Pettiford v. Next Gen. Trust Serv.

Latashia Pettiford v. Next Generation Trust Service, No. 34, September Term, 2019 LANDLORD-TENANT LAW – SUMMARY EJECTMENT PROCEEDING – CONSENT JUDGMENT – DEFENSE UNDER IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY – DEFENSE UNDER RENT ESCROW STATUTES – Court of Appeals concluded that tenant’s motion to dismiss was properly denied. Court of Appeals held that judgment entered by trial court was not consent judgment, and, as such, tenant was not required to object to its entry to preserve for appellate review issues concerning judgment and merits of case, but rather could simply appeal, as she did. Judgment entered by trial court was not consent judgment because there was no agreement between parties as to resolution of issues in case, parties did not present any agreement to trial court, there was no consideration, and neither tenant nor her counsel consented to so-called consent judgment. Court of Appeals also held that trial court improperly precluded tenant from asserting and litigating defenses under implied warranty of habitability and rent escrow statutes, and that tenant was statutorily entitled to raise such defenses during summary ejectment proceeding and to have them fully considered.

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-19-000329 Argued: December 9, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 34 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ LATASHIA PETTIFORD v. NEXT GENERATION TRUST SERVICE ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. Barbera, C.J., and McDonald, J., concur. ______________________________________ Filed: March 26, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2020-06-29 15:43-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This case involves a summary ejectment proceeding, under Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. (1974, 2015 Repl.

Vol., 2018 Supp.) (“RP”) § 8-401, initiated by Next Generation Trust Service (“Next Generation”), Respondent, a landlord, in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore City, against Latashia Pettiford, Petitioner, alleging that Pettiford had failed to pay rent for five months (June through October 2018) and seeking repossession of the property. In the District Court, Pettiford moved to dismiss the complaint because Next Generation did not have a Baltimore City use and occupancy permit for the property following receipt of a violation notice from Baltimore City. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss. Pettiford attempted to assert defenses to summary ejectment, including breach of the implied warranty of habitability and a request for rent escrow.

The District Court stated that, if the property was uninhabitable, Pettiford would not be permitted to stay in the property, “[s]o, she’ll be out by midnight tonight if she wants to claim it’s uninhabitable.” Pettiford’s counsel responded that, in “that case[,] we cannot.” The District Court addressed the amount of rent still owed and sent the parties to the hallway to discuss a possible resolution of the case. The parties returned to the courtroom having not arrived at a resolution, and the District Court stated that the trial would proceed. Next Generation’s agent stated that the parties could not reach an agreement due to an issue with heat in the property. Pettiford’s counsel confirmed, stating that Pettiford was seeking the right to rent escrow based on a lack of heat in the property that Pettiford had notified Next Generation about approximately nine months earlier.

Pettiford addressed the District Court and confirmed that the furnace in the property was not working and she did not have heat, and that she had told an agent of Next Generation about the issue. The District Court stated that the complaint alleged rent owed for June through October, when Pettiford “wouldn’t have needed heat[,]” so Pettiford could “open [an] escrow for November[, b]ut [Next Generation was] not asking for November[,]” and Pettiford could “go to the [C]lerk’s [O]ffice and open that for November.” The District Court next addressed the amount owed by Pettiford, who acknowledged owing rent for certain months. The District Court asked whether Pettiford “just said she owes July, August, September[,] and October that she didn’t pay it, correct?” Pettiford responded: “Mmm-hmm.” Immediately thereafter, the District Court stated: “Okay, then we’ll do a consent judg[]ment[,]” and Next Generation’s agent thanked the court. The District Court thanked the parties “for working it out” and wished them good luck.

Pettiford’s counsel thanked the court. The District Court modified the amount of the judgment to be consistent with the amount sought in the complaint, less a partial payment, stating an amount, and Next Generation’s agent stated “[r]ight.” Pettiford’s counsel and Next Generation’s agent thanked the court and the proceeding concluded. Pettiford appealed on the record to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which affirmed the District Court’s judgment. Pettiford filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.

Against this backdrop, we decide whether the District Court properly denied the motion to dismiss. We decide whether the judgment entered by the District Court was a consent judgment and whether Pettiford failed to preserve an issue as to the judgment by not objecting to its entry. We also decide whether the District Court properly considered -2- Pettiford’s defenses under the implied warranty of habitability and rent escrow statutes. We conclude that the motion to dismiss was properly denied.

