Prioleau v. State

MURPHY, J. In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a jury convicted Maurice Darryl Prioleau, Petitioner, of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and several related violations of the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act. The State’s evidence was sufficient to establish that he committed those offenses on March 28, 2005. Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgments in Prioleau v. State, 179 Md.App. 19 , 943 A.2d 696 (2008). Petitioner then requested that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to address the following question: Was the question “What’s up, Maurice?” the functional equivalent of interrogation under all the circumstances of this case, where the question was posed by a police officer standing in the doorway of a stash house the suspect had been seen using, and was directed toward a handcuffed suspect who had just been arrested by another officer nearby and brought back to the stash house?

That request was granted. 405 Md. 290 , 950 A.2d 828 (2008). For the reasons that follow, we hold that the words at issue did not constitute the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Background Detective Timothy Stach was the only witness who testified at the suppression hearing. 1 The Court of Special Appeals provided the following summary of the Detective’s testimony: ⁶³³ On March 28, 2005, Baltimore City Police Detective Timothy Stach and his partner Officer Jenkins were conducting a covert surveillance of the 1600 block of Regester Street. Det.

Stach testified that, at about 6:00 p.m., he observed an Acura automobile pull to the curb. An individual, whom the detective recognized as Maurice Prioleau, [Petitioner], got out of the Acima and jogged to 1614 Regester Street. Det. Stach watched as [Petitioner] took out a clear plastic bag and tossed it onto the front steps of the house at that address.

Det. Stach was using 10 by 50 binoculars at the time and could see small vials inside the plastic bag. The detective opined at the hearing as an expert in the packaging, distribution, and identification of controlled dangerous substances that the bag contained cocaine. Det.

Stach saw [Petitioner] walk around the corner at the end of the block. The detective then saw a man, later identified as Keith Evans, walk up to the house at 1614 Regester Street to retrieve the bag. Det. Stach watched Evans distribute the contents of the bag to several individuals who had followed him.

Those individuals walked away after the transactions. Evans continued to pace Regester Street, distributing items from the bag to individuals who approached him. [Petitioner] appeared and walked with Evans south on Regester Street toward Federal Street. [Petitioner] turned onto Federal Street, while Evans continued to distribute the contents of the bag to additional individuals along Regester Street. Det. Stach recalled that, at about 4:20 p.m., [Petitioner] returned.

He entered 1610 Regester Street, and, after one minute, emerged with another bag of suspected cocaine. [Petitioner] gave the bag to Evans, who resumed his routine ⁶³⁴ of strolling back and forth on Regester Street, engaging in “hand-to-hand transactions” with individuals who approached. Det. Stach alerted Officer David Crites, who was at the police station, that he believed he was witnessing “narcotics activity,” and [Petitioner] and Evans were “working in tandem.” Officer Crites responded to the scene, driving a marked police vehicle. Officer Crites saw Evans walking northbound toward the house at 1608 Regester Street and handing off the bag to an unknown person at that address.

Officer Crites arrested Evans. Det. Stach and Officer Jenkins emerged from their undercover observation position and joined Officer Crites. Det.

Stach instructed Officer Crites to “go get [Petitioner].” Det. Stach then escorted Evans into the house at 1610 Regester Street. The detective testified that there were numerous torn clear plastic bags on the floor, indicating drug activity in the house. Meanwhile, Officer Crites located [Petitioner], arrested him, and placed him in the cruiser.

Officer Crites then drove to the front of 1610 Regester Street and removed [Petitioner] from the vehicle. [Petitioner] was reluctant to move, so Officer Crites employed a “wrist lock” and walked [Petitioner] up to the entrance of the house. As Officer Crites appeared at the front door of 1610 Regester Street with [Petitioner], Det. Stach was standing there. He said to [Petitioner]: “What’s up, Maurice?” [Petitioner] then said: “I’m not going in that house.

