Pope v. Board of School Commissioners

DAVIS, Judge. Pro Se appellant Mayner J. Pope appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City that granted appellees’ Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and denied appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Essentially appellant presents two questions on appeal, which we restate as follows: I. Did the trial court err in concluding that appellant’s wrongful interference with contract claim failed to state a cause of action because it was asserted against the employees of a party to the contract?

II

Did the trial court err in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to appellant’s breach of contract claim with regard to factual findings made in a prior trial, in which appellant was a party? We answer the first question in the negative, and therefore affirm this part of the circuit court’s judgment. We answer the second question in the affirmative. We, however, affirm the judgment of the circuit court, for reasons set forth below.

FACTS In her complaint, appellant identifies herself as a tenured special education teacher employed in the Baltimore City school system. From October 1987 to June 1991, appellant worked at Forest Park High School (Forest Park) in Baltimore, Maryland, and was a member of the Baltimore Teacher’s Union (BTU). In September 1991, appellant retired from the Baltimore City Public School System on medical disability retirement. The record fairly indicates that appellant was a disgruntled employee. ⁵⁸⁵ Appellees in this case are the Board of School Commissioners for Baltimore City (the Board); Dr. Walter Amprey, the Superintendent of Public Instruction; Lester McCrea, the Executive Assistant to the Board; Brenda Conley, the Director of Human Resources for the Board; Jerrelle Francois, the Associate Superintendent for Secondary Schools; and Annette Howard Hall, the principal of Forest Park High School.

These individual appellees are hereinafter collectively referred to as the “individual appellees.” At all times relevant to this appeal, an agreement (the Agreement) between the BTU and the Board governed the employment relationship between BTU members, Baltimore City school teachers, and their employer, the Board. In particular, Article IV of the Agreement outlines the procedure by which a teacher may seek relief for a “grievance.” The Agreement defines a grievance as a violation of any provision of the Agreement or of the policy of the Board. To understand properly the procedural posture of this case, it is necessary to explain the Agreement’s multi-step grievance resolution procedure. The first step involves an informal meeting between the teacher and school administrator.

If the grievance is not resolved at the informal stage, the complaint proceeds up four stages of hearings, or “levels,” as referred to by the parties. The “Level I” hearing is conducted before the school administrator. The “Level II” hearing is conducted before the Assistant Superintendent. The “Level III” hearing is conducted before the Superintendent.

The “Level IV” hearing is conducted before the Board. Finally, if the matter is still unresolved, the BTU may move for final and binding arbitration. The instant dispute is based on appellant’s belief that the manner in which the Board and the individual appellees processed two of appellant’s alleged grievances was improper and contrary to the terms of the Agreement. Due to the state of the record, gleaning the facts surrounding appellant’s grievances is difficult.

Nonetheless, we are satisfied that the following factual description fairly represents what occurred. During the course of appellant’s employment, ⁵⁸⁶ Neil Ross, a BTU representative, filed two grievances on appellant’s behalf. The first grievance, No. 1175, was filed on June 7, 1991. In this grievance, appellant complained that her 1990-91 annual teacher evaluation was not timely filed.

The record is unclear as to whether appellant believes the evaluation should have been submitted to her no later than April 1, 1991 or no later than June 1, 1991. There seems to be agreement, however, that appellant was actually handed the evaluation on June 3, 1991. Apparently, appellant was angered more about the evaluation, which indicated areas in which she needed improvement, than about the delay. Shortly after the filing of grievance No. 1175, appellant was notified that she would be transferred from Forest Park to another school.

In an attempt to resist this transfer, a second grievance, No. 1208, was filed on August 30, 1991. On July 2, 1991 a “Level I” hearing for grievance No. 1175 was held, bypassing the informal step. The school administrator decided to take no action on grievance No. 1175. Appellant, through Neil Ross, requested a “Level II” hearing.

No “Level II” hearing was scheduled. Interpreting the Agreement to allow a grievant to appeal to the next level when no hearing is scheduled, Ross requested a “Level III” hearing. Again, no hearing was scheduled for the “Level III” hearing. This caused Ross to request a “Level IV” hearing.

Ultimately a “Level IV” hearing was scheduled for December 12, 1991. On appellant’s behalf, Ross, however, requested that the “Level IV” hearing be postponed, and a “Level III” hearing be scheduled. A “Level III” hearing was scheduled for February 28, 1992. On that day, however, the Labor Relations Director apparently refused to hear the grievance.