We hold that the judgment entered by the District Court was not a consent judgment, and, as such, Pettiford was not required to object to its entry to preserve for appellate review issues concerning the judgment and merits of the case, but rather could simply appeal, as she did. The judgment entered by the District Court was not a consent judgment because there was no agreement between the parties as to resolution of the issues in the case, no agreement was presented by the parties to the District Court, there was no consideration, and neither Pettiford nor her counsel consented to the so-called consent judgment. We also hold that the District Court improperly precluded Pettiford from asserting and litigating defenses under the implied warranty of habitability and the rent escrow statutes, and that Pettiford was statutorily entitled to raise such defenses during the summary ejectment proceeding and to have them fully considered. As such, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand the case to that court with instructions to vacate the District Court’s judgment and to remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND Pettiford rents real property from Next Generation located on North Potomac Street in Baltimore City pursuant to a written lease agreement. District Court Proceedings On or about November 13, 2018, Next Generation filed in the District Court a form complaint entitled “Failure to Pay Rent - Landlord’s Complaint for Repossession of Rented Property [RP] §[ ]8-401.” (Bolding and some capitalization omitted). In the complaint, -3- Next Generation alleged that Pettiford had not paid rent for five months—June, July, August, September, and October of 2018—and owed $5,339.64 in rental payments and late charges. In the complaint, Next Generation checked boxes next to “Yes” indicating that it, as the landlord, was “required by law to be licensed/registered to operate th[e] premises as a rental property” and that it was “currently licensed/registered[.]” Next Generation provided its license/registration number and stated that it had a valid inspection certificate from the Maryland Department of the Environment for the property.

On November 19, 2018, the parties appeared before the District Court. At that time, Pettiford’s counsel advised that Pettiford had made a payment of $540 to Next Generation. Pettiford’s counsel stated that Pettiford disputed the amount owed, though, and that she was attempting to file a preliminary motion to dismiss based on Next Generation’s failure to obtain a use and occupancy permit following receipt of a violation notice from Baltimore City. The District Court stated that, if the property was not supposed to be occupied, a person would not be permitted to stay in the property, and Pettiford would need to leave.

Pettiford’s counsel provided the District Court with a notice for abatement that Baltimore City issued on November 13, 2018.1 Next Generation’s agent stated that Next Generation had not received the notice. The District Court observed that Next Generation had a registration number for the property from Baltimore City, and appeared to suggest that the lack of a use and occupancy permit would not be a defense if it were based on a mere 1 The notice stated that Baltimore City’s Environmental Control Board was assessing a fine in the amount of $900 against Next Generation for failure to abate an unsafe structure notice that had been issued for the property. -4- technicality or issue with Baltimore City. The District Court stated that it could conduct a hearing, allow a short postponement, or dismiss the matter. Although Next Generation’s agent stated that she wanted the District Court to conduct a hearing, the District Court postponed the case to November 30, 2018 to allow the parties to investigate the use and occupancy permit issue.

Pettiford’s counsel stated that Pettiford also had a rent escrow defense, and the District Court stated that that would need to be argued at the hearing. On November 30, 2018, the parties appeared again before the District Court. Next Generation’s agent stated that the remaining balance owed was $4,799.64. Pettiford’s counsel stated that she had a preliminary motion to dismiss based on Next Generation’s failure to abate a violation notice and obtain a use and occupancy permit.

At that point, the District Court asked Pettiford’s counsel if Pettiford wanted to leave the property, and Pettiford’s counsel responded: “[N]o[.]” The District Court asked: “She wants to stay in what you’re claiming is an unsafe property? . . . I can’t let her do that.” According to the District Court, the relevant statute stated that it needed to consider only whether Next Generation had filled out items two and three of the form complaint, concerning whether a landlord was licensed/registered to operate the premises as a rental property and whether, if required, there was a valid inspection certificate from the Maryland Department of the Environment for the property. Pettiford’s counsel disagreed, contending that Next Generation was also required to obtain a use and occupancy permit to rent the property. Next Generation’s agent stated that she had spoken with “Code Enforcement” and had been advised that, to file for a use and occupancy permit, Next Generation needed to pay $73.

