Penhollow v. BD. OF COMMISSIONERS CECIL COUNTY

CATHELL, Judge. Monica Anne Penhollow appeals from the decision of the Circuit Court for Cecil County granting motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment in favor of the Board of County Commissioners for Cecil County (Cecil County), several members of the Board of County Commissioners for Cecil ²⁷⁰ County who were sued in their individual capacities, Rodney E. Kennedy, George O. Haggerty, Jeffrey D. Clewer, Leon A. Ordway, Sergeant James Russell, and Corporal James Christopher (collectively, appellees). Appellant presents two questions on appeal: A) Did the trial Court improperly dismiss Counts I and II or in the alternative grant summary judgment as a matter of law? B) Did the trial Court improperly grant summary judgment as to Counts III—V as a matter of law?

We shall affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court. The Facts From 1985 until the filing of the complaint below, 1 appellant was employed as a correctional officer at the Cecil County Detention Center. Appellant attained the rank of Corporal in 1987 and retained that rank at the time she filed her complaint. Appellees in the case sub judice are the Board of County Commissioners for Cecil County and numerous individuals.

At the time of the filing of the complaint, the individuals and their employment positions were as follows: W. Edwin Cole Jr., Commissioner; A. Marie Cleek, Commissioner; the Successor of Grayson L. Abbott Jr., 2 Commissioner; Rodney E. Kennedy, Sheriff of Cecil County; George O. Haggerty, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Cecil County; Jeffrey D. Clewer, Director of the Cecil County Detention Center; Leon A. Ordway, Deputy Director of the Cecil County Detention Center; James Russell, correctional officer; and James Christopher, correctional officer. Appellant alleged in her complaint that she had been “sub-' jected to different terms, conditions, and privileges of her ²⁷¹ employment on the basis of her sex” and that she had been “forced to work in an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working environment, on the basis of her sex.” Her complaint alleged five counts: Count I, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2Q00e el seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)(hereina£ter Title VII); Count II, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter § 1983); Count III, negligent hiring or retention; Count IV, intentional infliction of emotional distress; and Count V, violations of Articles 24 and 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In particular, appellant complained of the following actions: a.

On May 20, 1994, the Plaintiff [appellant] received an interim evaluation that was ordered by Jeffrey Clewer. This evaluation was performed by Sergeant .Anna Husfelt who indicated on the report form that the Plaintiffs overall rating was “fair, but needs improvement.” Sergeant Hus-felt informed the Plaintiff that she had given the Plaintiff a higher rating than the one noted on the report, but vras ordered by Jeffrey Clewer to change the evaluation to a lower category. The Sheriffs Department and County policies provide that a yearly evaluation is to be completed on all employees after an employee serves a year probation. An employee who falls below “meets expectations” should have an additional document placed on file regarding the employee’s work.

No male supervisors received an interim evaluation.... b. The Plaintiff received a notice to report for Grand Jury duty from January 17, 1994 through May 13, 1994. The Plaintiff informed her supervisor on January 3, 1994 of that fact. Additionally the Plaintiff gave Sergeant Anna Husfelt a copy of the notice to report and informed Sergeant Husfelt that the Plaintiff had called the State’s Attorney to make certain her serving on the Grand Jury would not constitute a conflict of interest due to her employment ....

Judge Cole informed the Plaintiff that he had received calls from Sergeant Linda Lannen, Jeffrey Clewer and George Haggerty regarding a conflict of interest.... In similar circumstances involving male employees who had ²⁷² been called for jury duty, no calls were ever placed to any of the judges. c. From September 1,1994 through September 25,1994, Sergeant Anna Husfelt was on leave. By letter dated August 25, 1994, Sergeant Husfelt set forth a list of tasks which she expected accomplished during her absence by both the Plaintiff and Corporal James Christopher.

Sergeant Husfelt specifically assigned the Plaintiff to the control area and Corporal Christopher to booking. Both Corporal Christopher and the Plaintiff were ordered, in writing, to submit a log of events which took place while Sergeant Husfelt was on leave upon her return. The Plaintiff submitted her log on September 25, 1994; however, Corporal Christopher has never submitted anything in writing as ordered. The Plaintiff was the senior ranking Corporal, placing Corporal Christopher in the booking area put him in the position of the supervisor in charge....

