Prince George's County v. Maringo

ADKINS, J. Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), section 9-503 of the Labor and Employment Article (“LE”) establishes a presumption, for workers’ compensation purposes, that the heart disease or hypertension condition of certain firefighters and law enforcement personnel is an occupational disease arising out of or in the course of their employment. This presumption is commonly known as the “heart presumption.” For Prince George’s County deputy sheriffs, however, the presumption does not apply to pre-existing heart disease or hypertension. Rather, only heart disease or hypertension “that is more severe” than existed prior to their employment is subject to the presumption. An uncodified section of the statute requires Prince George’s County deputy sheriffs employed with the department on or before September 30, 1996, to submit, by December 31, 1996, a “medical report disclosing and describing any existing heart disease or hypertension from which the deputy sheriff may be suffering!).]” 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 637, § 2 (“House Bill 840”).

In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether, as a matter of law, James J. Maringo, appellee, a Prince George’s County deputy sheriff whose employment with the department began prior to 1996, is entitled to the heart presumption when he failed to timely submit a baseline medical report. We hold that he was not so entitled as a matter of law, but that he may have substantially complied with House Bill 840 when he supplied a report of his 2000 medical examination. Accordingly, we reverse the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Maringo. We remand to that court with instructions to reverse the decision of the Worker’s Compensation Commission (“the Commission”), and to remand to the Commission for a determination of the existence of two conditions necessary for substantial compliance. ⁶⁶⁸ If, on remand, the Commission finds that these two conditions are present, the Commission shall apply the heart presumption to Maringo’s claim.

Alternatively, if it finds that these two conditions do not exist, the Commission shall rule on the merits of Maringo’s claim, without applying the heart presumption. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Maringo has been employed by Prince George’s County (“the County”) as a deputy sheriff since 1985. In March 2000, Maringo underwent a physical examination, after which he was informed by his doctor that he had high cholesterol, and was advised to watch his diet and to exercise. His physical examination yielded no signs of heart disease or hypertension.

On April 16, Maringo experienced chest pain. After being transported to the hospital, Maringo was diagnosed with a mild myocardial infarction. Thereafter, he had an angioplasty, during which a stent was placed in one of his arteries. Because of his heart condition, Maringo did not work from April 16 to June 2.

In early June, he returned to work on “light duty” status, until early August when he returned to “full duty” status. In May 2000, the month after his myocardial infarction diagnosis, Maringo filed a claim for benefits with the Commission, asserting that he was entitled to the heart presumption. After an April 20, 2001 hearing, the Commission ruled that Maringo indeed was entitled to the presumption, and awarded him benefits. The County appealed the Commission’s decision to the circuit court.

There, both parties filed motions for summary judgment, asserting that the case should be disposed of as a matter of law. The July 22, 2002 trial date served as an impromptu hearing on the summary judgment motions. At this time, the parties stipulated to the facts, and announced that the issue was purely legal in nature. The parties agreed that Maringo “was a Deputy Sheriff before 12—1—96; that he was not aware of any heart disease prior to April of [2000] when he had the heart attack, and [that] ... [h]e had a ⁶⁶⁹ physical in March of [2000] that failed to reveal any heart disease or hypertension.” Because of the stipulation between the parties, the circuit court merely heard argument from the parties’ attorneys, and then ruled from the bench that the legislation required the following: [I]n the event that you do have any existing heart disease or hypertension, you shall provide a copy of medical records disclosing that.

The common sense reading of that is if you do not have those diseases, you are not required to provide a report, so [Maringo] is entitled to the presumption!.] The County appeals from the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to Maringo, which effectively approved the Commission’s decision that the heart presumption applied. DISCUSSION I. Principles Of Statutory Interpretation Because this case hinges on our interpretation of the legislation affording Prince George’s County deputy sheriffs the benefit of the heart presumption, we shall briefly set forth the well established principles governing statutory construction. “[T]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995). As always, “[t]he search for legislative intent begins with an examination of the statute itself and if the language is of clear import, the inquiry ends.” Crawley v. General Motors Corp., 70 Md.App. 100, 105 , 519 A.2d 1348 , cert. denied, 310 Md. 147 , 528 A.2d 473 (1987). “We review the language of the contested provision in the context of the statute as a whole and with respect to the clear purposes the legislature conveyed.” Schmerling v. Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund, 368 Md. 434, 445 , 795 A.2d 715 (2002).

