Pittway Corp. v. Collins

IRMA S. RAKER, Judge, Retired, specially assigned. This tragic and sad case arose out of a house fire on June 14, 1998, at the residence of Michael Chapman and his wife, Carolyn Hill, located at 23 Grantchester Place, Gaithersburg, Maryland, a residence they rented from Mr. and Mrs. Gui-Fu Li. Samuel Juster and Stephon Collins, Jr., overnight guests of the Chapmans, died in the fire. Three Chapman children were seriously injured in the fire.

The fire was caused by a burning candle in the basement, where the children were sleeping. The children lit the candle during an area-wide electrical outage caused by thunderstorms. The AC powered smoke detector, which did not have a back up battery system, was not activated by the smoke or fire. The plaintiffs, Michael Chapman 1 and Carolyn Hill, along with Keith and Brandon Chapman, Dagmar and Stephon Collins, Sr., parents and personal representatives of the estate of Stephon Collins, Jr., and Daniel and Patricia Juster, parents and personal representatives of the estate of Samuel Juster filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. 2 Plaintiffs filed suit against Gui-Fu Li and Chung Ling Li, the landlords of the dwelling, Pittway Corporation, First Alert, Inc, Sunbeam Corporation, BRK Brands, Inc. and Honeywell International, Inc., the manufacturers of the smoke ²²⁴ detectors in the home, 3 the Ryland Group, Inc., the builder of the home, Summit Electric Co., the electrical subcontractor who procured the smoke detectors and installed them for Ryland, the City of Gaithersburg and the city rental inspector, Victor Greenblatt. 4 Plaintiffs also filed suit against David Dieffenbach and his employee Kevin Hightower, renovators of the basement in 1994, for failing to replace the smoke detectors with dual-power smoke detectors and for failing to warn the owners and occupants that the enclosed rooms in the basement could not be used for sleeping.

The question presented before this Court is whether intervening negligent acts superseded, as a matter of law, petitioners Pittway and Ryland’s negligence in causing the fire that resulted in death and injury. The procedural history of this case is long and complicated. In January 2002, the Circuit Court granted summary judg ²²⁵ merit, in favor of Dieffenbach and Hightower. 5 The court also granted Ryland’s Motion to Dismiss and Summit’s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment. Following the dismissal of Ryland and Summit, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all claims against the remaining defendants and then filed an appeal against Ryland and Summit to the Court of Special Appeals.

The intermediate appellate court vacated the order consenting to voluntary dismissal, dismissed the appeal as premature, and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. Collins v. Li, 158 Md.App. 252, 256 , 857 A.2d 135, 137 (2004). 6 Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint. Prior to a hearing in Circuit Court in February 2005 on a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Justers and Collinses settled their claims against the Lis and the Chapmans. At the hearing, the Circuit Court granted Ryland’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the events that transpired between Ryland’s actions and the fire constituted unforeseeable intervening acts amounting to a superseding cause of the ultimate injuries.

In June 2005, the Circuit Court granted the manufacturer defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that the numerous acts of the Lis and the Chapmans amounted to a superseding cause of the injuries alleged, thereby relieving them of liability. In April 2006, the Circuit Court granted the Lis’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that the negligent acts of the Chapmans constituted superseding causes of the deadly fire. The Court of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the Complaint against the homebuilders ²²⁶ and manufacturers of the smoke detector for failure to state a cause of action. Collins v. Li, 176 Md.App. 502 , 933 A.2d 528 (2007).

The intermediate appellate court concluded that the Circuit Court erred in determining whether the intervening acts of negligence constituted a superseding cause, relieving the manufacturer defendants, Summit Electric, Ryland Homes and Gui-Fu Li and Chung Ling Li of liability for the plaintiffs’ deaths and injuries. The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of Dieffenbach and Hightower’s motions for summai'y judg;ment and held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that those defendants had a legally cognizable duty to the Collins, Juster and Chapman children. We shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. This Court granted Ryland 7 and Pittway’s petition for writ of certiorari, the only defendants to petition this Court, to consider the following questions: “(1) Does the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals improperly change the Maryland law of superseding cause in ways that conflict with well-settled principles long applied by this Court?

