Peninsula Produce Exchange v. New York, Philadelphia & Norfolk Railroad

Bond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant sued for the return to it of money paid to the appellees for the refrigeration or icing of three carloads of strawberries from Marion, Maryland, to Buffalo, Xew York, and which is alleged to have been unlawfully charged because the railroad companies “then had no tariff or tariffs lawfully on file and in effect at the time of the transportation of said goods/’ as required by the Federal Interstate Commerce Act, February 4th, 1887, and its amendments. The defendant filed pleas of limitations; to these the plaintiff demurred, the demurrers were overruled, and, the plaintiff declining to amend, judgment was entered for the appellees. The appeal from that judgment raises the one question of the validity of the railroad companies’ pleas of limitations.

According to the declaration, the charges complained of were paid on the 7th and 20th of June, 1921, and the suit was instituted on December 5th, 1924. Under the United States Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of February 28th, 1920, such actions to recover overcharges paid were required h> be brought within two years from the time the cause of action accrued. Phillips v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 662 ; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Wolf, 261 U. S. 133 ; Danzer Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R. Co., 268 U. S. 633 .

By a later Act of Congress, June 7th, 1924, par. 3, sec. 16, sub-see. (e), the period of limitations was extended to three years from the time the cause of action accrued; and sub-section (h) of the same act, section 16, provided that a cause of action which accrued after March 1st, 1920; should not be deemed to' be barred if action was begun on it prior to this last enactment, June 7th, 1924, or within six months thereafter. As the present suit was begun on December 5th, 1924, upon causes of action which ⁵⁹⁶ aecimed after March 1st, 1920, the appellant contends that it is not barred by limitations under the federal act. It has been held, however, that a subsequent extension of the two year limitation by an Act of Congress, passed after a claim had been barred under the previous law, would, as to that claim, be an unconstitutional deprivation of property.

The limitation of two- years in the amending act of February, 1920, has been held, not merely to affect the remedy, but to terminate and destroy the liability which the act created. And to revive that liability after it had been so terminated by the period of limitations would, says the Supreme Court, be to deprive the carriers of their property