Pitt v. State

⁵² HOLLANDER, Judge. This case has its genesis in a guilty plea to a felony drug charge tendered by Jacqdont Cliftshaun Pitt, appellant, on January 20, 1992, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Eight and a half years later, on June 19, 2000, appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (the “Petition”), claiming that his guilty plea was constitutionally defective because, for several reasons, it was not made knowingly and voluntarily. Further, appellant claims that, as a result of his “constitutionally invalid” plea, he suffered adverse collateral consequences.

In particular, he complains that after he pleaded guilty in the underlying case, he was deemed a repeat offender in a subsequent, unrelated matter, as a result of the conviction at issue here. Consequently, Pitt received an enhanced sentence for the subsequent offense. Following a hearing on the Petition on March 9, 2001, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County denied the requested relief. Pitt timely noted this appeal and presents a single issue for our review, which we have rephrased slightly: Did the circuit court err when it found that appellant’s guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, thereby denying appellant’s Petition for Writ of Error Coram No-bis?

For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm. FACTUAL SUMMARY The facts of this case are largely undisputed. As we noted, appellant alleged in the Petition that his guilty plea of January 20, 1992, was not made knowingly and voluntarily. At the time of his guilty plea, appellant was twenty-one years old.

During the guilty plea proceedings, the following transpired: [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Pursuant to discussions we have had with Your Honor in chambers, with the State, etc., at this time Mr. Pitt will withdraw his previously entered plea of not guilty to Count Number Two in this indictment, which charges him with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and enter a plea of guilty to that. ⁵³ In this particular case, Your Honor, it is that after the presentence report is completed and sentencing is set that Mr. Pitt face a 20 year suspended sentence, all except one year, a period of active probation, five years. All other charges in this indictment will be nol-prossed at sentencing.... [THE COURT]: Do you understand the nature of these charges against you? [APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am. [THE COURT]: And the factual basis for the plea? [THE PROSECUTOR]: If this matter had gone to trial, the State would have proven that on October 23, 1990, at approximately 11:50 p.m., Officer Mammano of the Prince George’s County Police Department received information from a confidential source stating the defendant would be in the area of 3400 Branch Avenue, Temple Hills, Prince George’s County, Maryland, delivering a quantity of cocaine. On that day and that given time, the defendant did in fact arrive in that area, and officers observed the description that the confidential source gave. A search revealed the defendant to be in possession of a quantity of crack-cocaine.

That substance was field tested, and it did test positive for cocaine. [THE COURT]: Is that the evidence against your client? [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Essentially, yes, Your Honor. In fact, the observations were that apparently he had passed a bag to another defendant, and then when the officers came out and the bag was recovered, that bag did have cocaine. Other than that, there was no indication. ⁵⁴ [THE COURT]: Mr. Pitt, were you listening as the prosecutor told the Court about the evidence in this case? [THE APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am. [THE COURT]: Do you agree if your case went to trial that is how the State’s witnesses would testify, what they would say? [THE APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am. [THE COURT]: Has your attorney explained to you the legal definition of possession vnth intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance? [APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am. [THE COURT]: And have you talked to [defense counsel] about your case in general? [APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am. * * * [THE COURT]: The Court is satisfied that the guilty plea is knowledgeably, voluntarily and intelligently made, and we will accept it. (Emphasis added).

Thereafter, the circuit court sentenced appellant to a suspended term of twenty years, and placed him on five years of probation. In 1997, appellant was prosecuted in federal court for an unrelated offense. Following his federal conviction, appellant was sentenced as a repeat offender to an enhanced penalty of twice the mandatory minimum. That sentence prompted appellant’s Petition.

