Phinney v. Trustees of the Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hospital

McSherry, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Having decided in the preceding case that no trust was, or was intended to be, created by the residuary clause of Mr. Pratt’s will, it remains for us now to consider the contention of the alternative residuary legatees and devisees. This contention is that the Act of Assembly of 1898, ch. if, changing the name of the Sheppard Asylum to the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital is unconstitutional and void; that consequently the condition upon the happening of which the property disposed of by the residuary clause was to vest in the Sheppard Asylum, did not come to pass, and that therefore the alternative legacy and devise in the same clause took effect and the estate devolved upon these legatees and devisees, the appellants in this case. It is insisted that this statute is invalid because, first, it violates sec. 29, Art 3, of the Constitution of Maryland; and because, secondly, it conflicts with sec. 10, Art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States.

The title of the Act of 1898, ch. if, is in these words: “ An Act to change the name of The Trustees of the Sheppard Asylum, incorporated by the General Assembly of Maryland by the Act of 1853, ch. 274, as amended by the Act of 1886, ch. 9.” There are two enacting sections preceded by a brief preamble. The preamble recites the original incorporation. It then alludes to the great interest which Mr. Pratt manifested in the management of the institution, and declares that the purpose of the statute is to carry out the suggestion contained in his will with reference to a change of the name of the body corporate. Then follows section one containing the effective, affirmative enactment changing the original name of “ The Trustees of the Sheppard Asylum ” to “ The Trustees of the Sheppard and Enoch ⁶³⁶ Pratt Hospital,” and prescribing that the corporation by the new name shall hold all the property, enjoy all the rights and possess all the powers and functions which were possessed by or conferred upon it under its former name, “ and shall hold in like manner all property and estate which it shall acquire by will or otherwise under said change of title hereby made.” Then comes section two providing that the Act shall take effect from the date of its passage.

The provision of the State Constitution which is relied on to defeat the enactment is in these words: “And every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title,” This section has been before this Court a great number of times. It has been invariably held to mean that the title shall sufficiently describe the subject of the legislation, but that it need not give an abstract of the contents of the Act. The primary object of the provision undoubtedly is to exclude all foreign, irrelevant or discordant matter from a statute and to confine the statute to the single subject disclosed in the title. Davis v. The State, 7 Md. 151 ; Mayor &c. v. Reitz, 50 Md. 579 ; State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91 ; Trustees &c. v. Manning, 72 Md. 133 ; Scarf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378 .

A casual glance at the body of the Act under consideration will reveal its absolute and exact accordance with the title. It is true there are certain recitals in the preamble, but strictly speaking the preamble is no part of the statute, though it may be resorted to in explanation of the enacting clauses whenever the meaning- of the latter is doubtful. Lucas et al. v. McBlair et al., 12 G. & J. 17-18. But a preamble contains no legislation and therefore no matter what its statements may be they are not parts of the subject enacted into law.

The enacting clause follows but does not precede the preamble, and whilst the latter may disclose the reasons that induced the Legislature to adopt the Act, it obviously forms no part of that which is enacted. Even if it should be out of harmony with the body of the Act, forming, as it does, no part of the statute, the statute cannot be said to con ⁶³⁷ tain foreign and discordant matter not disclosed in the title. But we do not regard the recitals, even if they formed part of the statute, as at variance -with the subject named in the title, because at most, as already remarked, they simply state the reasons that influenced the action of the Legislature. Nor are the clauses which are contained in the body of the statute and which declare that the corporation by the new name shall hold all the property and enjoy all the rights and possess all the powers which were possessed by or conferred upon it under its original name, such foreign and discordant matter as to expose the Act to the criticism that it contains provisions not disclosed in its title.

These clauses add nothing to the powers formerly possessed and are merely declaratory of a result that would have followed a change in the name though they had been wholly omitted from the Act; because under its new name all of the original rights, privileges and liabilities would have remained unaffected by the change of its name. 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. (2nd Ed.) 686. The identity of the corporation ■was not altered — it continued to be, under the new name, precisely the same corporate body that it formerly was, with exactly the same and no greater