Price v. State

BISHOP, Judge. Mervil Leon Price, Jr., appellant, was charged by criminal information with two counts of murder and two counts of assault with the intent to murder. Appellant entered pleas ²¹² of not guilty and not criminally responsible and was tried by a jury on February 14, 15 and 16, 1989 in the Circuit Court for Washington County (Judge F.C. Wright, III). On February 15, 1989 the court granted the State’s motion to bifurcate the case on the issues of guilt and criminal responsibility.

On February 16, 1989 the jury found appellant guilty of two counts of second degree murder. After a hearing before the jury on February 23 and 24, 1989 the jury found appellant criminally responsible. Appellant was sentenced to two consecutive thirty (30) year terms of imprisonment. ISSUES Appellant asks: I. Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that they could not consider a verdict of manslaughter on the homicide of Sherri Unger; II.

Whether the trial court erroneously overruled appellant’s objection to bifurcation of the guilt and criminal responsibility phases of the trial; III. Whether the admission of photographs of the homicide victims was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion; and IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering appellant to hold the rifle identified as the murder weapon. FACTS It was undisputed that appellant shot both his wife, Betty Jean Price (B.J.), and his fifteen (15) year old stepdaughter, Sherri Unger (Sherri), each in the head with a .22 caliber rifle.

The State’s first witness, Dr. Julia Goodin of the Medical Examiner’s office, testified that the victims died from gunshot wounds to the head and that BJ. had a blood alcohol content of .14 at the time of her death. ²¹³ Next the State called James Hahn, the son of B.J., who testified that on the evening of their deaths, his mother and sister called him asking to be picked up from their house because his mother and appellant were fighting. Hahn advised them to call a cab because he only had a motorcycle at that time. Hahn testified that he could tell that his mother had been drinking. Appellant’s son, Martin Price, was called as a State’s witness and testified that on the night of July 28, 1988 appellant visited him and confessed to shooting B.J. and Sherri.

Afterwards, Martin drove appellant to the nearest police station. The State called six more witnesses and then the court adjourned for the day. On the second day of trial the State made a motion to bifurcate the proceedings. The court granted the motion and ordered a continuance of the issue of criminal responsibility.

The State then called its last witness and rested its case. Appellant’s motion for acquittal was denied. Appellant then called Teresa Hibbard, his daughter, who testified that just prior to the shooting, she had spoken with B.J. and Sherri on the telephone. They wanted to leave appellant’s house and Hibbard advised them to take a cab.

Hibbard testified that she could tell something was going on and that she tried to calm Sherri and B.J. In addition, she testified that B.J. and Sherri refused to allow her to speak to appellant and that she could tell that B.J. had been drinking. Appellant testified that B.J. had a "drinking” problem and that she became nasty when she drank; she occasionally ran off for a period of a few days. Appellant then testified that he arrived home from work on July 28 at approximately 5:45 p.m. After he took a nap, he was confronted by a drunken B.J. who accused him of touching Sherri’s breasts and other inappropriate conduct.

Believing B.J. was preparing to leave him, appellant went upstairs where he heard her speaking on the telephone. ²¹⁴ Appellant confronted Sherri and B.J. in Sherri’s bedroom. B.J. responded by “cursing and hollering” and then she struck appellant with her hands and a telephone. Defending himself, appellant struck B.J. once in the face and broke her nose. Appellant testified that at this point, he began to enter a dream-like state.

He said that at that point he was not mad. He could hear Sherri yelling at him in the background when he went to get the gun. While still in a dream-like state, appellant returned to the bedroom with a .22 caliber rifle. He testified that he remembered holding the gun but that he did not remember firing the fatal shots.

At the time of the shooting appellant was still in the dream-like state and did not feel anger or fear for his life. When appellant realized' what had happened he fled the scene, going first to his son’s house. His son then took him to the police station where he first realized he had broken his arm. Dr. Richard Epstein, a private psychiatrist, testified as an expert that appellant was in a disassociative state at the time of the shooting, and unable to comprehend what was going on about him.

This disassociation was a symptom of the post-traumatic stress disorder suffered by appellant as a result of physical and emotional abuse he suffered as a child. The defense then rested its case. Dr. Lawrence Raifman, a psychologist from Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital, as State’s rebuttal witness, testified that appellant and his wife, B.J., had a chaotic relationship and that Sherri took advantage of that chaos to manipulate appellant and B.J. He opined that appellant did not suffer a reaction resulting from post-traumatic stress, and that at the time of the shooting, appellant had the capacity to form the requisite willful state of mind. At the close of all the evidence the trial judge denied appellant’s request to instruct the jury on manslaughter with regard to the charge involving Sherri.

Appellant, however, was permitted to argue to the jury that Sherri was indeed the victim of manslaughter. The State, in closing, reminded the jury that the court determined there ²¹⁵ was no legal basis to convict appellant for manslaughter in the death of Sherri. Appellant was subsequently convicted of two counts of second degree murder. DISCUSSION I. Manslaughter Instruction Appellant argues that Maryland Rule 4-325(c) requires the court to instruct the jury on applicable law upon the request of any party.

