Porter v. Bayliner Marine Corp.

BELL, Chief Judge. We granted certiorari in this case to address an issue not heretofore considered by Maryland courts, whether, when an ⁶¹¹ award by the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“Commission”) requiring periodic payments is satisfied by a single lump sum payment, without Commission approval, Maryland Code (1957,1991 RepLVol.) § 9-736 of the Labor and Employment Article 1 bars the reopening of the claim giving rise to the award more than five years after the lump sum payment is made, and, thus, any modification of that award. The Commission determined that it did, and, on judicial review, the Circuit Court for Allegany County concurred. We shall reverse.

I The facts are largely undisputed. Arthur R. Porter (the “appellant”) was employed by Bayliner Marine Corporation (“Bayliner”), a boat manufacturing facility. On March 13, 1988, he sustained an accidental injury when, while lifting a boat deck, he stepped on an air hose and twisted his right leg and back. Subsequently, the appellant filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits with the Commission.

Eventually, after receiving temporary total disability benefits on two separate occasions, appellant, Bayliner, and its insurance carrier, National Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh (“the appellees”), entered into a stipulation in which it was agreed that the appellant had sustained an 11% permanent disability of the body as a whole. The Commission adopted the stipulation, and, in conformity with it, by order dated August 17, 1989, made an Award of Compensation, in which the appellees were ordered to pay the appellant permanent partial disability benefits of “11% under ‘Other Cases’ to the body as a whole at the rate of $80.00, payable weekly, beginning February 6, 1989 for a period of 55 weeks.” The appellees were further ordered to pay, from the final weeks of compensation, the appellant’s attorney’s fee of $880.00 and $104.00 in reimburse ⁶¹² ment of a medical bill. By check dated August 22,1989, in the amount of $4,400.00, 2 and made payable to the appellant and his counsel, the appellees paid the full amount of the award in a lump sum. Neither the appellant nor the appellees sought or received authorization from the Commission for the payment of the award in that fashion.

Believing that his condition had not improved as expected and, indeed, had worsened, the appellant sought to reopen his claim by filing, on August 29, 1994, an “Issues” form, in which he alleged “worsening of condition—low back with pain radiating into both legs.” This was more than five years after the lump sum payment of August 22,1989, but less than five years from when the last periodic payment required by the Commission’s August 17, 1989 order would have been paid. 3 The appellees responded by raising, among other issues, limitations. Following a hearing, the Commission, agreeing with the appellees, concluded that the appellant’s claim to reopen was barred by limitations and, so, passed an order dismissing it. The appellant filed, in the circuit court, a petition for judicial review of the Commission’s decision. The appellees responded by filing a Motion for Summary Judgment, to which the appellant filed an opposition.

In the motion and accompanying memorandum, the appellees once again argued that the appellant’s request to reopen was barred by limitations. The court held a hearing, following which, on April 29, 1996, it signed an order granting the appellees’ motion for summary judgment. This Court granted certiorari on its own motion before the appeal, filed by the appellant, was heard by the Court of Special Appeals. ⁶¹³ II Critical to the resolution of the issue before the Court is § 9-736(b)(3), it being crystalline that, subject to its limitation, the Commission has continuing power and jurisdiction to modify the findings and orders it makes in respect to each Workers’ Compensation claim. 4 That section provides: “Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Commission may not modify an award unless the modification is applied for within five years after the last compensation payment.” The appellees assert that interpretation of this section is dispositive and, therefore, it is not necessary to consider any other provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. They argue, as they did before the Commission and the circuit court, that if the words used in § 9-736(b)(3) are given their ordinary and natural meaning, the statute is clear and unambiguous and, thus, does not permit modification of a previous award more than five years after the last compensation payment, whether a periodic one or a lump sum, and whether authorized by the Commission or not.

The appellant disagrees. He believes that it is important that payment of an award by a lump sum, as an option, is required by § 9-729 to be approved by the Commission. 5 Pertaining to the conversion of periodic payments to a lump sum, that section provides, in pertinent part: ⁶¹⁴ “(b) Conversion to lump sum.—If the Commission finds that a lump-sum payment is warranted under the facts and circumstances of a claim, the Commission may order that compensation payable to a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee be converted to a partial or lump sum. (e) Reduction of future payments.—If the Commission grants a lump-sum payment under this section in a claim involving permanent total disability or death, the Commission shall: (1) reduce the weekly rate of compensation until the amount of the lump sum would have been paid if it had been paid in weekly payments; and (2) determine in the award: (i) the dollar amount and the number of weeks to be paid by the employer or its insurer at the reduced weekly rate____ * * * * (d) Discount prohibited.—An award may not be discounted because of a lump sum payment.” Moreover, the appellant finds the Commission’s regulation on the subject, Code of Maryland Regulations, § 14.09.01.18, also to be relevant and material. Promulgated pursuant to § 9-309, 6 the regulation states: “A. A claimant seeking a lump sum payment shall file an application with the Commission.

The application shall state specifically the facts and circumstances that the claimant contends justify the lump sum payment and shall be accompanied by any documents upon which the claimant is relying to support the application. B. The party who may be required to make the lump sum payment shall file with the Commission a statement showing the outstanding balance of payments due the claimant and ⁶¹⁵ indicating whether that party objects to the granting of application. C. A hearing on the application shall be scheduled only if an objection and a request for hearings are filed, or on the Commission’s own initiative.” The appellant also points out that lump sum awards or payments are the exception, not the rule and, thus, while necessary in some cases, certainly are not favored. He notes further that such awards are not made lightly or for other than important or necessary reasons.

