Provident Trust Co. v. Massey

Digges, J\, delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Cecil County, in favor of the appellee in the sum of twenty-seven hundred and fifty dollars, the suit having been removed to that ¡court from the Circuit Court of Kent County. The appellant is The Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia, executoij in Maryland of the will of Ella M. Oopperfield, and the appellee is E. Thomas Massey. The suit was brought by the appellee to recover for services rendered Ella M. Oopperfield djuring her lifetime, said services being the supeiwising of her farm in Cecil County, Maryland, for eleven years from 190,9 to 1919, inclusive.

Ella M. Oopperfield, before her marriage, was Ella Massey, the daughter and only surviving child of George Olam ³⁷ Massey. She inherited from her father, who died in 1909, a farm containing about six hundred acres, located in Cecil County, Maryland. She was twenty-four years old at the time of her father’s death, and about nine months thereafter married Earl M. Copperfield, and lived with him in the City of Philadelphia up to the time of his death, which occurred in August, 1920. She did not long survive her husband, her death taking place in 'December of the same year.

The appellee, E. Thomas Massey, is an uncle of Ella M. Copperfield, being her father’s brother, and lives in Kent County, being cashier of The Peoples’ National Bank of Ohestertown, and engaged in the insurance, seed and fertilizer business. He also supervised and managed farms belonging to different members of the Massey family, that of his sister, Mary Massey, his own, and his mother’s. Shortly after the death of his brother, Ceorge Olam Massey, he took over the management of the farm belonging then to Ella Massey, afterwards Ella M. Copperfield. Tt is services rendered in this connection for which compensation is claimed.

In August, 1911, Ella M. Copperfield executed a power of attorney to the appellee, in which power was given him to manage her property and collect rents and profits arising therefrom, and under which power of attorney the appellee continued the care of Mrs. Oopperfield’s farm, supervised and generally managed it, the management and supervision consisting of leasing or renting the farm to tenants on shares, disposing of the landlord’s share of the produce, collecting the proceeds therefrom, and doing generally those things which an owner of farm property would do. This relationship continued to exist until Mrs. Copperfield sold the farm to Mr. Steele in the year 1920, the purchaser getting the grain crop sown in 1919. In connection with the management of the farm the appellee supervised the construction of a barn or stable thereon, costing about twenty-eight hundred dollars, to replace one which had burned. The declaration contains the money counts, and accompanying it is the cause of action, consisting of an account for services rendered in the supervision and management of the ³⁸ said farm in each of the years beginning with 1900 and ending with 1919, the said account setting out generally in each year the character of the services and the amount due therefor.

The aggregate amount, according to said account, being-thirty hundred and thirty dollars, and being sworn to by the appellee. The defendant pleaded the general issue plea, and after-wards filed pleas of limitation. These pleas of limitation, upon motion of the plaintiff, after -argument were rejected by the court. Issue was then j o-ined on the defendant’s general issue pleas and the case tried by a jury on September 26th, 1923.

During the- progress of the trial the appellant reserved six exceptions- to- the rulings of the- court on the testimony, three of which were abandoned during the- argument in this court, and only the fourth, fifth and sixth urged by the- appellant. At the clo-se of the plaintiff’s testimony the defendant offered a prayer to take the case- from the jury, which was refused by the court. The defendant offered no- testimony. The plaintiff then offered five prayers, the first, third and fifth of which were granted and the other two rejected.

The defendant offered four prayers, the second and third of which were granted, and the other two- rejected. The defendant filed special exceptions to the granting of the plaintiff’s first and fifth prayers, which were overruled by the court. The- ruling of the court in granting the plaintiff’s first, third and fifth prayers, and overruling the defendant’s special exceptions to the plaintiff’s first and fifth prayers, and refusing the defendant’s first and fourth prayers, constitutes the seventh bill of exception. We will first examine and pass upon the exceptions taken to- the rulings of the court on the evidence.