The District Court stated “this is a revenue[-]enhancing bill for [Baltimore] City[,]” and -5- denied the motion to dismiss. Pettiford’s counsel stated that Pettiford was asserting a defense based on the warranty of habitability, including a request for rent escrow. The District Court immediately responded: “Well[,] if it’s uninhabitable[,] I’m not going to let her stay in it . . . [bec]ause[,] if something happens to her[,] and you’ve told me it’s uninhabitable[,] it’s on me. So, she’ll be out by midnight tonight if she wants to claim it’s uninhabitable.” Pettiford’s counsel stated that, in “that case[,] we cannot.” Next Generation’s agent asserted that the property had been renovated before Pettiford moved in, and claimed that Pettiford was asserting such a defense only because Next Generation had filed the complaint.

The District Court noted that it had denied the motion to dismiss, and turned to the amount still owed. Next Generation’s agent stated that Pettiford had paid $540. Pettiford’s counsel requested to see a ledger, and the District Court sent the parties into the hallway to take a look at the ledger and discuss a possible resolution. The parties returned to the courtroom and advised that they had not arrived at a resolution.

The District Court stated that the trial would proceed. At that time, Next Generation’s agent stated that the parties could not reach an agreement due to an issue with heat in the property. The District Court asked: “Well[,] this isn’t an escrow case, right?” Pettiford’s counsel responded that Pettiford was raising a rent escrow defense based on a heat issue in the property that Pettiford told Next Generation about in “February [2018] and months between[,]” and that Pettiford had not had working heat in the property since February and that, to date, she still did not have heat. Pettiford addressed the District Court and stated that the pipes in the property had been replaced, and that she had hot water, but -6- that the furnace was not working, and that Next Generation had not sent someone to light the furnace.

Pettiford stated that she had been in contact with an individual at Next Generation about the fact that maintenance personnel had not come out to light the furnace. The District Court asked: “[S]o[,] this is only for June, July, August, September[,] and October? . . . When you wouldn’t have needed heat. . . . So, you can open your escrow for November[, b]ut they’re not asking for November.” The District Court reiterated that Pettiford could “go to the [C]lerk’s [O]ffice and open that for November.” The District Court addressed the amount owed by Pettiford, and the following exchange occurred: COURT: So, does she agree that she owes [$4,799.64] then for June, July, August, September[,] and October? [] PETTIFORD: No. COURT: You’ve [] paid June, July, August, September[,] and October’s rent? [] PETTIFORD: I just made a payment on November the 15th[,] so that was the rest of June’s.

So, I owe for July, August, September[,] and October. COURT: Do you have a payment for June? [PETTIFORD’S COUNSEL]: Not for June, no. [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: No, she made -- [] PETTIFORD: It was made on November the 15th[,] so that’s the rest of June’s payment. So, I owe for July, August, September, [and] October. [PETTIFORD’S COUNSEL]: She paid [$540]. [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: Okay, so she’s[] just backdating it? [PETTIFORD’S COUNSEL]: So, . . . from July, August, September -- -7- [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: Okay, well – COURT: So, she agrees to [$1,200] times [4,] which is [$4,800,] and then[,] what is your late fee? [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: Our late fee is [$60]. COURT: So, [$240] late fee, so[,] she agrees to [$5,040,] and we’ll cross June off[.

D]o you consent to that? [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: Yes. COURT: She just said she owes July, August, September[,] and October that she didn’t pay it, correct? [] PETTIFORD: Mmm-hmm. COURT: Okay, then we’ll do a consent judg[]ment in the amount of [$5,040]. [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: Thank you, Your Honor. COURT: Thanks for working it out.

Good luck. [PETTIFORD’S COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor. COURT: Oh wait, hold on. That’s actually more than what you amended -- [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: Right, right. COURT: Your complaint is.

So, we’ll just, the max that we can give you is what you asked for. [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: Okay. COURT: Which -- [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: The [$4,700]. COURT: [$4,799.64]. [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: Right. -8- [PETTIFORD’S COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor. [NEXT GENERATION’S AGENT]: Thank you, Your Honor. The “DISPOSITION” portion of the form complaint indicated that the District Court entered “[j]udgment in favor of Landlord for possession of the premises and costs” and rent due and unpaid in the amount of $4,799.64.

The “DISPOSITION” portion also included boxes next to options as to the type of judgment—default, trial, consent, and/or without the right of redemption—and the box next to “[c]onsent” was checked. Pettiford filed a notice of an on-the-record appeal and a “Motion to Note Record Appeal, Set Appeal Bond[,] and Stay [] Execution of Judgment Pending Ruling.” (Some capitalization omitted). In the motion, Pettiford requested that the appeal bond be set in an amount no greater than $4,799.64, the amount of rent and late fees that the District Court ruled was owed. Pettiford also requested that the November 30, 2018 judgment for possession be stayed pending a ruling on the motion and the opportunity for Pettiford to pay the appeal bond.

