Permanent Financial Corp. v. Taro

WEANT, Judge. These cases, which have been consolidated on appeal, originated in the Circuit Court for Howard County. Each case began when Permanent Financial Corporation and National Permanent Bank, F.S.B. (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Bank”) filed a notice of lis pendens with the clerk of the circuit court.

The basis for each notice, both of which were subsequently amended, was an action pending in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, i.e., Permanent Financial Corp. v. Taro, Civil Action No. 84-1979. 1 In that action, the Bank has ⁴⁹¹ asked the federal district court to decree, inter alia, an equitable lien on each of two Howard County properties; the properties are known as Brick House Farm and Fox Run. In the case giving rise to Appeal No. 859, 2 the amended notice of lis pendens concerned the tract of Howard County land known as Brick House Farm. Thomas Taro, et al., 3 opposed that notice of lis pendens with a motion to quash. The circuit court granted that motion and the Bank appealed.

In the case giving rise to Appeal No. 1265, 4 the amended lis pendens notice concerned the tract of Howard County land known as Fox Run. Fox Run Limited Partnership, et al., 5 challenged that notice of lis pendens by filing a motion to quash. That motion was denied and Fox Run Limited Partnership, et al., appealed. Broadly stated, the questions that confront us in these appeals are as follows: Did the circuit court err in granting the motion to quash the notice of lis pendens concerning the Brick House Farm property?

Did the circuit court err in denying the motion to quash the notice of lis pendens concerning the Fox Run property? The parties in turn have raised a plethora of more narrowly focused questions. Our treatment of the broadly stated ⁴⁹² questions will cover, to the extent necessary, the issues posed by the parties. Lis Pendens For an early statement of the lis pendens doctrine and for the public policy reasons upon which that doctrine rests, we turn to the case of Inloes v. Harvey, 11 Md. 519 (1857).

There, Chief Justice Legrand, quoting from I Story’s Eq. Jur. secs. 405, 406, stated at pages 524-25: In sec. 405 it is said: “A purchase made of property actually in litigation, pendente lite, for a valuable consideration, and without any express or implied notice in point of fact, affects the purchaser in the same manner as if he had such notice; and he will accordingly be bound by the judgment or decree in the suit.” And in sec. 406 it is said: “Ordinarily, it is true, that the decree of a court binds only the parties and their privies in representation or estate. But he who purchases during the pendency of a suit, is held bound by the decree that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. The litigating parties are exempted from taking notice of the title so acquired; and such purchaser need not be made a party to the suit.

Where there is a real and fair purchase without any notice, the rule may operate very hardly. But it is a rule founded upon a great public policy, for, otherwise, alienations made during a suit might defeat its whole purpose; and there would be no end to litigation. And hence arises the maxim, pendente lite nihil innovetur; the effect of which is, not to annul the conveyance, but only to render it subservient to the rights of the parties in litigation. As to the rights of these parties, the conveyance is treated as if it never had any existence; and it does not vary them.” [Emphasis in original.] Much more recently in the case of Angelos v. Maryland Casualty Co., 38 Md.App. 265 , 380 A.2d 646 (1977), this Court stated as follows regarding the doctrine of lis pen-dens: ⁴⁹³ Lis pendens literally means a pending action; the doctrine derives from the jurisdiction and control which a court acquires over property involved in an action pending its continuance and until final judgment is entered.

Under the doctrine, one who acquires an interest in the property pending litigation relating to the property takes subject to the results of the litigation. It is clear that the doctrine has no application except where there is a proceeding directly relating to the property in question, or where the ultimate interest and object of the proceeding is to subject the property in question to the disposal of a decree of the court. Id. 38 Md.App. at 268 , 380 A.2d at 648 (citing Feigley v. Feigley, 7 Md. 537, 563 (1855); Applegarth v. Russell, 25 Md. 317 (1866)). Subtitle BD Effective 1 January 1962, “Subtitle BD.

Lis Pendens” was added to the Maryland Rules of Procedure. That subtitle, which has not been amended since its adoption, contains four rules, all of which are reproduced below: Rule BD1. Creation. In any action in which the doctrine of lis pendens is applicable, service of process shall not be necessary to create lis pendens.

Rule BD2. Constructive Notice in Another County. The pendency in a county of an action affecting title to real or