Prince George's County v. Longtin

¹⁰⁴ ZARNOCH, J. We are asked in this appeal to determine whether Maryland’s expansive damage remedy for State constitutional violations is subject to key strictures of the statutorily-created Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA), Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (C & JP) §§ 5-301 et seq. This question arises in the context of allegations by appellee and cross-appellant Keith Longtin of a pattern and practice of police misconduct and wrongful incarceration sanctioned by Prince George’s County, appellant/cross appellee. 1 On October 7, 1999, Longtin was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his wife, Donna Zinetti, who three days earlier was raped and murdered while jogging near her home. 2 Longtin was then incarcerated in the Prince George’s County Detention Center. Eight months later, Longtin was released. Another man, Antonio Oesby, was charged with the crime. 3 On October 31, 2000, Longtin’s lawyer sent to then-Prince George’s County Executive Wayne Curry a notice of claim that stated: Pursuant to Md.Code Ann. Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 5-304, Mr. Longtin hereby gives notice that he suffered injuries to his person and his property and was denied important rights guaranteed to him under the United States Constitution when he was arrested on October 5, 1999 by the Prince Georgefs] County Police Department, and thereafter incar ¹⁰⁵ cerated in Prince George[’]s County for a period of months for a murder he clearly did not commit. The claim was apparently forwarded to the County’s Office of Law, which received it on November 6, 2000. Nearly a year later, on October 22, 2001, Longtin filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. In his 13-count complaint, he named as defendants, Prince George’s County, it’s then-Chief of Police, John Farrell, and 5 members of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the County Police Department: Troy Harding, Ronald Herndon, Bert Frankenfield, Glen Clark and Michael McQuillan.

Longtin alleged that the defendants’ actions violated two provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Articles 21 and 24) 4 constituted false imprisonment, false arrest and malicious prosecution, intentionally inflicted emotional distress, invaded his privacy and portrayed him in a false light, intentionally misrepresented material facts, amounted to negligence, and resulted in negligent detention. The complaint also asserted, among other things, that the individual defendants had engaged in a pattern or practice of “unconstitutional and unlawful detention and interrogation” and “excessive force and brutality,” which the County had tolerated, encouraged and instigated by allegedly failing to “properly train, prosecute, supervise and discipline its officers.” Longtin also sought injunctive relief prohibiting improper interrogations and imposing certain procedural safeguards on those interrogations. In addition, he alleged a civil conspiracy by which the defendants “agreed and jointly acted in ... unconstitutional and unlawful conduct.” Finally, Longtin sought a declaratory judgment “that the detaining and interrogation of the plaintiff as well as the on-going pattern and practice of detaining individuals and conducting interrogations in the manner de ¹⁰⁶ tailed herein violate[d] Maryland Rule 4-212 and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” An allegation generally repeated in many of the counts stated: As a direct result of [Defendants’] deprivations, Plaintiff was subjected to excessive interrogation totaling 38 hours, deprived of sleep and privacy, harassed, humiliated, and subjected to undue infliction of emotional distress. The CID Defendants attempted] to coerce Longtin to make a false confession, and thereafter falsified a confession, resulting in Longtin’s incarceration for eight months, while Defendants ignored and/or neglected the exculpatory evidence in their possession.

In 12 of the 13 counts, the complaint sought $10 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive damages. The County and the individual defendants filed separate, boilerplate answers. However, the County’s answer specifically noted that “[p]laintiffs claim is barred by the required notice provisions” and the individuals’ consolidated answer stated that the “claims are barred by the provisions of section 5-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings [A]rticle.... ” The defendants sought to raise the notice of claim issue in various motions, including motions for summary-judgment, but their contentions were ultimately rejected by the circuit court. 5 After some claims fell out, including some counts against the County, and the Chief of Police and Detective McQuillan were dropped as parties, the trial began in August of 2006. The case was submitted to the jury on eight counts. 6 On August 31, 2006, the jury returned a verdict in Longtin’s favor on all ¹⁰⁷ eight counts. 7 It then awarded $5.2 million in compensatory damages against the County. 8 In addition, Hardy, Frankenfield and Clark were each assessed $275,000 in punitive damages and Herndon was assessed $350,000.

On September 11, 2006, the County and the officers filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and/or for New Trial and/or to Exercise Revisory Power. They argued that 1) there was no authority for Longtin’s “pattern and practice” claim; 2) the jury instruction on his due process claim under Article 24 was insufficient; 3) the $200,000 property damage award should have been reduced to reflect the evidence at trial; and 4) the damage awards should be limited by the caps in the LGTCA, C & JP § 5-303 and in C & JP § 11-108 (limitations on non-economic damages). Longtin opposed the motion, asserting, among other things, that even if the defense’s first two arguments were correct, the errors were harmless and that § 11-108’s damage cap did not apply to intentional torts such as those involved here. In addition, he asserted: The Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”) does not cap the damages here because, at the time of the facts ¹⁰⁸ giving rise to this case, the cap did not apply to constitutional claims.

