Pleasants Investments Ltd. Partnership v. State Department of Assessments & Taxation

KENNEY, J. This case arises out of the Tax Court’s rejection of appellants’ petition for planned development assessment of their respective properties under Md.Code Ann. (1986, 1993 Supp.), § 8-220 et seq. of the Tax Property Article (“TP”). 1 Appellants raise one question on appeal: Whether the circuit court erred in interpreting § 8-221(2)(ii) of the Tax Property Article in contravention of the General Assembly’s intent. For the reasons following, we shall affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On June 25, 1993, appellants collectively filed an application with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (“SDAT”) seeking a planned development assessment (“PDA”) for their properties, which are located in the Germantown West area of Montgomery County. A PDA permits “contigu ⁴⁸⁶ ous tracts of land of not less than 500 acres,” TP § 8-221(3), to be assessed “at the rate equal to farm or agricultural land.” TP § 8-222(b).

Appellants collectively own 660.67 acres of land (the “subject land”). The subject land is made up of 20 separate parcels of land owned by the different appellants. The various parcels are zoned R-200/TDR (Residential, Transferable Development Rights), R-90 (Residential, One Family), or PD (Planned Development). Montgomery County Code (“MCC”) §§ 59-C-l.l; 59-C-7.

Most of the subject land is zoned R-200/TDR or PD. A developer in the TDR zone must submit a subdivision and a site plan for approval but not a development plan. MGCC § 5-C-1.393. A developer in a PD zone must file a development plan with the district council as well as a site plan.

MGCC § 59-D-l.l; MGCC § 59-D-1.2. In this case, each of the eleven property owners individually have filed the plans required for development within the zoning categories in which their respective properties are located. SDAT denied the application for PDA, and appellants filed a timely appeal to the Property Tax Assessments Appeals Board for Montgomery County (“PTAAB”). PTAAB affirmed SDAT’s decision, stating: “Lacking affirmative compelling evidence to support the granting of ‘rates equal to farm or agricultural land’ the Board must affirm the 1993 [SDAT] value of this large development in Germantown.” Appellants then appealed to the Tax Court.

The Tax Court affirmed the PTAAB ruling, and appellants filed a petition for judicial review by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The circuit court initially remanded the case to the Tax Court for consideration of the criteria set out in TP § 8-221: Land that is assessed [as agricultural land] under § 8-222 of this subtitle must: (1) be located in an area shown on a current master plan or a general or regional plan, or otherwise designated for planned development by a plan adopted by the county or municipal corporation that has planning or zoning jurisdiction over the land; ⁴⁸⁷ (2) be zoned in a classification that: (i) permits development only under the plans listed in item (1) of this section; (ii) requires a land use and comprehensive site development or subdivision plan, approved before development by the county or municipal corporation that has planning or zoning jurisdiction over the land, if those plans consider: 1. land use; 2. utility requirements; 3. highway needs; 4. water and sewers; 5. industrial uses; 6. economic and job opportunities; and 7. recreation and civic life; and (iii) requires the owner of the land to pay for or provide the following public facilities that are usually paid for or provided by a county or municipal corporation or a unit of the county or municipal corporation under other zoning classifications: 1. streets and roads; 2. walkways; 3. open spaces; 4. parks; 5. school sites; and 6. other property needed for public use; (3) except for intervening rights-of-way, easements, or grants for public quasi-public uses, be contiguous tracts of land of not less than 500 acres owned by 1 or more persons; and (4) be primarily undeveloped at the time the land is placed in the zoning classification. On remand, the Tax Court again affirmed PTAAB’s ruling, and appellants again petitioned for judicial review before the ⁴⁸⁸ circuit court. This time, the circuit court affirmed the Tax Court’s ruling.

DISCUSSION I. Appellants argue that the circuit court interpreted the language of TP § 8-221(2)(ii) in contravention of the legislative intent. The legislative intent in creating the PDA assessment is set forth in the legislation: (a) Intent of General Assembly. — The General Assembly-states that it is in the public interest to provide for the development of lands in a planned manner. (b) Necessity for provisions. — The development of lands in a planned manner is necessary to: (1) obtain economic and environmental benefits; (2) relieve economic pressures that result from the assessment of planned development land at levels inconsistent with planned development; (3) aid the assembly of land for planned development land; (4) facilitate cooperation among landowners; and (5) permit holding of planned development land in an undeveloped status for orderly and staged improvement, particularly for the development of new communities. TP § 8-220.