The court held an evidentiary hearing on the Petition, at which appellant’s attorney argued that Pitt’s guilty plea was involuntary because “the elements of the crime were never set forth, ... the court never set forth the maximum penalties for the crime.” In addition, Pitt’s lawyer asserted that there was “an insufficient factual predicate” for the offense. Although appellant’s attorney conceded that there is no requirement in Maryland obligating the court to distinguish a felony from a misdemeanor at the time a guilty plea is offered, he com ⁵⁵ plained that the crime was “never defined as a crime versus a misdemeanor.... ” The following testimony of appellant was adduced at the hearing on the Petition: [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Can you tell the court what happened that day when you came to court? [APPELLANT]: Well, basically, I came to court, and when I came to court, he [appellant’s defense attorney] told me to take a plea. If I took a plea there was going to be no jail time. So, you know, I just took the plea, like he told me. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: What did you plead guilty to? [APPELLANT]: Possession. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Why did you think it was possession? [APPELLANT]: Because that is what he told me it was.

He said it was possession. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: And what did you think possession meant? [APPELLANT]: Just basically, simple possession. At the time I didn’t really know anything but simple possession. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Did you come to learn something different later about what you pleaded guilty to? [APPELLANT]: Now? Yes. Now, down the line I learned when they used it against me later on that it was a felony instead of what I thought was just simple possession, was a misdemeanor. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: So what I need to know is what, exactly, to the best of your recollection, did [defense counsel] tell you about the nature of the charge to which you were pleading guilty?

If you recall? ⁵⁶ [APPELLANT]: Basically, he didn’t explain really nothing about the nature of the charge. All he explained was just the facts. Just the facts of what had happened, and he said I would be pleading guilty, and there would be no jail time. * * * [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Did at any time [defense counsel] sit you down and tell you what possession with intent to distribute meant? [APPELLANT]: No. He never told me that. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: I am talking about now prior to January 20th, or on January 20,1992? [APPELLANT]: No, he never. During cross-examination, appellant testified as follows: [PROSECUTOR]: At the bottom of the same page, line 24, the court says—starting on line 21, the court says, “Mr. Pitt, were you listening as the prosecutor told the court about the evidence in this case?” You say, “Yes, ma’am.” So were you telling the truth at that time? [APPELLANT]: That was a long time ago.

If the transcript says that, yes. * * * [PROSECUTOR]: So you knew at the time that this plea was entered that the State expected to prove that you had a quantity of cocaine that you were delivering, isn’t that true? [APPELLANT]: I mean, basically, on that case right there, I was never—the other two defendants, both of their charges were dismissed, and they in actuality had the drugs, and I didn’t think it was anything but possession for me. [PROSECUTOR]: As to when you heard the word “delivering” here, that didn’t mean anything to you? [APPELLANT]: It didn’t stick with me. [PROSECUTOR]: Now, on page six of this transcript, the court says, “Has your attorney explained to you the legal ⁵⁷ definition of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance?” You replied, “Yes, ma’am.” Now, were you are [sic] telling the truth at that time, Mr. Pitt? [APPELLANT]: I didn’t know what possession with intent to distribute means until a later time, when they used this against me. [PROSECUTOR]: Is the answer no, that he didn’t explain this to you? [APPELLANT]: He didn’t explain to me that I was pleading to a felony, and I was pleading to possession with intent to distribute was a felony. [PROSECUTOR]: Did he explain to you the legal definition of possession with intent to distribute? [APPELLANT]: No, he didn’t. [PROSECUTOR]: So what you said to the court here wasn’t true? [APPELLANT]: I was going on what my attorney said to me; “Say yes to everything, and you will get no jail time,” and that is what I was doing. [PROSECUTOR]: No further questions. [THE COURT]: Mr. Pitt, if I am not mistaken, but assuming you didn’t have any prior record, the guideline sentence would be six months to three years, is that correct? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It would have been. [THE COURT]: So he got a sentence substantially below the guidelines? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, ma’am. The court concluded that appellant’s plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and denied appellant’s request for relief. The court reasoned: Basically, the complaint is that the plea was not freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made, because Mr. Pitt was not aware that it was a felony to be in the possession with intent to distribute. The penalties for the crime were not told on ⁵⁸ the record, that the factual basis for the plea was insufficient. * * * He took the plea, he got burned by the consequences of taking this plea when he got in trouble again, and in hindsight, if he knew it was a felony, he certainly wouldn’t have done it.