See Housing Auth. v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356 , 754 A.2d 367 (2000). A hearing was held on the motions, where argument was confined to those issues specified in the written motion. Subsequently, in an order dated August 31, 2007, the circuit court denied the motions for judgment notwithstanding verdict and for new trial, but with respect to the motion to revise, the court granted it in part and denied in part. Specifically, the court reduced the property damage award to $25,000, reduced Herndon’s punitive damages to $50,000 and, “[u]pon reconsideration” of appellants’ motion for judgment at trial, vacated the punitive damage awards assessed against the remaining defendants because of insufficient evidence of actual malice.

Relying on Longtin’s arguments, the court rejected the contention that the statutory caps applied in this case. 9 The County and the officers noted their appeal and Longtin cross-appealed on the punitive damages ruling. QUESTIONS PRESENTED In this appeal, appellants have raised the following issues: 1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on 12 of 13 Counts in Appellee’s Complaint for failure to comply with the notice provisions of the LGTCA, and/or not applying the Act’s limitation on damages. 2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Appellee to advance a “Monell [v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ] type” theory of liability against a municipality based on a “pattern and practice” violation under the Maryland Constitution, when ¹⁰⁹ no such claim has been previously recognized in Maryland and, if adopted, there was insufficient evidence for such a finding. 8.

Whether the trial court erred during its evidentiary rulings allowing testimony of DNA testing along with the crimes and conviction of another individual after the determination of probable cause; permitting testimony of other interviews or interrogations; and limiting hearsay to establish probable cause for an arrest and detention. 4. Whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the law as it relates to claims for a due process claim; pattern and practice; that probable cause is to be judged at the time of arrest; intentional infliction of emotional distress; the authority to terminate a prosecution; and the definition of malice for punitive damages. On cross-appeal, appellee raises this question: Did the trial court improperly reduce the punitive damages in this matter sua sponte without first providing notice or an opportunity to be heard to the parties? For reasons set forth below, we affirm the jury verdict as modified by the circuit court.

FACTS On October 5, 1999, Longtin called the Prince George’s County Police to report that his estranged wife was missing. At that time, the police had already discovered Zinetti’s body and CID considered her husband a suspect. A note from Detective Harding to Detective Herndon expressed police reaction to the call: RON: Your V’s husband called Dist. VI for check on the welfare.

Det. Lloyd played along and took m/p info. He made statement to her about the V being sexually assaulted at knifepoint in the past. He is working somewhere in DC tomorrow.

He agreed to meet Lloyd at 1500 hrs. at Dist. VI in order to “sign the m/p report.” ¹¹⁰ Good luck: Get him! Troy[ 10 ] Later on October 5, 1999, Longtin, after learning of a media report of a woman’s body found near Zinetti’s apartment, arrived at the yellow-taped crime scene. He asked a police officer about his wife and the officer, after calling in to his supervisor and being informed of Longtin’s identity, told appellee to get into his police cruiser. 11 He was then taken into an interrogation room in Landover.

Over the next day and a half, Longtin was questioned on a rotating basis by at least six different officers. 12 Police records showed that he slept only 50 minutes during that 38-hour period. 13 At 8:55 p.m. on October 5th, Longtin signed an “Advice of Rights and Waiver Form” indicating, among other things, that he had a right to talk to a lawyer and that he was willing to make a statement “at this time” without a lawyer. When asked at trial why he signed this document, Longtin said he had been told by officers “If I had nothing to hide or worry about, I would sign those rights, so I said ‘Well, I have nothing to hide,’ so I signed them.” Although all of the detectives testified at trial that Longtin did not ask for a lawyer, Longtin testified that during the questioning he told officers that he wanted to talk to a lawyer and his cell phone records showed that he tried to call two different lawyers from ¹¹¹ the interrogation room. Appellants claimed that Longtin was not under arrest or in custody until the conclusion of the interrogation and thus, he did not have to receive warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and the clock did not begin ticking on the 24-hour deadline of Md. Rule 4-212 for presenting him to a district court commissioner. However, the officers took his belt, wallet, shoelaces and cell phone and, according to Long-tin, threatened him with violence when he indicated he wanted to leave, and, at one point, handcuffed him to the wall.