On December 10, 2018, the District Court issued an order stating that the appeal would proceed on the record, setting the appeal bond in the amount of $4,799.64, and staying execution of the judgment of possession until December 24, 2018, to provide Pettiford an opportunity to pay the appeal bond. Circuit Court Proceedings On April 15, 2019, the circuit court conducted a hearing and held the matter under advisement. On April 18, 2019, the circuit court issued an order affirming the District Court’s judgment and an accompanying memorandum opinion. In the memorandum -9- opinion, the circuit court concluded that the District Court properly entered a consent judgment, and that Pettiford was required to object to the entry of the judgment to preserve the issue for appellate review.

The circuit court also determined that Pettiford was required to object to the District Court’s decision to preclude the breach of the warranty of habitability defense. Proceedings in This Court On May 23, 2019, Pettiford petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following three issues: 1. Did the District Court err by failing to dismiss [Next Generation]’s summary ejectment complaint when [Next Generation] had not obtained, prior to renting the property to [Pettiford], a permit required by law for the property to be occupied? 2. Did the District Court err when it effectively denied [Pettiford] the opportunity to assert a warranty of habitability defense and denied [Pettiford]’s attempted rent escrow defense? 3.

Did the [c]ircuit [c]ourt erroneously affirm the District Court’s entry of a consent judgment after [Pettiford] raised multiple defenses, had not come to any agreement with [Next Generation], and neither party had requested entry of a consent judgment? On August 26, 2019, this Court granted the petition. See Pettiford v. Next Generation Trust Serv., 465 Md. 665 , 214 A.3d 1195 (2019). On December 9, 2019, this Court heard oral argument.

At oral argument, the parties addressed whether the holding in McDaniel v. Baranowski, 419 Md. 560, 563 , 19 A.3d 927, 929 (2011) applies to Baltimore City use and occupancy permits, i.e., whether a rental property owner is required to have a use and occupancy permit, when required, to initiate a summary ejectment proceeding. On December 13, 2019, this Court issued an order - 10 - inviting the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and the Maryland Multi-Housing Association, Inc. to file amicus briefs “on the question of whether the Court’s holding in McDaniel [] should be extended to [use and] occupancy permits required by Baltimore City[.]”2 According to the order, any amicus briefs were due by January 27, 2020, and any responses to the amicus briefs were due by February 18, 2020. On January 24, 2020, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore filed an amicus brief, arguing that the holding in McDaniel applies to Baltimore City use and occupancy permits, as well as Baltimore City’s new rental property licensing scheme, which became effective on January 1, 2019, after the proceedings in the District Court in this case. On January 27, 2020, the Maryland Multi-Housing Association, Inc. filed an amicus brief, arguing that the new Baltimore City rental property licensing scheme renders moot any need to expand McDaniel, and that, in any event, extending the holding in McDaniel to Baltimore City use and occupancy permits is both impracticable and redundant in light of the new licensing requirement.

On February 18, 2020, Pettiford filed a reply to the amicus briefs, contending that extending McDaniel to Baltimore City use and occupancy permits is not moot under the circumstances of this case, and that a landlord should have to plead and demonstrate a valid use and occupancy permit where required. STANDARD OF REVIEW Maryland Rule 8-131(c) governs review of a bench trial and provides: When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review 2 At the time, the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. had filed the only amicus brief in this case, contending that this Court’s holding in McDaniel applies to Baltimore City use and occupancy permits. - 11 - the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In Estate of Zimmerman v. Blatter, 458 Md. 698, 717-18 , 183 A.3d 223, 235 (2018), “we explained the standard of review applicable under Maryland Rule 8-131(c)[,]” stating: We give due regard to the trial court’s role as fact-finder, and will not set aside factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.

The appellate court must consider evidence that is produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, and, if substantial evidence was presented to support the trial court’s determination, it is not clearly erroneous, and cannot be disturbed. Questions of law, however, require our non-deferential review. When the trial court’s decision involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, this Court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are legally correct. Where a case involves both issues of fact and questions of law, this Court will apply the appropriate standard to each issue.

