Piven v. Comcast Corp.

LAWRENCE F. PODOWSKY, J., Retired, Specially Assigned. Presented here are two claims of trespass quare clausum fregit which were joined in one action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The properties are under separate ownerships. One lies in Baltimore County but the other lies in Baltimore City.

We shall apply to each claim the ordinary rule, now codified in Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 6-203(b)(4) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ), that the venue for a trespass q.c.f. action is the county where the land lies. In doing so, we shall hold that CJ § 6-203(c) does not alter this rule under the facts of this case. Subtitle 2, “Venue,” of Title 6, “Personal Jurisdiction, Venue, Process and Practice,” of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article consists of three sections. Section 6-201, set forth in full in the margin, provides the general rule for civil actions. 1 Those rules look to a defendant’s residence or ²²³ economic activity, and, in the case of multiple defendants, to where the cause of action arose.

Section 6-202 permits venues in thirteen specific types of actions that are in addition to the venues provided in §§ 6-201 and 6-208. No party to this action argues the applicability of § 6-202. The relevant provisions of CJ § 6-203 read: “(a) In general.—The general rule of § 6-201 does not apply to actions enumerated in this section. “(b) Interest in land.—The venue of the following actions is in the county where all or any portion of the subject matter of the action is located: “(1) Partition of real estate; “(2) Enforcement of a charge or lien on land; “(3) Eminent domain; “(4) Trespass to land; and “(5) Waste. “(c) Property in more than one county.—If the property lies in more than one county, the court in which proceedings are first brought has jurisdiction over the entire property.” The Proceedings The Circuit Court for Baltimore County dismissed, without leave to amend, appellants’ amended class action complaint. In essence, it alleged the following facts.

One of the appellants, Sylvia B. Piven, owns property known as 7914 Stevenson Road in Baltimore County. The remaining appellants, Stanley A. “Tony” Chaplinski and Donna L. Chaplinski, own property known as 1410 Union Avenue in Baltimore City. The appellants sued eleven corporations, two limited partnerships, and two limited liability corporations, the names of all of which ²²⁴ contain the word, “Comcast.” In addition, appellants undertook to sue ninety-nine “John Doe” Comcast corporations. In ¶29 of the amended complaint, the appellants collectively define each named defendant and each John Doe defendant as “ ‘Comcast.’ ” Appellants allege that Comcast “committed, inter alia, a trespass by running cable lines and/or wires across, above, and/or within the property of Plaintiffs and the proposed class (‘Class’) without valid permission to do so.” 2 The amended complaint avers that “Comcast has no legal right to run, cause to be run, maintain, and/or benefit from this trespass; Defendants herein are jointly and severally liable for the tortious conduct identified herein and are the sole (and/or primary) financial beneficiaries of that trespassory conduct.” Appellants complain that “Comcast” has no lawful permission or other legal justification or excuse for “Comcast’s illegal trespassory conduct as alleged herein.” They assert that “[t]he illegal lines or other wires running across the Affected Properties include wires running above Affected Properties (a trespass) and wires attached to utility poles emanating from Affected Properties (also a trespass).” These, and similar allegations, are all incorporated into each of the three counts set forth in the amended complaint.

Those counts are labeled “Trespass to Property,” “Unjust Enrichment,” and “Action for Possession.” The appellees had moved to dismiss the original complaint on the ground, inter alia, of improper venue. They argued that, under CJ “§ 6-203(b)(4) and established common law ²²⁵ principles, actions for trespass on, or [to] quiet title to, real property can only be maintained in the county in which the property is located. Claims involving distinct properties located in different jurisdictions and owned by different plaintiffs cannot be combined in one jurisdiction.” The circuit court agreed with appellees’ argument, and granted the motion to dismiss, with leave to amend. Speaking to the plaintiffs, the court said: “I can tell you that if another action is filed in Baltimore County that relates to the [Baltimore City] property that without there being a certification of a class action then this Court is going to dismiss that and—transfer it, not dismiss it—I’m going to transfer it to Baltimore City, because in my—well, I’m going to dismiss it, because there’s got to be in my view a separate action filed by the Baltimore City Plaintiffs in Baltimore City and that Baltimore County is not the proper venue for the Chaplinski action.” In so ruling, the circuit court rejected the argument by the appellants that the controlling venue statute was CJ § 6-203(c) and that, based on the construction of a predecessor statute to subsection (c) in Roessner v. Mitchell, 122 Md. 460 , 89 A. 722 (1914), subsection (c) authorized a single venue, even where non-eontiguous, separately owned properties were involved.