Appellant was asked “what if” questions about the murder, such as: “[Wjhat if you had done this murder? [W]hat do you think would have happened?” He was shown photographs of his dead wife. 14 According to the notes of Sgt. Clark, Longtin admitted to having a verbal and physical altercation with his wife on October 3, 1999, 14 hours before her body was found. Clashing over her alleged extra-marital affair, he said he pushed her down. He stated that then he went into the kitchen, got a knife and ran after her when she left to go jogging, “but I didn’t kill her.” 15 On October 7, 1999, Longtin was formally arrested, taken before a commissioner, and charged with murdering Donna Zinetti, an action appellant later contended violated Md. Rule 4-212(f)(l). 16 A Statement of Probable Cause completed by ¹¹² Detective Herndon said that Longtin “volunteered” to come in and talk to police about his wife’s death.

The Statement recited: While interviewing the Defendant,] he was developed as a suspect. At that point the Defendant] was advised [of] his constitutional rights and subsequently admitted to be[ing] involved in this case. The defendant admitted to having a verbal and physical altercation at the victim’s apartment. The defendant gave details about this case that had not been related to the media and only the perpetrator would have known.

He stated that during the altercation the victim ran out of her apartment and that he ran after her with a knife. The defendant knew that the victim had been stabbed several times and that the stabbing occurred in the wooded area near the victim’s apartment. At trial, Longtin asserted that the Statement of Probable Cause was false, viz. that he never admitted his involvement in the case and that details of the murder were given to him by the police or were publicly available and thus were not known “only [by] the perpetrator.” He also emphasized that this charging document deliberately omitted appellant’s repeated declaration in interrogation: “[B]ut I didn’t kill her.” 17 Long-tin’s attorney in the criminal case, Samuel Serio, conferred with the State’s Attorney Office and was told that appellant faced a “double life” sentence in connection with the charges. The police took DNA samples from Longtin to compare with those left by the perpetrator of the crime.

On January 14, 2000, Meredith Monroe of the Maryland Police Crime Laboratory spoke to Detective Herndon and told him that ¹¹³ Longtin had been excluded as a possible donor of the DNA taken from the victim. This exculpatory information was not shared with the State’s Attorney or Longtin’s counsel. No steps were taken to release appellee. Detective Herndon also told Monroe that he would provide her with DNA from Oesby, but waited two more months before requesting testing. 18 On June 12, 2000, Detective Herndon advised the State’s Attorney’s Office that the DNA found on Zinetti matched Oesby, and Longtin was released.

During his incarceration, Longtin lost three automobiles. He was evicted from his apartment and his possessions were left on the curb. In the detention center, he was attacked by an inmate, and placed in a mass bunk in the middle of the floor with female guards watching him use the restroom. He was not permitted to attend his wife’s funeral.

As the trial judge noted when ruling on appellants’ post-trial motions, Longtin left County custody “with little more than the clothes on his back.” Longtin sought to establish his “pattern and practice” claim against the County in a variety of ways. He set forth evidence through Detective Herndon that sleep deprivation was a “tool” of investigation that he had been trained to use. 19 Admitted into evidence was an interview and interrogation training manual of the Prince George’s County Community Police Institute that told officers they could read a suspect his rights “or wait until after he admits.” The manual stated that the interrogator should consider handcuffing an angry suspect to the wall “and let [him] sit a while.” Officers were advised to ¹¹⁴ “wait out” a passive suspect because “few people can keep it up.” If a suspect “is so convincing that you are starting to believe him ... [l]eave the room [and] [d]on’t go back unless you re-fortify your conviction that he is guilty.” Detective Kerry Jerningan testified that it was departmental policy that police did not necessarily have to take the suspect before a district court commissioner within 24 hours if the suspect was continuously providing information, and confirmed that a police training manual described Md. Rule 4—212(f)(1) as “[a] Maryland procedural rule, not law” that could be waived. There was testimony regarding other “lengthy interrogations,” one lasting 72 hours, and the interrogation, confession and confinement of a developmentally-disabled minor who was released when another person was convicted of the offense. One of appellee’s experts, William Katsaris, a police consultant and trainer, opined that in Longtin’s case, one or more of the officers violated commonly accepted police practices by using sleep deprivation, 20 denying the suspect a lawyer, physically threatening him, “shoving into his face” pictures of his dead wife, violating the 24-hour presentment rule, and asserting that probable cause existed to charge Longtin in the absence of physical evidence and in the face of his declaration of innocence.

He also found fault in the failure to release Longtin after the DNA results were in, noting that when you find out you have an innocent man in jail, you have to get in your car and go get him out. Appellants’ expert, William Wagner, a police training consultant, sharply disagreed with Katsaris, crediting the police log over Longtin’s testimony. The expert concluded that the police had acted properly. He said that probable cause existed to arrest Longtin and that when he was interrogated, he was never in custody (even though escorted to the bathroom by two officers and stripped of his belt, wallet and cell phone) ¹¹⁵ and was free to leave or consult his attorney. 21 The jury found otherwise.

