Price v. Hitaffer

⁵⁰⁶ Diggbs, J"., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from an order of the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City passed in the distribution of the estate of Della A. Martin, deceased intestate, which order excluded from participation in the distribution of said estate the heirs or personal representatives of Walter J. Martin, the husband of Della A. Martin, who, it is admitted and proven, did on the first day of October, 1931, shoot and kill his wife, and almost immediately thereafter commit suicide. These facts present the main question to be determined, namely: Can a murderer, or his heirs and representatives through him, be enriched by taking any portion of the estate of the one murdered ? The case is one of first impression in this state, and at the threshold this court is met with conflicting decisions of other courts of last resort in this country, which divergent views and opposite conclusions have been urged upon us by counsel for the respective parties in able briefs and forceful oral argument.

These contentions represent the two views which this court is at liberty to take, each of which has been adopted by other courts, as exemplified and illustrated by the decisions to which our attention has been directed, either by counsel, or as a result of our own investigation. One line of decisions apply the common-law principle of equity that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, to take advantage of his own wrong, to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime, and hold that provisions of a will and the statutes of descent and distribution should be interpreted in the light of those universally recognized principles of justice and morality; that such interpretation is justified and compelled by the public policy embraced in those principles or maxims, which must control the interpretation of law, statutes, and contracts. The other and opposite view, as expressed in those decisions which reach a different conclusion, is that, while they recognize the public policy of the common law as declared in the principles and equitable maxims above set forth, such public policy founded upon the common law has been abrogated ⁵⁰⁷ and denied, and a new and different public policy declared by tbe Legislature in tbe enactment of statutes to direct descents and distribution, or governing the execution and effect of testamentary disposition. 'Some of the courts in the last mentioned group also rely upon constitutional or statutory declarations fi> the effect that conviction of crime shall not work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. In this case, Mrs. Martin having died intestate, the appellant relies upon the language of sections 124 and 127 of article 93 of the Oode, which provide: “124.

When all debts of an intestate exhibited and proved or notified and not barred shall have been discharged or settled, or allowed to be retained as herein directed, the administrator shall proceed to make distribution of the surplus as follows. 127. If there be a surviving husband or a widow, as the case may be, and no child or descendant of the intestate, but the said intestate shall leave a father or mother, or brother or sister, or child of a brother or sister, the surviving husband or widow, as the case may be, shall have one-half.” Mrs. Martin, the wife, was childless at the time of her death, and left surviving her one sister, and four nephews and one niece, the children of two deceased sisters of the intestate. The husband of the intestate survived her. The whole of the intestate’s estate consisted of money amounting to $6,365.78, remaining for distribution to her next of kin after all debts and costs of administration had been paid.

The appellant is the duly qualified administrator of the husband. According to the language of the statute above set forth, the facts were such as would have plainly entitled the husband to one-half of the wife’s personal estate at the time his wife died with him surviving, and, he being now dead, his administrator would be entitled to the same amount, if the wife had died a natural death and the husband had survived. Does the fact of the criminal act of the husband in killing his wife prevent distribution of the wife’s estate in the manner it would be distributed under normal circumstances ? Article 27 of the Declaration of Eights declares “That no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of ⁵⁰⁸ estate”; and this declaration is also embodied in section 573 of article 27 of the Code, which is: “Eo conviction or attainder shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate; the estate of such persons as shall destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as in case of natural death; if any person be killed by casualty there shall be no forfeiture in consequence thereof; an approver shall never be admitted in any case whatsoever, and a sentence of death shall not be executed in less than twenty days after judgment.” The contention is that these constitutional and statutory provisions have been violated by the 'order of the orphans’ court.

In the view that we take of the case, the constitutional and statutory prohibition against corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate by conviction has no application, because by reason of his murderous act the husband never acquired a beneficial interest in any part of his wife’s estate. These provisions apply to the forfeiture of an estate held by' the criminal at the time of the commission of the crime, or which he might thereafter become legally or equitably entitled to. In other words, it is a constitutional declaration against forfeiture for a general conviction of crime. Wellner v. Eckstein, 105 Minn. 444 , 117 N. W. 830; Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621 , 108 S. W. 641 ; Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393 , 79 S. W. 1042 ; Wharton on Homicide (3rd Ed.), sec. 665.

There can be no* forfeiture without first having beneficial use or possession. One cannot forfeit what he never had. The surviving husband in the case before us, never having acquired any interest in his wife’s estate, there is nothing upon which the constitutional or statutory prohibition can operate. By virtue of his act he is prevented from acquiring property which he would otherwise have acquired, but does not forfeit an estate which he possessed.

In re Tyler’s Estate, 140 Wash. 691 , 250 P. 456 ; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506 , 22 N. E. 188 . We next approach the question of whether or not section 127 of article 93 of the Code, which prescribes the persons entitled to distribution where a childless wife dies intestate leaving a surviving husband, compels such interpretation as ⁵⁰⁹ would distribute tbe portion of the estate therein described to a husband who had murdered his wife. It is argued that, it being once ascertained that the wife died intestate, without children or descendants surviving her, and leaving surviving her husband, we must give effect to the words of the statute and award one-half of the estate to1 the husband, no matter how abhorrent to the principles of equity and morality as understood and practiced by the average citizen, and almost universally applied by the Christian nations of the world. It is further argued that the enactment by the Legislature of our statutes of descent and distribution was a legislative declaration of the public policy of this state, overriding a contrary public policy embodied in the common law as a result of ages of wisdom, morality, and good conscience.

