Petroli v. Mayor of Baltimore

Offutt, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On December 23rd, 1929, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, hereinafter called the city, being thereto enabled by chapter 229 of the Acts of 1924, by Ordinance 902 authorized the commissioners for opening streets, hereinafter called the commissioners', to condemn, open and grade the Orleans Street Viaduct as an improved east and west highway in that city. In the exercise of the power thus conferred and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by article 4, Code P. L. L., the commissioners awarded damages and assessed benefits incident to the proposed improve- ⁴³³ merit, and their action in that respect was ratified and approved hy Ordinance 1206, adopted December 20th, 1930. Among other properties condemned was 308 East Street, owned by the appellants in this case, which lay in the path of the proposed improvement, for which the commissioners awarded the owners thereof $3,300.

ISTo appeal from that award was taken, the owners were satisfied, and tendered themselves ready and willing to transfer the property to the city, but it neither paid nor tendered the amount of the award, nor did it accept the landowners’ offer to transfer it, but it did attempt to induce them to accept therefor 85 per cent, of the valuation fixed by the commissioners. All assessments of benefits and awards of damages incident to the proposed improvement have been finally completed, property other than that of the appellants has been acquired, the condemnation has not been abandoned, the city has elected to proceed with the improvement, but, although appellants’ property is indispensable and essential to it, the city has failed, either to physically accept it, or to pay the appellants the damages awarded to them as compensation therefor, although frequently requested so to do. On July 21st, 1933, the appellants brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City an action against the city to recover damages for loss occasioned to them by the city’s delay in “carrying out the provisions of the award.” A demurrer to their amended declaration filed in the case was sustained, with leave to the plaintiffs to file a second amended 'declaration within fifteen days. Subsequently, after proceedings which are not material here, judgment for the defendant for costs was entered upon the failure of the plaintiffs to file such amended narr.

From that judgment the landowners appealed. Appellants’ contention appears to be that, upon the facts alleged in the narr.j the city’s delay in paying the award was unreasonable, that the condemnation of their property for-an improvement to which it is essential, and which will be completed, rendered it unsalable and destroyed its market value, and that therefore they are entitled to recover dam ⁴³⁴ ages in this action. Appellee’s contention is that whatever appellants’ abstract rights may be, they have failed in the declaration to allege concrete facts sufficient to warrant a ■ recovery. While not universally recognized (Nichols on Em.

Dom., sec. 420, 20 C. J. 1086), the law of this state long has been that a condemning corporation is responsible to a landowner for special damages actually suffered through its unreasonable delay in electing either to abandon the condemnation of his property, or to pay the award therefor. Graff v. Baltimore, 10 Md. 553 ; Norris v. Baltimore, 44 Md. 606 ; Baltimore v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 282 ; Black v. Baltimore, 50 Md. 241 ; Baltimore v. Black, 56 Md. 338 ; Record Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 166 Md. 348 . But to justify a finding that the delay was unreasonable there must be some showing that it was due to bad faith, negligence, or default in some legal duty (20 C. J. 1084), and ordinarily whether it was unreasonable is a jury question. Baltimore v. Black, 56 Md. 338 .

Tested by those principles, while the facts stated in the declaration are sufficient to support the inference that the city’s delay in paying appellants the amount awarded them for their property was not only unreasonable but intentional and oppressive, they are not sufficient to show that the delay caused any special loss or damage to them. The only allegations relating to damages found in the narr. are that: “The plaintiffs herein have suffered great loss and