DISCUSSION 1. State Constitutional Torts and LGTCA Requirements—An Uneasy Fit. The appellants argue that all but one of Longtin’s successful claims are barred by the notice requirements of the LGTCA. 22 Appellants also contend that the approximately $5 million compensatory damage award cannot stand because it exceeds the monetary caps of the LGTCA. 23 The parties have battled ¹¹⁶ over these defenses on many fronts. On the notice of claim issue, Longtin responds that: 1) the denial of appellants’ summary judgment motion on this question was not reviewable on appeal after the case was tried by the jury; 2) because notice was timely on the malicious prosecution claim and Detective Herndon was found liable for this tort, under the “general verdict rule” the jury was assumed to award under this count, and the County was thereafter fully liable for the entire amount of the compensatory damage award, regardless of whether the remaining claims were in compliance with notice requirements; 3) he substantially complied with the ¹¹⁷ notice requirements; 4) good cause existed to waive the notice requirements; 5) notice was not required because the individual appellants were acting outside the scope of their employment; 6) because the Prince George’s County Charter had waived governmental immunity, notice was not required to impose liability on the County; and 7) the notice requirements did not apply to violations of State constitutional rights. 24 On the damage caps contention, Longtin asserts: 1) the jury’s finding of malice precluded application of the limits; 2) the damage award against the individual appellants was not capped; 3) because 2001 legislation purporting to cap damage claims against local governments could not retroactively impair the appellant’s previously accrued claims, the caps did not apply in this case; and 4) the caps did not apply to any of the constitutional claims.

Appellants urge rejection of all of these contentions. Thankfully, for reasons set forth below, we believe there is no need to address all or even most of these arguments. The parties have devoted a great deal of attention to the question of whether the LGTCA’s notice provision applies to State constitutional torts. 25 This is understandable because the County was liable for the entire compensatory damage award and was determined to have engaged in two constitutional violations. The Court of Appeals has consistently said that the LGTCA and the Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA), Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), §§ 12-101 of the State Government Article, et seq., do not exclude State constitutional torts from their coverage.

See, e.g., Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70 , 107-08 n. 19, 660 A.2d 447 (1995); Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344 , 374 n. 14, 597 A.2d 432 (1991). See also Thomas v. City of ¹¹⁸ Annapolis, 113 Md.App. 440, 457 , 688 A.2d 448 (1997) (Stating that the LGTCA applies to “all torts without distinction, including intentional and constitutional torts”). Less clear is whether the restrictions of those statutes that would defeat all or partial recovery apply in every respect to State constitutional torts. See, e.g., Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245 , 265 n. 4, 863 A.2d 297 (2004) (reserving issue of whether the damage caps of the MTCA can be applied to a monetary award for violations of the Maryland Constitution). 26 On the one hand, the Court of Appeals has said that a State constitutional tort, such as one premised on a violation of a “self-executing” constitutional provision, like Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, is enforceable in a common law action for damages.

Benson v. State, 389 Md. 615, 631 , 887 A.2d 525 (2005); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hospital Center, 300 Md. 520, 536 , 479 A.2d 921 (1984). In addition, a State constitutional tort action cannot be defeated by the assertion of official or local government immunity. See Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 684 , 541 A.2d 1303 (1988); Ashton, 339 Md. at 101-02 , 660 A.2d 447 . 27 Thus, it appears to exist independently of the LGTCA, which is premised on a waiver of governmental immunity. 28 ¹¹⁹ On the other hand, at least in MTCA cases, the Court of Appeals has indicated that recovery against the State is available as long as the claimant “complies with the procedural requirements” of the Act. Lee, 384 Md. at 262 , 863 A.2d 297 .

In addition, in Md. Reclamation Assoc. v. Harford County, 342 Md. 476, 492-93 , 677 A.2d 567 (1996), the Court also emphasized that administrative exhaustion requirements apply even in cases of alleged State constitutional violations. 29 Finally, presumably the Court of Appeals, in concluding that constitutional torts were not excluded from the LGTCA and MTCA, intended that such coverage include more than just a deeper pocket for recovery and the protection of employees from individual liability. But see Ashton, 339 Md. at 108 , 660 A.2d 447 (emphasizing that “fajny judgments rendered [for State constitutional torts] should, under the Local Government Tort Claims Act, be paid by the City and not the individual defendants”). The issue of the applicability vel non of tort claims act notice of claim requirements to State constitutional torts is one that has arisen in a number of other jurisdictions—always with the same result. Often citing constitutional concerns, these courts invariably have held that these procedural requirements are inapplicable to actions for violations of a state constitutional right.