I’ve never been in that house.” Det. Stach testified that his words to [Petitioner] were “not a question on anything that has to do with illegal activity.” He stated, moreover, that [Petitioner] appeared very agitated and nervous when he “blurted out” those words. Det. Stach acknowledged that [Petitioner] was under arrest by the time he was brought to the house....

Inside 1610 Regester Street, the police recovered a handgun with live rounds in it and three plastic bags containing ⁶³⁵ 25 clear vials of cocaine, all of which had been stashed above the ceiling tiles. The police searched [Petitioner] incident to his arrest and recovered $210.00 [from Petitioner’s person]. 179 Md.App. at 22-24 , 943 A.2d at 698-99 (footnotes omitted). The record shows that the following transpired during Detective Stach’s direct examination: [STATE’S ATTORNEY:] And when you observed [Petitioner] being brought up to the house, could you explain his demeanor and his tone when he was making the statements to you? [DETECTIVE STACH:] Oh, he was very agitated, nervous and he, again, he blurted out, as I said, “Hi, Maurice,” to him, “I’m not going in that house. I was never in that house.” The following transpired during Detective Stach’s cross-examination: [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] And when [Petitioner] was brought back by Officer Grites, was he free to leave at that time? [DETECTIVE STACH:] No, he was under arrest. [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] He was under arrest at that time? [DETECTIVE STACH:] Yes, at my direction. [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] And did you read [Petitioner] his Miranda rights at that time? [DETECTIVE STACH:] No, I did not. [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] And are you aware of whether Officer Crites did? [DETECTIVE STACH:] No, I do not believe so.

I don’t know. [Petitioner] was never questioned. [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] Well, you asked him what was up, didn’t you? [DETECTIVE STACH:] That’s not a question on anything that has to deal with illegal activity. ⁶³⁶ [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] I’m not asking you that[.] [DETECTIVE STACH:] I did ask him what was up. [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] And after [Petitioner] blurted out [that] he didn’t want to go into the house, I assume that’s when the arrest and control technique was used; is that correct? [DETECTIVE STACH:] He was escorted in. I asked [Officer Crites] to bring him in. We needed him in the house. I didn’t want one officer outside, one officer inside and then me looking around the house with three suspects, three Defendants [in there with me]. [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] Detective, I asked you[,] was that before or after he blurted it, the statement out. [DETECTIVE STACH:] He was put into the house after he blurted out the statement, he was brought into the house. [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] And it’s my understanding from your testimony that nobody asked [Petitioner] any questions except you? [DETECTIVE STACH:] I said, “What’s up, Maurice?” That’s a question, yes, ma’am. [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] And that’s when he blurted the statement out? [DETECTIVE STACH:] That’s when he stated, “I’m not going in that house.

I haven’t been in that house.” Yes, ma’am. [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] And after that, were there any other questions that were asked of him? [DETECTIVE STACH:] Not by me. ⁶³⁷ The following transpired at the conclusion of Detective Stach’s testimony: [PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:] Your Honor, I’m just going to submit. Thank you very much. THE COURT: Okay. [STATE’S ATTORNEY:] Your Honor, I just simply argue that the statement that was made wasn’t really ... in response to an interrogation, therefore Miranda didn’t really apply at that time. It was a statement that was blurted out and I don’t think it should be suppressed.

And as far as the money that was recovered off of [Petitioner], it was [a] search incident to arrest and there was probable cause based on the facts that Your Honor heard. THE COURT: Okay, based on the evidence before the Court, the Court is satisfied that there was compliance with the Constitution of Maryland. Also, the Court is further satisfied that the law of the State is that an interrogation is where the officer expressly ask[s] an individual a question or employ[s] any word or act that the officer should [have] know[n][was] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The evidence before the Court establishes that the comments by Detective[ ] Stach amounted to merely an exchange of greetings [under] the case law [of] [Rhode Island v.] Innis, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 [(1980)], [and] ... [State v.] Conover, 312 Md. 33 [ 537 A.2d 1167 (1988)].