Consequently, the appellant concludes that failure to obtain the approval of the Commission to convert an award of periodic payments to a lump sum renders any such payment a nullity with respect to the application of § 9-736(b)(3). The thrust of the appellant’s argument is that § 9-736(b)(3) must be read in light of, and reconciled with, § 9-729. Though not stated explicitly, he seems to recognize that, § 9—736(b)(3) is clear and unambiguous only if viewed in isolation, without the benefit of § 9-729; however, when read together with § 9-729, it is quite ambiguous, it not being clear whether the last payment refers to an authorized payment, rather than an unauthorized one. Ill In B. Frank Joy Co. v. Isaac, 333 Md. 628 , 636 A.2d 1016 (1994), this Court reiterated what the Legislature declared loudly and clearly when it enacted, more than 80 years ago, what was to become the Workers’ Compensation Act, its purpose, general aim and policy, what was sought to be achieved, and the evils to be addressed.

We said: “In the preamble to the Act, the legislators recognized that industries necessary for the prosperity of the state involve ‘injury to large numbers of workmen, resulting in their partial or total incapacity or death,’ and that, under the legal system at the time, determining the responsibility of the employer meant ‘great and unnecessary cost ... in litigation, which cost is borne by the workmen, the employers and the taxpayers.... ’ Beyond that, ‘the State and its ⁶¹⁶ taxpayers are subjected to a heavy burden in providing care and support for such injured workmen and their dependents, which burden should, in so far as may be consistent with the rights and obligations of the people of the State, be more fairly distributed.... ’ To alleviate the burden on both the citizens of Maryland and the workers and their families, the Act withdrew from private controversy all questions of fault in accidents arising in hazardous employment. To provide ‘sure and certain relief for workmen injured in extra-hazardous employments and their families and dependents,’ the General Assembly created the State Industrial Accident Commission, which is now the Workers’ Compensation Commission. The Legislature bestowed upon the Commission the exclusive administrative and supervisory authority over the Act. The Commission’s duties, in the main, were to examine individual cases and decide whether to order employers to compensate injured employees, and, if so, in what amount, so as to fulfill the expressed policy, aims and objectives of the legislation.” Id. at 634-635 , 636 A.2d at 1019-1020 , quoting the Acts of 1914, ch. 800.

We had earlier quoted, in another case, the statement contained in its Preamble of the purpose and goal of the Acts of 1914, Chapter 800: “The Workmen’s Compensation Act was passed to promote the general welfare of the State and to prevent the State and its taxpayers from having to care for injured workmen and their dependents, when under the law as it previously existed, such workmen could not recover damages for their injuries.” Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 318 Md. 624, 628 , 569 A.2d 697 (1990). Moreover, the Act is to be construed as liberally as possible in order to comply with the legislative command, contained in § 9-102(a), that it be interpreted so as to “carry out its general purpose.” Isaac, 333 Md. at 635 , 636 A.2d at 1020 . See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 97 , 656 A.2d 757, 761-762 (1995); Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg.

Co., 318 Md. at 629 , 569 A.2d at 700 . It is likewise well settled that the plain meaning of the Act ⁶¹⁷ may not be disregarded in the name of liberal construction. Cassidy, 338 Md. at 97 , 656 A.2d at 762 . Section 9-736(b)(3) is a part of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as is § 9-729.

When read by itself, the requirement in the former section tying the right to modification of prior orders and claims to the date of the last compensation payment is clear enough, even unambiguous; in a vacuum, the provision makes clear that any payment of compensation benefits, whatever the form or timing, will do. Section 9-736(b)(3) cannot be read in a vacuum, however. We pointed out in Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 650 , 689 A.2d 610, 614 (1997), that “Statutes that are clear when viewed separately may well be ambiguous where their application in a given situation, or when they operate together, is not clear.” See also Board of County Comm’rs of Garrett County v. Bell, 346 Md. 160, 178 , 695 A.2d 171, 180 (1997) (“When interpreting any statute, we must look to the entire statutory scheme, and not any one provision in isolation, to effect the statute’s general policies and purposes”); Sullins v. Allstate, 340 Md. 503, 508 , 667 A.2d 617, 619 (1995) (a term which is unambiguous in one context may be ambiguous in another); Geico v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 , 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993) (where the statute to be construed is a part of a statutory scheme, the legislative intention is determined by considering it in light of the statutory scheme); State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7 , 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993) (“when we are called upon to interpret two statutes that involve the same subject matter, have a common purpose, and form part of the same system, we read them in pari materia and construe them harmoniously”); State of Maryland v. Crescent Cities Jaycees, 330 Md. 460, 468 , 624 A.2d 955, 959 (1993); Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 74 , 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986) (“That a term may be free from ambiguity when used in one context but of doubtful application in another context is well settled”).

Section 9-729 must also be considered. By requiring Commission approval for the conversion of periodic payments to partial or total lump sum payments, it makes clear that the preferred method of paying awards is by periodic payment ⁶¹⁸ rather than by lump sum. Indeed, that is what our courts have held. See Bethlehem Steel Company v. Taylor, 199 Md. 648, 651 , 87 A.2d 844, 845