Furthermore, “ ‘we seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common ⁶⁷⁰ sense.’ ” Ward v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 339 Md. 343, 352 , 663 A.2d 66 (1995) (citation omitted). “[WJhere a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity,” however, we “consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, objectives and purpose of the enactment.” Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986). “Language can be regarded as ambiguous in two different respects: (1) it may be intrinsically unclear ...; or (2) its intrinsic meaning may be fairly clear, but its application to a joarticular object or circumstance may be uncertain. Thus, a term which is unambiguous in one context may be ambiguous in another.” Town & Country Mgmt.

Corp. v. Comcast Cablevision of Md., 70 Md.App. 272, 280 , 520 A.2d 1129 , cert. denied, 310 Md. 2 , 526 A.2d 954 (1987).

II

The Legislation At Issue In this case, we must interpret 1996 House Bill 840, a piece of legislation that has been only partially codified. Section 1 of the bill is codified as LE section 9-503(b). That section provides: (b) Heart disease or hypertension—Police officers.— (1) ... [S]ubject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, a Prince George’s County deputy sheriff ... is presumed to be suffering from an occupational disease that was suffered in the line of duty if: (i) the ... deputy sheriff is suffering from heart disease or hypertension; and (ii) the heart disease or hypertension results in partial or total disability or death. (2) (i) A Prince George’s County deputy sheriff is entitled to the presumption under this subsection only to the extent that [he or she] suffers from heart disease or hypertension that is more severe than [his or her] heart disease or hypertension condition existing prior to [his or her] employment as a Prince George’s County deputy sheriff. ⁶⁷¹ (ii) To be eligible for the presumption under this subsection, a Prince George’s County deputy sheriff, as a condition of employment, shall submit to a medical examination to determine any heart disease or hypertension condition existing prior to the individual’s employment as a Prince George’s County deputy sheriff.

Section 2 of House Bill 840, however, remains uncodified. 1 Section 2 added the following procedural prerequisite to application of the presumption to deputy sheriffs employed by the department prior to October 1996: 2 [N]otwithstanding the provisions of [LE] § 9—503(b)(2) ..., a Prince George’s County deputy sheriff who is employed on or before September 30, 1996: (1) as a condition of continued employment shall provide to the Prince George’s County Sheriff on or before December 31, 1996 a copy of a medical report disclosing and describing any existing heart disease or hypertension from which the deputy sheriff may be suffering; and (2) is entitled to the presumption under § 9—503(b) ... only to the extent that the individual suffers from heart disease or hypertension that is more severe than the individual’s heart disease or hypertension condition existing as of the date of the medical report provided under paragraph (1) of this section. 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 637, § 2 (emphasis added).

III

The Legislation’s Requirement Of A Baseline Medical Report Maringo contends that the circuit court and the Commission correctly ruled that he was entitled to the pre ⁶⁷² sumption even though he did not submit a baseline medical report in 1996. According to Maringo, the legislation’s plain language requires existing deputy sheriffs to submit a medical report by December 31, 1996 only if they had a known heart condition as of that date. Because he was unaware of any existing heart condition at that time, Maringo argues, he was not required to submit a medical report to “opt-in” to the heart presumption. He explains: The plain language of [House Bill 840] ... does not require a deputy sheriff to submit a medical report “disclosing and describing” heart disease or hypertension from which [he or she is] not suffering.

It also does not enumerate a requirement mandating that a deputy sheriff submit a medical report verifying that the deputy sheriff is without a medical history of heart disease or hypertension and, in fact, free from any such heart disease or hypertension. Had the legislature intended for every existing deputy sheriff to submit a medical report, regardless of whether he or she had an existing heart condition, Maringo contends, it would have used different language in its bill. We disagree. When read as a whole, the legislation unambiguously requires existing deputy sheriffs desiring to benefit from the heart presumption to submit a baseline medical report in 1996.