The Plaintiff was not treated as the senior ranking supervisor in this instance. d. On August 1, 1993, Corporal James Christopher stated to Corporal Alex Holotanko, referring to the Plaintiff, that he (Corporal Christopher) had worked hard in moving an inmate to a section which he supervised. He stated [, after discovering that appellant had the inmate further moved,] to Corporal Holotanko “She’s a fucking bitch.” “She’s got the brain the size of a pea and I am tired of her fucking shit.” This conversation occurred in the booking station at a shift change. Deputy Kevin Sinclair and DFC Lisa Crocket were present and overheard the conversation ....

The Plaintiff has complained repeatedly over the last three years concerning Corporal James Christopher’s attitude, comments and treatment of female employees, all without action being taken to correct the problems---- e. On January 28, 1993, at the booking station, the Plaintiff was accused by Sergeant James Russell of taking his paperwork to Mr. Clewer’s office. The Plaintiff informed Sergeant Russell that she had not, but had given it to Mr. Clewer at the booking station. Sergeant Russell ²⁷³ stated “You took my fucking paperwork to Jeffs office because he told me you did.” “You better not be fucking with any of my paperwork.” Sergeant Russell continued to use foul and abusive language.

The Plaintiff stated to him on numerous occasions that she did not appreciate him talking to her in such a manner, especially in front of subordinates. The Plaintiff suggested that if Sergeant Russell wished to continue the conversation that it take place in the supervisor’s office. Present during this incident were Sergeant Danny Blackburn, Corporal Alex Holotanko, Corporal James Christopher, Corporal Thomas Morris, DFC Patty Miller, DFC Harry Griswold, DFC Basil Goodwin, Deputy Mary Ann Sprout, and Deputy James Belcher. The Plaintiff filed a verbal complaint with Sergeant Anna Hus-felt and later with Jeffrey Clewer.

There was no further investigation provided or follow up by Mr. Clewer. Of the nine staff members present, three, DFC Patty Miller, DFC Harry Griswold, and DFC James Belcher complained to the Plaintiff that they not be exposed to this type of conversation and behavior from a supervisor. The Plaintiff spoke with Mr. Clewer who was Sergeant Russell’s supervisor, however, nothing was ever done. f. On October 3, 1990, the Plaintiff was transferred via an inter-departmental transfer by Alexander M. Francis, the then Detention Center Director.

The Plaintiff was assigned to the 1600-2400 hour shift under the supervision of Sergeant Anna Husfelt. Shortly thereafter the Plaintiff began to receive orders to cover other shifts. For instance, she would get off of work at midnight and be made to report back at 8:00 a.m. She would get off at 4:00 p.m., and made to report back [at] midnight.

There were many times that the Plaintiff would get off at 8:00 a.m. and be required to report again at 4:00 p.m. This occurred continuously throughout 1991,1992, and 1993. During this period of time Corporal James Christopher worked exclusively day shift and was never required to work overtime. The Plaintiff was the only supervisor ordered to work the evening and midnight shifts. ²⁷⁴ g.

On October 18, 1991, the Plaintiff was assigned by-Mr. Clewer as the “Control Center Supervisor.” The Plaintiff worked this assignment four days a week. No other male supervisors were required to work a post four days a week. The Plaintiff received no shift briefings, copies of any reports about incidences, fights, contraband, etc. On Saturdays, the Plaintiff would be the only supervisor on duty. The Plaintiff finally complained on March 21,1992, to Sergeant Gary Hinkle.

The Plaintiff was later informed by Deputy Christine Davis that the Plaintiff could not be moved out of control because he had orders from the Sheriff to keep her on that duty. If something happened Sergeant Hinkle would get in trouble. h. On August 13, 1993, Deputy Director Ordway designated the Plaintiff as the Female Unit Supervisor. Initially the Plaintiff worked this assignment from midnight to 8:00 a.m.

The Plaintiff worked this shift until September 30, 1993. She was then assigned to the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. shift by Jeffrey Clewer. The Plaintiff worked 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. until October 31,1993 when she was moved to the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift to do the same assignment. This work area is normally staffed by a correctional officer and not a supervisor. i.

In November, 1993, Mr. Ordway assigned the Plaintiff to oversee booking and make recommendations for changes in the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift. No male supervisor has ever been assigned Control, Female Unit, Booking and Property supervision positions. The Control Center is run by two officers. The Plaintiff was assigned to the Female Unit which is known as a disciplinary post.