I can’t look at the hindsight. I have to look at the transcript, I have to give great deference to [the trial court’s] findings in this matter. I find there is a sufficient factual basis. It said this is a plea of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and [the] use of [the] words “to deliver” is used on page five, and on page six [the trial judge] asked, “Has your attorney explained to you the elements of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance?” And the defendant answers, “Yes.” And I think now I cannot believe [appellant] when he says that at that time he did not realize that he was pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute.

Well, clearly it matters in the federal system if something is a felony or not. That is not something that we ordinarily mention in the course of taking a plea in Maryland. “Do you understand this is a felony?” “Do you understand this is a misdemeanor?” * * % Additionally, possession with intent to distribute, while it carries a 20 year maximum, if you had no prior record in this court, the minimum sentence was six months to three years, and I think the fact that this sentence was such a fabulous deal, to me, makes it even more voluntary. He saw a good deal. He was caught with the cocaine, and he took it, and now there are collateral consequences, and that is a shame, but I see nothing involuntary about this plea.

I think there is a factual basis for the plea, and I am going to deny the motion. ⁵⁹ DISCUSSION Pitt contends that his guilty plea to the offense of possession with intent to distribute was not made knowingly and voluntarily, and therefore the circuit court improperly denied his request for coram nobis relief. In particular, Pitt alleges that there was no factual predicate to support his conviction for possession with intent to distribute, he did not understand that he was pleading guilty to a felony offense, he was not advised of the maximum penalty for the offense, and he suffered adverse collateral consequences as a result of the State conviction. We begin our analysis with a review of the writ of error coram nobis. A coram nobis proceeding is an independent civil action.

Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 65 , 760 A.2d 647 (2000); Ruby v. State, 353 Md. 100, 107 , 724 A.2d 673 (1999); State v. Hicks, 139 Md.App. 1, 6 , 773 A.2d 1056 (2001). In Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685 , 166 A. 410 (1933), the Court of Appeals explained the nature of the writ: “The writ of error coram nobis is an old common-law writ recognized in this state. Its functions differ from an ordinary writ of error in that the latter raises questions of law, while it deals only with facts, which, if known at the time the judgment was rendered, would have prohibited its rendition. It is also unlike a -writ of error, as it is addressed to the court which rendered the judgment, while a writ of error is addressed to some other and superior court.” Id. at 691 , 166 A. 410 (citation omitted); see Ruby, 353 Md. at 105 , 724 A.2d 673 ; Johnson v. State, 215 Md. 333, 336 , 138 A.2d 372 (1958); Miles v. State, 141 Md.App. 381, 387 , 785 A.2d 841 (2001); Jones v. State, 114 Md.App. 471, 475 , 691 A.2d 229 , cert. denied, 346 Md. 27 , 694 A.2d 950 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917, 118 S.Ct. 304 , 139 L.Ed.2d 234 (1997).

As the Court recognized in Keane, 164 Md. at 691-92 , 166 A. 410 , the writ of error coram nobis “lies to obtain relief from such errors of fact as the infancy, death, or coverture of the defendant, in cases where those defenses, if known at the time, would have prevented a judgment, but which through no ⁶⁰ fault of the defendant were not known when the judgment was entered.” Further, the Court explained: Such facts would rarely affect the proceedings in a criminal prosecution; consequently the writ is less frequently available in such cases than in civil cases, and there is less uniformity in the decisions as to what errors of fact will justify its use in criminal prosecutions. But it has been generally held that, where the writ is available, it lies to reverse a judgment obtained by fraud, coercion, or duress, as where a plea of