Price v. Hobbs

Alvey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The two cases embraced in the one record before us were actions of dower, instituted by the appellee against the appellants, to recover dower in lands of which it is alleged the husband was seized after his marriage with the demandant, but which were alienated in his life-time. By agreement, .judgments were entered pro forma in the Court below, in favor of the demandant, for dower in the lands described in the declarations ; and it is from such judgments that appeals have been taken. By the agreement under which the pro forma judgments were entered, it is provided “that an appeal shall be forthwith entered on behalf of the defendants, and that the said cases shall be forthwith carried to the Court of Appeals for review of said judgments, and for final adjudication of all questions of right and interest between the respective parties to said suits, arising out of the pleadings, evidence and statement of facts; and in order to make such judgment final, the Court of Appeals shall have full power and authority to consider and pass upon any claim on the one side, or defence on th.e other, arising out of the pleadings, evidence and statement of facts in the respective cases, that might be legally and successfully set up or pleaded, either at law or in equity.” These actions being actions at law, of course, no consent of parties can confer power or jurisdiction on this Court to review the judgments therein, and determine the rights of parties upon any other principles than' such as properly apply to such actions, and which the Court below would have been authorized to make the rule of its decision.

Otherwise, it would- be in the power of the parties to a cause, by their mere agreement, to confer original jurisdiction, -where the Constitution and laws have conferred appellate jurisdiction only. The jurisdiction of this Court is one solely of review, and the consent of parties cannot clothe it with power, on an appeal from a judgment at law, ³⁷⁹ to convert tbe action into a bill in equity, and so shape and form the proceedings as to give force and effect to principles exclusively of equitable cognizance. It is a well established maxim that consent of parties will not confer jurisdiction on a Court, where no jurisdiction exists without such consent. Bents vs. Graves, 3 McCord, 280 ; Overstreet vs. Brown, 4 McCord, 79 ; Lindsay vs. McClelland, 1 Bibb, 262.

But notwithstanding that the specific questions for review are not property presented, and the judgments which may be rendered in these cases can only be in respect of the legal rights of the parties, we shall, in view of the agreement, and in order to avoid delay, cost and further litigation, if possible, express an opinion as to the rights of the parties, both legal and, equitable, upon the facts before us; the equitable rights thus determined to be accepted by the parties as modifications of the legal rights determined in the judgments, and thus give effect to the terms of the agreement. According to the statement of facts agreed on, William A. G. Hobbs and the demandant were married in 1831, and the former died in the year 1874. In 1832, William Ring-gold and Mary his wife, being the father and mother of the demandant, executed and delivered to William A. G. Hobbs a deed for a tract of land called “Sportsman’s Hall.” This land belonged to Mrs. Ringgold, the mother of the demandant, having been devised to her by her father John L. Blake. The deed conveyed the land absolutely and in fee-simple.

At the time of making this deed, that is to say, on the second of February, 1832, Hobbs, the purchaser, executed under his hand and seal, the following agreement: — “I have purchased of Wm. Ringgold and Mary Ringgold, his wife, the farm called ‘Sportsman’s Hall,’ which was devised to the said Mary Ringgold, by her father, John L. Blake, and am to pay eight dollars an acre for said land, after deducting such parts thereof as ³⁸⁰ have been heretofore sold. .The whole purchase money is to be paid by me equally among the children of the said Mary Ringgold, immediately after her decease, and upon their arrival at legal age; and in case of the death of either, or any of said children without legal issue, then the portion of such deceased child to be equally divided amoDg the survivors ; and I am to reserve to myself a child’s part of such purchase money in right of my wife. The said purchase money is not to bear interest during the life of the said Mary Ringgold, but I am to apply annually, during her life, a sum equivalent to such interest, to such purpose as I may think most useful to her and her family. I am also to reserve for her use, during her life, the dwelling-house, kitchen, meat-house, poultry-houses, and garden on said farm, with the privilege of getting fire-wood, of pasturing four head of cattle, and of raising any kind of poultry, except turkeys.

And if the said Wm. Ringgold should survive his said, wife, then I am to retain in my hands one thousand dollars of said purchase money during his life, the interest of which is to be applied by me in such manner as I may think most to his advantage ; the said sum to be distributed as above mentioned after his death ; and if I should refuse or neglect to secure to the said Mary Ringgold the annual sum and the privileges above mentioned, and to the said Wm. Ringgold the interest above mentioned, after the death of his wife, it is understood, and I hereby agree to pay to the children of the said Mary Ringgold, at the times specified for their receiving the principal of the purchase money, interest on the sum from the first day of January last, and to forfeit such portion of said purchase money as I should be entitled to in right of my wife.” The consideration expressed on the face of the deed as having been paid, is $3000. The land passed into the possession of Hobbs and he held it until it was sold for his debts in 1844.