Also, the law of the State is [that] volunteered] statements or blurts that are not the product of an interrogation, [do] not trigger Miranda warnings. The Motion to Suppress ... the statements [is] considered and denied. The State’s case-in-chief included the testimony that Petitioner sought to suppress. ⁶³⁸ Standard of Review The following standard of review is applicable to a case in which a petitioner argues that this Court should reverse the denial of a motion to suppress his or her inculpatory statement: In reviewing a circuit court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we ordinarily consider only the evidence contained in the record of the suppression hearing. State v. Tolbert, 381 Md. 539, 548 , 850 A.2d 1192, 1197 (2004); State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207 , 821 A.2d 439, 443-44 (2003); White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 249 , 821 A.2d 459, 469 (2003).

The factual findings of the suppression court and its conclusions regarding the credibility of testimony are accepted unless clearly erroneous. Tolbert, 381 Md. at 548 , 850 A.2d at 1197 . We review the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id.; Rucker, 374 Md. at 207 , 821 A.2d at 444 ; White, 374 Md. at 249 , 821 A.2d at 469 .

We “undertake our own independent constitutional appraisal of the record by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the present case.” Tolbert, 381 Md. at 548 , 850 A.2d at 1197 ; White, 374 Md. at 249 , 821 A.2d at 469 . Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 82-83 , 939 A.2d 689, 697 (2008). Discussion In the case at bar, it is clear that (1) Petitioner was “in custody” when he made the inculpatory statement, 2 and (2) none of the exceptions to the requirements of Miranda v. ⁶³⁹ Arizona are applicable. 3 Petitioner was therefore entitled to suppression of the statement at issue if that statement resulted from either actual interrogation or the junctional equivalent of interrogation. We hold, however, that Petitioner was subjected to neither.

As to whether “What’s up, Maurice?” constituted actual interrogation, 4 it is very well settled that not every question constitutes “interrogation” of a suspect who is in custody when the question is asked. As the Supreme Court of Indiana has stated: The term “interrogation” has been defined as a process of questioning by law enforcement officials which lends itself to obtaining incriminating statements. Escobedo v. Illinois, (1964), 378 U.S. 478, 485 , 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1762 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 986 . Not every statement uttered by a police officer which is punctuated with a question mark will necessarily constitute an interrogation....

Rather, it is necessary to view the statement in the context in which it was made. Johnson v. State, 269 Ind. 370 , 380 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (1978). While the Miranda warnings must precede questions directed to the issue of whether a suspect who is in custody has engaged in and/or has knowledge of criminal activity, a classic example of a question that does not constitute “interrogation contemplated by Miranda ” is a question that asks the defendant, “Do you understand your (Miranda) ⁶⁴⁰ rights?” Richardson v. State, 6 Md.App. 448, 452 , 251 A.2d 924, 927 (1969), cert. denied 255 Md. 743 (1969). In Richardson , an appellant who had been convicted of rape and related offenses argued that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the State’s evidence included statements attributed to him while he was being asked questions to determine whether he understood his Miranda rights.

After the appellant had been placed under arrest, he was advised of his rights by a detective who read from a “Miranda card” that was introduced into evidence. 5 That card contained four questions to be asked of the defendant after he or she had received the advise required by Miranda: Do you understand your rights and what I have just explained to you? Are you willing to make a statement without a lawyer present at this time? Do you understand and know what you are doing? Have any promises, threats or inducements been made to pressure or coerce you into making this statement?

Id. at 450 n. 1, 251 A.2d at 926 n. 1. The suppression hearing court accepted the following testimony of the arresting officer. After he had read to appellant the Miranda rights contained on the card, and while he was asking appellant the questions contained on the card, appellant stated, “I did not rape that girl. She gave in to me voluntarily.” While rejecting the appellant’s contention that his statement should have been suppressed, the Court of Special Appeals stated: In the case at bar, there can be no question that the appellant was in police custody at the time the statement was given; but it is equally clear that the statement was not the result of “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers [quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)].” ...