As long as some evidence is present all lesser included offenses of murder must be included in the instruction to the jury. Appellant posits that there was evidence that Sherri Unger provoked appellant and, therefore, a manslaughter instruction should have been given with reference to her death. The State responds that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that Sherri’s death may have been the result of manslaughter because there was no prima facie showing of hot-blooded provocation with reference to her. The trial court found that while a jury might find appellant’s shooting of his wife to be a hot-blooded reaction to a violent fight, “... obviously its not a reaction of any kind to anything Sherri did.” Therefore, the trial court decided that a manslaughter instruction would be inapplicable to Sherri because “Sherri was not an instigator.

And for manslaughter the victim has to be the instigator.” The judge instructed the jury on manslaughter and added: The only act you can find to be adequate provocation under the evidence in this case is a battery by Betty Jean Price upon the defendant Mervil Price. Third, the defendant was still enraged when he killed. That is his actual rage had not been cooled by the time of the killings. Fourth, there was not enough time between the provocation and the killing for a reasonable person’s rage to cool.

And lastly, the victim was the person who provoked the rage. Now there’s no evidence in this case that Sherri Lynn Unger provoked any rage. Therefore I’ll instruct you ²¹⁶ that there is not sufficient evidence legally to consider manslaughter as it applies to the killing and death of Sherri Lynn Unger. You may however consider manslaughter as an option in the killing of Betty Jean Price____ In Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 41 , 553 A.2d 233 (1989) the Court held that in a murder case, “at the request of the defendant, the court shall instruct the jury regarding a lesser included offense when the evidence warrants such an instruction, that is, when the offense is fairly supported by the evidence.” There must have been evidence adduced that would support the instruction of manslaughter.

Appellant argued there was evidence of a hot-blooded provocation warranting the instruction. We held that: “[TJhere may be a homicide which would otherwise be murder which is reduced to manslaughter by circumstances of alleviation or mitigation. Such a case is where the circumstances surrounding the homicide establish that it was provoked. For the ‘Rule of Provocation’ to be invoked there are four requirements: (1) There must have been adequate provocation; (2) The killing must have been in the heat of passion; (3) It must have been a sudden heat of passion — that is, the killing must have followed the provocation before there had been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool; (4) There must have been a causal connection between the provocation, the passion, and the fatal act.” Cunningham v. State, 58 Md.App. 249, 258 , 473 A.2d 40 (1984), quoting from Whitehead v. State, 9 Md.App. 7, 10-11 , 262 A.2d 316 (1970).

The evidence adduced in this case must be measured against these requirements. As we stated in Cunningham “[t]he appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of hot-blooded provocation with respect to at least two of the necessary four elements.” The first requisite is that there be adequate provocation. In Scott v. State, 64 Md.App. 311, 323 , 494 A.2d 992 ²¹⁷ (1985) we held that where the evidence showed that the defendant bumped into the victim, and then they argued, there was not adequate provocation for the subsequent shooting. In the case sub judice the evidence showed that no physical contact occurred between the victim, Sherri Unger, and appellant.

Appellant testified that Sherri “hollered” at him. This was not adequate provocation for hot-blooded provocation to mitigate murder to manslaughter. 1 In addition, there must be a showing that the shooting was committed in the heat of passion. In Cunningham we held that: As observed in this regard in Bartram v. State, supra, at 33 Md.App. [115] 175, 364 A.2d 1119 [1976], “The blood, however, must indeed be hot and, generally speaking, only the hot-blooded killer can attest to that.” The appellant here took the stand in his own defense and testified unequivocally that he shot the victim not in hot-blooded rage, but because he feared that if he did not kill in self-defense, he would be killed or grievously wounded himself. His abject failure to provide evidence of hotblooded motivation, as to which he was the best if not exclusive source, is as fatal here as was a similar failure to provide such indispensable evidence in Bartram v. State: “In the circumstances of this case, only the appellant could have injected evidence as to an intentional but hot-blooded killing.

She, however, stoutly maintained that the killing was suicidal.” 33 Md.App. at 175 , 364 A.2d 1119 . Cunningham v. State, supra 58 Md.App. at 259-60 , 473 A.2d 40 ; see also Tripp v. State, 36 Md.App. 459, 469 , 374 ²¹⁸ A.2d 384 (1977). The same deficiency in the evidence is present here. Appellant, the “best if not exclusive source” of his own state of mind, testified as follows: Q. Well up to this point now when she came at your swinging, what ... what were your feelings?

What were your emotions? A. I don’t know. When I went upstairs I wasn’t mad. I mean we hollered downstairs a couple of times, you know.

I mean I got tired of hearing her and I’d holler at her and I’d tell her to get sober or go get another bottle or something, you know. But she had been upstairs for a little while and the phone’s ringing. And then like I said she come down to the landing or the foyer and then walked back up. Q. Well at the point that you went upstairs you say you weren’t mad.

Now when she jumped up off the bed and started to swing were you mad then? A. I don’t know. I don’t know if mad is the ... more defensive I think. I don’t know that you know anger and whatever goes together but I don’t really ...

I was ... I was telling her to stop it when she hit me with the phone. And ... Q. Were you in fear of your life at that point?

A. I ah ... I don’t think I was afraid of my life. ♦ * sis * * * Q. And at the time that you were in this other state of mind were there any emotions? Did you feel anger? Did you feel rage?

Did you feel anything? A. No.... Therefore, appellant