Pinkney v. State

Orth, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The precise question presented in this case is whether the lower court erred by not applying the proper test as to the sufficiency of the evidence in denying appellant’s motion for a new trial. The question requires consider ²⁸⁶ ation of basic matters with respect to a motion for a new trial by a defendant who stands convicted of a criminal offense: (1) his right to have the trial court entertain a motion for a new trial; (2) the reasons which may be assigned for the motion; (3) his right to appeal a denial of the motion and the scope of the appellate review. THE RIGHT TO A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL A defendant convicted of a criminal offense in a state prosecution has no constitutional right to appellate review of the judgment against him.

Harris v. State, 6 Md. App. 7, 17 . Nor does he have the constitutional right to have the trial court entertain a motion for a new trial. State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 467 ; Brown v. State, 237 Md. 492, 499 . But when such rights are granted by a state, he is protected from invidious discriminations or improper denials with respect thereto by the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the federal constitution flowing to the states through the 14th Amendment.

See McCoy v. Warden, 1 Md. App. 108, 121 . In this State a person convicted of a crime has the right to be heard by the trial court in which he was convicted on a motion for a new trial. Although the authorities are not in entire accord as to the origin of the practice of granting new trials, see Johnson v. State, 219 Md. 481, 483 , it apparently stems from inveterate custom and usage as an inherent power in the trial court. Blackstone recognized the power.

Noting that “[t]he practice, formerly in use, of fining, imprisoning, or otherwise punishing jurors, merely at the discretion of the court, for rendering a verdict, contrary to the direction of the judge, was arbitrary, unconstitutional and illegal,” he said: “Yet in many instances, where, contrary to evidence, the jury have found the prisoner guilty, their verdict has been mercifully set aside, and a new trial granted.” Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law (Gavit), Book 4, ch. 27, p. 910. Hochheimer’s Criminal Law (1st Ed.) states, ch. 26, § 669, p. 216: “Upon conviction, a new trial may be ordered ²⁸⁷ by the court, upon its own motion or at the instance of the accused, or any one of several persons accused, at any time before judgment, for any matter extrinsic to the record whereby it appears that there was a defect of substantial justice at the former trial.” Wharton in his Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson), vol. 5, § 2155, p. 347 says flatly, “The accused has a right before sentence to be heard by the court by way of motion for a new trial.” But the authorities are in accord that no new trial can be ordered after an acquittal. The statutory law of this State and its Rules of Procedure recognize a motion for a new trial in criminal cases. Code, Art. 27, § 594; Md. Rules 564 c, 567, 759.

Code, Art. 27, § 594 prescribes the time a motion for a new trial shall be heard by the court in which the motion is pending. Rule 567 pertains to motions for a new trial in causes at law but is made applicable to criminal causes by Rule 759 a. The statute and the rules deal, in the main, with procedural matters in regard to a motion for a new trial, including the time within which the motion shall be filed, the time within which it shall be heard and that it shall be heard in the court in which it is pending. 1 ,It is clear that in Maryland a convicted defendant ²⁸⁸ in a criminal prosecution has the right to be heard on a motion for a new trial, properly filed by him, in the court in which the motion is pending. 2 ²⁸⁹ REASONS FOR A NEW TRIAL The reasons to be assigned for a motion for a new trial are not prescribed in this jurisdiction by the constitution, a statute or a rule. Rule 567 b merely requires that “[a] 11 reasons for said motion shall be filed in writing within the time limited for the filing of said motion, and no other reason shall be thereafter assigned without leave of court.” Rule 759 a states simply: “The Court may grant a new trial if required in the interest of justice.” Hochheimer, supra, states, § 340, pp. 216-217: “The principal grounds for granting a new trial are, that the verdict was contrary to the evidence; newly discovered evidence; accident and surprise; misconduct of jurors or the officer having them in charge; bias and disqualification of jurors, disqualification not entitling to a new trial, however, if there was an opportunity to challenge; misconduct or error of judge; fraud or misconduct of prosecution, e.g., abuse of argument.” Wharton, supra, Vol. 5, §§ 2163-2175, pp. 354-367 discusses at length the grounds for a new trial.

