Prince George's County v. One (1) 1969 Opel

McWilliams, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Murphy, C. J., concurs in the result and filed a concurring opinion at page 501 infra. While not moot this case has a pronounced post mortem cast born of our having to deal with a statute (Code [1971 Repl. Vol.], Art. 27, § 297) declared to be unconstitutional by the learned chancellor, McCullough, J., on 2 March 1972 and, a few months thereafter, repealed and re-enacted with amendments by Ch. 616 of the A.cts of 1972, and expanded by Ch. 659.

Both chapters became effective on 1 July 1972. The ad hominem overtones of the chancellor’s opinion evoke a modicum of sympathy. Nonetheless we think he is in error. Late in October 1971 a Prince George’s County detective reported the purchase of methadone from the young operator of a Pontiac Firebird belonging to her father (Robinson).

A month later the State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County filed a petition praying the forfeiture of the vehicle as authorized by § 297, supra. Answering the petition, Robinson denied the allegations and, averring the unconstitutionality of § 297, prayed the dismissal of the petition. In addition to the Pontiac Firebird the State’s Attorney prayed the forfeiture of a 1969 Opel belonging to Norma Jean Houghton. The record provides neither the details of the seizure nor the nature of her defense.

We shall assume, however, that she took the same tack and averred the unconstitutionality of § 297. The chancellor found merit in only one of the several ⁴⁹³ grounds put to him by Robinson and in this regard he said, in part: “The Court of Appeals has recognized the general rule that under the doctrine of separation of powers, the law-making function is assigned exclusively to the Legislature, and any attempt to abdicate it in any particular field is unconstitutional, Pressman v. Barnes, 121 A. 2d 816 , 209 Md. 544 (1955). There the Court said: “ ‘Generally, a statute or ordinance vesting discretion in administrative officials without fixing any standards for their guidance is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. But we also hold, as a qualification of the general rule, that where the discretion to be exercised relates to police regulations for the protection of public morals, health, safety, or general welfare, and it is impracticable to fix standards without destroying the flexibility necessary to enable the administrative officials to carry out the legislative will, legislation delegating such discretion without such restrictions may be valid.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Id. 209 Md. at 555 . “It certainly would not have been feasible for the Legislature in enacting Section 297 to spell out every situation where the authorities should or should not forfeit a vehicle and for that very reason they delegated authority to decide whether a vehicle should be forfeited, however, the Legislature has, by empowering local authorities to exercise discretion, indicated that it is not its wish that all vehicles, not subject to the stated exceptions, be forfeited; and it has given no indication of what criteria should be employed.

Was it the Legislature’s wish that Mr. Marshall’s standard of ‘absolute innocence’ ⁴⁹⁴ of the owner of the vehicle be used or would the Legislature prefer the Prince George’s County Police Departments’ guidelines, whatever they might be? There is no way of knowing the answer. * * * “The defect of Section 297 is that the fundamental policy of when the statute should be utilized is not provided for, there is no indicium of what the legislative will is. This fundamental policy decision cannot be abdicated by the Legislature.” On 2 March 1972 the chancellor adjudged § 297 to be unconstitutional and ordered the return of the Pontiac to Robinson. On 3 March he ordered the return of the Opel to Miss Houghton.

About three weeks thereafter this appeal was noted. On the next day the chancellor and counsel agreed that the fair market value of the Pontiac was $1,595, and in respect of the Opel, $2,000. Pursuant to an order passed the same day counsel for the County deposited these sums in the registry of the court. In this Court Robinson, for the most part, puts his trust in the opinion of the chancellor, the relevant portion of which we have set forth above.

He goes on to argue that § 297 is “hopelessly standardless,” that there are no rules laid down “to guide or restrain the power conferred on” the State’s Attorney, that there is nothing to “inform the citizen under what terms and conditions his automobile may be forfeited or returned.” The absence of guidelines or standards, he says, leaves it “entirely to his untrammeled discretion whether to retain the automobile or return the same.” That the State’s Attorney, for whatever reason, might fail to move in either direction, i.e., to forfeit or to return, is not argued. That, however, is not before us. Here the motion for forfeiture was filed just about one month after seizure and, for bureaucracy, that seems to be quite reasonable expedition. ⁴⁹⁵ In Commercial Credit Corp. v. State of Maryland, 258 Md. 192 , 265 A. 2d 748 (1970), we dealt with the predecessor of § 297 (Code [1967 Repl. Vol.], Art. 27, § 301).

There we held that the Legislature intended the proviso (in § 301) that “no vehicle shall be forfeited . . . unless the owner thereof authorized or permitted such use or employment” to embrace “innocent conditional vendors.” It was not suggested in Commercial Credit that the apparently unlimited discretion of the State’s Attorney to forfeit or not to forfeit had been, in any way, erosive of § 301. A month or so after our decision in Commercial Credit Chapter 403 of the Laws of 1970 took effect, repealing §§ 276 through 313D of Art. 27 and substituting in lieu thereof §§ 276 through 302 under a new subheading, “Health-Controlled Dangerous Substances.” Patterned after legislation proposed by the United States Department of Justice, Chap. 403 substituted § 297 for § 301 making more rigorous and less flexible the provisions in respect of forfeiture. In Prince George’s County, Maryland v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 659-60 , 284 A. 2d 203 (1971), we held that the innocence of the owner of the forfeited vehicle is of no consequence. Judge Digges, for the Court, said: “In the present action the County does not argue that Blue Bird is a culpable party.

But that is insignificant, for in Maryland under the applicable statute at the time of this seizure, lack of complicity by the owner, unless rescued by the stated exceptions in the law, is not a defense and in fact it makes no difference whether there is any conviction of a crime related to those seized goods. It is interesting to note that prior to July 1, 1970 the law in Maryland was contrary to the general view. Code (1957, 1967 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 301 stated in part: “ *. . . [A] ny motor vehicle or other vehicle, vessel or aircraft used or employed in the concealment, conveying or transporting of any such narcotic drug, or used dur ⁴⁹⁶ ing the course of any violation of this subtitle by any person or persons convicted of the same, shall upon the conviction or convictions be declared by the court to be forfeited to the county or to Baltimore City, as the case may be; provided that no vehicle shall be forfeited hereunder unless the owner thereof authorized or permitted such use or employment.’ (Emphasis added.) This Court accepted that statutory mandate in Commercial Credit Corp. v. State, 258 Md. 192, 203 , 265 A. 2d 748 (1970), where we said: ‘The purpose of Code, Art. 27, § 301, supra, is to deter violations of the narcotics laws but not at the expense of innocent persons.’ This conclusion as well as the holding in that case is no longer operative.

Commercial Credit was decided on May 12, 1970, but effective July 1 of that year the Legislature, by Ch. 403, Laws of Maryland 1970, repealed Art. 27, §§ 276-313D and enacted a new law on Health — Controlled Dangerous Substances which more closely aligned the forfeiture provisions to the historical concepts of deodand.” Judge Digges went on to say: “The general tenor of Blue Bird’s