Following the dismissal, the appellants adhered to their theory of the case and filed an amended complaint which continued to join the claim of the owners of the Baltimore City property. Appellees again moved to dismiss. The circuit court dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety, without transfer or leave to amend. 3 From that judgment this appeal was noted. 4 ²²⁶ The Parties’ Arguments Appellants’ argument rests on Roessner, 122 Md. 460, 89 A. 722 . That decision construed Maryland Code (1912), Article 16, § 87, a provision which, with an immaterial amendment by Chapter 36, § 13 of the Acts of 1962, was codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1966 Repl-Vol.), Article 16, Title, “Chancery,” § 100 at the time CJ § 6-203(c) was adopted in the Code Revision project.

Former § 100 consisted of one long paragraph. To assist our analysis, we shall divide that paragraph into subsections. “[ (a) ] Whenever lands lie partly in one county and partly in another, or partly in a county and partly in the City of Baltimore, or whenever persons proper to be made defendants to proceedings in chancery reside, some in one county and some in another, or some in a county and some in the City of Baltimore, that court shall have jurisdiction in which proceedings shall have been first commenced; [ (b) ] provided that all proceedings for any partition of real estate, to foreclose mortgages on land, or to sell lands under a mortgage, or to enforce any charge or lien on the same shall be instituted in the court of the county or the City of Baltimore where such lands lie; [ (c) ] or if the lands he partly in one county and partly in another, or partly in one county and partly in the City of Baltimore, then such proceedings may be commenced in either county or in the City of Baltimore. [ (d) ] When the defendants, or any of them, reside in a different county from that in which the land lies which is to be affected by a suit, the circuit court for the county (or Baltimore City) where the land or any part thereof lies shall alone have jurisdiction; and process may be sent to the county or counties wherein the defendants respectively reside, to be served by the sheriff of such county or counties upon the defendants named therein, and returnable as directed in the summons.” 5 ²²⁷ Roessner arose out of a sale in lieu of a partition in kind. The plaintiffs and the defendants comprised the five children of a decedent, who had devised to each child an undivided one-fifth interest in land in Baltimore County and an undivided one-fifth interest in the decedent’s interest in land in Washington County. See Roessner v. Mitchell, Trustees, No. 85, October 1913 Term, Court of Appeals of Maryland, Record at 4.

The partition action was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County which had ordered and ratified the sale of the Washington County interest as well as of the Baltimore County property. The purchaser of the Washington County interest, Roessner, refused to settle, “contending that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County was without jurisdiction to decree the sale of land in Washington County, [where] such land is not contiguous to and does not form a part of the tract or parcel of land that is located in Baltimore County, but is a separate tract or parcel of land.” Roessner, 122 Md. at 463 , 89 A. at 722-23 . Rejecting this contention, the Court focused on the last clause of our subsection [ (a) ], i.e., “that court shall have jurisdiction in which proceedings shall have been first commenced.” The Court held: “We do not construe this language as it is construed by the [purchaser] to apply only in those cases where the lands situated in the different counties are contiguous and together form one tract or parcel of land. The language used should be given a wider and more comprehensive meaning.

The purpose of the statute was to avoid a multiplicity of suits and the costs and expenses of such suits. If the appellant’s construction is to be placed upon the statute, it would apply only to a very small number of cases. In the great number of cases, where the lands in the different counties form separate and distinct tracts, proceedings ²²⁸ would have to be instituted in each county in which the land is situated, which would be attended with much cost and expense. This we think was not the intention of the Legislature as expressed by the statute.

In our opinion, the meaning of the language of the statute is that, if all the lands to be affected by the suit are not situated in one county or in the City of Baltimore, but some of them are in one county and some in one or more of the other counties, or some in the City of Baltimore and some in one or more of the counties, then such proceedings may be commenced in either county, or in the City of Baltimore, where any part of said land is situated, and the Court in which the proceedings shall have been first commenced shall have jurisdiction as to all of said lands without regard to the fact that such lands are contiguous and form one tract or parcel of land.” Id. at 463-64 , 89 A. at 723 . From the foregoing, appellants conclude that CJ § 6-203(e) provides venue in Baltimore County for the claim of trespass to property in Baltimore City. The appellees argue that CJ § 6-203(b)(4) controls. They submit that “appellants cannot evade the venue statute by joining distinct trespass claims regarding distinct pieces of real property and then claiming that the ‘property’ that is the subject matter of the action ‘lies in more than one county.’ The ‘property’ that is the ‘subject matter’ of the Chaplinskis’ claim does not lie in more than one county, Section 6—203(e) does not apply to their claim, and the Circuit Court for Baltimore County was not a proper venue for this action.” Brief of Appellees at 14 (footnote omitted).