(Cleaned up). DISCUSSION I. In the District Court, Pettiford moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Next Generation did not have a Baltimore City use and occupancy permit for the property following receipt of a violation notice from Baltimore City. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss. In this Court, Pettiford raised an issue concerning whether the holding in McDaniel, 419 Md. at 563 , 19 A.3d at 929 , applied to Baltimore City use and occupancy permits at the time that Next Generation initiated the summary ejectment proceeding.

We conclude that, under this case’s circumstances, the holding in McDaniel did not apply when Next Generation filed the summary ejectment action in November 2018. - 12 - In McDaniel, id. at 563 , 19 A.3d at 929 , this Court held “that a rental property owner who does not possess a current license to operate the premises[] is not entitled to utilize the summary ejectment procedures outlined in [RP §] 8-401 [] upon a tenant’s failure to pay rent, if the dwelling is located in a jurisdiction that requires owners to obtain such licenses.” In that case, concerning the rental of an apartment in a multiple dwelling unit in Anne Arundel County, the Anne Arundel County Code provided that a person could not operate a multiple dwelling unit without a license from the Department of Inspections and Permits, and that a separate license was required for each multiple dwelling unit. See id. at 564, 19 A.3d at 929 . The license could not be issued without the approval of the Health Officer, who was to approve issuance of a license if inspection revealed compliance with the requirements of the Anne Arundel County Code, including that the dwelling was clean, sanitary, fit for human occupancy, and in compliance with the Code and other applicable State and county laws. See id. at 564-65 , 19 A.3d at 929-30 .

We concluded that “[l]icensure under local ordinances in order to operate rental dwelling units is an integral part of a landlord’s status as claimant in those jurisdictions that require licensure.” Id. at 587 , 19 A.3d at 943 . As such, we held that, to invoke the summary ejectment process, “a landlord in those jurisdictions requiring licensure[] must affirmatively plead and demonstrate that he [or she] is licensed at the time of the filing of the complaint for summary ejectment in order to initiate the summary ejectment process.” Id. at 587 , 19 A.3d at 943 . At the time of the underlying proceedings in this case, Baltimore City required rental properties to be registered as rental properties, but did not require that rental properties be - 13 - licensed. On August 1, 2018, a new Baltimore City ordinance became effective, requiring that all Baltimore City rental properties, including one- and multi-family dwellings, be registered, inspected, and licensed to operate as rentals by January 1, 2019.

See Baltimore City Code (2020) (“BCC”), Art. 13, §§ 5-1 to 5-26, available at https://ca.baltimorecity. gov/codes/Art%2013%20-%20Housing.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE2N-PUGF]. Under the new rental licensing scheme in Baltimore City, to receive or renew a rental license, a landlord must have a valid use and occupancy permit, where such a permit is required. See BCC, Art. 13, § 5-6(6); Baltimore City Department of Legislative Reference, Building, Fire, and Related Codes of Baltimore City (2018) (“BFRC”) §§ 111.5, 116.2(2)(b), 116.5.4(2), available at https://ca.baltimorecity.gov/codes/Art%2000%20%20Bldg,% 20Fire.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y22N-LD84]. Thus, a question arose as to whether the holding in McDaniel applied to Baltimore City use and occupancy permits at the time that Next Generation began the summary ejectment process, i.e., whether prior to January 1, 2019, Next Generation was required to have a valid use and occupancy permit to avail itself of the summary ejectment process.

We conclude that the holding in McDaniel did not extend to Baltimore City use and occupancy permits at the time that Next Generation initiated the summary ejectment proceeding in this case. At the risk of stating the obvious, a use and occupancy permit was not required for a property to be registered as a rental property in Baltimore City. A “use and occupancy permit” is a permit that signifies compliance with the Baltimore City Code and related laws and indicates the Building Official’s approval to occupy a structure for the authorized use. See BFRC § 202.2.45.

A use and occupancy permit may be issued after inspection where - 14 - no violations of the code or other laws exists, and must include, among other things, a statement that the described portion of the structure has been inspected for compliance with the requirements of the code for the occupancy and use for which the proposed occupancy is classified. See BFRC §§ 1-102, 111.2; International Building Code (2015) § 111.2, available at https://codes.iccsafe.org/content/IBC2015/chapter-1-scope-and-admin istration#IBC2015_Ch01_SubCh02 [https://perma.cc/DD5P-GFLY]. A use and occupancy permit concerns matters broader than the issue of habitability or whether a property is suitable for rent. And, prior to the new ordinance requiring a use and occupancy permit as part of the rental licensing process, a use and occupancy permit was not expressly linked to a landlord’s ability to rent a property.