See Garlanger v. Verbeke, 223 F.Supp.2d 596, 602-04 (D.N.J.2002); Moore Real Estate, Inc. v. Porter County Drainage Bd., 578 N.E.2d 380, 881 (Ind.Ct.App.1991); ¹²⁰ Dishman v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 240 Neb. 452 , 482 N.W.2d 580, 582 (1992); Greenway Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paramus, 163 N.J. 546 , 750 A.2d 764, 768, 770 (2000); Baumler v. Town of Newstead, 198 A.D.2d 777 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (N.Y.App.Div.1993); Wolff v. Sec. of S.D. Game, Fish & Parks Dept., 544 N.W.2d 531, 535 (S.D.1996); Heughs Land, L.L.C. v. Holladay City, 113 P.3d 1024, 1027 (Utah Ct.App.2005). 30 Some of these decisions, see, e.g., Greenway Dev.

Co., 750 A.2d at 770 and Moore Real Estate, 578 N.E.2d at 381 , 31 rely on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988). There, the Court held that a state tort claims act 4-month notice of claim requirement could not be applied to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of an individual’s federal constitutional rights. Id. at 138 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 . Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan said that federal civil rights actions “exist independent of any other legal or administrative relief that may be available as a matter of federal or state law.” Id. at 148 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 .

(citing Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 , 104 S.Ct. 2924 , 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984)) 32 ; that a notice of ¹²¹ claim requirement mirrored a conferral of immunity, 487 U.S. at 142 , 108 S.Ct. 2802 ; that “[mjany civil rights victims ... will fail to appreciate the compensable nature of their injuries within the 4-month window,” id. at 146 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 ; and that the state statute “burden[ed]” the exercise of the rights of civil rights victims. Id. at 141 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 . Pointing out the relative complexity of some constitutional claims, Justice Brennan said: [Mjany other deprivations, such as those involving denial of due process or of equal protection, will be far more subtle. In the latter, and by no means negligible, category of constitutional injuries, victims will frequently fail to recognize within the 4-month statutory period that they have been wronged at all.

Id. at 146 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 2302 . These points are particularly telling here, because the Court of Appeals has declared Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to be self-executing and has recognized that there is no official or local governmental immunity from a State constitutional tort. See n. 27 and accompanying text. Moreover, if the four and six-month periods of Felder and Burnett wave deemed too short for a plaintiffs assertion of a 14th Amendment violation, it would seem to follow that the six-month notice of claim period of C & JP § o-304(b) is too short for the Maryland constitutional analog to the 14th Amendment—Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights. 2.

The Good Cause Issue Mindful of our obligation to avoid unnecessarily deciding constitutional questions, see Davis v. State, 294 Md. 370, 377 , 451 A.2d 107 (1982), including those premised on the inapplicability of a statute on constitutional grounds, we leave for another day the issue of whether it may or may not be possible to accommodate the special circumstances of State constitutional torts with the notice provisions of the LGTCA. 33 ¹²² We believe the notice of claim issue can be resolved on the much narrower ground decided by the circuit court, viz. that good cause existed to excuse timely compliance with regard to each of Longtin’s claims. Although not raised by “motion” as contemplated by subsection (d), Longtin, in repeated filings, sought to invoke the good cause exception, and the circuit court, by explicitly finding no prejudice to the appellants, clearly relied upon § 5-304(d) in rejecting their notice of claim defense. 34 They contend that the circuit court’s good cause finding is inconsistent with three cases: Heron v. Strader, 861 Md. 258 , 761 A.2d 56 (2000); Wilbon, 172 Md.App. 181 , 913 A.2d 678 ; White, 163 Md.App. 129 , 877 A.2d 1129 . Each of these cases state that good cause exists when the claimant has presented his claim with the degree of diligence that an ordinary prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. Heron, 361 Md. at 271 , 761 A.2d 56 ; Wilbon, 172 Md.App. at 205 , 913 A.2d 678 ; White, 163 Md.App. at 150-51 , 877 A.2d 1129 .

Each also notes the Heron factors, i.e., the ¹²³ earmarks of good cause. Heron, 361 Md. at 272 , 761 A.2d 56 ; Wilbon, 172 Md.App. at 205-06 , 913 A.2d 678 ; White, 163 Md.App. at 152 , 877 A.2d 1129 . These were summarized in Wilbon : excusable neglect or mistake (generally determined in reference to a reasonably prudent person standard), [2] serious physical or mental injury and/or location out-of-state, [3] the inability to retain counsel in cases involving complex litigation, ... [4j ignorance of the statutory notice requirement!,] or [5] misleading representations made by [a] representative of the local government. 172 Md.App. at 205-06 , 913 A.2d 678 (Quotations and citations omitted.) 35 Appellants argue that none of these conditions are present here. They also point to the holding in Heron that “the pendency of criminal proceedings” against the claimant does not constitute good cause. 361 Md. at 272 , 761 A.2d 56 . 36 In addition, in White and Wilbon , the presence of an ongoing police investigation into a brutality complaint did not excuse notice defectively given to the wrong entity.