(2) Does the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals improperly prevent trial courts from deciding the issue of superseding causation on a motion to dismiss?” Pittway v. Collins, 403 Md. 304 , 941 A.2d 1104 (2008). I. The Factual Background The Court of Special Appeals set out the background facts succinctly. We quote from the opinion: ²²⁷ “Gui-Fu Li and Chung Ling Li purchased residential property located at 23 Grantchester Place in Gaithersburg, Maryland from the Ryland Group in 1989. Appellee Ryland Group was the builder of Grantchester Place and Summit was the electrical subcontractor.

When the home was built in 1989, appellees Ryland and Summit installed an AC-power smoke detector that was hard wired into the home’s electrical system, but that did not have a safety battery back-up on each level of the home. Gui-Fu Li, a chiropractor, renovated the basement for a medical office; these renovations, however, were performed without a building permit. When Dr. Li began to treat his acupuncture patients in the finished basement, neighbors complained to the City of Gaithersburg about his home medical office and he was cited for a zoning violation on June 6, 1989. After the Lis were denied permission for a zoning variance for a home medical office, they relocated their residence and, thereafter, sought to rent Grantchester Place.

Michael Chapman and the Lis signed a rental agreement on August 13, 1991 and the Lis applied for and obtained a Rental License from the City of Gaithersburg on August 29, 1991. The enclosed basement rooms had been used as bedrooms by the Chapman children and the sleep-over guests of their children since 1994. Mr. Chapman lived in the home with his wife, Catherine Chapman, and their children, including his three boys from his prior marriage, Keith, Brandon and Kyle Chapman. Grantchester Place had a finished basement, which had three enclosed rooms: (a) Brandon and Kyle Chapman’s bedroom, (b) Keith Chapman’s bedroom, and (c) Mr. Chapman’s computer room/office.

The two basement bedrooms did not have any windows. In early 1994, a water pipe burst in Grantchester Place, causing extensive damage, especially to the basement, where a foot of water had accumulated. On February 2, 1994, appellee, David E. Dieffenbach, trading as DEDHICO Home Improvements, submitted a written proposal to the Lis and Mr. Chapman to repair the water damage for a ²²⁸ total of $28,060. The contract itself indicates that ‘[t]he existing metal stud framing will be replaced and repaired to facilitate replacement of the walls.’ Dieffenbach did not apply for and thus never obtained a building permit.

Dieffenbach subsequently submitted two invoices for extra work, which both showed that twenty electrical outlets in the basement were cleaned and re-wired by an electrician at $17.50 per outlet for a total cost of $350. Kevin Hightower, who is a journeyman electrician and an employee of Dieffenbach, performed the electrical re-wiring work. Hightower admitted that he installed two or three new electrical outlets in the basement. Neither Dieffenbach nor Hightower obtained a permit for the electrical work performed from the City of Gaithersburg and they conceded that they were required by law to apply for an electrical permit.

As a result of appellees’ failure to apply for a building and/or electrical permit, the City of Gaithersburg did not inspect the work performed by appellees Dieffenbach and Hightower. Neither the Lis, Dieffenbach or Hightower undertook to upgrade the basement’s AC-power smoke detector to dual-power smoke detector in conjunction with the renovation project or to recommend an upgrade or to warn the owners or occupants of the limitations of the AC-power smoke detector. On Saturday, June 13, 1998, thirteen-year-old, Stephon Collins, Jr. and twelve-year-old Samuel Juster were overnight guests of Keith, Brandon and twelve-year-old Kyle, the three sons of Michael Chapman and Carolyn Hill Chapman, at Grantchester Place. That evening, powerful thunderstorms caused an area-wide electrical power outage.

