Priddy v. Jones

GARRITY, Judge. The appellant, Betty L. Priddy, appeals an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Beard, J.) granting appellee Jack G. Jones’s Motion to Dismiss her amended complaint. She presents the following issues for our determination: I. Whether the circuit court erred in ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her first amended complaint; II. Whether she filed her second amended complaint within the applicable limitations period; III.

Whether the circuit court erred in granting the appellee’s Motion to Dismiss on grounds that her amended complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and IV. Whether her complaint is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because we hold the appellant’s amended complaint was barred by limitations, we shall affirm the circuit court’s ruling without need to discuss the remaining issues. Factual Background On March 16, 1981, the appellant was injured when she allegedly slipped and fell on a marble floor of the lobby in the building where she worked, then owned by the appellee.

As a result of her injuries, the appellant filed a declaration in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on March 1, 1984. The complaint sounded in negligence, and among her allegations the appellant claimed the following: On the date of the incident described herein the defendant, Jack B. Jones, knew and should have known that the floor was wet and slippery. That the defendant, Jack ¹⁶⁷ B. Jones, by and through his agent, servants and employees, left the marble-tile floor uncovered and unclean for a substantial period of time, knowing of the condition described above. That the defendant, Jack Jones, by and through his agents, servants and employees, failed to make any attempt to cover and clean up said dangerous condition or to warn the plaintiff or other business invitees of the dangerous condition of the hallway floor.

On March 28, 1988 the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Cave, J.) granted the appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment, a ruling we affirmed in Priddy v. Jones, No. 605, September Term, 1988 (Md.App., filed December 28, 1988) (unreported). 1 Our mandate in that case was issued on January 27, 1989. On January 23, 1989, the appellant, through different counsel, filed an “Amended Complaint” under the same case number as the original. That amended complaint added the theory of negligent construction to her prior claim of negligent maintenance. Specifically, it alleged: That on the date of the incident described herein the defendant, Jack B. Jones, knew and should have known that the marble/tile floor was inherently slippery and defective and that it failed to meet applicable safety standards.

That the defendant, Jack B. Jones, by and through his agent, servants and employees, left the marble/tile floor uncorrected, uncovered and uncleaned for a substantial period of time, knowing of the conditions described above. The defendant, Jack B. Jones, by and through his agents, servants and employees, failed to ¹⁶⁸ make any attempt to cover and correct said dangerous condition or to warn the plaintiff or other tenants or business invitees of the dangerous condition of the said floor. $ $ $ jfc >jc $ That the defendant, Jack B. Jones, had a duty to construct and maintain said premises in a safe condition for a person working in the building, including the plaintiff, Betty L. Priddy; that the defendant, Jack B. Jones, knew, or in the exercise of due care, should have known the floor surface was inherently dangerous and failed to meet minimum safety standards and that the accumulation of water on the tile/marble floor worsened the said dangerous condition; that the defendant, Jack B. Jones, negligently and carelessly failed to correct the defective hallway floor and failed to place rubber mats or other adequate protection on said marble/tile floor, when the defendant, Jack B. Jones, knew or should have known that the said floor was slippery and dangerous. 2 Apparently because it was initially filed four days prior to our mandate in the first Priddy decision, the appellant refiled the same amended complaint, entitled “Second Amended Complaint” on February 27, 1989. The appellee filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to strike the appellant’s amended complaints, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the first amended complaint and that the second amended complaint was barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and limitations. Following a hearing, the circuit court (Beard, J.) granted the appellee’s motion, ruling that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over the appellant’s amended ¹⁶⁹ complaint of January 23, 1989 and that her second amended complaint filed February 27, 1989 was barred by limitations.

I. Jurisdiction The lower court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the January 23 amended complaint. The appellant refiled the identical amended complaint after the issuance of our mandate, however, thereby superseding the earlier complaint. It is well settled that an amended complaint complete in itself, without reference to the complaint that preceded it, replaces an earlier complaint in its entirety, and the earlier complaint is regarded as withdrawn or