White, 163 Md.App. at 157 , 877 A.2d 1129 ; Wilbon, 172 Md.App. at 210 , 913 A.2d 678 . 37 ¹²⁴ These cases have little in common with the situation presented here. Longtin was not charged with burglary or a disorderly conduct offense, but murder in the first degree with the possibility of a double life sentence. Unlike Heron, he was not quickly released. Unlike White, he was not justifiably incarcerated, complaining of an ancillary constitutional violation.

Longtin alleged and the jury found that agents of the County lied and withheld exculpatory DNA evidence to keep him incarcerated. If we assume that the 180-day notice period for most of the tort claims ran from the date he was arrested, he was not released until more than two months after the statutory period had expired. He was not made aware of the withholding of the DNA evidence—a key component of the alleged due process violation—until much later. Had Longtin filed his notice of claim in April 2000, while incarcerated, the false charges and the withholding of DNA evidence would likely have skewered any investigation or resolution of his claim.

Even if Longtin’s State constitutional allegations were not factored into the equation, it is hard to disagree with the circuit court’s determination that “the facts in this case are sufficient” to defeat the appellants’ notice defense. 38 In short, an “ordinary prudent person” in Longtin’s position could not have given notice by the 180th day. Thus, we conclude that, even if notice on any or all of Longtin’s claims against the County and the individual appellants were untimely, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that good cause existed to excuse any delay. 39 ¹²⁵ 3. The LGTCA Damage Caps Our conclusion that it was not error for the jury to award damages against the County for violation of Longtin’s constitutional right to due process does not resolve the issue of whether the amount of the compensatory damage award— $5,025,000—was proper. 40 Appellants argue that under the LGTCA, the court was obligated to reduce the compensatory damages to $200,000. See supra n. 23.

Among other things, Longtin contends that the statutory damage caps can never be applied to damages for violations of the State Constitution. While Longtin raises a serious question, cf. Felder, 487 U.S. at 142 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 (stating that a State law “that limits the amount recoverable in suits against local governments” cannot apply in a federal civil rights action); Lee, 384 Md. at 265 n. 4, 863 A.2d 297 (reserving issue of whether the MTCA damage caps can be applied to a State constitutional tort), we believe the correctness of the amount of the damages can be resolved on a narrower basis, viz. at the time Longtin’s action accrued, the caps did not apply to damages from his State constitutional claims. In 1999 and 2000, during the period of Longtin’s interrogation, arrest, incarceration and release, Prince George’s County had no immunity, statutory or otherwise, from constitutional torts. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City v. Crystal Bennett, 359 Md. 356, 368-69 , 754 A.2d 367 (2000) (collecting cases).

In ¹²⁶ Bennett , which involved local governmental liability under State housing authority laws, the Court of Appeals noted: “It would not be a reasonable construction of the [LGTCA] ... to apply the monetary caps to tort actions directly against local governments when the bases for such actions are enactments of the General Assembly, state common law, the state constitution, or federal law.” Id. at 373-74 , 754 A.2d 367 . In direct response to the Bennett decision, the General Assembly in 2001 passed emergency legislation, which, according to its title, was intended to “[clarify] that the monetary limits on the liability of a local government under the [LGTCA] apply to claims against local governments when named as defendants [and] that the monetary limits under the [LGTCA] apply to tort judgments for which local governments are liable.... ” Ch. 286, Laws of 2001 (HB 942). The legislation, which took effect upon the Governor’s signature on April 20, 2001, reenacted without change C & JP § 5-303, but provided in an uncodified Section 2: That it is the intent of the General Assembly that the total liability of a local government, directly or otherwise, in an action arising from tortious acts or omissions, may not exceed the limits on liability stated in § 5-303(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Finally, in an uncodified Section 3, the measure stated: That this Act shall apply to any claim for damages under § 5-303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article in a case pending on the effective date of this Act and arising from events occurring on or after July 1,1987.

The measure made no direct reference to constitutional torts. In bill review letters dated April 19 and April 23, 2001, Attorney General J. Joseph Curran, Jr. concluded that the legislation’s retroactive application was “constitutionally defensible” against a contention that it violated due process by interfering with a vested right in a cause of action. However, the April 23rd bill review letter noted that the Court of Appeals had agreed to hear Dua v. Comcast, 360 Md. 485 , 759 A.2d 230 (2000) (mem.) and that the outcome of that case ¹²⁷ “could have some bearing on the constitutionality of the retroactivity claimed in the bill.” The Attorney General’s prediction was correct. In Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md. Inc., 370 Md. 604 , 805 A.2d 1061 (2002), the Court of Appeals said that “there normally is a vested property right in a cause of action which has accrued prior to the legislative action,” id. at 633 , 805 A.2d 1061 , and invalidated two statutes that retroactively abrogated plaintiffs’ “rights to particular sums of money” as well as their “causes of action in pending cases.” Id. at 642 , 805 A.2d 1061 .