At fhe date of the deed and contract Mrs. ³⁸¹ Ringgold had five children, including Mrs. Hobbs ; one of whom, Mrs. Pratt, died in 1854, without issue. William Ringgold, one of the grantors in the deed, died sometime before the year 1845, and Mrs. Mary Ringgold, the other grantor, died in the early part of the year lSTO. In the year 1831, Hobbs made to Valentine Bryan a mortgage of the land embraced in the deed from Ringgold and wife, as indemnity for suretyship, and to secure a certain indebtedness to the mortgagee; and on the 14th of September, 1844, Brjuin, the mortgagee, became purchaser of the equity of redemption in the land at sheriff’s sale, made on execution against Hobbs ; the judgment upon which the execution issued being subsequent to the date of the mortgage. Bryan, the purchaser, became possessed of the land from the time of the sale, and from the time of his death, in 1848, to the present, it has remained in the possession of those claiming under him.

The land has been divided into several parcels, and is now owned by different parties, and it has been considerably improved by the erection of buildings and otherwise, before the death of Hobbs, in 1814. 1. On this state of facts, there can be no doubt or question as to the demandant’s legal right to dower in the land conveyed by the deed of the 2nd of February, 1832. There was legal and unconditional seisin in the husband, and that seisin was beneficial and for his sole use. In such case, the inchoate right of dower attaches from the vesting of the title in the husband, if acquired after marriage, and becomes consummate on‘the death of the husband, the wife surviving; and no intermediate conveyance or charge by the husband alone will defeat the wife’s right to dower.

Nor did the contract of Hobbs, executed at the time of receiving the deed, in any way modify or affect his seisin under the deed. The contract created an equitable lien or charge upon the land for the purchase money, and also in respect to the privileges reserved for the benefit of Mrs. ³⁸² Ringgold, and such lien or charge was in the nature of an equitable mortgage ; but the contract did not, like a legal mortgage, divest the legal title and seisin under the deed. The lien,or charge, thus created, having its inception in the contract of purchase, was paramount to the wife’s claim to dower ; and as against those claiming the benefit of the lien under the contract, she could only claim her right to dower in the surplus, after the full discharge of the lien. Moreton vs. Harrison, 1 Bland Ch., 499, 500 ; Ellicott vs. Welch, 2 Bland Ch., 242; 1 Scrib. on Dow., 530-533.

That this contract constituted a lien or charge upon the land, has been expressly adjudicated, as appears from the case of Ringgold vs. Bryan and others, 3 Md. Ch. Dec., 488, to which the demandant and her husband were parties. 2. In the case just referred to, Mrs. Ringgold, in 1845, after the death of her husband,, filed a bill in the 'High Court of Chancery against Bryan, the purchaser of the land, and others, for the enforcement of the contract of Hobbs, proceeding upon the ground that the land had been purchased by Bryan with notice of the contract, or if not with actual notice, that there were circumstances sufficient to put him on inquiry; and the Chancellor so decided. The case was referred to the auditor, and an account was stated of the purchase money owing, with the interest thereon, and also of the value or equivalent of the privileges reserved for Mrs. Ringgold on the land.

This account was finally ratified; and in the final decree ratifying the account passed in 1851; the amounts ascertained were directed to be brought into Court by a given day, and in default thereof that the land should be sold. Before this decree was passed Valentine Bryan had died, and his heirs had been made parties to the cause, and his real estate had been partitioned; and John O. Bryan, one of his children and heirs-at-law, had elected to ■ take “Sportsman’s Hall,” at a valuation. The present defen ³⁸³ dants derive title immediately through John C. Bryan, deceased, or his devisees. It appears that Mrs. Ringgold was fully paid the interest of the purchase money down to the time of her death, and also the annual value of her privileges reserved on the land; and that all of the purchase money due on the land, except one-fourth part thereof, has been paid to the three surviving children of Mrs. Ringgold, other than the demandant, and they make no further claim.

This money, thus paid, was paid by or for the heirs and distributees of Valentine Bryan, by an arrangement among themselves, and in exoneration of the land which had been decreed to be sold. Now, as we have already said, the lien or charge created by the contract, was paramount to the demandant’s claim to dower in the land : and as the heirs of Valentine Bryan have been required to discharge the lien, it is but fair that they should bo substituted to the place of those who have received the money. It is very certain, if "the land had been sold under the decree, it would have been sold free and clear of all claim of the demandant to dower in the land: for the decree, in express terms, declared that the land should be sold free, clear and discharged of all claims of the parties to the cause, and of all persons claiming by, from or under them ; and the demandant and her husband were parties to the cause. In the event of sale under the decree, she could only have claimed dower in the surplus proceeds, after discharging the lien, and all the expenses attending the proceedings and the sale.

She contributed nothing to the exoneration of the land, and there is no reason, therefore, why she should be better off, and the parties paying the money worse off, because the land was redeemed rather than allowed to be sold for the satisfaction of the lien. There was no personal obligation on Valentine Bryan, or his heirs, to pay off the lien, and the decree created none; the personal obligation was upon Hobbs, with the superadded security by way of lien upon the ³⁸⁴ land; and the main object of the decree was to enforce the lien specifically. In 2 Sto. Eq.

Juris., sec. 1227, the law is stated to be that “if a subsequent