Phipps v. General Motors Corp.

Eldridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We are here presented with two questions of law certified to this Court by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code (1974), § 12-601 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The plaintiff, James D. Phipps, an employee in the service department of Marbert Motors, Inc., of Annapolis, Maryland, was injured on November 1, 1972, when a 1972 ³³⁹ Pontiac automobile which had been delivered to Marbert for servicing, and which Phipps was test driving in Annapolis, left the highway and crashed into a tree. A co-worker, Alexander F. Barchanowicz, who was a passenger in the automobile, was also injured.

James Phipps and his wife, Evalyn Phipps, instituted this action on October 31, 1975, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the manufacturer of the automobile, General Motors Corporation. They alleged that the accident occurred when the accelerator of the automobile became stuck without warning, causing the automobile to accelerate suddenly at a high rate of speed and leave the road. It was further alleged that this malfunction of the automobile was caused by latent defects in the automobile’s accelerator mechanism, in the carburetor and its components, and in the motor mounts. The complaint contains six counts.

In the first three counts, three separate causes of action are set forth. Count one alleges negligence in the design and manufacture of the automobile. Count two alleges breach of express and implied warranties. Count three alleges that the automobile was in a defective condition rendering it “not reasonably safe” when it left the control of the defendant and predicates liability upon the theory of strict liability in tort. 1 The final three counts of the complaint, in which James Phipps was joined by his wife, are each based upon the above theories respectively and seek damages for loss of consortium.

General Motors filed an answer to the complaint and also filed motions to dismiss both counts based upon the theory of strict liability in tort and the count seeking damages for loss of consortium caused by the alleged breach of warranty. In support of its motion to dismiss the strict liability counts, General Motors relied upon several prior cases of this Court which had declined, under the circumstances involved, to adopt the theory of strict liability in tort. General Motors argued that no such cause of action is recognized in this ³⁴⁰ State. As to the loss of consortium count, General Motors relied upon Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95 , 231 A. 2d 514 (1967), in contending that an action for loss of consortium is actually an action for damages to the marriage relationship and not for damages sustained by an individual.

Since a seller’s warranty extends only to a non-purchaser who is a “natural person” and who is “injured in person” under § 2-318 of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code, Maryland Code (1975), § 2-318 of the Commercial Law Article, General Motors argued that no action for loss of consortium could be brought by a non-buyer as the marriage relationship was not a “natural person” who was “injured in person.” Phipps opposed both motions. Citing several trial court opinions, he argued that the. courts of Maryland have recognized the theory of strict liability in cases where it would be applicable. Phipps also argued that a joint action for loss of consortium was proper where one spouse sustains bodily injury. The United States District Court, finding that there were no controlling precedents in the decisions of this Court, certified the following two questions: “1.

Do the third and sixth counts of the Complaint (alleging that the defendant manufactured and placed on the market an automobile in a defective condition which condition rendered the automobile not reasonably safe for its intended use) state causes of action under Maryland law by a person who allegedly sustained bodily injuries by reason of the defective condition? “2. Does the fifth count of the Complaint (alleging injury to a marital relationship by reason of breaches of express and implied warranties) state a cause of action under Maryland law?” (1) The theory of strict liability is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A (1965): ³⁴¹ “Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer “(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. “(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.” As the Official Reporter’s Notes to this section indicate, the rule stated in § 402 A was based upon a developing body of case law expanding the liability of manufacturers for injury caused by defective products. Early cases in several jurisdictions created an exception to the general rule that a supplier of chattels was not liable to a third person in the absence of negligence or privity of contract where food products were involved. Liability was generally premised upon an “implied warranty” which arose from the seller’s representation in placing the food on the market that it was fit for human consumption.

Although employing warranty language, the strict liability theory was essentially an action in tort dispensing with the traditional requirement of privity in contract actions. E.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622 , 135 P. 633 (1918); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876 , 111 So. 305 (1927). Strict liability without privity was slowly extended to products other than food for human consumption, such as animal food, McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Midwest ³⁴² Game Company v. M.F.A. Milling Company, 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959). Products involving intimate bodily use were brought within the strict liability rule, e.g., Graham v. Bottenfield’s Inc., 176 Kan. 68 , 269 P. 2d 413 (1954) (hair dye); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265 , 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958) (permanent wave solution).