Therefore, in failing to timely submit the required report, Maringo failed to fully comply with the statute. We explain. Although the provisions of Section 2 of House Bill 840 may be ambiguous when read in isolation, any ambiguity disappears when those isolated provisions are read in the context of the legislation as a whole. See Schmerling, 368 Md. at 445 , 795 A.2d 715 .

Subsection (1) states that existing deputy sheriffs “shall provide ... on or before December 31, 1996, a copy of a medical report disclosing and describing any existing heart disease or hypertension from which the deputy sheriff may be suffering.” As an initial matter, we think the significance that Maringo attributes to the legislature’s use of the word “disclos[e]” in ⁶⁷³ subsection (1) is unwarranted. Maringo argues that one cannot “disclose” a condition that one does not have. The verb “disclose,” however, means “[t]o make known (something heretofore kept secret).” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.2000). We think one can disclose the absence of a condition in the same sense as one can disclose the presence of a condition.

That subsection (1) speaks of disclosure of “any existing” heart condition seems to support Maringo’s contention that he need not submit a report if he is not suffering from any such existing condition. (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, the same section speaks of a heart condition that a deputy sheriff “may be suffering,” language that supports the County’s position that all existing deputy sheriffs must submit medical reports. If the legislature intended that only deputy sheriffs with existing heart conditions submit medical reports revealing those conditions, it likely would have spoken in terms of a heart condition that a sheriff “is suffering.” We perceive that subsection (1) may be ambiguous when read in isolation. When subsection (1) is examined in light of subsection (2), however, such perceived ambiguity disappears.

Subsection (2) provides that existing deputy sheriffs are only entitled to the heart presumption “to the extent that [they] suffer[ ] from heart disease or hypertension that is more severe than [that] existing as of the date of the medical report provided under” subsection (1). Thus, the legislation clearly contemplated that a medical report, against which to measure the deputy sheriffs heart condition at the time of his or her workers’ compensation claim, will be available in every case. Further, when the provisions of LE section 9-503(b)(2) and Section 2 of House Bill 840 are examined in the context of LE section 9-503 as a whole, it is clear that the legislature intended the heart presumption, as it applies to Prince George’s County deputy sheriffs, to be more restrictive, or limited in scope, than the presumption applying to other covered emergency personnel. Only for Prince George’s ⁶⁷⁴ County deputy sheriffs is the presumption explicitly limited to post-employment heart disease or hypertension.

Both LE section 9—503(b)(2)(ii), governing new deputy sheriffs, and Section 2 of House Bill 840, governing existing deputy sheriffs, provide the mechanism through which the County can determine the existence and extent of the heart presumption—a medical evaluation pinpointed to the applicable date (before his or her employment with the department for new employees, or before the effective date of the presumption, for existing deputy sheriffs). The distinction between the LE section 9-503(b)(2)(ii) requirement that new sheriffs “shall submit to” a medical evaluation to determine their heart health, and the mandate of Section 2 of House Bill 840 that existing deputy sheriffs must provide by a certain date “a copy of a medical report disclosing and describing” their heart condition, is immaterial. Comparing the statute as it applies to both classes of deputy sheriffs supports the County’s contention that all Prince George’s County deputy sheriffs who wish to benefit from the heart presumption, whether new or existing, are required to have a baseline medical report on file with the department. Without this medical examination and report mechanism, the more restrictive presumption intended for Prince George’s County deputy sheriffs could not reasonably be enforced.

We agree with the County that it would be wrong to read a knowledge requirement into the statute. It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a court may not rewrite a statute. See Harford County v. McDonough, 74 Md.App. 119, 124 , 536 A.2d 724 (1988)(court “may not rewrite the statute by inserting or omitting words therein to make the legislation express an intention not evidenced in its original form ... or to create an ambiguity in the statute where