Perry v. State

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. To a three-count indictment charging assault with intent to rape, assault with intent to carnally know a child under the age of fourteen years and common law assualt and battery, appellant pleaded guilty to the third count. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment and referred to Patuxent Institution to determine whether he could be classified as a defective delinquent. In this appeal it is asserted that the plea of guilty was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because the possibility of appellant’s confinement in the Patuxent Institution as a defective delinquent “was never explained, defined or mentioned.” It is clear from the colloquy between the trial judge and the appellant and the trial judge’s admonitions to appellant, all of which are set forth in the record before us, that appellant understood (1) the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, (2) the sentence that legally could be imposed and (3) the constitutional rights he would forego as enunciated in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 .

Appellant does not contest the voluntariness of his plea or question that it was knowingly and intelligently entered, except in one respect: that he would not have entered the plea had he known of his possible confinement in the Patuxent Institution. It is true that the acceptance of a guilty plea “demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences.” Boykin , at 243-244. But in the course of a canvass the trial judge cannot be expected to spell out every conceivable ramification