Prince George's Cnty. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Lovick

Panel: Eyler, Deborah S., Graeff, Nazarian, JJ. Nazarian, J. ^{477 882} The Prince George's County Office of Child Support Enforcement (the "Office") appeals an order of the Circuit Court ⁴⁷⁸ for Prince George's County setting aside affidavits of parentage that Michael Lovick had executed in the District of Columbia, where his long-time girlfriend had given birth to twins, and striking an earlier order requiring him to pay child support. The Office claims that the circuit court failed to extend full faith and credit to the D.C. affidavits and that the passage of more than two years precluded Mr. Lovick from seeking to set them aside. Mr. Lovick responds that his child support obligations are controlled by Maryland law, which allows a court to set aside a declaration of paternity after a court-ordered genetic test excludes him as the twins' father, as a test did here.

We agree with Mr. Lovick and affirm. I. BACKGROUND On October 4, 2011, Mr. Lovick's girlfriend, Angela Rice, gave birth to twin girls ("the twins") at Georgetown University Hospital in the District of Columbia. Mr. Lovick and Ms. Rice lived in Prince George's County at the time the twins were born, and both live there still. Two days after the twins' birth, Mr. Lovick signed, at the hospital, an Acknowledgment of Paternity (the "Acknowledgment" or the "affidavit") stating that he was the twins' father.

As part of the Acknowledgment, Ms. Rice affirmed that Mr. Lovick was the only possible biological father of her children. The couple separated, and in February 2013, Ms. Rice filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking custody of the twins. She and Mr. Lovick later agreed to share legal custody and that Ms. Rice would have primary physical custody. After they entered this agreement, Mr. Lovick contacted the Office to initiate a child support case.

A child support action was initiated, 1 and in February 2014, Mr. Lovick agreed to pay $1,500 per month in child support. In May 2016, Mr. Lovick filed a motion to establish paternity in both cases and requested a court-ordered genetic test. This motion followed Mr. Lovick's discovery that Ms. Rice had ⁴⁷⁹ been involved sexually with another man around the time the twins were conceived and the results of private genetic testing that revealed Mr. Lovick was not the twins' father. The circuit court denied the motion.

On September 16, 2016, Mr. Lovick filed a new motion in the child support case to set aside the Acknowledgment on the basis of fraud. After a hearing in December, the circuit court ordered genetic testing and scheduled a follow-up hearing. The test results excluded any possibility that Mr. Lovick was the twins' father. And at the hearing, the circuit court agreed with Mr. Lovick that Ms. Rice had committed fraud: Ms. Rice said he is the only possible father.

And it's quite apparent that that was a lie. That was an out and out lie.... It's obvious that it's not Mr. Lovick. It's obvious that she lied on the affidavit...

I can't, in good conscience, let Ms. Rice falsify that affidavit and charge this man with child support. On March 28, 2017, the circuit court entered an order setting aside the Acknowledgment ⁸⁸³ of Paternity and striking the February 2014 child support order. The Office filed a timely appeal.

II

DISCUSSION The Office challenges, on three grounds, the circuit court's decisions to set aside the Acknowledgment of Parentage and strike the child support order. 2 First , the Office contends that the court should have applied the law of the District of ⁴⁸⁰ Columbia, which prohibits challenges to Affidavits of Parentage more than two years after execution, and dismissed Mr. Lovick's motion to set aside his Affidavit. By applying Maryland law, the Office argues, the circuit court failed to extend full faith and credit to the Affidavit. Second , the Office asserts that Mr. Lovick could not prove fraud, duress, or a material mistake of fact in connection with the Affidavit. And third , the Office argues that Mr. Lovick is estopped from disclaiming the twins' paternity because, in the custody case, he had sought to increase his visitation with them after he learned that he was not their father.

"When the trial court's decision involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court's conclusions are legally correct." Clickner v. Magothy River , 424 Md. 253 , 266, 35 A.3d 464 (2012) (cleaned up). We will not set aside a circuit court's fact findings unless they are clearly erroneous, Clickner , 424 Md. at 266 , 35 A.3d 464 , but we review questions of law de novo . Harvey v. Marshall , 389 Md. 243 , 257, 884 A.2d 1171 (2005). Here, neither party disputes that Mr. Lovick is not the twins' biological father-the questions before us concern the circuit court's authority to set aside the Affidavit of Parentage he executed right after they were born.

Mr. Lovick Was Entitled To Seek To Have The Affidavit Set Aside. There is no doubt that Mr. Lovick signed the Affidavit, or that it states plainly that the "signed and notarized [affidavit] constitutes a legal determination of paternity" and "creates legal rights and obligations relating to the child, and may impact custody, child support and visitation." The Office argues that because the twins were born in the District of Columbia and Mr. Lovick executed the Affidavit in the District, his ability to rescind the Affidavit or have it set aside is controlled by District of Columbia law. Under D.C. law, Mr. Lovick had sixty days to rescind his signature. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-909.01(a-1).

After sixty days ⁴⁸¹ have passed, an affidavit "legally establish[es] the parent-child relationship between the father and the child for all rights, privileges, duties, and obligations under the laws of the District of Columbia," D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-909.01(b), and may be challenged only if the signatory can prove fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. D.C. v. D.H. , 140 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2117 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012).

After two years, the presumption of paternity becomes conclusive and can be challenged only on even narrower grounds not relevant ⁸⁸⁴ here. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2342(c). Moreover, District of Columbia courts have held that a putative father cannot seek a court-ordered genetic test in order to determine whether he is the child's biological father after two years have passed, regardless of whether genetic tests excluded the man as a possible father. Virginia DeHart v. Lewis Ruffin , 143 Daily Wash.

L. Rptr. 2329 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2015). So if D.C. law controls Mr. Lovick's ability to have the Affidavit set aside, his 2016 filings are too late. The Office points to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Article IV of the United States Constitution, which provides that Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.

And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. U.S. CONST. ART. IV ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2003) ("[J]udicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken.").

As the Supreme Court explained in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt , the Clause ensures that a judgment from one state receives the same treatment in all states: [T]he clear purpose of the full faith and credit clause [is] to establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties ⁴⁸² in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered. 320 U.S. 430 , 439-40, 64 S.Ct. 208 , 88 L.Ed. 149 (1943) (emphasis added). As such, judicial findings of fact by another state's court , as well as conclusions of law, get full faith and credit in Maryland (absent circumstances not relevant in this case). Dackman v. Dackman , 252 Md. 331 , 336, 250 A.2d 60 (1969), rev'd on other grounds , Eastgate Assoc. v. Apper , 276 Md. 698 , 350 A.2d 661 (1976) ; see also Underwriters Nat'l. Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life and Accident and Health Ins.

Guaranty Assoc. , 455 U.S. 691 , 704, 102 S.Ct. 1357 , 71 L.Ed.2d 558 (1982) ("[T]he judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court of the