The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore point out in its amicus brief that a use and occupancy permit is not issued as a matter of routine. As the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore observe, an occupancy permit is required for newly constructed or renovated rental properties and in certain other circumstances as well. For example, if a structure is vacated or vacant, it may not be reoccupied until it is satisfactorily rehabilitated and a use and occupancy permit is issued. See BFRC §§ 116.2, 116.4.3(5).

If a structure is found to be unsafe or unfit for human habitation or other authorized use, it must be rehabilitated, the violation notice or order must be abated, and a use and occupancy permit must be obtained before it may be reoccupied. See BFRC §§ 116.2, 116.5.4. Given that use and occupancy permits were not required under the rental property registration process that existed prior to the new rental licensing scheme and are not routinely required for all properties in Baltimore City, though, we decline to apply the holding in McDaniel to - 15 - require that Next Generation needed to have a use and occupancy permit before initiating the summary ejectment proceeding in November 2018. Under the current rental licensing scheme, the situation is different.

It is clear that the holding in McDaniel would apply to the need to have a Baltimore City rental license before initiating a summary ejectment proceeding. From our perspective, to avail itself of the summary ejectment process now, a Baltimore City landlord must affirmatively plead and demonstrate in a complaint that the landlord possesses a license to operate the premises. Thus, on remand, Next Generation must satisfy Baltimore City’s new licensing requirement and have a valid rental license, before being permitted to move forward with a summary ejectment proceeding. To be clear, we are not herein extending McDaniel to apply to use and occupancy permits.

There is no need in this case to extend McDaniel because, following the adoption of the new licensing scheme, McDaniel applies. We simply state that, in accord with McDaniel, on remand, the landlord must affirmatively plead and demonstrate that the landlord possesses a valid rental license in accord with the requirements of BCC, Art. 13, §§ 5-1 to 5-26.

II

The Parties’ Contentions Pettiford contends that the District Court erred in entering a consent judgment where the parties did not enter into a proposed agreement and did not request entry of a consent judgment. Pettiford asserts that the judgment entered in this case was not a consent judgment because it was initiated by the District Court, not the parties, after—not before— trial, without any indication of an agreement, settlement, or consideration, and without - 16 - benefit to her or her affirmative consent to entry of judgment. Pettiford maintains that, at trial, she simply testified that she had not paid certain months of rent, and the District Court seized on that to enter a consent judgment. Pettiford contends that, after judgment had been rendered and the matter concluded, her counsel’s “thank you” was merely a customary civility, not consent to the judgment.

Pettiford argues that, other than acknowledging at trial that she did not pay rent for certain months with an “Mmm-hmm,” there was no inquiry into her understanding or acceptance of an agreement or judgment. Next Generation responds that the circuit court did not err in finding that Pettiford failed to preserve an argument that she did not enter into a consent judgment. Next Generation contends that, ordinarily, no appeal will lie from a consent judgment, and that, here, the record is devoid of an objection to the entering of the judgment in the District Court. Next Generation argues that, to preserve an issue for appeal as to the judgment, Pettiford was required to contest or object to the entry of the judgment, and this Court should not exercise its discretion to review the consent judgment.

Next Generation asserts that the judgment entered in this case was a consent judgment because Pettiford acknowledged owing rent, there was an exchange with both parties, and the District Court confirmed that consent had been reached. Next Generation maintains that Pettiford admitted liability and agreed to the consent judgment. Law Maryland Rule 3-612 governs consent judgments in the District Court and provides: “The court may enter a judgment at any time by consent of the parties.” “Consent judgments or decrees are essentially agreements entered into by the parties which must be - 17 - endorsed by the court. They have attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees.” Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md. 470, 478 , 610 A.2d 770, 774 (1992) (citation omitted).