In order to provide lighting so that Brandon, Kyle and Keith, and their friends, Samuel and Stephon could continue playing their game of Monopoly, they lit approximately six candles in the basement bedroom where Kyle and Brandon slept. Keith Chapman, then seventeen years old, was the last of the boys to retire. He extinguished all but one of the ²²⁹ candles at approximately 4:30 a.m. and removed the one remaining lit candle from Kyle’s and Brandon’s bedroom, leaving it on a triangular corner unit in the basement’s main recreational room. Keith Chapman estimated that he went to bed at approximately 4:45 a.m.

Some time around 5:00 a.m., Sunday, June 14, 1998, the candle that was left burning on the triangular corner unit in the basement’s main recreational room ignited a fire. Both the Fire Investigation Report of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire Arms and the Event Report of the Montgomery County Police Department concluded that the fire was ignited by the candle left on the triangular corner unit. As noted, the smoke detector located in the basement did not trigger an alarm due to the lack of a back-up power source. Stephon Collins, Jr. and Samuel Juster perished as a result of the fire; Kyle Chapman suffered severe burns requiring the amputation of both legs and the minor Chapman children suffered burns and injuries to their respiratory systems.” Collins, 176 Md.App. at 518-20 , 933 A.2d at 537-38 .

II

Trial Court Proceedings A. The Complaint The Complaint filed in the Circuit Court contained twenty-six counts, each alleging acts of omissions in relation to the smoke detectors and lack of emergency egress from the basement at the Grantchester Place residence. The plaintiffs alleged that all of the defendants, by either acts or omissions, were responsible for the lack of adequate warning to the children of the fire, which plaintiffs alleged, resulted from the lack of a battery backup in the smoke detector, or other alternative safety power source in the event of an electrical outage. The theory against the Lis was that the deaths and injuries were proximately caused by their acts and omissions resulting in the illegal use of the basement as bedrooms. The Complaint states that had the Lis not performed the unauthorized renovation of the basement for use as a medical office, it ²³⁰ “would have remained an empty concrete shell without even electrical outlets [under which] inhospitable conditions, the children would not have used the Chapman’s basement as a sleeping area on June 14, 1998.... ” The Complaint also alleged that had the Lis “warned their tenants, plaintiffs’ children would not have been sleeping in the enclosed basement bedrooms____” Plaintiffs’ theory against the manufacturer defendants, as set out in the Complaint, alleged negligence, strict liability/design defect and failure to warn of the limitations of the AC-powered only smoke detector, breach of implied warranty, and breach of express warranty, all stemming from the lack of a battery back-up smoke detector system.

Plaintiffs alleged that, as a direct and proximate result of the failure to equip the detector at issue with a battery back-up or other alternative safety power source, the fire and smoke could not be detected, and thus no alert sounded to the children who did not have a reasonable opportunity to and could not escape the burning residence. The Court of Special Appeals provided the following chart outlining the claims against the manufacturer defendants: [[Image here]] ²³¹ [[Image here]] As to Ryland and Summit, plaintiffs alleged in the Complaint negligence, strict liability/failure to warn, wrongful death, survival actions and vicarious liability. The Court of Special Appeals provided the following chart outlining the claims against Ryland and Summit: [[Image here]] B. The Circuit Court Rulings The Circuit Court granted the motions to dismiss filed by the manufacturer defendants, Ryland, Summit and the Lis, ruling that as a matter of law, the enumerated and different substantial intervening acts of negligence constituted a superseding cause of the injuries. The court determined that the intervening acts interrupted the chain of causation, thereby relieving the manufacturer defendants, Summit, Ryland and the Lis of legal liability.