The Plaintiff was referred to by the male employees as “Corporal Pen-happy” presumably because she wrote or documented the complaints the Plaintiff had regarding her working conditions. The assignment as the Booking Supervisor had never been assigned to a male supervisor. In the female unit the Plaintiff received no briefings and no copies of reports in reference to controlling contraband, problem inmates, etc. ²⁷⁵ j. On October 5, 1992, the Plaintiff was wrongfully charged with an unauthorized release of a prisoner.

Disciplinary sanctions included two days suspension and six months probation. The Plaintiff appealed this action to Jeffrey Clewer on October 16, 1992. Mr. Clewer upheld this action per letter dated October 25, 1992. The Plaintiff appealed to and met with Chief Deputy Haggerty on November 5, 1992.

Chief Deputy Haggerty upheld Mr. Clew-er’s decision per letter dated November 5, 1992. The Plaintiff then appealed the matter to a third level hearing board but never received anything from the board after she filed her appeal. Those persons having personal knowledge thereof are Corporal Thomas Morris, Sergeant Linda Lannen, and Sergeant Anna Husfelt, Jeffrey Clewer and George Haggerty. k. On December 31, 1992, the Plaintiff met with Sergeant James Corcoran regarding her evaluation.

When the Plaintiff arrived she observed her evaluation laying on Sergeant Corcoran’s desk. Sergeant Corcoran informed the Plaintiff that the evaluation was not what he submitted and that his was considerably higher, however, Jeffrey Clewer had ordered him to lower the evaluation. l. On October 15, 1991, the Plaintiff was wrongfully disciplined for the escape of two inmates by Chief Deputy, Acting Detention Center Director, Johnny G. Lough. The escape had taken place on August 15, 1991, while Corporal James Christopher was the shift supervisor.

Corporal Christopher became ill and turned bis shift over to Corporal Thomas Morris. Both corporals are subordinate to the Plaintiff in terms of tenure. As a result of being charged, the Plaintiff was given six months probation and given a three day suspension without pay. Deputy James Belcher who was charged along with the Plaintiff was also given the same discipline.

The Plaintiff retained personal legal counsel and as a result of various grievances, it was determined that the Plaintiff and Deputy Belcher were not responsible for the escape. It was ordered that the three days back pay be reimbursed. Sheriff Rodney Kennedy intercepted the ²⁷⁶ three day pay check and refused to return [it] to the Plaintiff. It was only as a result of the Plaintiffs complaint to the County Commissioners that a hand written check was issued by the Commissioners, and the check Sheriff Rodney Kennedy had in his possession was voided.

Corporal Morris never filed any grievance paperwork per County policy, though he received his three day suspension pay back from Sheriff Rodney Kennedy. m. In 1991 at the Annual Sheriffs Department Awards Banquet staff were recognized for not using sick leave during the previous year. The Plaintiff was one of many who were to receive recognition for not using any sick leave. The Plaintiff worked during this event.

The Plaintiff repeatedly requested her award from Sergeant James Corcoran, Jeffrey Clewer, George Haggerty, Rodney Kennedy and Tony Shivery, but never received it. Corporal James Christopher who also was entitled to receive recognition and was unable to attend the banquet, however, he received his award. To this day, the Plaintiff has never received her award. n. During the year 1991, the Plaintiff was entitled to “comp time” which she had earned but which was refused by Jeffrey Clewer. o.

Supervisors are required to be in the dining hall during all inmate meals. When the Plaintiff worked a shift with Corporal Christopher he would be in the dining hall per Mr. Clewer’s orders. When the Plaintiff would enter the dining hall Corporal Christopher would not allow her to work in the area and would make statements in front of the male inmates that he did not need her or as he stated on 12/25/91, “I don’t need you in here. Go sit in booking and look nice.” p. The Plaintiffs mailbox has typed on it “Corporal Monica Penhollow???” All other supervisors have their names followed by their respective shift assignments la-belled on their boxes. ²⁷⁷ Appellees filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment as to Counts I and II and for summary judgment as to Counts III, IV, and V. The trial court, after an 8 October 1996 hearing, granted appellees’ various motions.