A consent judgment is like any other judgment, with the “distinction [] that it is a judgment that a court enters at the request of the parties.” Jones v. Hubbard, 356 Md. 513, 528 , 740 A.2d 1004, 1013 (1999). Stated otherwise, “[a] consent judgment or consent order is an agreement of the parties with respect to the resolution of the issues in the case or in settlement of the case, that has been embodied in a court order and entered by the court, thus evidencing its acceptance by the court.” Long v. State, 371 Md. 72, 82 , 807 A.2d 1, 6 (2002) (cleaned up). A consent judgment “memorializes the parties’ agreement to relinquish the right to litigate the controversy,” thereby saving the parties “the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation.” Kent Island, LLC v. DiNapoli, 430 Md. 348, 360 , 61 A.3d 21, 28 (2013) (cleaned up). In Long, 371 Md. at 82-83 , 807 A.2d at 7 , we explained that a consent judgment embodies the parties’ agreement and, therefore, is “in some respects [] contractual in nature[, b]ut it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.” (Cleaned up).

As to the contractual nature of a consent judgment, we observed that a “consent judgment memorializes the agreement of the parties, pursuant to which they have relinquished the right to litigate the controversy in exchange for a certain outcome and/or, perhaps, expedience.” Id. at 83 , 807 A.2d at 7 . Indeed, a consent judgment is “entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on the[] precise terms.” Id. at 83 , 807 A.2d at 7 (citation omitted). Because a - 18 - consent judgment embodies the parties’ agreement, it is that “agreement that defines the scope of the decree[,]” meaning that, where an issue as to the scope of the judgment arises, a court looks to the parties’ agreement and applies the rules of contract interpretation. Id. at 83-84 , 807 A.2d at 7-8 .

Moreover, for a contract to be binding on the parties, “it must be supported by consideration[,]” which “necessitates that a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.” Chernick, 327 Md. at 479 , 610 A.2d at 774 (cleaned up). “A performance is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his [or her] promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.” Id. at 480 , 610 A.2d at 774 (cleaned up). “[O]rdinarily, a party may not appeal from a judgment to which [the party] consented[.]” Bryant v. Howard Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Costley, 387 Md. 30, 42 , 874 A.2d 457, 463 (2005) (citations omitted); see also Chernick, 327 Md. at 477 n.1, 610 A.2d at 773 n.1 (“[G]enerally[,] no appeal will lie from a consent judgment.” (Citation omitted)). “This is so because entry of a judgment by consent implies that the terms and conditions have been agreed upon and that the parties have consented to its entry.” Long, 371 Md. at 86 , 807 A.2d at 9 (cleaned up).

Nevertheless, [a]n appeal will lie from a court’s decision to grant or refuse to vacate a “consent judgment” where it was contended below that the “consent judgment” was not, in fact, a consent judgment because the consent was coerced, the judgment exceeded the scope of consent, or for other reasons there was never any valid consent. Chernick, 327 Md. at 477 n.1, 610 A.2d at 773 n.1 (citations omitted). In Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md. App. 359, 359-60 , 370 A.2d 577, 578 (1977), the Court of Special Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion in denying a petition to set - 19 - aside a purported consent decree. The parties entered into a contract for the sale of land, with the appellant, the seller of the land, agreeing to construct a house.

See id. at 360 , 370 A.2d at 578 . Issues arose concerning the completion and possession of the house, and the appellees filed a complaint for specific performance. See id. at 360 , 370 A.2d at 578 . The case was set for trial, and, when the case was called that day, the parties’ attorneys requested a settlement-type conference in the judge’s chambers.

See id. at 360 , 370 A.2d at 578 . The attorneys conferred with their respective clients, and the appellant expressed reservations about the settlement. See id. at 360 , 370 A.2d at 578 . The appellant and his attorney met with the appellees’ attorney before the attorneys met with the trial court to advise that a settlement had been reached.

See id. at 360 , 370 A.2d at 578-79 . The trial court requested that a consent decree be prepared and presented to the court. See id. at 360 , 370 A.2d at 579 . A few hours later, the appellant told his attorney that he would not agree to a consent decree, and the appellant’s attorney met with the trial court to advise as much.

See id. at 360-61 , 370 A.2d at 579 . The trial court stated that the matter was settled and that it would sign the consent decree when it was presented. See id. at 361 , 370 A.2d at 579 . A few days later, the trial court signed the purported consent decree.

See id. at 361 , 370 A.2d at 579 . The appellant filed a motion to set aside the purported consent decree, which the trial court denied, and the trial court granted a petition to enforce the purported consent decree. See id. at 359-60 , 370 A.2d at 578 . The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the purported consent decree because the trial court knew “at the time of the entry of the decree [] that the appellant did not so consent.” Id. at 362 , - 20 - 370 A.2d at 579 (footnote omitted).