Appellants might argue that Dua was a case involving retroactive abrogation of a cause of action, rather than retroactive imposition of a damage cap that merely reduced recovery. Cf. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 362 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992) (upholding the prospective imposition of non-economic damage caps in private litigation). However, pre-and post-i>«.a cases recognize that the retroactive grant of governmental immunity “might transgress a vested right.” Allstate Ins.

Co. v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 296 , 829 A.2d 611 (2003); see also WSSC v. Riverdale Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 569 , 520 A.2d 1319 (1987) (stating that retroactive imposition of immunity “would cut off fully accrued causes of action for compensatory damages.”). Here, what was at stake was a fully accrued cause of action for complete recovery for constitutional violations that were not previously subject to an assertion of either all or partial local government immunity. Undoubtedly, Longtin had a vested right in such a cause of action prior to the enactment of Chapter 286. Appellants emphasize that the 2001 legislation was designed to be expressly retroactive to cases “arising from events occurring on or after July 1, 1987.” However, as a matter of statutory construction, if not constitutional law, a statute, even if intended to apply retroactively, will not be given that effect if it would take vested rights.

Dua, 370 Md. at 628 , 805 A.2d 1061 ; see also WSSC, 308 Md. at 569 , 520 A.2d 1319 (stating that a construction of a statute retroactively conferring governmental immunity to cut off fully accrued ¹²⁸ causes “is to be avoided”). Appellants’ attempt to justify retroactive application of the 2001 legislation as “remedial” fails for the same reason. See Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 408 , 754 A.2d 389 (2000) (stating that generally, a remedial statute may not be applied retroactively if it would interfere with vested or substantive rights); WSSC, 308 Md. at 560 , 520 A.2d 1319 (noting that the granting of immunity affects more than mere change of remedy). On the basis of these authorities, we conclude that, regardless of the later enactment of Chapter 286, at the time Longtin’s claim had accrued, the LGTA damage caps (and the partial immunity they would have provided the County) did not apply to appellee’s action for State constitutional violations.

This is true whether the action was predicated on a respondeat superior theory or otherwise. 4. The Pattern or Practice Claim The County challenges both the legal and evidentiary support for Longtin’s “pattern or practice” claim, which he premised on a violation of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights. 41 Before addressing the County’s contentions, we believe a brief history of these terms would be helpful. Generally, a “pattern or practice” claim falls into two categories. 42 The first type is a long-recognized remedy for unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (and other federal antidiscrimination statutes). 43 Such a suit focuses on multiple incidents of ¹²⁹ systematic discrimination against individuals in a protected class.

See, e.g., Gaston v. New York City Dept. of Health, 432 F.Supp.2d 321 (S.D.N.Y.2006). A second category is litigation under the 1871 federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . 44 Section 1983’s focus on a local g'overnment’s “policies and customs” came to establish a dividing line between respondeat superior immunity and what is often termed pattern or practice liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692-95 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Thus, Monell spawned countless lawsuits aimed at allegedly unconstitutional municipal policies and customs, including those targeting systematic police misconduct. See, e.g., Kammeyer v. City of Sharonville, 311 F.Supp.2d 653 (S.D.Ohio 2003). Noteworthy is Congress’ enactment in 1994 of legislation governing law enforcement misconduct. This statute, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 , provides: (a) It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration ¹³⁰ of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

(b) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of paragraph (1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice. According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Resource Manual, at 5, this statute authorizes the Department to examine a wide variety of potential misconduct including: unnecessary use of deadly force; excessive force; discriminatory harassment; improper stops, searches, arrests, or failures to provide service based on impermissible criteria such as race, national origin, or gender; coercive sexual conduct; and retaliation against citizens alleging misconduct. Examples of departmental practices that may be actionable because they result in misconduct include: failure to investigate allegations of officer misconduct; failure to discipline officers who have engaged in misconduct; engaging in a code of silence to protect persons guilty of misconduct; and a failure to train personnel in proper law enforcement techniques. With this background in mind, we turn to the County’s contentions.