In an oral ruling from the bench, the court stated: As to count one, Title VII. I’m going to grant the motion to dismiss the individual employees because I think the law is clearly, it’s clear to me that the suit should be brought against the employer. So I will grant a motion to dismiss with respect to each individual employee. As to the count as to the Board of County Commissioners, I will grant their motion for summary judgment for a couple reasons.

Number one, I don’t think that she exhausted her remedies before the EEOC. The county was never named in that complaint. And I frankly, from reading the facts of the case, don’t see the facts as counsel for defendant says that cut the mustard to warrant an allegation as claimed. As to count two, I will grant the motion to dismiss all parties, because as I see it the law requires it must be a violation of official municipal policy or custom.

And I don’t see any allegation or proof of that. And as to count three, negligent hiring and retention. Section 5[-]321(b)(l) [of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article] grants immunity of the parties on the mere negligence basis and it’s clear under the law that you’ve got to allege facts clearly which show the official was malicious in hiring and retention. I don’t see any allegations sufficient to warrant that.

And I will grant a motion to dismiss and or summary judgment in that. As to count four infliction of emotional distress. It’s got to be 1) intentional, reckless conduct, 2) extreme and outrageous[,] 3) causal connection between the conduct and the emotional distress and the emotional distress must be severe. I don’t think these four counts are alleged or I don’t think there are sufficient facts alleged to fulfill all four of these particular requirements, especially the extreme and outrageous part.

And I will grant the motion to dismiss and or motion for summary judgment as to all parties. ²⁷⁸ As to count five declaration of rights. I think I stated it before, I don’t see an abridgment of any federal rights. And I will grant a motion to dismiss and or summary judgment in count five as to all parties. In the resolution of the case sub judice, we shall address the following issues: A. Whether the trial court properly granted appellees’ motion to dismiss the Title VII claim as to the individual appellees.

B. Whether the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss the Title VII claim as to the Board of County Commissioners of Cecil County due to appellant’s failure to name the Board in her EEOC complaint. C. Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to appellant’s Title VII claim. D. Whether the trial court properly granted appellees’ motion to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. E. Whether the trial court properly granted appellees’ summary judgment motion on the negligent hiring/retention claim against Cecil County.

F. Whether the trial court properly granted appellees’ summary judgment motion on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. G. Whether the trial court properly granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment as to the claim that the defendants violated her rights guaranteed by the Maryland Declaration of Rights. A. Dismissal of Title VII Claim as to the Individual Appellees Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the individual appellees could not be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1996) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Title VII defines the term “employer” as “a pei’son engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person.” 42' U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

The federal circuit courts are currently ²⁷⁹ split on the issue of whether Title VII liability can be imposed on individuals. Compare Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir.1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir.1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1015 , 115 S.Ct. 574 , 130 L.Ed.2d 491 (1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir.1993); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 , 114 S.Ct. 1049 , 127 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994); and Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226 (5th Cir.1981) with Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (1990)(en banc); and Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir.1986). Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.1993), is indicative of the view that Title VII liability cannot be imposed on individuals. In that case, the court noted that some federal courts had found “that supervisory personnel and other agents of the employer are themselves employers for purposes of liability.” Id. at 587 .

The Miller court found that the phrase “and any agent of such person” was not incorporated in the definition of employer to impose liability on individuals but to impose respondeat superior liability on the employer. It reasoned: The statutory scheme itself indicates that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability on employees. Title VII limits liability to employers with fifteen or more employees, 42 U.S.C. § 20Q0e(b), ... in part because Congress did not want to burden small entities with the costs associated with litigating discrimination claims. If Congress decided to protect small entities with limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees.

Id. Addressing the criticism that refusing to Impose liability on individuals “‘would encourage supervisory personnel to believe that they may violate Title VII with impunity,’ ” the court stated that it believed that employers, knowing that they may be subject to Title VII liability, would take measures to correct a supervisory employee’s belief. Id. at 588. ²⁸⁰ Also indicative of the view that individuals should not be liable under Title VII is Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir.1995). In that case, the victim of workplace sexual harassment sued her former supervisor under Title VII.

The supervisor, asserting that Title VII did not apply to him, moved to dismiss. .The motion to dismiss was granted. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court noted that in EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 , 1279-82 (7th Cir.1995), it had held that the definition of employer that is contained in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and includes the employer’s agents was “simply a statutory expression of traditional respondeat superior liability and imposes no individual liability on agents.” Williams, 72 F.3d at 553 . The court further stated: If a victim of harassment suffers mental and emotional distress, embarrassment, and humiliation so severe that even an employer’s prompt action does not provide sufficient compensation, it is not unreasonable to assume that Congress intended the victim to turn to traditional tort remedies for redress.