To facilitate its intended goal of “orderly and staged improvement” of land “in a planned manner” the General Assembly alleviated some of the property tax burden of landowners who hold land to develop in an orderly and planned manner. Appellants focus their argument on the following language from TP § 8 — 221 (2) (ii): (ii) requires a land use and comprehensive site development or subdivision plan, approved before development by the county or municipal corporation that has planning or zoning jurisdiction over the land.... [Emphasis supplied.] ⁴⁸⁹ SDAT argues that the meaning of “a” is plain and unambiguous and, for the property owners to qualify for a PDA, there must be a single land use plan for development of the entire 500 or more acres under consideration. SDAT also argues that, even if we were to look beyond the plain language of the statute, there is sufficient evidence in the statutory scheme as a whole that the General Assembly intended for “a” to mean “one.” Standard of Review [T]he final order of the Tax Court is subject to judicial review as provided in §§ 10-222 and 10-223 of the State Government Article, governing the standard of review for decisions of administrative agencies. “Under this standard, a reviewing court is under no statutory constraints in reversing a Tax Court order which is premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law. See, e.g., Supervisor of Assess, v. Carroll, 298 Md. 311 , 469 A.2d 858 (1984); Comptroller v. Mandel ReElection Com., 280 Md. 575 , 374 A.2d 1130 (1977).

On the other hand, where the Tax Court’s decision is based on a factual determination, and there is no error of law, the reviewing court may not reverse the Tax Court’s order if substantial evidence of record supports the agency’s decision.” Supervisor of Assessments v. Keeler, 362 Md. 198, 207 , 764 A.2d 821 (2001)(quoting Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 302 Md. 825, 834 , 490 A.2d 1296 (1985)). The scope of our review is substantially the same as that of the circuit court. That is, we review the Tax Court’s decision and not the decision of the circuit court. Keeler, 362 Md. at 207 , 362 Md. 198 .

Moreover, we view the agency’s decision “in a light most favorable to the agency, since ‘decisions of administrative agencies are prima facie correct,’ and ‘carry with them the presumption of validity.’ ” Keeler, at 209, 764 A.2d 821 (citations omitted). ⁴⁹⁰ The Tax Court’s Ruling The Tax Court affirmed the PTAAB decision denying appellants’ application for the PDA, ruling, in pertinent part: [T]he other requirement [in TPP § 8-221] (2) be in that they be zoned in a classification that in particular [in subsection] ii requires a land use or comprehensive site development or subdivision plan. It seems to me the word “a” in there makes this singular is quite important [sic], especially when looked at in conjunction with 8-220 where the intent of the General Assembly as specified wherein that the special beneficial assessment that is Petitioner’s request be granted only if this process or this benefit according to Number Four facilitates cooperation among landholders and Number Five permits holding of plan development land in an undeveloped status for orderly and staged improvement. My interpretation of this single land user comprehensive site development is critical in that only if there is one land user site development plan can the process assure the cooperation among different land holders and a[n] orderly and staged improvement of the land. If, as in the case here, there’s multiple landowners, each of which could and did file their own separate land use and site development plans, there is no legal way to implement cooperation between the landholders and no way to implement orderly and staged development.

Each individual land use plan would have to be acted upon by the Park and Planning Process and while they can and do look at developments on adjoining parcels, there is no way that they can enforce total cooperation among the different parties nor can they enforce the orderly and staged development of the property. Clearly, that was the intent of the Legislature and it seems to me that that intent would require the singular or one land use or comprehensive plan. The facts in this case are not disputed, and clearly the Tax Court based its decision on its interpretation of the statute. ⁴⁹¹ Rules of Statutory Construction In general terms, the rules of statutory construction are as follows: The principles of statutory construction are not novel. “Every quest to discover and give effect to the objectives of the legislature begins with the text of the statute.” If the legislature’s intentions are evident from the text of the statute, our inquiry normally will cease and the plain meaning of the statute will govern. We bear in mind, however, that the plain-meaning rule is elastic, rather than cast in stone.