In the development of such a public policy there may have been, and doubtless were, individuals who did not agree with or subscribe to such a policy, but the fact that it became a maxim of the common law demonstrates the overpowering force of its righteousness and the settled conviction of men throughout a very long period, derived from experience, observation, and sound thinking, as to its inherent and incontrovertible worth. Speaking of statutes, Blackstone wrote: “If there arises out of them collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void. * * * Where some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happens to be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the Parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it.” 1 Blackst. Comm. (Lewis’ Ed.), 91.

An illustration given by this learned author is that if an act of Parliament gives a man power to try “all cases that arise within his manor of Dale,” yet, if a case should arise in which he himself is a party, the act is construed not to extend to that, because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel. In Hooper v. Creager, 84 Md. 195 , 35 A. 967, 971, 1103 , ⁵¹⁰ 36 A. 359 , wherein an'act of Legislature was under consideration, the literal letter of which would have permitted the city council of Baltimore to commit the appointive power of officers of the city to a portion of its own body, or even to a stranger to the city administration, Judge McSherry, speaking for the court, said: “The bare possibility that such a result may flow from a judicial construction of a statute is sufficient to demonstrate the utter fallacy of the interpretation; especially when there is another and a different construction, which is far more reasonable, and which leads to no such serious consequences. A construction fraught with consequences so pernicious, as well as so dangerous to the order and good government of a great city, must be rejected, unless the plain, imperative words of the act of assembly are open to no other meaning at all.” Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights declares: “That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which by experience have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity.” In State v. Buchanan 5 H. & J. 317 , at page 358, it was said that this article of the Bill of Rights embraced and included the common law in mass, as it existed here, either potentially or practically, and as it prevailed in England at the time, except such portions of it as are inconsistent with the spirit of that instrument and the nature of our new political institutions. It is impossible to conceive that the maxims of the common law now under consideration, and which we are asked to apply, are inconsistent with or repugnant to' the spirit and principles of republican institutions, whose strength lies in the virtue and integrity of the citizen to correct the morals and protect the reputation, rights, and property of individuals, by denying the right of a murderer to enrich himself by taking any part of his victim’s estate. ⁵¹¹ Judge Phelps, in his work entitled Juridical Equity, under the general discussion of restrictive maxims, says: “All laws, as well as all contracts, may he controlled in their operation and effect by these general fundamental maxims of the common law, viz: Eo one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, to take advantage of his own wrong, to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.

If a legatee wilfully murders the testator, although no statute has enacted a forfeiture, these principles will prevent his reaping the fruit of his crime.” The English courts dealt with this question in Cleaver v. Mut. Res. Fund Loan Assn. (1892), 1 Q. B. 147.

That was a case where a murder was committed and an action was brought under the policy of insurance by the executors of the murdered man; the beneficiary named in the policy being the murderess, his wife. It was a case of contract, but in the course of the opinion Lord Esher said: “Eo doubt there is a rule that if a contract be made contrary to public policy, or if the performance of a contract would be contrary to public policy, performance cannot be enforced either at law or in equity. If, in consequence of the death of the insured having been caused by the crime of a person in whose favor the policy is expressed to be made, or to or upon whom the policy money is left by will or settled, such person is not entitled to insist on its being paid to him, but he nevertheless claims the money from the executors, they may then vouch the doctrine of public policy, and say that by reason of it such person has forfeited his or her right to the money.” Lord Justice Ery, in the same case, said: “The principle of public policy invoked is in my opinion rightly asserted. It appears to me that no system of jurisprudence can with reason include amongst the rights which it enforces rights directly resulting to the person asserting them from the crime of that person.

If no action can arise from fraud, it seems impossible to suppose that it can arise from felony.” And Lord Justice Lopes, in expressing his view, said: “I do not doubt that the principle of public policy would prevent the wife from recovering the amount of the policy money from ⁵¹² them and so reaping benefit from her crime; because no trust can be enforced which contravenes the law.” That case was followed in the case of In re Hall (1914), Prob. 1, which was a case of manslaughter. The court there said: “It is said the Cleaver case was a case of murder and not manslaughter. I entirely fail to appreciate that distinction. It was a case of felony, and I see no reason to draw a distinction between murder and manslaughter in a case like this.

The authority of Cleaver v. Mut. Bes. Fund. Loan Assn., is sufficient for this court and is binding upon us, even if we felt any difficulty in following it, which I am bound to say I do not.” In the Crippen case (1911), Prob. 108, it was declared : “It is clear that the law is that no person can obtain or enforce any rights resulting to him from his own crime; neither can his representative claiming under him obtain or enforce any such rights.

The human mind revolts at the