Id. at 555 . A majority of the federal circuit courts are in accord with the view that Title VII does not impose individual liability. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir.1995) (“We now hold that individual defendants with supervisory control over a plaintiff may not be held personally liable under Title VII.”); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir.1994) (“[W]e conclude that individuals who do not otherwise qualify as an employer cannot be held liable for a breach of Title VII.”); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.1993) (“Under Title VII, suits against individuals must proceed in their official capacity; individual capacity suits are inappropriate.”). The Fourth Circuit has adopted a view contrary to that of the majority of the federal circuits.

In Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1989), the court examined whether a supervisory employee could be held liable pursuant to ²⁸¹ Title VII. The court, holding that such an employee could be held personally liable under Title VII, stated: An individual qualifies as an “employer” under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over the plaintiffs hiring, firing or conditions of employment. The supervisory employee need not have ultimate authority to hire or fire to qualify as an employer, as long as he or she has significant input into such personnel decisions. Furthermore, an employee may exercise supervisory authority over the plaintiff for Title VII purposes even though the company has formally designated another individual as the plaintiffs supervisor.

Id. at 104 (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit, in dicta, has also indicated that individual employees can be held liable under Title VII. In Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir.1986), the plaintiff brought a Title VII action alleging that her employment with the defendant company had been terminated because of her race. The district court dismissed the complaint because the complaint failed to specify under which statute (Title VII or § 1981) the individual defendants were being sued, under which statute the sex discrimination claims were brought, and under which section damages were sought.

The court noted that it was clear that the sex discrimination claims were brought under section 1981. In regard to the Title VII claim, the court indicated that individual liability could be imposed. Although the Fourth Circuit has imposed Title VII liability on individual employees, we are not bound by its decisions. See Gayety Books, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 279 Md. 206, 213 , 369 A.2d 581 (1977); Davis v. Director, Patuxent Inst. 29 Md.App. 705, 713 , 351 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 277 Md. 736 , and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 , 97 S.Ct. 312 , 50 L.Ed.2d 285 (1976); Wiggins v. State, 22 Md.App. 291, 302 , 324 A.2d 172 , aff'd, 275 Md. 689 , 344 A.2d 80 (1975).

We find the majority view taken by the federal circuit courts to be persuasive as to whether Title VII imposes personal liability on ²⁸² individual employees. We perceive that the purpose of Title VII was to prompt employers that were recalcitrant in responding to allegations of workplace discrimination to take action and to impose liability when employers failed to do so. As we view it, Title VTI’s purpose was not to impose liability on individual employees; traditional tort remedies are sufficient to redress harm to individual victims on the part of individual employees. Moreover, not every wrong need have a judicial remedy.

Incivility, repugnant as it may be, does not necessarily create a cause of action. If it did, there would not be sufficient court resources to rectify that which is uncivil. Accordingly, we shall affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the Title VII claim against the individual employees. B. Dismissal of Title VII Claim as to Cecil County The trial court, finding that the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) did not name Cecil County, granted the county’s motion to dismiss as to the Title VII claim.

The employer named in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the EEOC was the Cecil County Sheriffs Department. The charge did not specifically name any of the individual appellees in regard to instances of alleged sexual harassment. It did state that on August 13, 1993, appellant had been “subjected to verbal harassment and sexual harassment from male supervisory and management officials.” It also stated that appellant had been “subjected to unfair terms and conditions of employment.” Appellant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint against Cecil County due to appellant’s failure to name Cecil County specifically in the EEOC charge. 3 She argues that Cecil County was clearly on notice of the EEOC charges filed against the Sheriffs Department and was not prejudiced by her failure to name it in the charge. ²⁸³ It is unclear whether Cecil County disputes the contention that the failure to name it specifically in the EEOC charge should not bar suit against it. In their brief, appellees conclude that “the trial court correctly dismissed count I as to defendants Cole, Cleek, Abbott, Kennedy, Haggerty, Clewer, Ordway, Russell, and Christopher.” Appellees do not contend that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint against Cecil County due to appellant’s failure to name it in the EEOC charge.