Before the Circuit Court, for the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the manufacturer defen ²³² dants, Ryland and Summit challenged only the legal causation element of the plaintiffs’ claim, and did not dispute that their actions constituted a cause-in-fact of plaintiffs’ injuries. 8 As a result, the Circuit Court addressed only the issue of proximate cause. As to the manufacturer defendants, the Circuit Court ruled as follows: “As a matter of law, it was not foreseeable when the smoke detectors were manufactured in 1989 that so many different substantial intervening acts of negligence, including violations of law, would occur so as to link the ‘Manufacturer Defendants’ alleged negligent act to the Plaintiffs’ injuries nine years later. Those intervening acts constitute a superseding cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries.” As to Ryland and Summit, the Circuit Court ruled that the Complaint did not establish legal causation, reasoning that it was inconceivable that they could foresee, nine years before the fire, that the Lis would finish the basement without providing emergency egress, in violation of building codes and that the Chapmans would allow the boys to keep candles lit while they were sleeping. ²³³ The court also granted Dieffenbach and Hightower’s motion for summary judgment, determining that “as home-improvement contractors repairing water damage to the basement of the residence in 1994, [Dieffenbach and Hightower] did not have a legally cognizable duty on which to impose liability for damages and injuries sustained in [the] June 1998 fire, to warn the occupants that the basement rooms should not be used for sleeping.” The court also ruled that the failure to obtain building or electrical permits from the City of Gaithersburg in 1994, prior to repairing water damage to the basement was neither a cause-in-fact nor a legal cause of the fire. 9 The Collins, Juster and Chapman plaintiffs noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

III

The Court of Special Appeals Decision The issue before the Court of Special Appeals was “whether the negligence of the Chapmans, in failing to ensure that the candle was extinguished, and the Lis, in allowing the enclosed basement rooms to be used for bedrooms, among other causes, operated to attenuate the legal responsibility of the manufacturer defendants, Ryland and Summit for the injuries and deaths.” Collins, 176 Md.App. at 533 , 933 A.2d at 546 . Before that court, Ryland and Summit maintained that the ultimate harm was caused by the negligent acts of the Lis rather than the failure of the smoke detector to alert the children or by any lack of knowledge that the smoke detector was not equipped with an alternate power source. The manufacturer defendants asserted that the injuries and fatalities occurred not because of any defect in the design of the smoke alarm, but because the children were sleeping in an illegally enclosed, windowless basement bedroom which lacked ade ²³⁴ quate emergency egress facilities. The plaintiffs argued before the Court of Special Appeals that the issue of whether intervening acts of negligence are foreseeable is one of fact and therefore may not be properly resolved on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.

The Court of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court could not properly determine, based solely on the allegations in the Complaint, whether the allegations of the negligent acts of the Chapmans and others could have been foreseen by the manufacturer defendants, Ryland and Summit. Id. at 518 , 933 A.2d at 537 . Before addressing the issues before the court, the Court of Special Appeals set forth the standard of review as to a motion to dismiss. Id. at 534 , 933 A.2d at 547 .

The court was crystal clear in its understanding of the proper approach: that in reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, the court must determine whether the Complaint, on its face, discloses a legally sufficient cause of action. In doing so, the court presumed the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the Complaint, along with any reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Id. The Court of Special Appeals then addressed the propriety of deciding foreseeability on a motion to dismiss, and concluded that while foreseeability is ordinarily a question of fact, to be decided by the trier of fact, there are those cases where the resolution of the issue becomes one of law.

Id. at 537 , 933 A.2d at 548 . The court framed the inquiry as follows: “[W]e may only affirm the circuit court’s determination of foreseeability if we are convinced that the facts of this case are susceptible of but one inference and that they gravitate so close to the polar extreme that the issue of causation is rendered a matter of law.” Id. at 538 , 933 A.2d at 549 . The intermediate appellate court held that although the Circuit Court’s analysis was a proper adjudication of the issues as framed by the parties, the court erred because the analysis was of facts not susceptible of but one inference. Id. at 545 , 933 A.2d at 553 .

