage specific types of behavior by one party to the benefit of another party.” Valentine, 353 Md. at 550 , 727 A.2d at 950 . “While foreseeability is often considered among the most important of these factors, its existence alone does not suffice to establish a duty under Maryland law.” Remsburg, 376 Md. at 583 , 831 A.2d at 26 . As we clarified in Ashburn : [t]he fact that a result may be foreseeable does not itself impose a duty in negligence terms. This principle is apparent in the acceptance by most jurisdictions and by this Court of the general rule that there is no duty to control a third person’s conduct so as to prevent personal harm to another, unless a “special relationship” exists either be ⁶³⁸ tween the actor and the third person or between the actor and the person injured. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 628 , 510 A.2d at 1083 (citations omitted).

In addition, “a tort duty does not always coexist with a moral duty.” Jacques, 307 Md. at 534 , 515 A.2d at 759 (citing W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 56 (5th ed.1984)). We have held that such a “special duty” to protect another may be established “(1) by statute or rule; (2) by contractual or other private relationship; or (3) indirectly or impliedly by virtue of the relationship between the tortfeasor and a third party.” Bobo, 346 Md. at 715 , 697 A.2d at 1376 (internal citations omitted). B. Appellants allege that a “special relationship” existed between Appellees (USA Rugby, MARFU, PRU, the Referees’ Society, and Steven Quigg) and Robert and Donald Patton sufficient to recognize the existence of a duty to protect the latter, the breach of which gave rise to an action for negligence. Appellants argue that: A participant in a sporting event, by the very nature of the sport, trusts that his personal welfare will be protected by those controlling the event.

Stated another way, it is reasonably foreseeable that both the player, and the player’s father, will continue to participate in the match, as [ ]long as the match is not stopped by the governing bodies in charge. It also is reasonably foreseeable that, when matches are played in thunderstorms, there is a substantial risk of injury from lightning. And finally, it is reasonably foreseeable that a father will not abandon his son, when he sees those who have assumed responsibility for his son’s welfare placing his son in a perilous condition.... Appellants essentially contend that the tournament organizers had a duty to protect Robert and Donald, and to extricate them, from the dangers of playing in and viewing, respectively, a sanctioned rugby match during a thunderstorm. ⁶³⁹ Appellees counter that “there is no ‘special relationship’ between Mr. Patton, Sr., Mr. Patton and the [Ajppellees which would require the [Ajppellees to protect and warn these