The trial court, however, stated: “As to the count [Count I] as to the Board of County Commissioners, I will grant their motion for summary judgment for a couple reasons. Number one, I don’t think that she exhausted her remedies before the EEOC. The county was never named in that complaint.” 4 As the trial court clearly addressed the county’s status as a proper defendant, we shall address whether appellant could bring suit against Cecil County despite her failure to name it in the EEOC charge. Standard of Review Motion to Dismiss The general rule is that a party not named in an EEOC charge cannot be sued in a subsequent civil action.

See Alvarado v. Board of Trustees, 848 F.2d 457 (4th Cir.1988); Maxey v. M.H.M. Inc., 828 F.Supp. 376 (D.Md.1993). This “naming requirement is designed to provide notice to the charged party and to permit the EEOC to attempt voluntary conciliation of complaints.” Alvarado, 848 F.2d at 460 . In Alvarado v. Board of Trustees, the plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination naming Montgomery County College as his employer and then subsequently filed suit against the Board of Trustees of Montgomery Community College. The Board of Trustees moved for summary judgment on the ground that it had not been named in the EEOC ²⁸⁴ charge; that motion was granted by the Maryland District Court.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It stated: An examination of the Maryland statutes creating Montgomery Community College and conferring powers and duties on the college’s board of trustees clearly reveals that the board of trustees is identical with the college itself for purposes of suits such as that brought by Alvarado. Maryland has by statute created boards of trustees and empowered them to establish and operate community colleges. Id. at 460 (citations omitted).

A Maryland statute gives the Cecil County Sheriff the authority to appoint “Deputy sheriffs to perform correctional functions.” Md.Code (1974, 1995 RepLVol., 1996 Supp.), § 2-309(i)(l)(iii)2. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ). Once hired by the Cecil County Sheriff, deputy sheriffs who perform correctional functions are for some purposes “governed by the rank, salary, and benefit structures of the Cecil County personnel policy.” CJ § 2—309(i)(l)(vi)l. Additionally, following a probation period, such employees are “subject to the Cecil County personnel regulations and policies in all matters.” CJ § 2-309(i)(l)(vi)2. We are, however, unable to say, under the circumstances of this case, that the Sheriffs Department of Cecil County was identical with Cecil County itself.

Nevertheless, some federal courts have adopted exceptions to the general rule that an aggrieved party may not bring a civil suit against a party that was not named in thé EEOC charge. Under the “identity of interest” exception, the courts examine various factors in order to determine whether a party unnamed in the EEOC charge may be sued. The more common factors include: 1) similarity of interests between named and unnamed parties; 2) ability of the plaintiff to ascertain the unnamed party at the time of the EEOC charge; 3) notice of the EEOC charge by the unnamed party; and 4) prejudice. See, e.g., Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., . 69 F.3d 1235 (2d Cir.1995); Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., 30 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.1994). ²⁸⁵ In the case sub judice, only the second factor weighs against the inclusion of Cecil County in this suit.

There is clearly a similarity of interests between Cecil County and the Sheriffs Department in that the Sheriffs Department is funded by the county and, for Title VII purposes, many of the Sheriffs employees are governed, administratively at least, by the policies and regulations of Cecil County. Furthermore, there is some indication that the Director of the Cecil County Human Resources had knowledge of appellant’s EEOC charge. Finally, there is little prejudice to Cecil County. We, therefore, conclude that the Title VII action was properly filed against Cecil County under the “identity of intent” exception.

We shall reverse the trial court’s granting of the motion to dismiss as to the county on this count. C. Summary Judgment as to Title VII Claim In addition to dismissing the various appellees on the grounds we have previously discussed, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on the Title VII action. It stated: “[F]rom reading the facts of the case, [I] don’t see the facts as counsel for [appellees] says that cut the mustard to warrant an allegation as claimed.” Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in this regard because “[a]n employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an[ ] environment at work which significantly and adversely affects an employee because of gender.” In reviewing the granting of a summary judgment motion, we are concerned with whether a dispute of material fact exists. Arnold Developer, Inc. v. Collins, 318 Md. 259, 262 , 567 A.2d 949 (1990); Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 408 , 559 A.2d 365 (1989); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (1985); Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md.App. 137, 170-71 , 607 A.2d 82 (1992). “A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.” King, 303 Md. at 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (citing Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8 , 327 A.2d 502 (1974)). “A dispute as to a fact ‘relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material