Appellant argues that nothing in the language of Article 24 or in Maryland caselaw gives rise to a state constitutional claim against a local government for an alleged pattern or practice violation. Reversing the dividing line in Monell , the County seems to contend that if a local government is liable for a constitutional tort on a respondeat superi- or theory, it cannot at the same time be liable for a pattern or practice violation. In our view, these arguments miss the mark. Just as a county ordinance can violate the state constitution, so too, in the words of § 1983, can a “regulation, custom, or usage.” In addition, given the almost uniquely expansive reach of Mary ¹³¹ land’s constitutional tort remedy, where no official or local governmental immunity is possible, see n. 27 and accompanying text, we think it highly unlikely that Article 24 contains any exemption from liability for an unconstitutional pattern or practice.

Finally, we note that the Court of Appeals in DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 53 , 729 A.2d 354 (1999), set forth the rationale for making local governments liable for the constitutional torts of their employees. Quoting favorably from Brotan v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172 , 652 N.Y.S.2d 223 , 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1142-43 (1996), it recognized that the government is appropriately held answerable for the acts of its officers and employees because it can avoid such misconduct by adequate training and supervision and avoid its repetition by discharging or disciplining negligent or incompetent employees. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, see supra, pp. 129-30, 988 A.2d at p. 39, violation of these duties can be trademarks of a pattern or practice of police misconduct. 45 In our view, these deficiencies, when coupled with a record such ¹³² as that presented here, can lead to liability by a local government for a violation of Article 24.[ 46 ] The County contends that even if a pattern or practice claim exists under Article 24, there was insufficient evidence in this case to warrant liability. It asserts that Longtin presented no evidence of an unconstitutional policy, practice or custom that led to the constitutional injuries he suffered, and that he failed to prove anything more than a single instance of unconstitutional activity.

Although even a single decision by municipal “policymakers” can constitute a policy whose unconstitutionality can lead to liability, see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 , 106 S.Ct. 1292 , 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), there is some support for the County’s contention that a single incident by a nonpolicymaking police officer cannot lead to Monell-type liability. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle (plurality opinion); see also Civil Rights Resource Manual, supra at 5 (stating that proof of a “single, insignificant, isolated action would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice”). 47 However, Longtin presented much more in support of his pattern or practice claim. He introduced evidence of lengthy interrogations of other individuals (of 60 hours and 72 hours); another dubious confession and erroneous incarceration; an official police training manual urging constitutionally questionable actions with respect to the conduct of interrogations, Miranda warnings, and the right to counsel, which the individual officers appeared to have followed “by the book”; expert testimony regarding violations of commonly-accepted police practices, evidence of serial violations of multiple constitutional rights by a number of offi ¹³³ cers; 48 and a blurring of the line between presumptive innocence and pre-determined guilt. See supra pp. 113-15, 988 A.2d at pp. 29-30.

The jury could have reasonably concluded that such evidence demonstrated a pattern or practice or a custom of unconstitutional police conduct. 5. Evidentiary Issues The appellants complain of four evidentiary rulings of the trial court: 1) admission of DNA evidence regarding Longtin and Oesby; 2) introduction of evidence that Oesby was ultimately arrested and convicted; 3) introduction of other police interviews, interrogations, and the outcomes of other criminal cases to prove the pattern or practice claim; and 4) the limitation of hearsay testimony by appellants’ expert witness regarding the existence of probable cause to arrest and detain Longtin. In our view, none of these evidentiary rulings warrants reversal of the jury’s verdict. A. Standard of Review We generally review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard, giving more deference to the judge’s discretionary weighing of relevance than a ruling premised on a pure conclusion of law.

Brown v. Daniel Realty Co., 409 Md. 565, 583 , 976 A,2d 300 (2009). In addition, even if the evidentiary ruling was manifestly wrong, it will not be set aside unless the appellant can show the probability of prejudice. Id. at 584 , 976 A.2d 300 . Finally, to preserve a challenge to the admission of evidence, ordinarily, a party must object each time the evidence is introduced.

Pulte Home Carp. v. Parex, Inc., 174 Md.App. 681, 763-64 (2007). ¹³⁴ B. DNA Evidence In the circuit court, appellants filed a motion in limine to prohibit introduction of the DNA evidence because it was not available when the district court commissioner independently determined that probable cause existed to arrest and hold Longtin. 49 This motion was denied. When the evidence was later disclosed in testimony, appellants made no further objection. Under these circumstances, the motion in limine will not preserve appellants’ objection. Pulte Home Corp., 174 Md.App. at 763 , 923 A.2d 971 .

Even if the issue had been preserved, Longtin contends that the DNA evidence was admissible to show that probable cause was destroyed. He points to State v. Dett, 391 Md. 81, 94 , 891 A.2d 1113 (2006), which states: [T]he legal justification for the arrest based on the identity of the arrestee can dissipate over time. The detaining authority may come into possession of information, not known at the time of arrest or not known at some earlier point in the detention, which, by establishing that the person being detained is not, in fact, the person authorized to be detained, may cause the legal justification