Poole v. State

KEHOE, J. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Bryan Lamont Poole was convicted of first degree murder and use of a handgun in a crime of violence. On March 25, 1996, Poole was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and twenty years for the handgun conviction (to be served concurrently). His conviction and sentence were affirmed by a panel of this Court on January 24, 1997. Poole v. State, Slip Op., No. 500, Sept. Term, 1996 (filed January 24, 1997), 118 Md.App. 737 (1997).

On March 14, 2006, Poole filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. On January 24, 2008, Poole’s assigned public defender filed a “Supplemental Petition for Post Conviction Relief’ raising additional grounds for relief. 1 At the ³ postconviction hearing on October 1, 2008, the court dismissed Poole’s supplemental petition as untimely filed. Thereafter, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order denying Poole’s original petition for postconviction relief. Poole filed an application for leave to appeal.

We granted his application on March 30, 2011. Poole presents one question to this Court, which we have altered slightly: Did the postconviction court err in dismissing Poole’s supplemental petition for postconviction relief because it was not filed within ten years of the date of his sentencing as required by MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-103(b)(1)?

We conclude that the postconviction court erred by dismissing Poole’s amended petition for failure to show “extraordinary cause.” Amendments to postconviction relief petitions are governed by Maryland Rule 4-402(c), which provides that an “[ajmendment of the petition shall be freely allowed in order to do substantial justice.” The aspect of substantial justice at issue in this case is a postconviction petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court erred in dismissing Poole’s amended petition for post-conviction relief. Factual and Procedural Background The facts relevant to this appeal are those that concern the timeliness of Poole’s original petition for postconviction relief and Poole’s amended petition for postconviction relief. We will limit our background discussion to these facts.

Poole was sentenced on March 25, 1996. He was required to file his petition for postconviction relief within ten years of this date, i.e. by March 27, 2006 (March 25, 2006 was a Saturday). Poole complied with this deadline by filing a pro se petition for postconviction relief on March 14, 2006, alleging court error and ineffective assistance of counsel. Thereafter, ⁴ Poole’s case was referred to the Office of the Public Defender, Collateral Review Division.

The Office received this referral on April 3, 2006. On April 25, 2006, an assistant public defender entered an appearance on behalf of Poole. The hearing on Poole’s petition was initially scheduled for October 12, 2006. Because of difficulty in obtaining transcripts and the reassigning of Poole’s case to a different public defender, the postconviction court granted three postponement motions filed by Poole’s counsel.

On January 24, 2008, Poole’s counsel filed a supplemental petition, which raised additional claims to the issues raised in the original pro se petition. 2 The State filed its answer to Poole’s supplemental petition on September 19, 2008. The State argued, inter alia, that “Poole’s supplemental petition was filed well outside the 10-year time limit ... and should be dismissed.” Poole’s hearing was held on October 1, 2008. At the hearing, the State orally moved to dismiss the supplemental petition because Poole failed to show “extraordinary cause” for filing the supplemental petition outside the ten year statute of limitations. Poole argued that the arguments in the supplemental petition should be considered because the original petition was filed pro se.

The postconviction court agreed with the State that “extraordinary cause” had not been shown and granted the State’s motion to dismiss. ⁵ The postconviction court issued a written opinion reiterating this position on December 4, 2008. In the opinion, the court “determined that the filing of a Supplemental Petition to a Post-Conviction Petition is to be governed by the purview of the 10-year rule.” The court decided that supplemental petitions, even ones that amend timely filed original petitions, can only be accepted by the court if “extraordinary cause is shown.” The court reasoned that “[i]f supplemental petitions were not also restrained by the 10-year filing rule ... the 10-year rule would be moot, allowing petitioners unfettered time to file and present a petition for post-conviction relief.” After dismissing the supplemental petition, the postconviction court found no merit in the pro se petition and denied all relief to Poole. Discussion The primary issue before this Court is whether a postconviction court errs in dismissing an amended petition for postconviction relief when it is filed more than ten years after the date of sentencing and the petitioner fails to show “extraordinary cause” for filing at such time. Poole argues that “extraordinary cause” need not be established because his original petition was timely filed and amendments to timely filed petitions are freely allowed.

The State counters that the “extraordinary cause” standard must apply because freely accepting new arguments after the limitations period would ignore the purpose of enacting the limitations period in the first place. We discuss these arguments and others in turn. In Maryland, postconviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”), see MD. CODE ANN.

CRIM. PROC. (“CP”) § 7-101 et seq. (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.), and the Maryland Rules implementing the UPPA, see Rule 4-401 et seq.

The outcome of this case turns on our interpretation of the UPPA. 3 ⁶ The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Obomighie v. State, 170 Md.App. 708, 710 , 908 A.2d 132 (2006) (citing Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688 , 861 A.2d 727 (2004)). In Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274-76 , 987 A.2d 18 (2010), Judge Harrell summarized the applicable principles of statutory interpretation: The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature. A court’s primary goal in interpreting statutory language is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under scrutiny.