But as the question here before us involves only the sufficiency of the evidence, we limit our discussion to it. As to that ground, Wharton, says, § 2166, pp. 355-356: “A verdict or finding of the jury must be based upon and conform to the evidence; and a verdict wholly unsupported by any evidence whatever should not be allowed to stand. But that a verdict is against the preponderance of evidence is no objection unless there is such a preponderance of proof on the other side as to show that manifest injustice has been done by ²⁹⁰ the verdict, and to warrant the conclusion either that the jury have mistaken or failed to weigh the evidence properly, or to apply legal principles, or to arouse suspicion of corruption, prejudice, or partiality on the part of the jury. Whether a new trial should be granted for insufficiency of evidence rests largely in the discretion of the trial court.

It has also been held that a verdict based on incompetent evidence on a material issue must be set aside.” This is in accord with Hochheimer’s statement that a motion for a new trial may be granted by the trial court if the verdict is “contrary to the evidence.” Thus it appears that the test to be applied by the trial court is broader in scope than that which it applies in determining whether or not to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal — whether there was evidence adduced, either directly or by rational inferences therefrom, which would be sufficient for the trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged. For in determining a motion for judgment of acquittal the court does not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, these matters being for the trier of fact in arriving at the guilt or innocence of the accused. See Williams v. State, 5 Md. App. 450 . But in deciding whether the interest of justice requires a new trial of an accused convicted by the trier of fact on the evidence before it, the trial court must weigh such evidence and consider which evidence is credible.

It is only by so doing that it may determine whether there is such a preponderance of proof in favor of the accused “as to show that manifest injustice has been done by the verdict.” Although the Maryland constitutional provisions touching on motions for a new trial are no longer in effect, we do not believe that its provisions, when effective, intended a standard as the basis for a new trial when determined by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City different from that to be followed by the Circuit Courts for the various counties, nor do we believe that the ²⁹¹ elimination of the constitutional provisions changed the standard to be followed. Under the Constitution the Supreme Bench had jurisdiction to hear motions for new trial arising either “on question of fact” or “for misdirection upon matters of Law.” Discussing this the Court of Appeals said in Johnson v. State, supra, at 483: “This Court pointed out in Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329 , that one of the purposes of the procedure contemplated by the constitution is to seek uniformity of decision and provide a form where there can be had the benefit of review in cases where an appeal will not lie. Often, where an appeal does lie the powers of review of the Supreme Bench in ruling upon the motion for a new trial are broader in scope than those of this Court. It may weigh the evidence in a criminal case even though the case was tried before a jury, and grant a new trial in its sound discretion.

It also has the authority to weigh and consider newly discovered evidence.” See also Brown v. State, supra, at 499. We note that Johnson was decided after the Court of Appeals had authority to review the sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases. We see no material difference in the trial court’s consideration of a motion for a new trial, as far as the evidence is concerned, between civil cases and criminal cases. In either case, although the court may not have felt justified to take the case altogether from the jury by applying the test applicable to the particular proceeding, “it may, nevertheless, in the exercise of its discretion, grant a new trial where it is plainly apparent that the jury have ignored or disregarded the overwhelming preponderance of the testimony, practically unsupported by evidence.” II Poe, Pleading and Practice, 4th Ed., § 336.