It is apparent that the appellant simply interrupted the officer and “blurt ⁶⁴¹ ed out” or “volunteered” the statement. The officer had not asked him any questions concerning the crimes for which he was arrested; interrogation, in the sense contemplated by Miranda , had not begun. Id. at 452 , 251 A.2d at 926 -27. Cases holding that not every question constitutes “interrogation” include United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 502 (7th Cir.1999), in which an appellant who had been convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute argued that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the government’s evidence included his post-arrest statements made after he had been asked whether he “would like to assist in different avenues of investigation that [you] could help us on[?]” Id. at 506 .

On June 16, 1997, the appellant was arrested for driving without a valid license, crack cocaine was discovered in the trunk of the vehicle he had been driving, and a vial containing crack cocaine was found under the seat of the patrol car in which he had been placed before being transported to police headquarters. On June 17,1997, the appellant (1) was removed from his cell by a detective of the East St. Louis Police Department (the detective) and advised of his Miranda rights, (2) stated that he would not make a statement unless a lawyer was present, and (3) was returned to his cell. On June 18, 1997, upon learning that the appellant had been arrested, an agent of the Illinois State Police (the agent) requested that the detective bring the appellant to an interview room where the agent requested that the appellant assist the officers in their investigation of the appellant’s supplier. The statements at issue were made as the appellant was being returned to his cell.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois ruled that the appellant was not entitled to suppression of those statements. While affirming that ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided the following factual background: During the interview, ... [the agent] explained to Jackson that he was not concerned with any of the details of Jackson’s arrest of June 16, 1997. [The agent] also advised Jackson that ... he [(the agent)] had knowledge that [the ⁶⁴² appellant] had sold crack cocaine on two separate occasions to an undercover officer. [The agent] also told [the appellant] that he was not interested in obtaining any statement from him and that he was a “little fish” who could help the police catch his supplier.... [The appellant] stated that he would call [the agent] upon his release. [The agent’s] conversation with [the appellant] lasted approximately twenty minutes____As [the detective] escorted [the appellant] back to his cell, [the appellant] mentioned to [the detective] that after speaking to [the agent] he realized “that he was in a lot of trouble. He stated that he wanted to clear up an earlier matter of the traffic stop in the park.” ... During the ensuing conversation, [the appellant] volunteered information to [the detective] concerning the June 16 traffic stop, none of which related to [the agent’s] narcotics distribution investigation.

Jackson stated that the bag of crack found in the trunk of [the] car [he had been driving immediately prior to his arrest] was his and took responsibility for placing the cocaine vial beneath the seat of the squad car. Id. at 505-06 (footnote omitted). After citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 678 , 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2096 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), (in which the United States Supreme Court held that, even if a suspect invokes his or her right to counsel when interrogated with respect to a particular investigation, the investigating officers “are free to inform the suspect of the facts of the second investigation as long as such communication does not constitute interrogation”), the Jackson Court stated: When [the agent] explained to Jackson that ... he knew that [the appellant] had sold crack cocaine to the undercover office on two occasions in April, he was “informing the suspect of the facts of the second investigation,” Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687 , 108 S.Ct. at 2101 , and soliciting Jackson’s assistance if he was willing to give it after he was released from jail. [The agent] also told [the appellant] that he had no interest in obtaining a statement from him. With respect to the constitutional claim that Jackson has raised concerning his interview with [the agent], in view of the fact ⁶⁴³ that [the agent] did not ask any questions of Jackson concerning the traffic stop on June 16, 1997, and since [the agent] advised Jackson of the fact that the only reason he was speaking with him was to solicit his help in an ongoing drug investigation after he was freed from jail, [the agent’s] meeting with Jackson should not be considered an interrogation. “An accused, ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,