The fourth and fifth exceptions will be considered together; they grow out of the refusal to- sustain objections by the defendant to questions asked the witness Perkins. Mr. Perkins had previously testified that he lived in Ches- tertown; that his business is being executor and administrator ³⁹ of estates, selling’ securities, and bonds; that at the time of testifying he was winding up the affairs of the Second National Bank; that he also had been managing farms for about ten or twelve years; that by managing farms he meant taking the place of the owner and giving the farm generally such supervision as would be given by the owner; that during the ten or twelve years he had been managing farms that the greatest number managed in any one year was sixteen and the lowest ten; that these farms managed by him during that period of time were located in Kent and Cecil Counties; that he knew the Copperfield farm and had been on it once; that he knew the general location of the farm and the conditions in that locality; that he was familiar with what was required of a person occupying the plaintiff’s position in respect to the management of farms; that at the time of testifying the witness was managing four farms in Cecil County, and that the same general condition as to roads, water transportation, telephone and other facilities as to the management of a farm existed in the locality of the Copperfield farm, as existed in the neighborhood where the farms that he was then managing were located; that the distance from the Copperfield farm to those the witness was managing ranged from four to nine miles. The witness was then asked: “Q. Mr. Perkins, have you heard all the testimony in this case ? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are von able to state from what you hefard, from all the testimony and from your experience in handling real estate, what the services from Mr. Massey were i*eason-ably worth annually ?” To the latter question, upon objection by the defendant being overruled, the defendant excepted, constituting the fourth bill of exception. The witness then answered, “Yes, sir.” “Q. Please state what in your judgment the services of Mr. Massey were reasonably worth in the period described in the testimony annually?” To which question the defendant also objected, .and upon the court overruling the objection, the defendant excepted, and this constitutes the fifth bill of exception. The basis of objection to these two questions is that the witness Perkins was not qualified to testify. ⁴⁰ We do not think the lower court erred in permitting these questions and answers, under the authority of the decisions of this Court in the cases of Wallace v. Schaub, 81 Md. 594 ; Doyle v. Gibson, 119 Md. 36 ; and State v. Phillinger, 142 Md. 365 . The witness here was a man of large business, and with special experience in the supervision and management of farm property, not only in Kent County where he lived, but also in Cecil County within a few miles of the Copperfield farm.

This experience extended over a period of ten or twelve years, during which period he managed from ten to sixteen farms annually. He knew the farm in question and the general conditions surrounding the management of like property in that locality. He was fully acquainted with the service required of a man occupying the position of the plaintiff in this case, and in addition thereto had heard during the progress of the trial numerous witnesses detail the service rendered by Mr. Massey. We think under this condition that the witness was qualified to express an opinion as to the reasonable worth of the service rendered by the plaintiff.

The cases of Carlin v. Biddison, 135 Md. 458 ; Giering v. Sauer, 120 Md. 295 ; Western Md. Rwy. Co. v. Jacques, 129 Md. 400 ; and Dashiell v. Jacoby, 142 Md. 330 , are not in conflict with this view. It follows from what we have said in reference to the fourth and fifth exceptions that the court below committed no error in refusing to strike out the whole of the witness Perkins’ testimony, which was the 'basis of the sixth exception. The rejected prayers of tire defendant were as follows: Defendant's- First Prayer. — “The jury are instructed that there is no evidence in the case legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover and the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant.

Defendant's FouHh Prayer. — The jury are instructed that there is no evidence in the case legally sufficient under the pleadings to establish a contract express or implied between ⁴¹ the plaintiff and the said Ella M. Oopperfield, and their verdict must be for the defendant.” These prayers constitute a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence. As repeatedly stated by this court, the legal effect of such prayers is to admit the truth of the plaintiff’s, evidence, and every inference properly deductible therefrom, but to deny their legal sufficiency under the pleading to entitle the plaintiff to recover. These prayers were properly rejected. E. Thomas Massey was an uncle, a blood relative, of the decedent, but they were not members of the same family; and there arises no presumption that the services were gratuitous.

The appellee lived in C'hestertown, Maryland, while Ella M. Oopperfield lived with her husband, in the City of Philadelphia, from 1909 to 1920, the time of his death. This was the whole period during: which the services were rendered and for which compensation is claimed. Their domestic associations did not involve the usual incidents of family relationship. Neudecker v. Leister, 132 Md. 574 ; Elosser v. Fletcher, 126 Md. 244 ; Giering v. Sauer, 120 Md. 302 ; Fearre v. Smith, 110 Md. 534 ; Wallace v. Schaub, supra.

As between persons not members of the same family the rendition of useful services by one to the other furnishes prima facie evidence of their acceptance and, in the absence of some' proof to the contrary, will create an obligation on the part of the recipient to pay an amount equal to the reasonable value of such services. Spencer v. Trafford, 42 Md. 20 ; Bixler v. Sellman, 77 Md. 494 ; Wallace v. Schaub, supra; Giering v. Sauer, supra. There is