If persuasive evidence exists outside the plain text of the statu[t]e, we do not turn a blind eye to it. We often look to the legislative history, an agency’s interpretation of the statute, and other sources for a more complete understanding of what the General Assembly intended when it enacted particular legislation. In so doing, “we may also consider the particular problem or problems the legislature was addressing, and the objectives it sought to attain.” This enables us to put the statute in controversy in its proper context and thereby avoid unreasonable or illogical results that defy common sense. “We should first attempt to ascertain [the legislature’s] intent from the statutory language, reading pertinent parts of the legislative language together, giving effect to all of those parts if we can, and rendering no part of the law surplusage.” Adamson v. Correctional Med. Servs., 359 Md. 238, 251-52 , 753 A.2d 501 (2000) (citations omitted).

Although TP §§ 8-220 through 8-222 are not included in Tax Property Article Title VII, favorable tax treatment of land as agricultural land has been found by the Court of Appeals to be “essentially an exemption, and as such must be strictly construed.” Warlick v. Supervisor of Assessments, 272 Md. 540, 545 , 325 A.2d 587 (1974) (citing Md.Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol., 1973 Cum.Supp.), Art. 81, § 19, the precursor to the statute at issue in this case, as explained infra). When the construction of a tax exemption statute is at issue: ⁴⁹² [I]t is well settled that tax-exemption statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the taxing authority. In Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Retail Sales Tax Division, 317 Md. 3, 11 , 561 A.2d 1034, 1038 (1989) (quoting Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller, 290 Md. 126, 137 , 428 A.2d 1208, 1214-15 (1981)), this Court stated the rule thusly: “It is fundamental that statutory tax exemptions are strictly construed in favor of the taxing authority and if any real doubt exists as to the propriety of an exemption that doubt must be resolved in favor of the State. In other words, ‘to doubt an exemption is to deny it’----The State’s taxing prerogative is never presumed to be relinquished and the abandonment of this power must be proved by the party asserting the exemption.” On the other hand, “[A] strict construction does not preclude a fair one.

Rather it still contemplates a construction that effectuates the legislative intent and objectives; ‘it does not require that an usual or unreasonable meaning be given to the words used in an exemption statute.’ In other words, the rule of strict construction of tax exemptions does not call for strained or unreasonable construction to the extent of being adverse to the real legislative intention, for the judicial interpretation must always be in accordance with the actual meaning of the lawmaking power.” Keeler, 362 Md. at 209-210 , 764 A.2d 821 (citations omitted). As we said' in Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 110 Md. App. 677, 690 , 678 A.2d 602 (1996), aff'd, 348 Md. 2 , 702 A.2d 690 (1997) (citations omitted): “In the final analysis, the real legislative intent prevails. The burden of showing that an exemption is allowed under the law falls upon the claimant.” Plain Language Although it appears to us somewhat myopic, we turn to the substance of appellants’ argument. They contend that the Tax Court’s construction of the word “a” in the phrase “a land use and comprehensive site development or subdivision plan” ⁴⁹³ to mean “one” was in contravention of the legislative intent of the General Assembly.

They argue that Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edition, states that “[t]he article “a” is not necessarily a singular term; it is often used in the sense of “any” and is then applied to more than one individual objection .... “a” may mean one only where one is intended, or it may mean any one of a great number.” Thus, the letter “a” does not invariably as a matter of law mean “one.” At the risk of being drawn into a semantic whirlpool, we note that appellants fail to mention that the same edition of Black’s defines “a” as follows: The word “a” has varying meanings and uses. “A” means “one” or “any,” but less emphatically than either. It may mean one where only one is intended, or it may mean any one of a great number. It is placed before nouns of the singular number, denoting an individual object or quality individualized. Black’s Law Dictionary 1 (6th ed.1990).

Moreover, the portion of Black’s cited by appellant also includes the following: So under a statute providing that the issuance of “a” certificate to one carrier should not bar a certificate to another over the same route, a certificate could be granted to more than two carriers over the same route. Also, article “a” in statute making it a crime for a person to have in his possession a completed check with intent to defraud includes the plural. But the meaning depends on context. For example, in Workers’ Compensation Act, on, or in or about “a” railway, factory, etc., was held not to mean any railway, factory, etc. but the railway, factory, etc., of the employer.