The court stated as follows: “We are satisfied that the circuit court engaged in the proper analysis, employing the applicable legal principles in ²³⁵ a determination of what constitutes a superseding cause. Because we are not convinced that the facts of this case are susceptible of but one inference, however, we hold that the circuit court erred in not first determining whether there existed material facts not discernible from the Re-Filed Omnibus Amended Complaint. In other words, the court’s analysis, although proper as to the facts it had available to it, was premature.” Id. at 547-48 , 933 A.2d at 554 . A. The Manufacturer Defendants The heart of the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion, expressed as multiple holdings, see id. at 534, 538, 545, 547, 552 , 933 A.2d at 546, 549, 553, 554, 557 , is “that the facts determinative of whether the negligent acts of the manufacturer defendants ... are substantial factors in causing the deaths and injuries and, hence, that such injuries and deaths were foreseeable are susceptible of more than one inference.” Id. at 552 , 933 A.2d at 557 .

The court found that “[tjhese facts are not so close to the polar extreme that the issue of causation is rendered a matter of law.” Id. On this basis, with examples cited to support its reasoning, 10 the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court’s grant of the manufacturer defendants’ motion to dismiss, making clear that the court was not addressing a resolution of the merits of the issue, but rather ruling that the issue was more appropriately-decided on a motion lor summary judgment or after trial. Id. at 551 , 933 A.2d at 557 . ²³⁶ The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court in dismissing Counts III and IV of the Complaint alleging that the manufacturer defendants were strictly liable for design defects in the smoke detector. After reviewing the essential elements of a claim sounding in strict liability, as delineated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, 11 the court noted that “the only issue is whether the circuit court could properly determine from the allegations in the complaint that any causation attributable to the manufacturer defendants ... was superseded by the negligence of others.” Id. at 578, 933 A.2d at 573 .

The intermediate appellate court stated that “an intermediary’s negligent failure to prevent harm will be a superseding cause when it is ‘so extraordinary as to not have been reasonably foreseeable.’ ” Id. at 580-81 , 933 A.2d at 574 (citation omitted). Moreover, the crucial inquiry in determining “the effect that a factor has, in causing harm, standing alone, when there are multiple causes, is determined, not only by the nature of the particular factor, but also by whether the aggregate of the causes produce an unforeseeable result.” Id. at 582 , 933 A.2d at 575 . The Court of Special Appeals held that such a determination could not be made until “the facts [are] ... gleaned from all relevant and material information.” Id. at 582 , 933 A.2d at 575 . Finally, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court granting the motion to dismiss the ²³⁷ manufacturer defendants as to Counts V and VI in the Complaint alleging breach of express and implied warranties.

The Court of Special Appeals reiterated that the motion “must be evaluated based on the pleadings alone. When matters outside of the pleadings are presented, the motion should be treated as one for summary judgment and ‘all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent.’ ” Id. at 583 , 933 A.2d at 576 . The Court of Special Appeals noted as follows: “Had the court elected to consider the User’s Manual, it may well have been persuaded that there was no breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because the instructions contained in the User’s Manual ... accurately described precisely how the product would perform. ... As to the more general implied warranty of merchantability, based on industry standards, a superseding cause analysis would likewise be appropriate, but only upon facts susceptible of but one inference.” Id. at 586-87 , 933 A.2d at 577-78 .

With respect to the breach of an express warranty claim, the Court of Special Appeals first noted the difference between a court’s treatment of express and implied warranties: “What differentiates a promise implied by law [i.e., an implied warranty,] ... and an express warranty is that the ‘standard of performance is set by the defendants’ promises, rather than imposed by law.’ ” Id. at 587 , 933 A.2d at 578 . Thus, “an express warranty [as well as an implied warranty], in essence, sounds in contract and, accordingly, is viewed from the perspective of the individual bargain.” Id. at 588 , 933 A.2d at 578 . The Court of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court could not have analyzed the breach of express warranty claim properly without examining the documents, including the smoke detector’s User’s Manual as well as marketing, advertisements, and sales literature, alleged to extend such warranties. Id.

The Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court’s grant of the manufacturer defendants’ motion to dismiss on Counts V and VI alleging breach of express and implied warranties. ²³⁸ B. Ryland Homes The Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court’s dismissal of Counts XI and XII against Ryland on the same grounds that it reversed the motion to dismiss granted to the manufacturer defendants. The Court of Special Appeals held that, in order for Ryland to succeed on its motion to dismiss, then “not only must the facts, as they relate to Ryland, admit of but one inference, but the same must be true of the acts of negligence asserted to be causes which supersede that negligence of Ryland.... ” Id. at 557 , 933 A.2d at 560 . Citing-several examples to support its reasoning, 12 the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Complaint was insufficient to properly determine whether the negligence of Ryland in selecting, purchasing and installing a smoke detector which did not comport with industry standards, and in failing to deliver a document that contained warnings of its limitations, was superseded by the negligence of the Lis and Chapmans. Regarding the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the count in the Complaint alleging that Ryland was strictly liable for having-participated in the selection, installation, selling and placing into the stream of commerce a defective product, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that whether intervening acts of negligence constituted superseding causes could not be determined until “the facts [are] ... gleaned from all relevant and material information.” Id. at 582 , 933 A.2d at 575 .

IV

Standard of Review and Argument of the Parties In order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the plaintiff must allege facts that, if ²³⁹ proved, would entitle him or her to relief. See Arfaa v. Martino, 404 Md. 364, 380-81 , 946 A.2d 995, 1004-05 (2008). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a reviewing court must “assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint, as well as all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from them.” Id. at 380 , 946 A.2d at 1004 . A dismissal is proper only if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff.

Id. at 380-81 , 946 A,2d at 1005 . The court must view all well-pleaded facts and the inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 380 , 946 A.2d at 1004-05 . Before this Court, Pittway and Ryland argue that this Court should affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court because, as a matter of law, they did not proximately cause the plaintiffs’ injuries.

They argue that the injuries occurred because, in violation of the Gaithersburg City rental ordinances, the children were sleeping in windowless basement bedrooms that lacked emergency egress. In addition, the injuries occurred because the Lis, the landlords, had modified the original, unfinished basement, on two occasions to include windowless bedrooms, and five years after the house was built, the owners did not follow code provisions that required the installation of new, dual-powered smoke detectors outside the bedrooms. Finally, Pittway and Ryland argue that the injuries occurred because the children went to sleep, leaving lit candles, in the windowless basement rooms, without emergency egress and without adult supervision. Petitioners assert that the Court of Special Appeals misconstrued their argument, misapplied longstanding principles of Maryland law, and confused the different components of proximate cause, in deciding the case as though they had argued the absence of causation-in-fact, which petitioners had not done, while conducting no analysis of legal causation and superseding cause, which had been the entire focus of petitioners’ motions.

Petitioners complain that the Court of Special Appeals improperly considered matters beyond the four corners of the Complaint in deciding the motion to dismiss. In ²⁴⁰ sum, petitioners argue that the correct legal analysis leads to the conclusion that, as the Circuit Court ruled, as a matter of law, Ryland and Pittway did not proximately cause plaintiffs’ damages because they could not have reasonably foreseen, in 1989, the intervening negligent and illegal acts, when, in compliance with all applicable code provisions, they manufactured and installed a single-powered smoke detector in the unfinished basement. They ask this Court to hold that, as a matter of law, the intervening acts of others broke any chain of causation running from their alleged acts or omissions to the injuries that occurred nine years later. Ryland concedes that the Court of Special Appeals recognized, correctly, that the issue on appeal related solely to issues of superseding causes and to the absence of causation.