The Court of Special Appeals explained: [Al]though the appellant orally agreed to a settlement agreement, it is obvious that he withdrew that consent before the final meeting with the trial [court]. It is also apparent that both the trial [court] and the appellees had full knowledge that the appellant was not consenting to the decree [three] days before it was signed. Id. at 362 , 370 A.2d at 579 . The Court of Special Appeals also held that “entry of a judgment by consent implies that the terms and conditions have been agreed upon and consent thereto given in open court or by filed stipulation.” Id. at 363 , 370 A.2d at 580 .

In that case, although the trial court determined that both parties had agreed to the terms of the settlement, “it [wa]s obvious there was no consent thereto in open court[,] nor was there a written stipulation filed in court.” Id. at 363 , 370 A.2d at 580 . In Long, 371 Md. at 77 , 807 A.2d at 3-4 , this Court held that the Court of Special Appeals erred in entering a modified consent order instead of a consent order submitted by the parties. In the Court of Special Appeals, the parties filed a joint motion to vacate sentence and proposed consent order, embodying their resolution of a civil contempt matter, whereby the petitioner’s sentence would have been vacated and his immediate release from incarceration ordered. See id. at 88 , 807 A.2d at 10 .

Rather than entering the proposed order, though, the Court of Special Appeals modified it by vacating the petitioner’s sentence and, instead of ordering the petitioner’s immediate release, remanding the case for further civil contempt proceedings and a pretrial determination of the petitioner’s eligibility for release. See id. at 88-89 , 807 A.2d at 10 . In our view, the motion to vacate sentence and proposed order “constituted [a] consent judgment which the[ parties] requested the Court of Special Appeals to enter.” Id. - 21 - at 88, 807 A.2d at 10 . We determined that the Court of Special Appeals erred in entering the modified consent order instead of “the proposed consent order jointly submitted by the parties.” Id. at 89 , 807 A.2d at 11 .

We explained: The modified order materially altered the agreement reached by the parties: by ordering a remand for further proceedings and a pretrial release determination, it is totally inconsistent with their agreement that the petitioner be released immediately from incarceration. Thus, as the parties correctly point out, by entering the modified consent order[,] the intermediate appellate court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the parties, and, in the process, undermined the settlement agreement at issue, and consent judgments in general, contrary to the State’s longstanding policy of encouraging settlements. . . . That action also deprived both of them of the benefit of their bargain and the petitioner of the alternative right to litigate the dispute. Id. at 89 , 807 A.2d at 11 (footnote omitted).

Similarly, in Smith v. Luber, 165 Md. App. 458, 479 , 885 A.2d 894, 906 (2005), the Court of Special Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion in entering a purported consent order that modified the agreement reached by the parties in open court. At trial, the parties reached agreements as to various issues in the case that would end the litigation, and those agreements were placed on the record in open court. See id. at 465 , 885 A.2d at 898 . “Both parties were asked qualifying questions by their attorneys about their acceptance of the agreement on the record[,] and both acknowledged their acceptance.” Id. at 465 , 885 A.2d at 898 . The trial court requested that the parties reduce their agreement to writing, and the parties engaged in some back and forth about a draft consent agreement.

See id. at 465-66 , 885 A.2d at 898-99 . After many months, the appellant’s attorney advised the trial court that it objected to the proposed consent order submitted by the appellee because it failed to accurately reflect the parties’ agreement. See - 22 - id. at 466 , 885 A.2d at 899 . The trial court ultimately executed a purported consent order.

See id. at 466 , 885 A.2d at 899 . The appellant filed a motion to vacate or to alter, amend, or revise the order, which the trial court denied, ruling that the executed order accurately reflected the parties’ agreement. See id. at 466 , 885 A.2d at 899 . The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the order, explaining: The parties entered into a valid consent settlement agreement on the record in open court, but refused to consent to the agreement as written.

The [trial] court, after months of wrangling between the parties, entered an Order that modified the agreement of the parties as entered on the record. Upon our examination of the Order and the record, we have concluded that several provisions of the [trial] court’s Order fail[] to accurately reflect the agreement of the parties entered on the record. Thus, the [trial] court’s Order, as entered, modified the parties’ agreement and altered the rights of the parties under the agreement. A consent decree implies that the parties have consented to the agreement.

In this case, it was clear to both the parties and the [trial] court that there was no consent to the terms of the written agreement. Therefore, we hold it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter the Order . . . , and we remand this case to the trial court to revise the agreement