Where the law requires the delivery of a copy of a notice to husband and a copy to wife, the sheriffs return that he had delivered “a copy” to husband and wife was insufficient. Black’s Law Dictionary 1 (6th ed.) (citations omitted, italics in original, bold text emphasis supplied). 2 ⁴⁹⁴ The Oxford English Dictionary defines the indefinite article “a,” as follows: A is strictly adjective and can only be used with a substantive following. Meanings:— 1. One, some, any: the oneness or indefiniteness, being implied rather than asserted.

It is especially used in first introducing an object to notice, which object, after being introduced by a, is kept in view by the; as T plucked a flower; this is the flower.’ Used before a noun singular, and its attributes. Oxford English Dictionary 4 (2d ed.1989) (italics in original). Finally, Webster’s defines the indefinite article “a” as follows: 3 a: one < swords all of a length > <men all of a sort> b — used as a function word to suggest limitation in number <with only a brigade to defend the fort> c: the same cbirds of a feather> 4 a: a particular illustration of: an example of (a named class) <he is a man> b — used as a function word before a singular noun followed by a restrictive clause or other identifying modifier <a man who was here yesterday> c: any, each — used with a following restrictive modifier <a man guilty, of kidnaping wins scant sympathy> <a man who is sick can’t work well> Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1 (1976) (italics and bold typeface in original). The foregoing dictionary definitions simply indicate that the indefinite article “a” is implied to mean “one” or “each,” subject to context.

Here, the relevant context is “land that is assessed [PDA] must ... be zoned in a classification that ... requires a land use and comprehensive site development or subdivision plan, approved before development by the county or municipal corporation that has planning or zoning jurisdiction over the land, if those plans consider” land use, utility infrastructure, highways, and other development factors. In this context, “land” means all the land assembled for the PDA, which must be at least 500 acres of contiguous land, and ⁴⁹⁵ requires that “land” to be zoned in a classification that requires either an approved comprehensive site development plan or subdivision plan to develop the land. Appellants, at oral argument, cited cases not cited in their briefs in favor of their contention that in this case “a” means more than one. 3 We will discuss two of them briefly. In Lewis v. Spies, 43 A.D.2d 714, 715 , 350 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1973), the court construed a restrictive covenant that contained language allowing the construction of “a private dwelling house or a part thereof and the outbuildings connected therewith.” The defendant in the case wished to construct a private home on a portion of property he owned.

The portion on which he wished to build was part of a larger parcel conveyed in 1904 by Garden City Company to Chase Mellon. Another portion of the property conveyed by the 1904 deed already contained a private home. The 1904 deed contained a number of covenants, including the following: “First: That the said premises shall not, nor shall any part thereof be used for any commercial or manufacturing trade or business or purposes or for any factory, shop, hotel, livery or boarding stable, lodging, tenement, boarding or apartment house, school, seminary, hospital, or other institution, and that no building or structure except a private dwelling house or a part thereof and the outbuildings connected therewith shall at any time be erected thereon, and that no structure at any time thereon shall be used hereafter for any purpose other than as a private dwelling house, except the necessary and proper stables and outbuildings connected or designed for use in connection with such dwelling house; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit the owner or tenant of any building on said land actually occupied by him or her primarily as a dwelling house, from pursuing or teaching the liberal arts, sciences or professions or from taking at any one time four ⁴⁹⁶ or any less number of persons to board or lodge” (emphasis supplied). Lewis, 43 A.D.2d at 715 , 350 N.Y.S.2d 14 .

The court reviewed twenty-three additional deeds by the common grantor, and found that all of them, unlike the subject property, specifically limited to either one or two the number of dwellings that could be constructed on the parcel. Construing the covenant in favor of the free use of the land, the court consequently found that in this instance “a” meant more than one. Id., 43 A.D.2d at 716 , 350 N.Y.S.2d 14 . Here, we construe the statute strictly in favor of the State.

In Lindley v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 506 , 56 N.E.2d 832 (1944),