President of the Farmers' Bank v. Thomas

Robinson J., delivered the opinion of the Court. A scire facias was issued against the appellees, as ierre tenants to revive a judgment recovered by the appellants against Henry W. Thomas. The appellees severed, but pleaded substantially the following pleas: 1st.- Nul tiel record. 2nd. That before the issuing of the scire facias, the defendant, Elizabeth Thomas, filed a bill in Equity to sell the land of Henry W. Thomas, to enforce a vendor’s lien, which she held against all the real estate of the said Henry ; that said lien had existed and attached ²⁵⁴ long before the rendition of the plaintiffs’ judgment, that said Henry appeared to said suit, and a decree was passed for the sale of said real estate, that the same was sold by a trustee appointed by the court, and bought, paid for, and conveyed to the defendants. 3rd Plea.

That the plaintiffs had notice of the suit in Equity, and after the decree and sale thereunder, became parties by appearing and filing their claim as "creditors of the said Henry W. Thomas, upon the judgment recited in the scire facias, and 'seeking payment thereof, out of the proceeds of sale, &c. To this third plea of the defendant Miles, .and which is the fourth plea of the other defendants,' the plaintiffs demurred, and the Court sustained the demurrer. To the second plea of the defendant Miles, and to the second and third pleas of the other defendants, the plaintiffs filed a replication, in which they admit the proceedings in Equity to sell the real estate of H. W. Thomas, as stated in said pleas, but say they were not made parties to said proceedings; they deny that the complainant in said Equity suit, had a vendor’s lien.on all the real estate of the said Henry, and aver that their judgment recited in the scire facias, was and is a lien ■ upon his real estate situate in St. Mary’s County, and which was sold under said proceedings, and purchased by the defendants. To this replication, the defendants demurrred, and it is from the judgment of the Court sustaining the demurrer, and the-general judgment entered for the defendants, that this appeal is taken.

It thus appears by the pleadings, that the judgment recited in the scire facias was recovered against the said Henry W. Thomas, prior to the filing of the bill to enforce the vendor’s lien ; that'the plaintiffs were not made parties to said proceeding, and that the said vendor’s lien did not attach to all the real estate of the said Thomas, sold under the decree, and ²⁵⁵ purchased by the defendants. The question then is, whether the defendants can plead the decree of the Court passed in said cause, and the sale thereunder, as a bar to a scire facias on said judgment, brought by the plaintiffs against them as terre tenants of the said Henry W. Thomas? The well settled rule of law, that a judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction, coming incidentally in question, or offered as evidence of title, cannot be impeached on the ground of informality in the proceedings, or mistake of the Court in the matter decided, relied on by the counsel for the appellees, we do not understand as being questioned by the other side, But there is a wide distinction between offering a judgment in evidence, as a muniment, or link in the chain of title, and pleading it as a bar or an estoppel to the right of a party to maintain his action. When offered in evidence, say the Court, in Barney vs. Patterson, 6 H. & J., 182 , the judgment is not binding per se, it is merely evidence of title or the right to maintain the suit, but when pleaded in bar, or relied on as an estoppel, the party whom it affects, is not permitted to aver against it, or offer evidence to controvert it.

In the latter case, the effect and operation of the judgment does not come incidentally in question, nor is it offered as evidence of title, but it is set up and relied upon as conclusive per se of the matter in controversy. No one questions the well settled rule, that when a case has once been fairly tried and determined, the judgment rendered therein is final and conclusive, as between the parties and their privies touching the matter in controversy, but it is equally true also, that such a judgment cannot bind or affect the rights of third parties, strangers to the record. It can hardly be necessary to say, that every man is entitled to his day in Court, and that only such persons, who in some manner recognized by the forms of law, become parties thereto, are bound by its proceedings. ²⁵⁶ That sales of land under decrees in Equity, are not exempt from the operation of this rule, must be considered as settled in Brooks vs. Brooke, et al., 12 G. & J., 306 , Cockey vs. Milne’s Lessee, 16 Md., 207 , and other cases in this Court. We are unable to distinguish in principle the case of Cockey vs. Milne’s Lessee, from the one before us.

There the appellant offered in evidence a decree of a Corirt of Equity, on a bill to foreclose a mortgage, and sale- thereunder, prior in point of time to the proceedings in attachment, and judgment and sale under which the appellee