The appellees point out that Roessner involved partition, not trespass, and that there was a common ownership of the undivided interests in the two properties that were sold in lieu of partition. The Issue Thus, the issue is whether CJ § 6-203(c) permits, or CJ § 6-203(b)(4) prohibits, the joinder of an action of trespass to ²²⁹ realty in Baltimore City with an action of trespass to separately owned realty in Baltimore County. Discussion CJ § 6-208(c) is not to be read completely independently of subsection (b). For example, if subsection (c) were read independently of subsection (b), lands lying in county A and in county B could be partitioned by an action brought in county C, which is not the situs of either property.

That reading completely negates the express requirement of subsection (b) that a “[partition of real estate” be brought “where all or any portion of the subject matter of the action is located.” Reading (b) and (c) independently violates the rules of construction that no part of a statute should be treated as surplusage and that all parts of a statute dealing with the same subject matter should be reconciled to the fullest extent reasonably possible. Kane v. Board of Appeals of Prince George’s County, 390 Md. 145, 162 , 887 A.2d 1060, 1070 (2005); Gilmer v. State, 389 Md. 656, 663 , 887 A.2d 549, 553 (2005); Lawson v. State, 389 Md. 570, 583 , 886 A.2d 876, 883 (2005). Indeed, the appellants do not contend that their putative representative claims could be brought other than in Baltimore City or Baltimore County. We also note that Roessner’s holding is not on venue grounds.

The defaulting purchaser was attacking collaterally the final order of ratification of sale of the interest in Washington County land on the ground that the court in Baltimore County had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Viewed in this light, it appears that at least one purpose of CJ § 6-203(c) is to undergird subject matter jurisdiction in “the court in which proceedings are first brought” over property in the ultra-forum county, in cases where “the property lies in more than one county.” In other words, the sophisticated draftpersons of Code Revision meant jurisdiction when they said “jurisdiction” in subsection (c) and meant venue when they said “venue” in subsection (b). Under the facts in Roessner , the petitioners could have “first brought” their partition action in either Washington County or Baltimore County, because the undivided interests ²³⁰ that they had inherited were in lands in each county. Roessner teaches that, under CJ § 6-203(c), the land need not be one contiguous parcel, lying partly in one county and partly in another.

Roessner , however, does not directly address whether a plaintiff can bring a CJ § 6—203(b) claim in a county where that plaintiff holds no interest in realty, simply by joining that § 6-203(b) claim with another similar § 6-203(b) claim of another plaintiff that does concern realty lying in the forum county. To support their respective positions on the permissible scope of joinder of trespass claims, the parties refer to legislative history, materials from Code Revision, and judicial applications of predecessor statutes. We now turn to a review of that history. Legislative History The current venue provisions were enacted by Chapter 2 of the Acts of 1973, First Extraordinary Session.

See also, generally, Kane v. Schulmeyer, 349 Md. 424, 429-36 , 708 A.2d 1038, 1041-44 (1998) (discussing background of current venue provisions). The Revisor’s Note to Maryland Code (1974), CJ § 6-203 advises as to the sources of the provisions at issue here. “Subsection (b) lists the exceptions contained in [Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.) ], Article 75, §§ 75(a) and 79 and Article 16, § 100. Reference to proceedings for foreclosure or sale of lands under a mortgage are proposed for deletion as covered by subsection (b)(2)—Enforcement of a charge or lien on land. “Subsection(c) is new language derived from Article 21, § 12-102, and Article 16, §§ 100,102 and 104.” Code (1957, 1966 Repl.Vol.), Article 16, § 100, has been set forth, supra, with editorial subparagraphing. Subsection [ (b) ] was the source for CJ § 6—203(b)(1) and (2).

The immediate source for subsection (b)(3) was Code (1957, 1972 Interim Supp.), Article 21, Title, “Real Property,” § 12-102(a) (“A proceeding for condemnation shall be brought in a court of ²³¹ law in the county where the property sought to be condemned is situated.”). 6 The inclusion of trespass in subsection (b) was based on its recognition as a local action by the remedial provisions of Maryland Code