Maryland case law › Pearce v. Arnold

Pearce v. Arnold

178 Md. 356 (1940) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: AffirmedSHEHAN✓ Good law
HoldingJulia W.

357 SHEHAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Allegany County, in equity, dismissing the bill of complaint of Julia W. Pearce, the appellant, who sought to enjoin George S. Arnold, receiver of the Citizens National Bank of Frostburg, and Lucian C. Radcliff, sheriff of Allegany County, from selling certain property belonging to her, in pursuance of a writ of fieri facias issued upon a judgment confessed by George E. Pearce, deceased, and the appellant, it being alleged that the order for the confession of judgment was signed by the appellant while under duress of her husband, and that the judgment in consequence thereof was void. George S. Arnold, receiver, answered and demurred to the bill of complaint. The defenses presented by the appellees are: First, denial of the charges relating to duress; second, that there was no agency existing between the husband, George E. Pearce and the bank, or the receiver, and consequently the appellees are not bound by the conduct of George E. Pearce; third, laches; and fourth, the acknowledgment of the validity of the judgment and her recognition of it as a binding lien upon her property.

The judgment was for $17,400 and was entered on the 31st day of July, 1929. On September 1st, 1939, after a lapse of more than ten years, a fieri facias was issued on the judgment, and the property of Mrs. Pearce was advertised for sale. It is this sale that is sought to be enjoined, for the reasons above recited. The validity of the obligations, in the form of promissory notes given by George E. Pearce, and his wife, Julia W. Pearce, the appellant, is not questioned, nor is the fact that the notes, aggregating $17,400, were due and unpaid at the time of the signing of the authority to enter the confessed judgment.

The principle question presented is that of duress practiced upon the appellant by the husband in obtaining her signature to the authority to enter the judgment. The questions of agency, laches, acknowledgment of the validity of the judgment are secondary, but might be of importance in arriving at a conclusion in this appeal, 358 were it not for the main question of duress, where it is obvious that the evidence, and the general situation of the parties, do not warrant the granting of the relief prayed upon that ground. There can be no doubt that the circumstances, with respect to this large indebtedness, which was an accumulation of notes given from time to time, caused a great deal of trouble and inconvenience in the Pearce family. Mrs. Pearce was not without business knowledge.

She had assisted her husband in the store; had operated the business when he was sick; had made deposits in the bank, where she frequently went on business; she was a woman of intelligence and capacity and therefore could not be easily subjected to undue influences or duress; she was aware of the large obligations which were due and unpaid, and of the demands of the bank for their payment, and in view of these facts, and at the insistence of her husband, signed the order for confession, but, as the evidence shows, without threat, false representations, or intimidation. The judgment was entered, and was never questioned by her for a period of more than ten years, and so suffered to remain a lien upon her property and the property of her husband. After her husband had died, the bank, or its receiver, evidently desired to have this matter settled. The receiver conferred with Mrs. Pearce on several occasions to that end, and for the purpose of making payment on the judgment she had attempted without success to sell or borrow on

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