Finally, strict liability for defective products other than food or those involving intimate bodily contact was imposed without privity or a showing of negligence beyond the defect in the product. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120 , 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (cinder building blocks); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N. J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 , 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960) (automobile); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57 , 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 377 P. 2d 897 , 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1962) (combination power tool). Greenman was the leading case expressly recognizing that the basis for strict liability for defective products was tort rather than contract.

Justice Traynor there stated for the Supreme Court of California ( 377 P. 2d at 901 ): “Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law (see e.g., Graham v. Bottenfield’s, Inc., 176 Kan. 68 , 269 P.2d 413, 418 ; ...), and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products (Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 , 161 A.2d 69, 84-96 ; . . .) make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly, rules defining and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer’s liability to those injured by their defective products ³⁴³ unless those rales also serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed.” 2 Various justifications for imposing strict liability in tort on manufacturers have been advanced by the courts. It has been said that the cost of injuries caused by defective products should in equity be “borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves” and that “warranties serve this purpose fitfully at best.” Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 377 P. 2d at 901 . It has also been suggested that imposing strict liability on manufacturers for defective products is equitable because it shifts the risk of loss to those better able financially to bear the loss.

Seely v. White Motor Company, 63 Cal. 2d 9 , 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 , 403 P. 2d 145, 151 (1965). Another reason advanced is that a consumer relies upon the seller in expecting that a product is safe for the uses for which it has been marketed, and that this expectation is better fulfilled by the theory of strict liability than traditional negligence or warranty theories. Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Ore. 259 , 509 P. 2d 529, 532-534 (1973).

And still another reason advanced is that the requirement of proof of a defect rendering a product unreasonably dangerous is a sufficient showing of fault on the part of the seller to impose liability without placing an often impossible burden on the plaintiff of proving specific acts of negligence. McCormack v. Hankscraft Company, 278 Minn. 322 , 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (1967); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443 , 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967). 3 ³⁴⁴ The essential elements of an action in strict liability are set forth in § 402 A. For recovery, it must be established that (1) the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause of the injuries, and (4) that the product was expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in its condition. However, in an action founded on strict liability in tort, as opposed to a traditional negligence action, the plaintiff need not prove any specific act of negligence on the part of the seller. The relevant inquiry in a strict liability action focuses not on the conduct of the manufacturer but rather on the product itself.

See Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler, Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 Duquesne L. Rev. 425, 429 (1974). Thus the standard to be applied in determining whether a product is defective becomes critical. For a seller to be liable under § 402 A, the product must be both in a “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous” at the time that it is placed on the market by the seller. Both of these conditions are explained in the official comments in terms of consumer expectations.

As Comment g explains, the requirement of a defective condition limits application of § 402 A to those situations where “the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.” An “unreasonably dangerous” product is defined in Comment i as one which is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.” In those cases where the defect is a result of an error in the manufacturing process, that is where the product is in a condition not intended by the seller, there is less difficulty in applying the defectiveness test of § 402 A. See Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability § 16A[4] at pp. 3-318 — 3-320 (1976). Where, however, the alleged defect is the result of the design process so that the product causing injury was in a ³⁴⁵ condition intended by the manufacturer, the test has proved more difficult to apply. This difficulty has caused some courts and commentators to suggest that the theory of strict liability in tort is not really applicable in cases involving design defects as opposed to construction or manufacturing defects but rather that, analytically, traditional negligence standards still apply. See Dorsey v. Yoder Company, 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F. 2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal.App.3d 633 , 105 Cal.

Rptr. 890, 895 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 836-838 (1973). The reasoning of these authorities is that in a design defect case the standard of defectiveness under § 402 A, involving as it does the element of unreasonable danger, still requires a weighing of the utility of risk inherent in the design against the magnitude of the risk. 4 Cf. Volkswagen of America v. Young, 272 Md. 201 , 321 A. 2d 737 (1974).