Ryland quotes from the appellate opinion that the court recognized the proper standard, i.e., that the proper focus is only on the four corners of the Complaint. Ryland concedes also that the court enunciated the correct legal principles pertaining to proximate cause. The gravamen of Ryland’s Complaint with the Court of Special Appeals opinion is that although the court articulated the guiding principles correctly, the court misapplied the correctly stated principles by failing to focus on the issue of legal causation and instead focusing on causation-in-fact, or a but for cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. Ryland states in its brief the following argument: “But although the court seemed to grasp the correct legal principles and the correct scope of review, it proceeded to decide the case on an entirely different set of principles and to base its decision on materials well beyond ‘the four corners of the complaint.’ Specifically, rather than focus on the issue of legal causation—i.e., the issue of whether the Lis’ and Chapmans’ wrongful acts were so unforeseeable as to constitute superseding causes and to break the chain running from Ryland’s alleged acts or omissions—the court focused on whether the absence of a functioning smoke detector did or did not represent a cause-in-fact or but-for cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.

Moreover, rather than ²⁴¹ review the well-pleaded factual allegations of the plaintiffs’ actual complaint, the court based its decision on testimony from depositions that were taken before Ryland (or the manufacturers) had even become parties to the case.” Brief of Ryland at 29. While Pittway does not concede as readily that the Court of Special Appeals recognized the proper standard for superseding causation, it echoed Ryland’s contention that the Court of Special Appeals erred in conflating cause-in-fact with legal cause. Pittway contended that the Court of Special Appeals focused on whether its negligence was a “substantial factor” in causing respondents’ injuries rather than on a determination of proximate cause. Pittway stated as follows: “[Tlhe doctrine of ‘superseding cause relieves the actor from liability, irrespective of whether his antecedent negligence ivas or ivas not a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.’ Courts must assume that the first actor’s alleged negligence was a substantial cause, or cause-in-fact, of the plaintiff’s injuries before even considering the question of superseding cause.

While the ‘substantial factor’ inquiry is largely fact driven, the superseding cause analysis is legal in nature, subject to ‘considerations of fairness and social policy.’ “None of the ‘fact issues’ identified by the Court of Special Appeals has any bearing on the superseding cause analysis. Correctly following the legal standards discussed above and for considering a motion to dismiss, the circuit court assumed that the Manufacturer Appellants’ alleged negligence did, in fact, contribute to the plaintiffs’ injuries. The court then applied the superseding cause analysis to determine whether the Manufacturer Appellants could not have proximately caused the injuries under the law of proximate causation. The ‘fact issues’ identified by the Court of Special Appeals relate exclusively to that which the circuit court properly assumed in accordance with this Court’s ²⁴² prior holdings, i e., that the Manufacturer Appellants’ negligence was a substantial factor.” Brief of Pittway at 26-27 .

V. Analysis and Discussion Before we proceed to an analysis of the issues before the Court, we point out that all parties’ arguments are flawed. Petitioner Pittway states that “[t]he Court of Special Appeals’ first basis for reversing the circuit court’s ruling is that ‘facts determinative’ of whether the Manufacturer Appellants’ negligence were a substantial factor in the plaintiffs’ injuries were not sufficiently developed.... [T]he Court of Special Appeals inexplicably declared that whether the ‘original negligence is a substantial factor’ is somehow important in analyzing superseding causation.” Brief of Pittway at 26 . That is not correct. The Court of Special Appeals said that in order for a motion to dismiss to be granted, superseding causation, which is normally reserved for the trier of fact, must be determined as a matter of law.

To do so, the facts alleged in the Complaint as they relate to petitioners, must “admit of but one inference, [and] the same must be true of the acts of negligence asserted to be causes which supersede that negligence of’ petitioners. Collins, 176 Md.App. at 557 , 933 A.2d at 560 . On the other hand, respondents state that the Court of Special Appeals “correctly held that the facts on superseding causation in this case at least pose a jury question, whether or not the [intermediate appellate] court erred procedurally when it considered documents outside of the Complaint.” Brief of Respondents at 8. That, too, is not correct.