Ross then requested that the “Level IV” hearing be rescheduled. A date for the “Level IV” hearing was finally set for May 29, 1992. The “Level IV” hearing proceeded before a hearing officer as scheduled. On June 26, 1992, the hearing officer recommended that the Board deny appellant’s grievance.

The Board adopted this recommendation on August 25, 1992, at which time the decision to deny grievance No. 1175 became final. ⁵⁸⁷ Appellant requested Ross to pursue the matter to binding arbitration, the final procedural step under the Agreement. The BTU, however, decided against arbitration. Ross notified appellant of the BTU’s decision, and instructed appellant that she could appeal the Board’s decision to the State Board of Education without the union. It should also be noted that during this time, and right up to the hearing date, school officials offered to change appellant’s evaluation to “satisfactory” in order to resolve the entire dispute.

Appellant, however, rejected this offer. Ross pursued grievance No. 1208 directly to the “Level III” stage, apparently because it is common BTU practice to initiate transfer grievances at this level. He indicated that appellant later notified him by letter that she had decided to waive pursuit of grievance No. 1208. Appellant, however, alleges that she only considered dropping this grievance, but made no final decision in this regard.

According to Ross, the hearing examiner ruled in the May 29, 1992 hearing that the issue of appellant’s transfer was moot because appellant had since retired. In any event, proceedings on grievance No. 1208 never went forward. As a result of both the disposition of these grievances and appellant’s unhappy employment relationship with the Board, appellant filed several lawsuits in federal and state courts. For our purposes here, we are only concerned with two of these lawsuits.

The first suit is Pope v. Baltimore Teacher’s Union, Case No. 93022046/CL159165 (hereinafter “Pope v. BTU”). Appellant filed this suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the BTU, wherein she alleged that the BTU failed fairly and adequately to represent her with regard to grievances No. 1175 and No. 1208. In Pope v. BTU, the trial court (Heller, J.) entered summary judgment against appellant and in favor of the BTU. Judgment was entered against appellant’s unfair representation claim for grievance No. 1175 (the evaluation grievance) on what we believe to be two alternative grounds: (1) appellant was required to exhaust her state ⁵⁸⁸ administrative remedies under the Education Article of the Maryland Code on the issue of inadequate union representation by appealing to the State Board of Education before seeking judicial relief; and, (2) even if not required to do so, the BTU’s representation of appellant was fair and adequate.

In reaching this determination, the trial court found as facts that appellant failed to appeal grievance No. 1175 to the State Board and that grievance No. 1175 did not go to binding arbitration. Judgment was entered against appellant’s unfair representation claim for grievance No. 1208 (the transfer grievance) on the ground that it had become moot in light of the trial court’s findings of fact that appellant voluntarily waived this grievance, and that appellant had since retired. Appellees note in their brief that appellant appealed Pope v. BTU, but that this Court affirmed the granting of summary judgment. Pope v. BTU, No. 440 (Md.Ct.Spec.App., Sept. Term, Jan. 9, 1995).

The second suit is the instant case, filed on May 27, 1994, subsequent to Pope v. BTU. In this case, appellant filed a two-count complaint against appellees. In the first count, appellant sued the individual appellees, alleging that they wrongfully interfered with the Agreement by failing adequately to process the grievances. For example, appellant alleges that the individual appellees failed to schedule hearings, failed to “act in good faith and fair dealings,” and failed to keep appellant from peril.

In the second count, appellant sues only the Board and Dr. Amprey for breach of the Agreement. In this count, appellant alleged that appellee Amprey failed to schedule a Level III hearing for grievance No. 1208, and that the Board failed to adhere to the procedures outlined in the Agreement. In total, appellant seeks $71,150,000. Rather than file an answer to this complaint, appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment pursuant to Maryland Rules 2-322 and 2-501.

Appellant filed a response thereto and also filed her own motion for summary judgment. A hearing on the motions was held on October 3, 1994. According to appellant no transcript was made of that hearing. On October 5, 1994, the trial judge issued a written ⁵⁸⁹ order granting judgment in favor of appellees on both counts of appellant’s complaint, and denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment.

On the contractual interference count (count one), the trial court held that the individual appellees were all employees of the Board. The trial court concluded, therefore, that under Maryland law this count must be dismissed because employees of a party to a contract cannot be sued for interference with that contract. Regarding the breach of contract count (count two), the trial court held that the findings of fact in the prior litigation of Pope v. BTU had collateral estoppel effect. According to the trial court, the trial judge in Pope v. BTU found that appellant failed to proceed to the final step of binding arbitration for grievance No. 1175 and that appellant failed to proceed with the institution of a Level III hearing for grievance No. 1208.

Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, therefore, the trial court held that these facts were established against appellant for purposes of the instant litigation. Accordingly, the trial judge determined that, under the holding of Howard County Bd. of Educ. v. Howard County Educ. Ass’n, 61 Md.App. 631 , 487 A.2d 1220 (1985), appellant inappropriately filed suit in circuit court for breach of the Agreement, because appellant failed to exhaust the dispute resolution procedures of the Agreement. Thus, the trial court granted judgment in favor of appellees.

LEGAL ANALYSIS I Initially, we note that the record is unclear regarding whether the trial judge granted a motion to dismiss or granted a motion for summary judgment. Appellees’ motion was couched in the alternative requesting a dismissal “and/or” summary judgment. Additionally, the trial court’s written order disposing of appellant’s action refers to both types of motions. ⁵⁹⁰ The nature of the trial judge’s ruling, of course, affects the appropriate standard of review to be followed in this appeal. “When reviewing the grant of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court must determine whether the trial court was legally correct. But this determination depends on the nature of the relief given.” Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hospital, 93 Md.App. 772, 785 , 614 A.2d 1021 (1992).

In order to follow the correct standard of review, therefore, it is necessary to determine what the trial court actually did. Hrehorovich guides us in this regard. We conclude from the record and the trial judge’s written order that the trial judge granted a motion to dismiss on the first count for failure to state a cause of action. We reach this conclusion because it is fairly evident from its written order that the trial court decided that, assuming the truth of the facts as alleged in the first count of appellant’s complaint, the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

See Hrehorovich, at 781-83, 614 A.2d 1021 (1992). A fair review of the record and the trial judge’s written order indicates that the trial judge granted a motion for summary judgment on the second count. We reach this conclusion because the trial court looked beyond the pleadings to the facts as established in Pope v. BTU, and determined that judgment against appellant must be granted. In other words, because it considered matters outside the pleadings, the court was deciding a motion for summary judgment.

Id. As a result, granting the motion to dismiss count one was proper if the trial court was legally correct when it determined that count one of the complaint did not disclose, on its face, a legally sufficient cause of action. Id. at 785 , 614 A.2d 1021 . Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 520 , 287 A.2d 265 (1972).

Granting summary judgment as to count two was proper only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and ■ the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. ⁵⁹¹ Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486, 495 , 520 A.2d 717 (1987). To these principles, we add that an appellate court will affirm a circuit court’s judgment on any ground adequately shown by the record, even one upon which the circuit court has not relied or one that the parties have not raised. Faulkner v. American Cas.

Co., 85 Md.App. 595, 629 , 584 A.2d 734 (1991). Therefore, it is within our province to affirm the trial court if it reached the right result for the wrong reasons. Id. II Appellant first argues that the trial court should not have dismissed her wrongful interference with contract count.

Essentially, appellant insists that the trial judge’s conclusion, that under Maryland law an interference with contract claim cannot be maintained against these individual appellees as a result of their status as Board agents, was incorrect. There is no cause of action for interference with a contract when suit is brought against a party to the contract. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 Md. 313, 329 , 424 A.2d 744 (1981). It is widely recognized that one cannot be liable for tortious interference with his own contract.

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Merling, 326 Md. 329, 343 , 605 A.2d 83 (1992). The reasoning behind this rule is that a suit for breach of contract is the appropriate remedy. Wilmington Trust Co., at 329-30, 424 A.2d 744.

These principles apply equally to employees of parties to contracts. “Thus, when an employee acts within the scope of her employment, or as an agent of her employer, she cannot be held liable for interfering with the contract, business relationships, or economic relationships, between the employer and another.” Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Serv., 98 Md.App. 123, 147 , 632 A.2d 463 (1993). Indeed, in order to sustain such a claim, there must be an allegation that the employee in question somehow acted maliciously for his own motives and beyond the scope of his authority without the ⁵⁹² intent to further the interests of the employer. Id. at 147-48 , 632 A.2d 463 . There can be no doubt that the individual appellees were agents of the Board, a party to the Agreement.

In fact, appellant expressly alleged the same in her complaint. In support of our conclusion, as appellees correctly point out in their brief, the Baltimore City Charter provides