However, there are those kinds of conditions which, whether caused by design or manufacture, can never be said to involve a reasonable risk. For example, the steering mechanism of a new automobile should not cause the car to swerve off the road, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra; the drive shaft of a new automobile should not separate from the vehicle when it is driven in a normal manner, Elmore v. American Motors Corporation, 70 Cal. 2d 578 , 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 , 451 P. 2d 84 , 33 A.L.R.3d 406 (1969); the brakes of a new automobile should not suddenly fail, Sharp v. Chrysler Corporation, 432 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.Civ.App. 1968); and the accelerator of a new automobile ³⁴⁶ should not stick without warning, causing the vehicle suddenly to accelerate. Conditions like these, even if resulting from the design of the products, are defective and unreasonably dangerous without the necessity of weighing and balancing the various factors involved.

Under § 402 A, various defenses are still available to the seller in an action based on strict liability in tort. These defenses are set forth and explained in the official comments following § 402 A. For example, the seller is not liable where injury results from abnormal handling or use of the product (Comment h), where mishandling or alteration after delivery of the product renders it unsafe (Comment g), or if warnings or instructions supplied with the product are disregarded by the consumer where, if used in accordance with these warnings, the product would be safe (Comment j). Additionally, where the plaintiff unreasonably proceeds to use a product despite a known risk or danger, the defense of assumption of the risk is still available (Comment n). As to defenses in strict liability actions generally, see Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand.

L. Rev. 93 (1972). This Court has in prior cases, where the question was raised, declined to adopt the strict liability principles of § 402 A, finding that under the facts of those cases § 402 A was not applicable and would have afforded no additional basis of liability. It was therefore deemed inappropriate to adopt the theory of strict liability. A review of those cases, however, demonstrates that this Court has never rejected the strict liability theory of § 402 A as a basis of liability in an appropriate fact situation.

The first case in which this Court was urged to adopt the strict liability theory was Telak v. Maszczenski, 248 Md. 476 , 237 A. 2d 434 (1968). There the plaintiff, a guest at a private swimming pool, was paralyzed when he dove into the pool from a diving board, installed by the owner, and struck his head on the bottom of the pool. In an action against the distributor of the pool, it was alleged that the pool was defective and unreasonably dangerous in that the maximum ³⁴⁷ depth of the pool, seven feet, was insufficient for safe diving. The evidence revealed that the owner had inspected several pools sold by the distributor before purchasing his pool and that the condition of the pool as delivered was exactly as represented by the seller and as observed by the buyer before the purchase.

Relying on Comment g of § 402 A, that the section is applicable only where the product is “in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,” the Court found that the strict liability theory was not applicable. 248 Md. at 488-489 . It should also be noted that the plaintiff was an excellent swimmer, and was familiar with the depth and slope at the pool’s bottom. Id. at 481,484 . Additionally, the diving board was not provided by either the manufacturer or the distributor of the pool, but was procured from another source and installed by the owners.

Id. at 480 . As previously discussed, § 402 A does not apply where subsequent mishandling or alteration render an otherwise safe product unsafe (Comment g), or where one proceeds in the face of a known danger (Comment n). This Court was again urged to adopt strict liability in Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282 , 252 A. 2d 855 (1969). In that case the plaintiff was injured while cutting grass with a power mower when he slipped on an incline and caught his foot under the mower.

An action was brought against both the manufacturer and retailer of the mower, on the basis of negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability for failing to provide protective guards on the mower. This Court upheld the action of the trial court in sustaining a demurrer to all three counts. As to the strict liability count, the Court noted that the absence of a safety guard was apparent to the plaintiff at the time of the purchase, that the mower had presumably functioned safely for more than a year, and that by the plaintiffs own allegations, the injury was caused by his fall and not an unknown defect in the mower. Relying on Comment g, the Court found that § 402 A was not applicable. 253 Md. at 297 .

Another alleged design defect was involved in Volkswagen of America v. Young, supra, 272 Md. 201. In that case, the driver of an automobile was killed when, upon impact with ³⁴⁸ another automobile, the seat in which he was sitting separated from the floor, propelling him into the rear portion of the car. The plaintiff alleged defective design in the seat mechanism and passenger compartment configuration, creating an unreasonable risk of injury. We again declined to adopt strict liability as a theory of liability, reasoning that under the particular facts of that case, strict liability would have “no special meaning.” As previously discussed, in some circumstances the