Tiller v. Elfenbein, 205 Md. 14, 21 , recognized the power of the trial court to reconsider all the evidence produced at the trial in regard to a grant of a new trial and in Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 369 , the Court ²⁹² said, “If the evidence is not satisfactory to' the trial court, it is within its province to order a new trial before another jury.” We see no distinction, as to the exercise of this discretion, whether the court or a jury was the trier of fact. See also Barbee v. Warden, 220 Md. 647, 650 . APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL Rule 759 not only contemplates a motion for a new trial but by § b provides for an arrest of judgment in criminal causes. “Upon motion of a party or on its own motion the court shall arrest judgment only for an error apparent on the face of the record, and which could not have been reached by motion to dismiss or grant appropriate relief before or during the trial.” The basic distinctions between a motion for a new trial and a motion for arrest of judgment are that the former is predicated upon matters extrinsic to the record and is not, as a general rule, appealable, while the latter is predicated upon matters intrinsic to the record and is appealable. In Miller v. State, 135 Md. 379, 382 , the Court said: “It is difficult to see in any case which has been fully tried on its merits the difference between a motion to strike out a judgment and a motion for a new trial, except from the refusal to grant the former an appeal may be entertained, and not, in this State, from such refusal as to the latter.” See also Quesenbury v. State, 183 Md. 570, 572 ; Wilson v. State, 181 Md. 1, 8 ; Bosco v. State, 157 Md. 407 .

It has been firmly established by a myriad of cases in this jurisdiction that the general rule is that the matter of a new trial lies within the discretion of the trial court and is not subject to appellate review. 3 The Court of Appeals ²⁹³ has stated baldly in a number of cases, to the effect, if not in the precise language as that employed in Haley v. State, 200 Md. 72 , 77: “Of course, there is no appeal to this Court from the refusal of a new trial.” But if the rule was, as it seemed to be from early decisions, and even from some cases decided after the Court of Appeals was granted the authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases, 4 that the appellate court cannot review the ruling of a trial court on a motion for a new trial, the rule has been tempered to a limited degree. In McCoy v. State, 236 Md. 632 , the Court said, at 633: “Of course, there is no appeal from a denial of a new trial, absent abuse of discretion * * *.” And in Thomas v. Stole, 215 Md. 558 , the Court said, at 561, that there was nothing the trial judge did or decided, in the aspect of the case concerning a denial of a new trial, for it to pass on, because he gave full consideration to the relevant facts, and in his “sound discretion”, decided they did not justify a new trial. Abuse of discretion as an exception to the general rule, from the adjudicated cases, has been applied only where the trial court refused even to consider newly discovered evidence as in W. B. & A. E. R. Co. v. Kimmey, 141 Md. 243 , to which reference was made in Givner v. State, 208 Md. 1 and stated as an exception in Burley v. State, 239 Md. 342, 344 . We stated the exception in Adams v. State, 4 Md. App. 135 , 140 but did not find it applicable to the facts of that case.

In Elder v. State, 7 Md. App. 368 , 373 and Stallard v. State, 6 Md. App. 560 , 563 we stated what we deem to be now the general rule — the granting of a new trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and is not reviewable by this Court. ²⁹⁴ THE INSTANT CASE , Jerome Julius Pinkney (appellant) was found guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of robbing David John Satterfield with a deadly weapon. Prior to the imposition of sentence and within 3 days after the reception of the verdict, he filed a motion for a new trial in writing, giving as one of the reasons therefor that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Rule 567 a and b. The motion was denied upon hearing.

He .seeks reversal of the denial of a new trial. He does not claim that the court did not consider the evidence in arriving at his decision but urges that it did not apply the proper standard in considering it. He argues that even if the court, had it considered the sufficiency of the evidence under the proper standard, would have been justified in denying a new trial, there was reversible error because the court did not apply the correct rule of law with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence applicable to motions for a new trial. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred at the trial on the merits in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of all the evidence.

Rule 755 b. The denial of this motion requires us to review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, as appellant presents the question on appeal. We decide this question before we decide the issue as to the motion for a new trial, for if the court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, the denial of a motion for a new trial becomes moot. The Denial of the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Appellant’s contention as to the sufficiency of the evidence goes only to his criminal agency; he does not claim .that the corpus delicti of the offense of which he was convicted was not established.

The victim made a positive in-court identification of appellant as one of the robbers. Noting that this was the second time his company had been held up in about three months, he said: “The first time I was a little unhappy that I wasn’t able to identify ²⁹⁵ anyone, and I think the reason I didn’t identify anyone, I was trying to remember both