To ascertain the intent of the General Assembly, we begin with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute. If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction. We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. ⁷ We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confíne strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.

We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope. (Citations and quotation marks omitted). The relevant sections of the UPPA are unambiguous as applied to the facts of this case. CP § 7-102 lists the substantive requirements that a petitioner must satisfy to begin a postconviction proceeding; CP § 7-103 explains the number of petitions that may be filed and states the time period in which petitions must be filed; and CP § 7-108 sets out a petitioner’s right to counsel and a hearing.

Rule 4-401 provides the venue where a petition should be filed; Rule 4-402 sets out the minimum content that a petition should contain and sets out a provision governing amendments to the petition; and Rule 4-403 states that, if the petitioner is indigent, the clerk of the court shall notify the Public Defender’s Office by forwarding it a copy of the petition. Two of these provisions are particularly important to the present dispute. CP § 7-103(b)(l) explains the available time frame for commencing a postconviction action: Unless extraordinary cause is shown, in a case in which a sentence of death has not been imposed, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed. Thus, a petition for postconviction relief may be filed as a matter of right within ten years of the date of sentencing, but after ten years, the court must find extraordinary cause to accept such a petition.

The UPPA does not address amendments to postconviction petitions, but the Maryland Rules do. ⁸ Rule 4-402(c) states that “[ajmendment of the petition shall be freely allowed in order to do substantial justice.” It is the interplay of these two provisions that fuels the dispute before us. We conclude that the postconviction court erred in dismissing Poole’s amended petition. The “extraordinary cause” standard set out in CP § 7-103(b)(l) does not apply to amendments made to timely filed petitions. A petitioner must show extraordinary cause only if the original petition for postcon-viction relief is filed more than ten years after the sentence was imposed.

If the original petition is timely filed, as it was in this case, then under Rule 4-402(c), amendments to petitions “shall be freely allowed in order to do substantial justice.” Our reasoning follows. The scope, meaning and applicability of CP § 7—103(b)(1) becomes clear when read in context with other provisions in the UPPA. See Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006) (“The plain language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation. Rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect.”).

CP § 7-102 states the requirements that a convicted person must satisfy to “begin a proceeding” under the UPPA. CP § 7-103 explains the time period in which a person should begin such a proceeding and lists how many petitions a person may file. Specifically, CP § 7-103 says that “a person may file only one petition for relief’ and that “a petition ... may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed.” These requirements only apply to petitions that “begin a proceeding,” i.e. petitions filed to institute a postcon-viction proceeding as contemplated in CP § 7-102. The requirements listed in the UPPA do not apply to amendments.

In fact, the UPPA does not address amendments at all. For insight on amendments to postconviction petitions, we must turn to Chapter 400 of Title 4 of the Maryland Rules, entitled “Post Conviction Procedure.” There, Rule 4-402(c) clearly and unequivocally states: “Amendment of the petition ⁹ shall be freely allowed in order to do substantial justice.” 4 As long as the petition that begins the proceeding is timely filed, amendment of that petition is freely allowed. The “extraordinary cause” standard only applies if the original petition—the petition that begins the proceeding—is “filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed.” CP § 7—103(b)(1). This conclusion is supported by CP § 7-108.

That statute provides that “[ejxcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person is entitled to assistance of counsel and a hearing on a petition filed under this title.” It is fundamental that “ ‘the right to counsel means the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ ” Stovall v. State, 144 Md.App. 711, 721 , 800 A.2d 31 (2002), cert. denied, 371 Md. 71 , 806 A.2d 681 (2002) (quoting State v. Flansburg, 345 Md. 694, 700 , 694 A.2d 462 (1997)) (emphasis added). In the context of postconviction proceedings, the right to effective assistance of counsel necessarily includes the right to add non-frivolous issues developed by counsel, which were not included in the original petition. See O’Connor v. Director, 238 Md. 1, 2 , 207 A.2d 615 (1965) (“It is a meaningless gesture to appoint counsel, if that counsel is afforded no opportunity, by suggesting amendments to the petition or otherwise, to assist the applicant.”); Hobbs v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 219 Md. 684, 686 , 148 A.2d 380 (1959) (“Since under the [Maryland Post Conviction Procedure] Act it is contemplated that the proceeding ... may be invoked only once, it is important that the applicant shall have an opportunity through counsel to present any ground of alleged error not previously and finally litigated.”). If amendments were not freely allowed to timely filed pro se petitions, a petitioner’s right to assistance of counsel would be reduced to a mere right to have an attorney appear at a hearing to ¹⁰ argue the issues as presented in the pro se petition, which are often frivolous.

It is only appropriate that counsel have the opportunity to remove frivolous claims as well as to add non-frivolous claims by freely amending a postconviction petition. See Niblett v. Warden of Md. House of Corr., 221 Md. 588, 591 , 155 A.2d 659 (1959) (“[T]rial judges should require counsel who represent post conviction procedure applicants ... to file amended