Pumphrey v. Pumphrey

Murphy, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant wife and appellee husband separated on April 12, 1958. On January 9, 1962 they entered into a separation agreement which, among other things, made provision for the support, maintenance, and education of three minor male children of the parties. By decree dated February 5, 1962 the appellant was divorced a vinculo matrimonii from appellee; the decree provided that the separation agreement be incorporated therein by reference “as if the same were set forth in haec verba.” 1 In paragraph two of the agreement, the appellee ²⁸⁹ agreed to pay to appellant for the support and maintenance of three of their minor children, therein named, the sum of $250 monthly for each child, “said payments to continue until any one of said named children reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years or becomes self-supporting, and upon any such child reaching the age of twenty-one (21) years or becoming self-supporting, the payment for such child shall cease.” In paragraph three of the agreement the appellee agreed to pay, in addition to the amounts in paragraph two, college tuition and expenses for each of the named minor children, with the proviso that should any of the children be attending college after the age of twenty-one, appellee would continue to pay the tuition and expenses for that child’s education.

The parties’ nineteen year old son, Robert, attending college in Minnesota, married on January 17, 1970. Shortly thereafter, appellee petitioned the court for modification of the divorce decree by eliminating the monthly payment of $250 for Robert’s support and maintenance. He claimed that by reason of his marriage, Robert had “emancipated himself from the home,” and the payment was no longer required under the decree. Appellee ceased making the payment.

Appellant promptly filed a petition to attach appellee for contempt, claiming that under the agreement she was entitled to $250 monthly for Robert’s support and maintenance, and to tuition and expenses for his college education, notwithstanding that he had married, because he was neither twenty-one years old nor self-supporting, and was in college. The court, acting upon appellee’s petition for modification, held that the evidence showed that Robert was not yet twenty-one; that he whas married and living away from home with his wife; and that he was “clearly emancipated by marriage.” It then concluded: “* * *A careful reading of said Agreement in its entirety clearly indicates to the Court that ²⁹⁰ the purpose was to provide for the support and maintenance of the children of the parties so long as they continued under the supervision and control of their parents. Additionally, it is extremely doubtful that this Court could Order that the defendant father pay for the support of an emancipated child regardless of any agreement (Borchert v. Borchert, 185 Md. 586 ). Finally, an Equity Court need not ratify or follow a contractual agreement between parents for support of minor children (Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285 ), and Equity Courts will not enforce such agreements when support is not reasonably necessary.” From the court’s order modifying its decree by suspending the monthly payment for Robert’s support and maintenance, appellant has taken this appeal.

She claims that the court misconstrued the agreement — that had the agreement “intended to terminate support of the minor children upon emancipation, it would have said so.” A separation agreement being a contract between the parties is subject to the same general rules governing other contracts, and particular questions must be resolved by reference to the particular language of the agreement. Heinmuller v. Heinmuller, 257 Md. 672, 676 . Thus, where a contract is plain as to its meaning, there is no room for construction and it must be presumed that the parties meant what they expressed. Devereux v. Berger, 253 Md. 264 .

In considering the applicability of this rule, “ [w] ords will be given their ordinary meaning when nothing appears to show that they are used in a different sense, and no unreasonable or absurd consequences will result from doing so. Words chosen by the contracting parties should not be unnaturally forced beyond their ordinary meaning, or given a curious, hidden sense which nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity of a trained and acute mind can discover.” Highley v. Phillips, 176 Md. 463, 471-472 . ²⁹¹ While Robert's marriage may have emancipated him from parental control (see 8 Md. L. Rev. 71 ), it did not make him “self-supporting” within the ordinary sense of that term, as used in paragraph 2 of the agreement. 2 Marriage, majority, and self-support may come at nearly the