The Court of Special Appeals did not state that the facts pose a jury question. The court stated that the resolution of the issues on a motion to dismiss was premature and that a more expansive review upon motions for summary judgment or on the merits is proper review. Collins, 176 Md.App. at 551 , 933 A.2d at 557 . The significant point the court made is that at the stage of the proceedings, a motion to dismiss, whether the injuries and deaths were foreseeable are susceptible of more than one inference, and were not so close to the polar extreme that the ²⁴³ issue of causation is rendered as a matter of law.

Id. at 552 , 933 A.2d at 557 . A. Legal cause and proximate cause has been widely discussed in cases and legal literature and has posed obstacles to recovery for victims for generations. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1208-09 (9th Cir.2003); Board of County Commissioners v. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, 346 Md. 160, 184 , 695 A.2d 171, 183 (1997); Hamblin v. State, 213 Ariz. 455 , 143 P.3d 388, 390-91 (Ct.App.2006); Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 279 Conn. 622 , 904 A.2d 149, 172-73 (2005); Pierre v. Allstate Ins., Co., 257 La. 471 , 242 So.2d 821, 830 (1970); William Lloyd Prosser & W. Page Keeton, The Law of Torts § 41, at 263-64 (5th ed. 1984) W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L.Rev. 921, 926-27 (2005). The principles have been set out, explored, explicated and expanded.

Nonetheless, the crux of this case is not about any new statement of law, and none of the parties suggest that the principles of proximate causation lack definition or are in need of revision. Instead, petitioners’ argument is that the intermediate appellate court misapplied well-established and well-recognized legal principles. For that reason, a discussion of the applicable legal principles is necessary, and we turn to the Court of Special Appeals’ application of them to this case. It is a basic principle that “[n]egligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the harm alleged.” Stone v. Chicago Title Ins., 330 Md. 329, 337 , 624 A.2d 496, 500 (1993).

Proximate cause “involves a conclusion that someone will be held legally responsible for the consequences of an act or omission.” Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 16 , 264 A.2d 851, 855 (1970). To be a proximate cause for an injury, “the negligence must be 1) a cause in fact, and 2) a legally cognizable cause.” Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 156-57 , 642 A.2d 219, 230 (1994). In other words, before liability may be imposed upon an actor, we require a certain relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the plain ²⁴⁴ tiffs injuries.

The first step in the analysis to define that relationship is an examination of causation-in-fact to determine who or what caused an action. The second step is a legal analysis to determine who should pay for the harmful consequences of such an action. Causation-in-fact concerns the threshold inquiry of “whether defendant’s conduct actually produced an injury.” Peterson, 258 Md. at 16-17 , 264 A.2d at 855 . Two tests have developed to determine if causation-in-fact exists, the but for test and the substantial factor test.

See id. at 16 , 264 A.2d at 855 ; Yonce v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., 111 Md. App. 124, 138 , 680 A.2d 569, 575 (1996), cert. denied, 344 Md. 118 , 685 A.2d 452 (1996); Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md.App. 34, 56-57 , 651 A.2d 908, 918-19 (1994), cert. denied, 338 Md. 557 , 659 A.2d 1293 (1995). The “but for” test applies in cases where only one negligent act is at issue; cause-in-fact is found when the injury would not have occurred absent or “but for” the defendant’s negligent act. Peterson, 258 Md. at 16 , 264 A.2d at 855 ; see also Sindler v. Litman, 166 Md.App. 90, 113 , 887 A.2d 97, 110 (2005). When two or more independent negligent acts bring about an injury, however, the substantial factor test controls.

Causation-in-fact may be found if it is “more likely than not” that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiffs injuries. See Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 240 , 630 A.2d 1145, 1152 (1993) (recognizing and applying the factors); Eagle-Picher v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 208 , 604 A.2d 445, 459 (1992). This Court has adopted the substantial factor test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Eagle-Picher, 326 Md. at 208-09 , 604 A.2d at 459 .

Section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads as follows: “The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and ²⁴⁵ (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.” Section 433 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: “The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another important in determining whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another: (a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of the effect which they have in producing it; (b) whether the